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ABSTRACT 
Higdon, Kevin Paul (Ph.D., Aerospace Engineering Sciences) 
A Systematic Process for Assessing Human Spacecraft Designs in Terms of Relative Safety and 
Operational Characteristics 
 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor, David M. Klaus, Ph.D. 
 
  The research efforts in this dissertation are focused on reducing uncertainty in the 
conceptual design phase through a process of establishing a minimum functionality baseline 
before trading Safety and Operability in proposed spacecraft configurations.  The challenge in 
human spacecraft development is how to combine the parts into a working design that complies 
with many requirements for top level mission objectives, safety, and mission success.  The 
design methodologies presented here provides designers and decision makers with additional 
methods that provide an overall view of candidate design concepts.  
 This work establishes a definition for a minimum functional design and is the first to 
group the fundamental mass parameters of a human spacecraft in the categories of Physics, 
Physiology, Safety, and Operability.  The minimum functional baseline configuration described 
in this work is different from previous approaches because it eliminates the bias toward a 
minimum set of requirements.  The amount of Safety in the spacecraft is the mass dedicated to 
safety through similar or dissimilar redundancy, safety components, margins, and dispersions.  
The amount of Operability in the spacecraft is the mass used to perform mission objectives and 
make functions easier or efficient.  Because human spacecraft are highly coupled systems, the 
introduction of mass in one subsystem has downstream effects on other subsystems that are not 
easily recognized by designers and the use of rapidly reconfigurable prototypes allows designers 
iv 
 
and multidisciplinary teams to utilize Boundary Objects as a means of communication for 
maturing designs.  The mass addition process coupled with the minimum functionality approach 
creates a tradespace of spacecraft configurations and provides designers with an overall view of 
how various levels of Safety or Operability will affect the overall spacecraft mass.  The decisions 
made in the conceptual design phase are critical to the success of the program and uncertainty 
can lead to unnecessary redesign in later phases.  The previous methods can be combined into a 
conceptual design process that couples easily with typical industry approaches to human 
spacecraft development.  The use of minimum functionality as a precursor to more conventional 
approaches allows the spacecraft configuration to take shape before detailed CAD and higher 
fidelity analyses. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Historically, the development of human spacecraft has followed an approach that 
develops low-volume and high-cost designs for a given or preferred spaceflight mission.  Human 
spacecraft are especially unique because the amount of development and cost is often driven by 
the need to simultaneously meet a host of requirements to meet performance and mission 
objectives while at the same time balancing objectives such as risk and safety.  Because of the  
large number of requirements typically associated with human spacecraft, a critical need in the 
early stages of conceptual development are standardized and repeatable processes for trading 
performance, safety, and operational objectives in a conceptual design process that can be easily 
implemented by spacecraft designers.   
 The research presented in this dissertation builds upon previous conceptual design 
approaches to introduce a new design methodology focused on the early conceptual design phase 
of human spacecraft.  Because the conceptual design phase is characterized by a large amount of 
uncertainty (Jilla and Miller, 2004), the approach described here provides valuable information 
to designers in the early conceptual design phase such that informed decisions can be made as to 
the expected risk and performance of the spacecraft in later stages of development.  The context 
of this approach is focused on the spacecraft designer, of which this author has firsthand 
experience and has learned many valuable lessons associated with the design, development, and 
integration of human spacecraft. 
2 
 
 The challenge in human spacecraft development is creating a system that meets a large 
number of requirements in order to carry out the spaceflight mission.  The spacecraft must 
transport the crew to a particular destination and return, keep the crew alive, keep the crew safe, 
and perform the mission operation objectives.  Because many unknowns exist during the concept 
exploration phase, the design approach is typically unstructured with design teams pursuing 
single design point options.  A standardized approach that allows designers to investigate a wider 
range of options in conceptual design is needed such that potential problems can be avoided in 
later phases.  As observed in the development of the Orion spacecraft, unrealistic assumptions 
made during the early phases created problems in later stages of the design and forced a 
complete redefinition of the spacecraft in order to achieve mass and performance objectives (Hu 
et al., 2008). 
 A human spacecraft must perform many independent tasks during a spaceflight mission.  
The mass associated with performing the tasks can be grouped into four fundamental parameters.  
These parameters are associated with transporting the crew, keeping the crew alive, keeping the 
crew safe, and performing the mission objectives.  The combination of these four fundamental 
mass parameters is the foundation of the design methodology and is expressed as:  
∑ Spacecraft Mass = f (Physics) + f (Physiology) + f (Safety) + f (Operability)            (1) 
                                             ‘non-negotiable’      ‘tradespace’   
 
 The design methodology presented in this dissertation begins with a “Minimum 
Functionality” spacecraft configuration as a baseline for trading Safety and Operability.  The 
minimum functionality design configuration is defined by the required Physics to fly the mission 
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and the Physiological needs of the crew as a lower boundary condition for design exploration, 
iteration, and maturation.  The minimum functionality configuration would never be utilized as a 
realistic ‘flyable’ design because it does not contain mitigations for failures and contingencies.  
However, in an academic sense, it establishes the absolute lowest spacecraft configuration as a 
boundary point for trading of mass, risk and operational objectives.   
 Using the minimum functionality spacecraft configuration as the baseline point of 
departure, the spacecraft configuration tradespace consists of various levels of Safety and 
Operability (or mission objectives) in the spacecraft to evaluate risk and trade mission 
objectives.  The addition of Safety is achieved by adding failure tolerance through similar or 
dissimilar components, safety components, and including factors of safety in components that are 
designed for minimum risk.  The addition of Operability is achieved by adding components 
dedicated for conducting mission operations functions beyond the transportation of crew and 
mitigating contingencies.  Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, the italicized variables 
of Physics, Physiology, Safety and Operability refer to the mass associated with the parameter. 
 In order to trade and evaluate Safety and Operability, two figures of merit: the “Safety 
Index” and “Operability Index” are introduced as metrics for comparing the amount of risk and 
functionality in conceptual spacecraft design configurations.  The Safety Index is not intended to 
replace current reliability or Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) approaches for spacecraft 
design, but is an early tool for designers to understand the impact of mass additions on the Safety 
of the spacecraft and reduce the need for detailed PRA in the early stages of design; when the 
design is changing rapidly and least amount of information is known.  The use of an Operability 
Index provides designers with a metric to evaluate the amount of additional functionality 
associated with a particular spacecraft configuration.  The methods presented in this work will 
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demonstrate a design methodology that can be coupled to existing design processes and 
procedures for reducing risk and increasing safety in conceptual human spacecraft designs. 
 
1.1 CHALLENGES IN CONCEPTUAL HUMAN SPACECRAFT  
 Overcoming uncertainty is the greatest challenge in the development of human 
spacecraft.  Spacecraft designers commonly use proven flight hardware and heuristics combined 
with knowledge and experience to explore the feasibility of potential ideas and concepts.  This 
approach is necessary because human intuition, creativity, and imagination are required in the 
beginning of the design process to foster ideas that can be developed into feasible solutions.  The 
conceptual design phase is also one of the least standardized but perhaps one of the most 
important design phases (Jilla and Miller, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2003).  In the context of a human 
spacecraft design, the need to reduce uncertainty in the early stages is especially important 
because the vehicle will be carrying humans and will operate in a combination of environmental 
conditions that are not easily replicated on the ground.   
 A secondary challenge in the development of human spacecraft is that new aerospace 
vehicles are often designed to “push the envelope”.  The need for new technology development 
is commonly required for the spacecraft to perform the intended mission, but also creates the 
need for additional resources or development time to reduce risk and uncertainty with unknown 
and unproven technology.  Thus, when a spacecraft designer or design team begins to explore an 
idea or concept, they are confronted with the stark reality of “How do I proceed from the mission 
objectives to a realistic spacecraft design?” and “Do we have the existing technology to make it 
work?”  As a spacecraft designer who has struggled with these questions, the first answers are 
very difficult to answer because of the uncertainty in design assumptions.  The methods used to 
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conceive concepts are highly dependent upon the creative skills and experience of designers or 
design teams (Bryant, et al., 2005).   
 Conceptual design concepts must be flexible and adaptable for unforeseen and unknown 
problems.  Spacecraft designers recognize the risk of “locking in” a particular design 
configuration too early and the consequences that can follow in the form of redesign, rework, or 
completely new designs.  Designs must be safe, robust, and reliable; but without the added 
penalty of over-designing the mass through additional complexity.  A common pitfall is to 
optimize concepts during this early phase to specified mass growth margin tables without 
considering flexibility or adaptability as the design matures.  Because spacecraft subsystems are 
highly coupled, additional complexity can be introduced in the form of additional requirements 
creep and misunderstood performance goals (Miller et al., 2008).  
 Perhaps the greatest challenge to spacecraft designers is that in addition to mass, 
performance, and integration uncertainty, a human spacecraft design must meet a minimum 
threshold for risk and reliability in order to fly crew.  The most common method of quantifying a 
“Safe” vehicle is through the use of a PRA (Stamatelatos, 2002).  The safety of a design concept 
is usually attributed to parameters such as the probability of Loss of Crew (LOC) or Loss of 
Mission (LOM).  Tumer et al., (2005) best described the problem with conceptual design and 
risk based design approaches in aerospace applications as: 
“Due to the risky nature of space missions, NASA centers have adopted a variety of 
techniques – developing tools, procedures, and guidelines to mitigate risk.  Most of these 
techniques, however, require significant amounts of detailed and possibly quantitative 
information, making them inapplicable to early stages of design.” (Tumer et al., 2005) 
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 When little information is known about the reliability of the components that make up the 
spacecraft subsystems, assumptions about the targeted reliability of unknown or untested 
components are used as a placeholder until information is gathered through testing or unmanned 
flight tests.  Although this approach provides an initial conservative target for risk, the exact 
calculation of the reliability of a spacecraft is usually done much later after a conceptual design 
has been chosen and the design is moving toward a Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  In 
addition, the early targets for reliability might not be achievable as more information is obtained, 
thus creating the need for redesign or rework within a preferred single design approach. 
 Many different and competing spacecraft concepts and configurations must be explored 
in a timely manner during the conceptual design phase to determine the most feasible solutions.  
In many cases, a single point design is not the most ideal candidate at the end of the conceptual 
design phase (McManus et al., 2004).  Optimizing too early will lead to multiple redesigns when 
additional information is discovered through testing or detailed analysis.  A high fidelity detailed 
analysis of each concept is not the best use of time in this stage (Messac and Mullur, 2008).  
However, a certain level of confidence in the conceptual design must be achieved in order to 
mature the design in the preliminary design phase.  Mass growth after conceptual design can 
either make or break a spacecraft and often incorrect assumptions about the technology, 
integration, and configuration of the spacecraft contribute to mass growth and reduced 
performance (Thompson et al., 2010).   
 Risk management procedures are used to mature the design in order to mitigate issues of 
technical, programmatic, or safety risk.  The limitation of this approach is that it requires 
additional design effort beyond the conceptual design phase to accept risk or force additional 
reliability testing of components if targeted goals are not achievable.  The uncertainty with 
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spacecraft integration can lead to concepts that are “over-designed” while adding a layer of 
unneeded complexity to the entire development process.  The goal of any conceptual design 
activity should be to provide a quality design that will meet the mission objectives and safety 
requirements. 
 
1.1.1 Background and Purpose of Study 
 At the start of this research, the Constellation program was in full swing and NASA was 
busily designing the early concepts for the yet to be named Altair Lunar Lander.  A question 
given to the Bioastronautics group at the University of Colorado was to determine the minimum 
functional mass for a lunar ascent vehicle based on NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture 
Study (ESAS) concepts.  In the fall of 2006, a team of graduate students embarked on the 
development of a full scale Lunar Lander Habitat mockup (Higdon and Klaus, 2008) and human 
spacecraft conceptual design process to perhaps assist NASA or other industry partners with 
design processes and information that would be useful in the development of conceptual human 
spacecraft.  The initial prototyping activity was the beginning of this thesis and helped to shape 
the following research activities.  Over the past 6 years, this research has expanded into a human 
spacecraft design project class and integrated into the Bioastronautics curriculum in the 
Department of Aerospace Engineering Sciences at the University of Colorado. 
 The research described in this work is focused on the conceptual design phase of human 
spacecraft to understand how designers should approach the development of early conceptual 
human spacecraft and the integration of the subsystems and components in order to maximize 
Safety and Operability without over designing the mass through unneeded complexity.  A design 
methodology is presented that enables spacecraft designers to investigate a tradespace in order to 
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minimize total spacecraft mass, increase Safety, and maximize mission Operability.  Four key 
areas of research were investigated to create a design methodology focused on the conceptual 
design of human spacecraft.  These four areas are: 
1) Define a Minimum Functionality design methodology based on the four fundamental 
parameters of Physics, Physiology, Safety, and Operability in human spacecraft designs. 
(Chapter 3) 
2) Examine rapidly reconfigurable physical prototyping methods for defining human factors 
early in the conceptual design and exploring subsystem integration uncertainties. 
(Chapter 4) 
3) Develop mass addition guidelines and tradespace exploration methods to identify regions 
in the objective tradespace for future investigation and concept development. (Chapter 5) 
4) Develop two figures of merit named the “Safety Index” and “Operability Index” for 
comparing spacecraft configurations without knowledge of subsystem and component 
reliabilities. (Chapter 6) 
 
 The combination of these four research activities form a design methodology based on a 
minimum functionality approach in order to explore the highly coupled aspects of a spacecraft 
design, reduce uncertainty in the configuration, and provide much needed information to 
decision makers.   
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1.1.2 Theoretical Framework 
 The design methodology of this research is in agreement with NASA guidelines as 
described in Miller et al. (2008), but the difference in this research compared to the NASA 
practices is “how” designers should approach the problem of conceptual human spacecraft 
development.  Based on practical experience with the development of conceptual designs for 
human spacecraft subsystems, much of the problem in the spacecraft design process is guiding 
spacecraft designers in the early stages and providing an understanding of how design changes 
affect the overall performance, Safety, or Operability.   
 It is commonly known that the conceptual design phase is the most important phase for 
determining the overall cost of a program (NASA, 1995; Adelstein et al., 2006; Miller et al., 
2008).  According to NASA, conceptual designs are offered to demonstrated feasibility and 
support programmatic estimates (NASA, 1995).  However, the processes used in conceptual 
design are often unstructured and not well understood (Jilla and Miller, 2004; Pacheco et al., 
2003).  In addition, the conceptual design phase is difficult to translate into a methodology that is 
useful to both experienced and inexperienced designers (Bryant, et al., 2005).  Because of the 
lack of standardized process and difficulty communicating ideas, the conceptual design phase 
contains many uncertainties (Hastings and McManus, 2004; Chudoba and Huang, 2006; German 
and Daskilewicz, 2009).    
 Predicting mass growth following the conceptual design phase has been a common 
problem for aerospace systems.  Many programs were not as successful due to mass growth, 
technical difficulties, and incorrect assumptions during the conceptual design phase (Thompson 
et al., 2010).  As observed with the recent cancellation of the Constellation program, mass 
growth in Orion and Ares I was attributed with overcoming technical challenges that had not 
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been anticipated in conceptual design (Chaplain, 2008).  During the Apollo program, the Lunar 
Module experienced a 50% growth in mass from the initial conceptual design while the Apollo 
Command and Service Module experienced a 42% increase in mass during its development 
(Kelly, 2001; Thompson et al., 2010).   
 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization is an area of research that develops systematic 
approaches for the design of complex systems governed by interacting physical phenomena 
(Alexandrov, 2005).  When first introduced in the 1990’s, the use of MDO methods for complex 
engineering problems had great promise for solving and optimizing problems.  However, the true 
use of MDO has been limited to mostly researchers and has not been widely used in realistic 
engineering problems (Alexandrov, 2005).  The central challenge in MDO is balancing the use of 
coupled high-fidelity models with the amount of computational time required to generate an 
optimized solution (Messac and Mullur, 2008). 
 Tradespace exploration is a method used to explore the various objectives in order to 
understand the relationship to the design space variables.  According to Ross (2006), tradespace 
exploration in the conceptual design phase may empower designers to overcome challenges 
associated with tendencies to reduce the design space and overlook potential design space 
solutions.  Ross (2006) conducted interviews with industry and learned that broad tradespace 
exploration is rare and often done in an ad hoc manner.   
 The findings by Tumer et al., (2005) describe issues with NASA approaches for 
incorporating risk based design decisions early in the conceptual design process.  An earlier 
NASA report by Knight and Stone (2002) also highlighted many of the needs within NASA for 
risk based design.  Knight and Stone (2002) suggested that risk based design methods make the 
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design process more robust given that a systems-level understanding is incorporated and detailed 
knowledge about the subsystems is utilized.   
 The typical approach used by NASA for understanding risk in the early stage of 
conceptual design is through the use of failure and risk analysis methods.  A common method 
used within NASA to assess risk is PRA.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment was identified as a need 
in 1996 in order to support decisions for Space Shuttle upgrades (Stamatelatos, 2002).  The use 
of PRA identifies what can go wrong, how frequently it will happen, and what are the 
consequences (Tumer et al., 2005).  The issue with PRA is that it requires a significant amount 
of information before a detailed analysis of the risk can be completed.   
 Minimum functionality design is a design approach where a baseline configuration is 
defined before trading other factors in human spacecraft designs.  Minimum functionality 
recently gained attention due to its use by the Altair Lunar Lander project.  The design approach 
for minimum functionality in the development of the Altair Lunar Lander started with a single 
point baseline design point of departure for cost and risk trades in order to justify mass add-backs 
to the subsystems in the form of additional redundancy and safety (Cohen, 2009).  In addition, 
the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle used a similar approach of creating a baseline design with a 
set of minimum functions called the Zero Based Vehicle (ZBV) (Hu et al., 2008).  According to 
NASA’s Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation Considerations for Safe and Reliable 
Human Rated Spacecraft Systems, a minimum functional design is the simplest, most robust, and 
highest performance design option as the starting point for assessing fault tolerance (Miller et al., 
2008).  Much of the confusion between different minimum functionality approaches is how the 
minimum or starting point configuration is defined before trading other aspects of safety, 
reliability, performance, and cost.  
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 A human lunar spacecraft is very much different from other spacecraft designs such as 
capsules and lifting bodies.  Although there are many similarities to conventional Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) operational spacecraft, a lunar spacecraft must operate in a different set of 
environments on the surface of the moon including thermal cycling, radiation, dust, lighting, and 
micrometeoroids (Cohen, 2009).  Significant lessons were learned during the Apollo missions 
that will assist designers in the development of future lunar spacecraft.   
 The Apollo Lunar Module (LM) was conceived, designed, and manufactured by the 
Grumman Corporation (Kelly, 2001).  The most remarkable aspect of this achievement is that the 
LM evolved from a conceptual idea to operational hardware on the lunar surface in a period of 
less than 9 years.  The conceptual design launch weight of the LM was initially proposed at 
22,000 lbs and grew to 33,000 lbs by the time of Apollo 11 (Kelly, 2001).  The major factors that 
drove LM mass during the preliminary design phase were reliability requirements, mission 
operational requirements, and configuration definition. 
 The proposed design objectives of the Altair Lunar Lander were very different from the 
Apollo LM.   The issues with minimizing the mass of the Lunar Lander were well known at the 
time of the Exploration Systems Architecture Study report and led to the minimum functionality 
design approach.  The technological differences between the Apollo and Constellation programs 
were significant in regards to the amount of operational capability that was to be included in the 
Altair design.  Because the objectives of the Constellation program were more challenging than 
Apollo, the large number of development projects was one of the biggest hurdles in the 
Constellation program (Chaplain, 2009).   
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1.2 OBJECTIVES   
 The objectives of this research are to explore the conceptual human spacecraft design 
process in order to develop methodologies for evaluating and comparing spacecraft 
configurations during the early stages of development. The minimum functionality design 
methodology is the primary focus of the research.  Within the overall design process, four key 
areas were investigated. 
1. Chapter 3: Define a Minimum Functionality design methodology based on the four 
fundamental parameters of Physics, Physiology, Safety, and Operability in human 
spacecraft designs including: 
a. Defining the minimum functional baseline functions and mass of a given 
spacecraft configuration, 
b. Defining the functions and components associated with Safety, and 
c. Defining the functions and components associated with Operability. 
 
2. Chapter 4: Utilize rapidly reconfigurable physical prototyping in parallel with minimum 
functionality design to explore subsystem integration, human factors, and design 
communication.   Specific methods of this objective include: 
a. Functionally decomposing spacecraft subsystems, 
b. Using physical and physiological relationships to define a minimum functionality 
baseline configuration, 
c. Incorporating a rapidly reconfigurable prototype as a means of exploring 
configurations in a full scale, hands on manner as a pre-validation step toward 
developing Computer Aided Design (CAD) models, and 
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d. Providing a point of departure for mass additions to address levels of uncertainty 
and degrees of risk and reliability. 
 
3. Chapter 5: Develop mass addition guidelines and tradespace exploration methods to 
identify regions in the objective tradespace for investigation and concept development.  
Specific methods of this objective include: 
a. Quantifying the minimum functionality baseline configuration in different types 
of lunar ascent spacecraft, 
b. Determining spacecraft mass at various levels of Safety,  
c. Determining spacecraft mass at various levels of Operability, and  
d. Defining preferred regions in the spacecraft configuration tradespace based on the 
objectives of minimizing total spacecraft mass, increasing Safety, and increasing 
Operability. 
 
4. Chapter 6: Develop two figures of merit named the “Safety Index” and “Operability 
Index” for comparing spacecraft configurations without knowledge of subsystem and 
component reliabilities.  Specific methods of this objective include: 
a. Comparing the Safety Index score between spacecraft configurations as an 
indicator of increased redundancy and safety components. 
b. Comparing the Operability Index score between spacecraft configurations as a 
measure of meeting top level mission objectives.  
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1.2.1 Importance of Research 
 This research described in this dissertation is a minimum functionality design 
methodology that could be utilized by NASA or industry as an effective means for reducing 
uncertainty and understanding risk before establishing design requirements.  Uncertainties in the 
conceptual design phase cannot be completely eliminated and the focus of this phase is to 
explore as many configurations as possible to reduce the amount of uncertainty in the design 
assumptions.  The greatest risk in any human spacecraft development process is the use of 
incorrect design assumptions that create unnecessary requirements and increase complexity.  The 
scope of this research is intended to bring designers back to the fundamentals of spacecraft 
design and propose a simple and easy to implement process for reducing uncertainty and risk in 
conceptual human spacecraft. 
 This research is being presented during a time of change at NASA.  The previous 
government “oversight” approach is being changed to a new paradigm of “insight” human 
spacecraft design and development where NASA partners with industry in the development of 
human spacecraft.  The recent awarding of Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) contracts 
represents a fundamental shift in the way NASA plans to conduct business in the future.  
Because of political and economic factors, companies who develop commercial spacecraft must 
utilize efficient methods that reduce the amount of development time. 
 
1.2.2 Scope of Research 
 Maturing a conceptual design to a working design requires a large amount of information.  
In the early stages, designers use limited information in order to develop a concept that will be 
iterated as the design matures.  A common theme in this early phase is that unknowns in the 
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design will be further investigated upon the results of detailed analysis.  Although this approach 
gives a designer the flexibility in the initial phases of the design, this seemingly logical method 
also “locks” in a design too early based on previous assumptions and limited information about 
new technology.  A danger of this approach is that previous assumptions are carried over into 
further phases of the design without proper communication as to the intent of the design logic. 
 When a designer makes assumptions in order to begin the design process, there is a 
certain amount of risk that is carried in the design until more information becomes available 
through higher fidelity analysis, testing, or demonstration.  An experienced designer will 
anticipate changes and potential shortfalls, but this practice is often unstructured and varies 
among different designers and design teams.  A design that is too heavy on risk reduction would 
likely be too heavy for the launch vehicle or propulsion subsystem; and a spacecraft that is at a 
bare-bones minimum mass would likely be too unsafe to fly.  Instead of focusing on single point 
concepts, designers should consider the limitations, risks, and uncertainties of many potential 
design choices.  This research describes the following studies to advance design approaches and 
methods in the early conceptual design of human spacecraft.  
 Definition of a Minimum Functionality design methodology for quantifying Safety and 
Operability mass in human spacecraft configurations (Chapter 3).  
 Investigation of rapidly reconfigurable prototypes for reducing risk and uncertainty in 
subsystem integration and human factors configurations (Chapter 4). 
 Development of guidelines for mass addition and tradespace exploration to evaluate 
safety and operational functionality in conceptual human spacecraft (Chapter 5). 
 Definition of two figures of merit for scoring Safety and Operability in human spacecraft 
configurations (Chapter 6). 
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 This author has firsthand experience with conceptual design in the framework of the 
traditional government “oversight” development processes and with the government “insight” 
assisted development processes in CCDev.  Both approaches to design and development are very 
similar in a technical sense; but the main difference between the two is related to economic 
factors.  It is hoped that the research and processes developed in this work can be used to guide 
the designers of future human spacecraft. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Although much has been learned during the past 50 years in human spaceflight, the risks 
associated with flying humans in space still remain.  A human spacecraft is unique compared to 
other aerospace systems because of the complexity of integrating the human element in the 
spacecraft while simultaneously optimizing subsystem components.  Human spacecraft must 
meet minimum safety requirements for risk and reliability in order to mitigate potential 
contingencies and bring the crew home safe.   
 The following literature review summarizes the background and design processes 
associated with the development of human spacecraft.  A review of Systems Engineering in a 
NASA human spaceflight context followed by Conceptual Design, Multidisciplinary Design 
Optimization, Minimum Functionality, and Risk Based Design are included in this chapter.  
Because the application of this research is focused primarily on the design of conceptual Lunar 
Ascent spacecraft, a review of the Apollo and Constellation Lunar Lander designs is presented. 
 
2.1 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
 Since the 1960’s, NASA has utilized Systems Engineering (SE) principles and methods 
in the design, development, and operation of human spacecraft.  The role of Systems 
Engineering practices in aerospace systems has evolved and is now firmly established in the 
aerospace industry.  However, the early conceptual design phase within a Systems Engineering 
framework is an unorganized process that relies on human creativity to foster ideas and concepts 
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for exploration and maturity.  Thus, the challenge of designing for uncertainty, risk, human 
factors, and extreme environments dictates the need for detailed systematic conceptual design 
methods that are closely coupled to Systems Engineering practices.  A large majority of design 
and product development literature recognizes the importance of decision making during the 
conceptual design phase and several approaches have been developed to assist design engineers 
with tools, methods, and processes to reduce uncertainty in conceptual design.   
 
2.1.1 Systems Engineering Background 
 Systems Engineering extends product development beyond traditional engineering 
analysis and some might argue that Systems Engineering is a “management” philosophy.  This 
viewpoint is likely due to the emergence of SE as a distinct discipline associated with the 
management of technological projects during and after World War II (Emes et al., 2005).   As 
noted by Mumford and Bishop (2004) on the role of SE in Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) 
design, they describe SE as a “catch-all” for all the functions that do not fit nicely in the 
traditional engineering disciplines and that SE is usually responsible for all of the “-illities” such 
as manufacturability, maintainability, and operability.   
 A thorough review of the many definitions and scope of SE was given by Emes et al., 
(2005).  These authors point out that the International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE) definition of Systems Engineering “includes no description of what is meant by a 
system and has no reference to engineering; it also makes no assumption that SE is relevant only 
to machines or technical systems.  In addition, Emes, et al., (2005) describe the need to actively 
“brand” Systems Engineering as its own engineering discipline.  However, they also recognize 
the difficulties with this viewpoint because SE overlaps fields of Operations Research, Systems 
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Analysis, Project Management, System Dynamics, and Soft Systems Methodology.  Because of 
the lack of a common definition of SE, many organizations have created their own interpretation 
of SE and the wording of the various definitions is not consistent (Emes et al., 2005).  For 
example, NASA describes Systems Engineering as: 
“A methodical, disciplined approach for the design, realization, technical management, 
operations, and retirement of a system. – Systems engineering is the art and science of 
developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed 
constraints” (NASA, 2007a). 
 
INCOSE defines Systems Engineering as: 
“An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems.  It 
focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the development 
cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with design synthesis and system 
validation while considering the complete problem”(INCOSE, 2010). 
 
 As observed by the difference between the NASA and INCOSE descriptions, a single 
definition of Systems Engineering is not universal.  The authors of the NASA Systems 
Engineering handbook agree that there are differences of opinion and interpretations of Systems 
Engineering.  The commonality between the many interpretations and definitions is that SE is an 
approach used by an organization to meet customer needs and requirements.    
 Adding to the difficulty of defining exactly what is SE, the adoption of SE has also been 
restricted by its limited appeal to universities “because Operations  
Research and Systems Engineering borrowed their methods from other disciplines and were 
common sense – that is, procedural – their claims to academic legitimacy were tenuous” 
(Johnson, 1997).  Although some might argue for or against this viewpoint at the university 
level, the main question is how do students learn SE fundamentals?  The most effective method 
for students to learn SE fundamentals is through experience with design projects, courses, or 
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intern job experience.  Regardless of the different interpretations, students who plan to work or 
research in the aerospace industry will need to be familiar with Systems Engineering principles.  
 NASA approaches SE as a robust approach to design, create, and operate systems 
(NASA, 1995).  The objectives are to verify that the system is designed, built, and operated so 
that it accomplishes its purpose in the most cost-effective manner, considering performance, 
cost, schedule, and risk. These four measures are the main attributes to consider in the 
development and operation of a system.  Shown in Figure 1 is an example of how Performance, 
Risk and Cost are coupled in Systems Engineering. 
 
Figure 1:  Systems Engineer’s dilemma. 
 
 Based on these relationships, it is obvious that to achieve increased performance requires 
higher costs to reduce risk.  Schedule can be thought of as a ‘cost’ and is closely coupled to 
overall cost.  Strictly focusing on the engineering design (performance) in a traditional 
engineering discipline approach will neglect the other measures of cost, schedule, and risk.  
Thus, a decision maker must trade options when one of the measures presents a challenge to the 
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entire system.  The relationship between the four measures is described as the “Systems 
Engineer’s Dilemma” (NASA, 1995).  These relationships are summarized as: 
 To reduce cost at constant risk, performance must be reduced; 
 To reduce risk at constant cost, performance must be reduced; 
 To reduce cost at constant performance, higher risks must be accepted, and; 
 To reduce risk at constant performance, higher costs must be accepted. 
 
 The management of the multidisciplinary and complex engineering systems as they are 
matured and developed in a Systems Engineering context is crucial to the reduction of cost while 
balancing performance and risk for the overall system. If performance measures are not met 
within a specified schedule and cost, the mission might not be feasible or could add significant 
risk to the program.   
 
2.1.2 Systems Engineering Development Phases 
 The entire Systems Engineering development process is divided into a series of life cycle 
phases that are intended to mature design concepts and reduce uncertainty through a series of 
technical reviews.  The NASA Procedural Requirements NPR 7120.5D defines the major phases 
of the project life cycle as: 
 Pre-Phase A – Advanced Studies  
 Phase A – Preliminary Analysis  
 Phase B – Definition  
 Phase C – Design 
 Phase D – Development 
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 Phase E – Operations 
 Phase F – Decommissioning 
 
 Major reviews are conducted at the end of each phase to verify the design or plans are 
acceptable for moving into the next phase.  The most common reviews include the Mission 
Concept Review (MCR), System Requirements Review (SRR), System Definition Review 
(SDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Test Readiness 
Review (TRR) and Flight Readiness Review (FRR).  These reviews form “Control Gates” for 
decision makers to assess the measures of the system moving forward.  Shown in Table 1 are the 
major “Control Gates” in each Life Cycle phase (NASA, 2007a). 
 
Table 1: Control gates for Life Cycle phases. 
Pre-
Phase A 
Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E Phase F 
Mission 
Concept 
Review 
(MCR) 
System 
Requirements 
Review 
(SRR) 
Preliminary 
Design 
Review 
(PDR) 
System – 
Level 
Critical 
Design 
Review 
(CDR) 
Test 
Readiness 
Review (TRR) 
Post 
Launch 
Assessment 
Review 
(PLAR) 
Decommissioning 
Reviews 
 System 
Definition 
Review 
(SDR) 
 Production 
Readiness 
Review 
(PRR) 
System 
Acceptance 
Review (SAR) 
Critical 
Events 
Readiness 
Review 
(CERR) 
 
   System 
Integration 
Review 
(SIR) 
Operational 
Readiness 
Review 
(ORR) 
Post Flight 
Assessment 
Review 
(PFAR) 
 
    Flight 
Readiness 
Review (FRR) 
  
 
 The formulation of the design ends at PDR when the design enters an implementation 
phase.  A baseline concept of system requirements, verification requirements, concepts of 
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operations, design specifications, and project plans are presented as part of PDR at the end of 
Phase B.  According to the NASA SE Handbook (1995), if costs are underfunded in Phases A 
and B, then overruns are likely in the rest of the program.  Thus, it is critical to examine all 
aspects of a spacecraft design to avoid having to “re-design” the spacecraft later in Phase C. 
 During Pre-Phase A, the purpose of the initial activity is to “uncover, invent, create, 
concoct, and devise” a broad spectrum of ideas and alternatives for missions from which new 
projects can be selected (NASA, 2007a).  This phase is where concepts are first identified and 
explored.  Technology needs and readiness levels are assessed in order to provide information 
for a Mission Concept Review (NASA, 2007b).   
 During Phase A, the feasibility of a new conceptual system is evaluated.  The top level 
requirements are developed and demonstrations of credible, feasible designs are presented.  In 
addition, the necessary systems engineering tools and models are acquired.  The activity in Phase 
A reexamines the information gained from Pre-Phase A to provide justification for placing a new 
system in NASA’s budget.  A central goal of this phase is to analyze mission requirements and 
establish mission architecture (NASA, 2007b).  
 The purpose of Phase B is to establish the initial system baseline that includes a 
decomposition of the system and subsystem design specifications for both flight and ground 
elements (NASA, 2007a).  The establishment of a baseline system is used to project schedule, 
cost, and business management plans.  Configuration management procedures are implemented 
beginning with the new baseline.  To decompose the spacecraft into subsystems, a functional 
decomposition is used to identify functions that map to specific hardware, software, and 
personnel.  A significant amount of time in this phase is dedicated to tradespace exploration of 
designs and architectures.  These studies are iterative processes that analyze information at the 
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system and subsystem levels.  In addition, risk drivers are identified and proposed mitigation 
plans are developed for each risk (NASA, 2007b).   
Before a baseline design is chosen, operational concepts should be validated by a level of 
technical detail that is beyond the level of detail of Phase A.  Subsystem and System level PDRs 
are held close to the end of Phase B.  These reviews examine the processes and analyses used to 
develop the baseline design requirements and “design-to” specifications.  Any issues identified at 
PDR should be addressed with specific plans before the spacecraft design progresses into Phase 
C, Final Design and Fabrication. 
 
2.1.3 System and Subsystem Decomposition 
 Decomposing a spaceflight mission into various spacecraft and launch vehicles makes the 
design of the overall mission architecture manageable.  Using the Constellation lunar mission as 
shown in Figure 2, the following systems were planned for the lunar mission architecture:  
 Ares V launch vehicle, 
o Includes Earth Departure Stage and Lunar Lander (LL)  
 Earth Departure Stage, 
o Coupled to Lunar Lander and Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)  
 Lunar Lander, 
o Includes Ascent and Descent Stages 
 Orion CEV, and 
o Includes Command and Service Module 
 Ares I launch vehicle. 
o Includes Orion CEV 
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Figure 2: NASA Constellation lunar sortie mission (NASA, 2005). 
 
 Upon review of the Constellation lunar architecture, it is obvious that all the systems are 
highly coupled and must work together in order to accomplish the overall goals of the lunar 
mission.  The decomposition of a system leads to segments which could be defined as a part of 
the larger system.  For example, if the overall lunar mission architecture is considered a system, 
then the top-level vehicle architectures are segments, such as Ares V.   
 In the decomposition of the vehicle architecture, it is obvious that a change in the Lunar 
Lander weight or configuration would affect the entire lunar architecture.  Increases in mass for 
the Lunar Lander affect not only the Ares V, but also the Earth Departure Stage.  Docking 
requirements between the Lunar Lander and CEV could increase the weight of the CEV, thus 
affecting the launch weight of the Ares I launch vehicle.  Spacecraft designers are aware that 
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changes in one small part of a subsystem can have a large effect on the overall mission design 
and architecture.  In the design of the Apollo Lunar Ascent Module, an increase of 1 lb. 
increased the mass of the Saturn V launch vehicle by 833 lbs. (Thompson et al., 2010). 
 
2.1.4 Systems Engineering Summary 
 Systems Engineering is a methodology utilized by NASA in the design, development, 
and operation of human spacecraft.  The exact definition and scope of Systems Engineering 
varies among different organizations, but the central goal is to develop products that meet a 
customer’s needs.  In the example of human spacecraft, the various systems and subsystems are 
highly coupled in terms of performance, cost, risk, and schedule.  Thus, a Systems Engineering 
approach takes a broader view of the entire design in order to balance tradeoffs of the four key 
parameters.  Systems Engineering is more than a traditional management approach, it serves as a 
leadership role to guide the traditional engineering disciplines in order to integrate the entire 
system or architecture into a workable solution that meets customer’s needs. 
  
2.2 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
 The conceptual design phase is where ideas are first conceived, developed, and explored 
as potential solutions to meet a customer’s need.  It is commonly known that the conceptual 
design phase is the most important phase for determining the overall cost of a program (NASA, 
2007a; Adelstein et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2008).  According to NASA, conceptual designs are 
offered to demonstrated feasibility and support programmatic estimates (NASA, 2007a).  The 
overall purpose is to further examine the feasibility and desirability of suggested new major 
systems before obtaining funding.  In a NASA SE context, Pre-Phase A develops ideas and 
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concepts for future missions and programs and Phase A and B activities are where the proposed 
conceptual design solutions are developed and explored before PDR.  According to Rowell et al., 
(1999), “the difficulties of early conceptual design are characterized by a low level of system 
definitions and at this stage the conceptual design parameters are often not well modeled or 
understood.”  Thus, the need to understand the overall impact of uncertainty, design space, and 
tradespace exploration is what makes the conceptual design phase very important in terms of 
designing for additional flexibility as the design matures. 
 
2.2.1 Conceptual Design Uncertainties 
 The conceptual design phase is one of the least structured in terms of standardized 
processes and procedures.  Jilla and Miller (2004) describe the conceptual design phase as 
unstructured and with designers “often pursuing a single concept or modifying an existing idea 
rather than generating new alternatives.”  McManus et al. (2004) also reinforce this viewpoint 
by describing that traditional approaches used in the U.S. aerospace industry rely on methods 
that settle on a preferred design early in the process without tools that consider many potential 
designs.  In addition, the approaches used in the conceptual design phase are limited to the aspect 
of how needs might change during development and operation (McManus et al., 2004).   The 
lack of flexibility in later stages of design is one of the central issues with typical conceptual 
design approaches.  Pacheco et al. (2003) describe the conceptual design space as not well 
understood.  In their approach of using Bayesian surrogates for uncertainty in design parameters, 
they address the issue of incomplete knowledge and relationship between the design parameters 
and the overall system (Pacheco et al., 2003).  Bryant, et al. (2005) describe in their research of 
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conceptual design that the concept generation phase of the design process is difficult to translate 
in a methodology that is useful to both experienced and inexperienced designers.  In their words,  
“Design success is often heavily weighted on personal experience and innate ability and 
methods such as brainstorming, intrinsic, and extrinsic searches and morphological analysis 
are designed to stimulated a designer’s creativity, but ultimately still rely heavily on 
individual bias and experience” (Bryant et al., 2005). 
 
 Because the conceptual design phase is where ideas are first explored, standardized 
processes and procedures are needed to fully explore the design tradespace. A common 
standardized approach to reducing uncertainty in conceptual design is not universal and is very 
difficult to quantify because of the multidisciplinary behavior.  In a study by Hastings and 
McManus (2004), the authors categorize the types of uncertainties in the conceptual design phase 
and the effects on the overall system.  These uncertainties include:  
 lack of knowledge about the system,  
 lack of definition in the system,  
 statistically characterized variables or phenomena,  
 known unknowns, and  
 unknown unknowns.  
 
 Hastings and McManus (2004) also point out that Uncertainty causes Risk handled by 
Mitigation resulting in Outcomes.  One can easily follow the logic that carrying uncertainty 
throughout the conceptual design phase will ultimately lead to risk in later development phases.  
As noted by Chudoba and Huang (2006), the uncertainty in design knowledge in the early 
conceptual phase can be related to the lag of design knowledge available to the design 
knowledge required.  Their recommendation is to create a design knowledge based database 
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system to prevent the loss of knowledge in aerospace designs (Chudoba and Huang, 2006).  
German and Daskilewicz (2009) associate the problem of aerospace conceptual design as a 
“wicked” problem described in the field of urban planning as “complex, highly uncertain, and 
solution dependent dilemmas that do not necessarily have one best answer.”  According to 
Scheidl and Winkler (2010), the conceptual design phase “should be supported by good models 
for the design map, which in turn expresses the relationship between the design parameters and 
the functional requirements.”  Their work presented a theory on how conceptual models are 
related to detailed design models and how “good” the conceptual models can be characterized.  
This research concluded that “since product development typically envisages a wider range of 
final product realizations, the knowledge of the validity range of these models is important for a 
successful systematic design” (Scheidl and Winkler, 2010).  A successful conceptual design must 
explore the design space and objective tradespace efficiently in order to anticipate future changes 
in the design.  The challenges in conceptual design are compounded in complex engineering 
systems where multidisciplinary approaches are required for developing design solutions.   
 Much has been written about processes and methodologies intended to improve the 
conceptual design process for various applications (Jilla and Miller, 2004;  McManus et al., 
2004; Pacheco et al., 2003; Bryant et al., 2005; Hastings and McManus, 2004; Chudoba and 
Huang, 2006; German and Daskilewicz, 2009; Scheidl and Winkler, 2010).  Among the vast 
amount of literature dealing with various approaches in conceptual design, three common themes 
appear:   
  The need to fully explore design concepts and ideas, 
  The need to increase knowledge to reduce uncertainty, and  
  Development of reduced order modeling. 
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 The large amount of uncertainty and lack of overall system definition contributes to the 
difficulty of standardizing methodologies and processes for a wide variety of conceptual design 
problems.  However, the common themes among the various approaches in the literature all seem 
to recognize the need to reduce uncertainty through exploring a wide variety of design concepts 
and perform the work in a manner that does not require high fidelity modeling development and 
analysis.  
 
2.2.2    Top Level Mission Objectives 
 Before starting the conceptual design activity, the top level mission objectives or 
customer’s needs must be clearly defined.  This is the foundation for what is expected in the 
design in terms of performance, risk, schedule, and cost.  Establishing firm mission objectives 
and goals at the beginning of conceptual design activity is crucial for the development and 
reducing technical and problematic issue later in the design.  As observed in the recently 
cancelled Constellation program, significant redesigns beyond the conceptual design phase 
proved to be problematic for maintaining cost and schedule goals.  According to a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2009, “NASA is now focused on providing the capability 
to service the International Space Station and has deferred the capabilities needed for flights to 
the moon” (Chaplain, 2009).   The change in the top level mission goals to focus on the ISS only 
and defer the lunar mission in 2009 represented a the fundamental problems in development of 
human spacecraft.  Due to numerous technical issues associated with Orion and Ares I at the 
time and the critical need for servicing the ISS; this led to a shift in the top level objectives of the 
Constellation program.  Although the original ESAS plan in 2005 outlined the steps toward the 
lunar mission as being a block upgrades from ISS to lunar mission architecture, the original 
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design of the Orion capsule was primarily focused on a dual role for ISS and lunar missions 
(NASA, 2005).  The GAO report in 2009 was a scathing report on the failures at NASA and the 
problems associated with maturing a conceptual design.  According to the GAO report: 
“Over the past decade, there have been a number of instances where NASA pursued costly 
efforts to build a second generation of reuseable human spaceflight vehicles without 
attaining critical knowledge about requirements and resources.  These programs 
experienced significant problems – including cost and schedule delays.  They include the 
National Aerospace Plane, the X33, and X-34, and the Space Launch Initiative, which were 
eventually cancelled. -  By emphasizing heritage technology, the Constellation program was 
designed to avoid problems associated with the prior shuttle replacement efforts, which were 
largely rooted in the desire to introduce vehicles that significantly advanced technologies” 
(Chaplain, 2009). 
 
 In NASA’s defense, the funding required to mature the early concepts from 2005 to 2009 
was not enough to overcome the technical challenges.  The GAO report in 2009 also highlights 
this issue by describing that the Constellation program was “poorly funded” and this affected the 
ability to deal with all of the technical challenges (Chaplain, 2009). 
 In addition to technical aspects of designing a human spacecraft, the enormous cost and 
risk largely decide the top level mission objectives.  As observed in the Constellation program, 
when cost and risk were subjectively judged too high in a political atmosphere, NASA changed 
the top level mission objectives in order to keep the program alive.  This change in mission 
objectives meant that redesign efforts were needed to remove the lunar requirements from Orion, 
thus creating multiple redesign activities in order to meet the new mission objectives.   
 The new era of spaceflight is much different from the Apollo program where the mission 
objectives were much simpler (Man, Moon, and Decade).  In addition, the economic landscape 
for funding major human spaceflight programs is very different from the 1960’s.  Unfortunately, 
cost is a huge factor in the fate of many of NASA’s programs (Chaplain, 2009).  The challenge 
for spacecraft designers in today’s human spacecraft development world is to mature concepts 
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quickly and efficiently within the given top level mission objectives before cost and schedule 
drive significant redesign. 
 
2.2.3 Functional Decomposition 
 Given a set of clearly defined top level mission objectives, the next logical step in the 
spacecraft conceptual design process is to determine the activities that need to take place for the 
mission to be successful.  This is potentially one of the most crucial aspects of design where 
designers must understand what the system needs to do in order to explore potential solutions. 
 A functional decomposition process identifies and states the “functions” or the activities 
that need to take place in the overall system architecture during a given mission.  The functional 
decomposition activity is not a single activity to be completed in the early stage of design.  As 
the design concepts are matured, additional functionality can be added to the design to increase 
performance, reduce risk, and mitigate contingencies.  Similar to the process used in system and 
subsystem decomposition, a functional decomposition maps individual functions to the lowest 
levels in the spacecraft subsystems.  A key aspect of functional decomposition is that the 
activities of the spacecraft are defined in a process that is separate from how the functions will be 
performed.  The solutions to the individual functions in the form of “how” is a large portion of 
the uncertainty in the spacecraft design.  It is easy to determine “what” needs to be done, but the 
difficult part in spacecraft design is determining “how” the functions will be performed.  
Spacecraft designers consider heuristics, technologies, and materials that will eventually match 
to the individual functions.  During Phases A and B, proof of concepts are studied and traded in 
order to establish a functional baseline concept.  This activity is a form of technology and risk 
mitigation that evaluates uncertainties before Preliminary Design Review (NASA, 2007a). 
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 The methods used by NASA for functional decomposition are detailed in the document 
Design, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (DDT&E): Human Factors Engineering 
(Adelstein et al., 2006).  According to NASA, the purpose of identifying functions is that it helps 
to define requirements and resources that are coupled to the functions such as hardware, 
software, and human elements.  The key steps in functional analysis are: 
 Determine the objectives, performance requirements, and constraints of the design;  
 Define the activities that must be accomplished to meet the objectives and required 
performance; 
 Define the relationships between functions and subsystems; and 
 Define tradeoff priorities and constraints (Adelstein et al., 2006). 
 
 The development of functional models is one of the first steps in systematic methods for 
product development (Cowan et al., 2006; Pahl and Beitz, 1996; Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000, Roy 
et al., 2008; Kitamura and Mizoguchi, 2003).  According to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Systems Engineering Fundamentals (2001), functional decomposition is described as a “top-
down process of translating system level requirements into detailed functional and performance 
design criteria” (DoD, 2001).  This interpretation is slightly different from NASA’s definition of 
functional decomposition, but the same approach is used to define the functions and expected 
performance at lower levels of the subsystems. 
 One of the drawbacks associated with functional decomposition identified by Kitamura 
and Mizoguchi, (2003) is that the knowledge about functionality is usually scattered among 
designers in the conceptual design phase because the individual designers are concerned about 
how their specific function will perform the prescribed sub-(micro) function.  Knowledge about 
36 
 
functionality should be shared among different groups and this viewpoint is reinforced by 
Ingham et al., (2006) who state that subsystem level functional decomposition fails to “scale in 
the tangled web of interactions typically encountered in complex spacecraft designs.”  In 
research conducted by Ingham et al. (2006), they propose a “State Analysis” for the development 
of system and subsystem explicit models.  A recent study by Camelo and Mulet (2010) offers a 
method that examines the relationships between functions in order to address the cross coupling 
aspect of functional decomposition.  However, they recognize that not all of the relationships 
between all of the functions can be fully explored to prevent “combinatorial explosion” (Camelo 
and Mulet, 2010).  Regardless of the challenges, functional decomposition remains a key process 
in the conceptual design phase to understand the fundamental needs of the spacecraft design in 
order to properly trade potential solutions. 
 
2.2.4 Boundary Objects 
 Obtaining knowledge in the conceptual design phase is a key activity in the investigation 
of solutions that match to a functional decomposition.  According to Carlile (2002), knowledge is 
a “barrier to and a source of innovation.”  To describe how knowledge can flow across 
boundaries, Star (1989) coined the term “Boundary Objects”.  Boundary Objects are 
representations of knowledge used to improve communication and understanding between 
different groups (Star 1989; Carlile 2002; Carlile 2004; Dare et al., 2004;).  Star (1989) 
categorized four types of boundary objects that are shared and sharable across different problem 
solving contexts.  These four types are: 
 Repositories – Cost databases, CAD databases, parts libraries; 
 Standardized forms and methods – report findings, problems solving; 
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 Objects or models – sketches, drawings, prototypes, mockups, simulations; and 
 Maps of boundaries – Gantt charts, process maps, workflow matrices. 
 
 According to Carlile (2002), the use of objects or models depicts or demonstrates current 
or possible “form, fit, and function” of the differences and dependencies identified at the 
boundary.  A boundary object is considered “good” if it can represent knowledge in a manner 
that is easily used in a problem solving setting.  Carlile (2002) identified three characteristics of a 
boundary object that made it useful in problem solving. 
 An effective boundary object establishes a shared syntax or language for individuals to 
represent their knowledge. 
 An effective boundary object provides a concrete means for individuals to specify and 
learn about their differences and dependencies across a given boundary. 
 An effective boundary object facilitates a process where individuals can jointly transform 
their knowledge. 
 
 These three characteristics were identified from a study of 65 observations of Boundary 
Objects (Carlile, 2002).  It is easy to understand how Boundary Objects can be used to share 
knowledge among groups, but how can the concept be applied effectively in conceptual design?  
In a study conducted by Brereton and McGarry (2000) on engineering design thinking and 
communication, they proposed a design problem to groups of engineering undergraduate 
students to observe what methods the students used to solve the problem.  Of their findings, they 
concluded that design thinking is heavily dependent upon experiences with physical objects and 
materials.  In the design process, hardware or prototypes becomes a “compelling medium” for 
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thinking.  Students used simple objects to clarify their thoughts and ideas, thus making hardware 
the “object” that was used in communication.  Listed below are seven reasons described by 
Brereton and McGarry (2000) for the use of hardware in engineering design. 
 Hardware is tangible; it can be seen and touched.  
 It gives physical presence to conceptual models. 
 Its behavior reveals errors in conceptual models. 
 It behaves in unpredicted ways which provokes the user to explore it. 
 It behaves in different ways in different environments and different contexts of use. 
 Interaction with hardware and integration of hardware components reveals properties and 
limits of the hardware and hardware components. 
 It is integral to communications affecting the course of inquiry, idea generation, 
discovery, and the dynamics of group interactions.   
 
 Carlile (2002) describes that the role a Boundary Object assumes in new product 
development is that it helps to establish a “boundary infrastructure” or “boundary process”.  The 
main idea is that knowledge is communicated among individuals through a visual means.  It is 
worth noting that Carlile (2002) also points out that CAD modeling can be a useful Boundary 
Object in one setting but is useless in another setting.  In order for a Boundary Object to 
communicate knowledge, it must have the flexibility to adapt to changes in the design process. 
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2.2.5 Physical Prototyping 
 Physical prototypes, mockups or objects can be used to communicate information during 
conceptual design.  According to a research study conducted by Brereton and McGarry (2000), 
the use of physical objects (hardware) and prototyping materials in support of design thinking 
and communication has the following roles: 
 Hardware is a Starting Point. 
o Hardware is easily noticed, remembered, seen and touched. 
o It offers a basis for comparison. 
 Hardware is a Chameleon. 
o Hardware is always in a context of use.   
o What the hardware reveals depends upon the context of use. 
 Hardware is a Thinking Prop. 
o Hardware objects have all sorts of properties that afford different actions. 
 Hardware is an Episodic Memory Trigger. 
o Episodes of experiences with physical objects serve as memory devices. 
 Hardware is an Embodiment of Abstract Concepts. 
o Observing and testing hardware reveals fundamental concepts, physical 
embodiments of abstract concepts, and unanticipated design issues in hardware 
behavior. 
 Hardware is an Adversary. 
o Challenging theoretical model predictions against hardware behavior reveals 
discrepancies and provides clues to modeling errors.  This reveals theoretical 
assumptions and causal relations. 
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 Hardware is a Prompt. 
o Device behavior prompts student questions and suggests experiments.  Through 
repetitive interaction with hardware, students bring order, distilling out key 
operational parameters, and their relationships. 
 Hardware is a Medium for Integration. 
o Integrating components in their functional context reveals practical limits of use, 
characteristics of operation, methods of connection, causal relations, and physical 
quantities.   
 Hardware is a Communication Medium. 
o Hardware is integral to learning communications, affecting the course of inquiry, 
idea generation, discovery and the dynamics of group interaction.  Hardware is 
used to command attention, to demonstrate, and to persuade. 
 
 The findings of Brereton and McGarry (2000) emphasize the need for hardware as a tool 
for visualizing abstract concepts and exploring the design space.  In a research study of adaptive 
design using system representations, Dare et al. (2004) defined Boundary Objects as 
“representations of knowledge that can improve communication and understanding between 
groups or organizations with different lexicons and cognitive foundations.” Dare et al. (2004) 
conducted eight case studies of Air Force programs and found the use of Boundary Objects to be 
effective in helping stakeholders’ bridge knowledge boundaries and establish understanding.  
The use of prototypes as a Boundary Object facilitates communication between multidisciplinary 
groups and helps to resolve discrepancies before a design configuration is selected.  Having a 
physical (full-scale) system that designers can see and touch reduces the possibility of 
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misinterpretation where CAD drawings or other computer representations may be viewed 
incompletely or in a different ways by different members of the design team.  Before the use of 
computational design methods, hardware and mockups were the primary means for 
understanding design concepts.  During the design phase of the Apollo Lunar Module, many 
uncertainties were discovered in preliminary design with the use of mockups (Kelly, 2001).  In 
today’s fast pace computational design world, mockups are typically constructed after the 
conceptual design is nearing completion.  However, the earlier new information is available, the 
higher its value (Krishnan et al., 1997). 
A mockup of proposed lunar habitats was constructed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
to demonstrate integration of several subsystems for near-term exploration habitats (Kennedy, 
2006).  Although mockups are not specifically required by NASA at PDR, the use of mockups is 
encouraged to allow testing and demonstration of technologies that would be useful for the 
mission.  Kennedy (2006) noted in the development of the lunar habitat mockup, the value of the 
testing will be realized while developing the test.  In his words, “the sheer act of determining the 
interfaces and integration to bring the subsystems together will help to identify the gaps that 
must be overcome when designing the actual subsystems” (Kennedy, 2006).   
Research conducted by Mulenburg and Gundo (2004) described a method titled “Design-by-
Prototype” to simplify the conceptual design process.  This method is used by NASA Ames 
Research Center to create unique one-of-a-kind research hardware for small high risk projects by 
eliminating much of the formal engineering design process.  Mulenburg and Gundo (2004) quote 
Frame (2002) as stating, “…it is impossible to pre-specify requirements precisely” and the use of 
prototypes early in the design process can help to validate design requirements through 
demonstration, experiment, or testing (Mulenberg and Gundo, 2004).  Although prototyping is 
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not a new concept, its use in different contexts is prevalent in the literature.  The main reason for 
using mockups, hardware, or prototypes is that uncertainties in the conceptual design can be 
investigated in a manner that increases communication between multidisciplinary groups. 
 
2.2.6 Computer Aided Design and Virtual Prototyping 
 Computer Aided Design is a well established engineering tool used in the design of 
structures and assemblies.  Commercial software packages such as SolidWorks, Pro-Engineer, 
CATIA, and I-DEAS are powerful analysis programs for modeling physical (mass and 
geometry) characteristics.  The disadvantage is that they are becoming more complex and require 
specialized training.  Because of increasing computational abilities available to many companies, 
computational analysis packages are becoming the standard for mechanical design (Wang and 
Shan, 2007).   
 CAD models serve the purpose of representing mass and geometry of a design in a digital 
format.  This information can be utilized by high fidelity analysis programs such as Finite 
Element Analysis (FEA) and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) where the design is 
evaluated in simulated environmental conditions to predict responses.  A vast amount of 
literature has been published on the topic of FEA and CFD.  However, in the context of this 
research, the study of CFD and FEA is not the goal.  Instead, this research will evaluate early 
design methods that validate the physical configuration of a human spacecraft using a human-in-
the-loop for pre-validation of CAD models.  The use of high fidelity analysis after conceptual 
design is necessary for obtaining higher degrees of accuracy, but limits the number of design 
configurations that can be evaluated.  Wang and Shan (2007) reported that it takes Ford Motor 
Company about 36 to 160 hours to run one crash simulation with their FEA models.  The huge 
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computational expense has led many researchers to investigate the use of approximation models, 
described as metamodels, as an alternative to high fidelity and time intensive computational 
codes.  Because of the large amount of time to develop CAD models and subsequent FEA 
models, the use of high fidelity tools is better suited for Phase B after conceptual designs have 
reached a level of maturity. 
 According to Cecil and Kanchanapiboon (2007), the use of CAD has been incorrectly 
used in the literature to represent virtual prototyping.  Their definition of a virtual prototype is 
based on the following characteristics. 
 Virtual prototypes must possess accurate geometry, topology, and appearance, reflecting 
characteristics of the target part, object, system or environment. 
 Virtual prototypes should be capable of simulating engineering or science based 
characteristics including behavior with real time responses. 
 Virtual prototypes are digital or computer based representations. 
 Virtual prototypes must possess the ability to interface virtual reality technology and 
graphics including supporting semi-immersive or immersive applications (Cecil and 
Kanchanapiboon , 2007). 
 
 Upon review of the four characteristics, it is easy to determine that Virtual Prototyping is 
very much different from Computer Aided Design.  Because CAD models are also digital 
representations of the parts and assemblies, this is most likely the cause of the misinterpretation 
in the literature.  CAD models are limited in their ability for a user to immerse in the 
environment.  Especially during the conceptual design phase, as CAD models are matured to 
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explore configurations, they do not always possess accurate geometrical specifications due to 
incomplete knowledge about the subsystem interfaces. 
 As computing power increases and technology becomes available, the future of Computer 
Aided Design is likely to utilize Virtual Prototyping to a greater extent.  According to Choi and 
Chan (2004), virtual reality can be used to determine bottlenecks in manufacturing or production 
without the use of expensive physical prototypes.  The overall goal of virtual prototyping is to 
simulate in a digital world the many physical aspects of a design.  CAD and Virtual Prototyping 
are tools that can be utilized in the conceptual design phase for maturing designs and 
communicating design knowledge using a Boundary Object.   
 
2.2.7 Spacecraft Mass Growth 
 Predicting mass during the conceptual design phase is a common challenge for aerospace 
systems.  The Space Shuttle and the Apollo Lunar Module are two examples of flight programs 
that experienced significant mass growth issues but were successful.  Other programs such as X-
30 and X-33 were not as successful due to mass growth and technical difficulties due to incorrect 
assumptions during the conceptual design phase (Thompson et al., 2010).  As observed in the 
Constellation program, mass growth in Orion and Ares I was attributed with overcoming 
technical challenges that had not been anticipated in conceptual design (GAO, 2008).  During the 
Apollo program, the Lunar Module experienced a 50% growth in mass from the initial 
conceptual design while the Apollo Command and Service Module experienced a 42% increase 
in mass during its development (Kelly, 2001; Thompson et al., 2010).  The increase in payload 
mass proved to be difficult for the Saturn V as its first stage dry mass increased approximately 
33% (Thompson et al., 2010). 
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 A recent review of mass growth in spacecraft conducted by Thompson et al. (2010) 
evaluated the reasons for mass growth after the conceptual design phase.  This work summarizes 
the history and issues with mass growth in human spacecraft and the challenges for future 
designers.  According to Thompson et al. (2010), manned spacecraft typically grow from 15% to 
50% during development.  Reasons for the growth include “optimistic and inaccurate initial 
estimates, inadequate guidelines on mission specific modifications to the standards and 
significant subsequent changes to requirements and designs” (Thompson et al., 2010).     
 To overcome the uncertainty in mass growth in early conceptual design, designers 
typically use industry and government guidelines to plan margin allocations.  This approach 
utilizes a percentage of the mass based on the maturity of the design in the development cycle 
(Thompson et al., 2010).   Although this serves to create allowable mass “boundaries” for 
identifying future mass impacts and potential threats, this method is highly dependent upon the 
first assumptions made during conceptual design.  Thompson et al. (2010) recommend that 
industry guidelines should be used as initial guidance and that “a structured and documented 
method should be employed to identify the mass and performance risks introduced through 
uncertainty due to lack of knowledge.”  Methods that consider the sensitivity of conceptual 
design mass growth should be developed and utilized earlier in conceptual design to reduce the 
likelihood of impacts on cost and schedule.  A study conducted by Thunnissen (2004) also 
concluded that spacecraft mass increases approximately 50% from the conceptual design phase.  
This is very significant when compared to the accepted margin of 30% based on typical 
approaches (Thunnissen, 2004).  Because aerospace systems are complex and multidisciplinary, 
not all of the uncertainty in the conceptual design can be quantified or predicted without testing 
and high fidelity analysis.  The lack of knowledge during the early phase of design is a key 
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contributor to uncertainty and the greater the uncertainty, the more likely that redesign efforts 
will be required as the design concept is matured. 
 
2.2.8 Conceptual Design Summary 
 The conceptual design phase is a very significant phase in the development of human 
spacecraft.  It is this phase where design decisions are made with limited information and 
assumed risk that decides the success of the spacecraft development program.  Because of the 
lack of knowledge and the need to explore many design solutions in a time-efficient manner, 
many recognize this phase as one that is unstructured in terms of design processes to assist the 
designer.   
 A central need in any conceptual design process is clearly defined top level objectives 
that remain constant throughout the development process.  Changing the top level objectives 
during the development program creates unnecessary redesign that usually requires a step back 
to the conceptual design process in order to redevelop the existing design.  Once the top level 
objectives are clearly stated and defined, a functional decomposition of the activities in the 
spacecraft is created to assist with trade studies of technology choices to perform the functions.  
The functional decomposition serves as a direct link between the various subsystems to the top 
level objectives to specify what the spacecraft systems must do to perform a successful mission.  
 Increasing knowledge and communication during the conceptual design process has been 
identified as a key contributor to the success of the life cycle development.  Design methods that 
utilize Boundary Objects to facilitate communication and knowledge among design teams are 
useful in terms of reducing uncertainty among teams with varying backgrounds.  The use of 
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physical prototypes and hardware is a powerful communication tool in the context of Boundary 
Objects.  Hardware serves many roles in the early stages of design, but the most powerful aspect 
is that it can be seen and touched to reveal potential errors in conceptual design models. 
 The use of Computer Aided Design is widespread in the aerospace industry.  The use of 
digital representations of mass and geometry allows designers to visualize concepts before costly 
efforts of physical prototyping.  However, the development of CAD is very time consuming and 
does not always reveal issues with component interfaces.  The use of Virtual Prototyping is now 
being explored as an extension of CAD modeling to allow a designer to “immerse” in the design 
domain to uncover integration issues that would have traditionally been discovered in physical 
prototyping. 
 Spacecraft mass growth is a key issue in any human spacecraft design.  Historically this 
growth has been caused by top level requirements creep, uncertainty in the conceptual design, 
and pushing the limits of technology development.  Various spaceflight programs managed mass 
growth differently during the life cycle development and few were not as successful.  The 
addition of mass beyond conceptual design is one that is anticipated in future development 
phases, but should be considered in the early conceptual design to allow flexibility as the design 
matures. 
 
2.3 MULTIDISCIPLINARY DESIGN OPTIMIZATION 
 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization (MDO) is described by Sobieszczanski-Sobieski 
and Haftka (1997) as “a methodology for the design of systems in which strong interaction 
between disciplines motivates designers to simultaneously manipulate variables in several 
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disciplines”.  MDO is an area of research that develops systematic approaches for the design of 
complex systems governed by interacting physical phenomena (Alexandrov, 2005).  In today’s 
computational world, many researchers are using MDO methods as a means for developing and 
optimizing complex systems.  The purpose of MDO is to bring all of the various subsystem 
disciplines together to simultaneously optimize a “multidisciplinary” system level problem.  To 
optimize a solution means to direct the analysis process toward solutions that will balance the 
needs of the subsystems in a quicker timeframe.  According to Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and 
Haftka (1997), the difficulty in adopting MDO among various groups lies in the ability of teams 
and codes to exchange data.  Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and Haftka (1997) defined three categories 
of MDO in the research literature at the time. 
1. The combination of two or three disciplines that can spawn a new discipline that focuses 
on the interaction between the disciplines such as aeroelasticity or thermoelasticity. 
2. The use of simple analysis tools in the Conceptual Design phase in a single, usually 
modular computer programs to reduce computational burden. 
3. The organizational and computational challenges for coupling various disciplinary high 
fidelity codes among dispersed groups and teams. 
 
 When first introduced in the 1990’s, the use of MDO methods for complex engineering 
problems had great promise for solving and optimizing problems.  However, the true use of 
MDO has been limited to mostly researchers and has not been widely used in realistic 
engineering problems (Alexandrov, 2005).  One of the reasons that MDO has not been fully 
adopted is that MDO lies on the border between applied mathematics and engineering 
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(Alexandrov, 2005).  Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and Haftka (1997) pointed out that the use of 
MDO actually costs more than the collection of single discipline optimizations.   
 A MDO analysis is a collection of mathematical modules that represent the various parts 
of the overall system such as a physical phenomena or part (Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and Haftka, 
1997).  Because a MDO problem can have a large number of design variables due to the many 
disciplines, the dimensionality of the problem is very difficult to reduce (Koch et al., 1999).  In 
many engineering and complex problems, the relationships between the various disciplines are 
not always clear to the designers in specific areas.   
 The central challenge in MDO is balancing the use of coupled high-fidelity models with 
the amount of computational time required to generate an optimized solution.  In today’s 
engineering environment, high-fidelity FEA and CFD simulations can take days or weeks to 
complete a single analysis.  For MDO problems, several analysis runs are needed for 
convergence of an optimized solution.  Although computational power has increased over the 
past few decades, the complexity of high fidelity codes has increased as well.  According to 
Messac and Mullur (2008), the high cost of computer times are unreasonable for obtaining 
optimized solutions from complex models.   
 MDO optimization methods are based upon two types of decomposition: hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical.  The difference in the two approaches is how the subsystems or levels are 
optimized.  In non-hierarchical, the overall design problems is optimized at the system level 
where the hierarchical level, the individual subsystems are optimized before the system level 
optimization.  Methods such as Concurrent Subspace Optimization (CSSO), Collaborative 
Optimization (CO) use the hierarchical decomposition.  
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 Many researchers have recognized the difficulty of coupling many different types of 
high-fidelity discipline specific codes and have created approximation techniques intended to 
reduce the computational time.  These techniques are often referred to as “surrogate” or 
metamodels (model of a model).  Because the surrogate or approximation models are based on 
an objective function created from a finite set of data points originally derived from high-fidelity 
models, there is an amount of uncertainty introduced in the design solutions.  According to 
Martin and Simpson (2006) in deterministic approaches to MDO, the uncertainties are ignored 
and not quantified.  Therefore, the particular surrogate modeling approach used should consider 
the random uncertainty in the design space variables.   
 A vast amount of literature has been published pertaining to Multidisciplinary Design 
Optimization and development of newer methods that extend the concepts of MDO.  Many of the 
newer methods focus on areas such as Reliability Based Design Optimization (RBDO), Robust 
Design, Uncertainty Quantification, and Visual Design Steering.  For example, Agarwal and 
Renauld (2004) utilized Response Surfaces (RS) in RBDO to reduce the computational burden of 
calculating reliability in MDO.  Allen et al. (2006) developed Robust Design processes in a 
multidisciplinary context for materials design.  Du and Chen (2005) utilized a method called 
Collaborative Reliability Analysis to improve reliability based design in multidisciplinary 
designs under uncertainty.  Winer and Bloebaum (2002) utilized Visual Design Steering to 
capture and enable designer insights; which allows a designer to make decisions before, during, 
or after optimization to effectively steer the design process.  All of these techniques build on the 
principles of MDO in order to develop more computationally and accurate analysis methods. 
 MDO problems are usually large and complex; requiring the use of higher fidelity 
analysis codes.  Because of the large computational demands, MDO codes are largely 
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optimization programs that attempt to reduce the computational burden and guide the analysis 
toward an optimized solution.  However, because many high fidelity codes are discipline specific 
such as FEA for structures and CFD for aerodynamics and fluids, a significant amount of human 
effort are needed to couple the input and output results among the different discipline specific 
teams.  This problem was highlighted by Sobieszczanski-Sobieski and Haftka (1997) and 
although many methodologies have been developed to overcome some of the challenges in 
MDO, a large amount of research still remains before MDO becomes more “user friendly.”  
According to Alexandrov (2005), “there are fundamental analytical and computational obstacles 
that must be overcome before MDO can make a wide-spread impact on the practice of design.”  
MDO is a powerful tool for design, but the difficulties in its use among designers with various 
backgrounds is likely one of the reasons it will remain largely in a research oriented setting. 
 
2.3.1 Metamodeling 
 Metamodeling is the process of creating a model that is an approximation of a complex 
analysis code model.  Simpson et al., (2001) describe metamodels as “statistical approximations 
of expensive computer analyses facilitating multidisciplinary, multiobjective optimization and 
concept exploration.”  The process of creating metamodels evolved from classical Design of 
Experiments (DOE) theory and is called “metamodeling” (Wang and Shan, 2007).   Because of 
the increased efficiency in computational times, metamodeling is used to approximate complex 
higher fidelity analysis codes such as FEA or CFD.  Metamodeling extend the capability of 
MDO analysis such that many more design configurations can be analyzed and understood.  
Wang and Shan (2007) outlined five benefits of Metamodel Based Design Optimization 
(MBDO).   
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 It is easier to connect proprietary and often expensive simulation codes. 
 Parallel computation becomes simple as it involves running the same simulation for many 
data points. 
 Building metamodels can better filter numerical noise than gradient methods. 
 The metamodel renders a view of the entire design space. 
 It is easier to detect errors in simulation as the entire design domain is analyzed. 
 
 Although the benefits of metamodeling seem very promising, Yang and Shan (2007) 
point out that the use of metamodeling techniques in the design engineering community seems to 
lag the research community.  Building metamodels is mathematically intensive and this could be 
a reason why metamodeling has not been as widespread among the practicing design engineering 
community (Wang and Shan, 2007).  During the AIAA/ ISSMO Symposium on 
Multidisciplinary Analysis and Optimization in 2002, an Approximations Methods Panel was 
held with the current leading researchers in the field of approximation methods to summarize the 
current and future research efforts at the time.  A key challenge given by the panel to the 
academic community was to help educate engineers on how to use metamodels (Simpson et al., 
2004).   
 Researchers have recognized the issue with the mathematical complexity involved with 
metamodeling and have attempted to develop many different methods of metamodeling to assist 
designers with optimization of MDO problems.  For example, Yang et al., (2005) studied five 
different types of metamodels (Stepwise Regression, Moving Least Squares, Kriging, 
Multiquadratic, and Adaptive and Interactive Modeling System) based on response surface 
methods to simulate vehicle frontal impacts.  This work demonstrated that metamodeling offers 
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designers a quick tool for evaluating design alternatives using Pareto plots and curves.  Wang 
and Shan (2007) reviewed metamodeling techniques and compiled a list of the most commonly 
used metamodeling techniques as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Commonly used metamodeling techniques (Wang and Shan, 2007). 
Experimental Design / 
Sampling Methods 
Metamodel Choice Model Fitting 
Classic Methods 
 Fractorial 
 Central Composite 
 Box-Behnken 
 Alphabetical optimal 
 Plackett-Burman 
Space Filling Methods 
 Simple Grids 
 Latin Hypercube 
 Orthogonal Arrays 
 Hammersley 
Sequence 
 Uniform Design 
 Minimax and 
Maximin 
Hybrid Methods 
Random or Human 
Selection 
Importance Sampling 
Directional Sampling 
Discriminative Sampling 
Sequential or adaptive 
methods 
Polynomial (linear, quadratic) 
Splines (linear, cubic) 
Multivariate Adaptive 
Regression Splines 
Gaussian Process 
Kriging 
Radial Basis Function 
Least interpolating 
polynomials 
Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) 
Knowledge Base or Decision 
Tree 
Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) 
Hybrid Models 
Weighted Least Squares 
Regression 
Best Linear Unbiased 
Predictor (BLUP) 
Best Linear Predictor 
Log – likelihood 
Multipoint Approximation 
(MPA) 
Sequential or adaptive 
metamodeling 
Back propagation (for ANN) 
Entropy (inf. –theoretic, for 
inductive learning on 
decision tree) 
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 The columns in Table 2 describe the three areas of metamodeling.  First, the particular 
Experimental Design and Sampling method is used to gather design points from a complex high 
fidelity code such as FEA or CFD.  The advantage of sampling is that it minimizes the number of 
high fidelity complex code runs needed to produce a “sample set” of information that will be 
used to develop the metamodel.  Second, a particular metamodel choice is used as a surrogate for 
the high fidelity complex code.  Lastly, a technique is used to “fit” or validate the metamodel 
against the sample data.  This area is of particular interest because the validation of a metamodel 
is crucial to quantifying uncertainty with the metamodeling technique.  As pointed out by Wang 
and Shan (2007), metamodel validation shares many of the same challenges associated with 
verification and validation of traditional computational models. 
 The topic of metamodeling is very extensive and much literature has been published in 
various applications.  The critical disadvantage to the use of the particular metamodeling 
approach is the quality of the metamodel (Yang et al., 2005).  The use of response surface 
methods in metamodeling techniques such as the one performed by Yang et al. (2005) is just one 
of the many different metamodeling approaches described in the literature.  Much literature has 
been published on metamodeling techniques and accuracy including: Jin, et al. (2001); Simpson 
et al. (2001); Martin and Simpson (2003); Clarke et al. (2005); one of the most common 
metamodeling approximation methods, Kriging, has been extensively documented in the 
literature (Kleijnen, 2007).  
 The use of metamodeling for optimizing and exploring the design and tradespace is very 
advantageous when compared to the computational costs associated with coupling several 
disciplinary high fidelity complex codes.  However, the reduction in computational time must be 
balanced against the loss of accuracy with a lower fidelity approximation code such as a 
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metamodel.  If the intent of the design process is to gather information about the entire design 
and objective tradespace, such as in the conceptual design phase; then a metamodeling approach 
is the preferred methodology for reducing the number of potential design solutions to a level 
where the use of a higher fidelity code is needed for design refinement.  The difficulties and 
mathematical rigor of sampling, programming, and fitting a metamodel is not well understood 
among practicing design engineers and the gap between the research and design community in 
metamodeling will continue until more powerful and easier to use software packages are 
developed to assist design engineers with complex engineering analyses.   
 
2.3.2    Tradespace Exploration 
 Tradespace exploration is a method used to explore the various objectives in order to 
understand the relationship to the design space variables.  According to Ross (2006), tradespace 
exploration in the conceptual design phase may empower designers to overcome challenges 
associated with tendencies to reduce the design space and overlook potential design space 
solutions.  In other words, a thorough exploration of the objective tradespace during the early 
stages of conceptual design is a powerful tool to uncover potential challenges and reduce 
uncertainty in the design.  A designer needs to understand the impacts of configuration changes 
on the overall spacecraft design.  Ross (2006) conducted interviews with industry and learned 
that broad tradespace exploration is rare and often done in an ad hoc manner. 
 A full tradespace exploration evaluates many more spacecraft configurations than a small 
set of preferred options.  In the work by Shaw (1998), an approach named the General 
Information Analysis (GINA) was proposed to explore a large set of space system design options 
in terms of generic metrics for comparison among different concepts.  The PhD dissertation by 
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Jilla (2002) utilized the GINA process and added Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) 
techniques to fully explore the design and objective tradespace for distributed satellite systems. 
 According to Hastings (2004), a Multi Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) tool 
was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to analyze system 
architectures with the goal of maximizing system attributes.  This process focuses on the needs 
of the stakeholders and the driving preferences are captured in attributes using Multi Attribute 
Utility Theory and forms a preference space for which potential systems will be evaluated (Ross 
et al., 2002).  Ross (2003) further developed the MATE process into MATE-CON; which was an 
extension into Concurrent Design.  Ross et al. (2004) also developed this approach as a front end 
for space system development.  What the MATE process identified is the need for fully 
exploring a tradespace given the specific value attributes a customer desires.   
 In the PhD dissertation by Ross (2006), the results of a survey with industry suggested 
that other “illities” such as sustainability, flexibility, scalability, agility, and adaptability are 
poorly addressed.  The topic of tradespace exploration in the literature is rather limited in 
aerospace applications.  The likely reason for the lack of other research beyond the work 
conducted at MIT is most likely due to how industry perceives the need for tradespace 
exploration in early conceptual design. 
 In the design of human spacecraft, a variety of objectives must be explored and compared 
for future design tradeoffs.  Unlike the MATE process, the minimum functionality methodology 
proposed in this research begins with a point (minimum) design configuration that must meet 
minimum physics and physiology requirements.  This baseline configuration is based in part due 
to customer or top level objectives but is not “locked down” such that further concepts for 
minimum functionality could be evaluated in a timely manner.  The evaluation of a Safety and 
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Operability tradespace provides designers with valuable information on the relationships 
between Safety and Operability in the spacecraft configuration. 
 
2.3.3 Design Space Exploration 
 Design space exploration is similar in many respects to tradespace exploration where the 
input design variables are evaluated to determine relationships among various objectives.  
According to Acar (2010), metamodels are widely used in design space exploration and there is a 
need for developing techniques that increase the accuracy of the metamodel predictions.  Nixon 
(2006) developed a systematic design space exploration process to keep the design effort 
manageable in the conceptual design phase.  In the PhD dissertation by Villeneuve (2007), a 
concept and technology selection methodology for complex architectures was developed to 
quantify and explore the design space simultaneously.  The interesting part of the research 
conducted by Villeneuve was in how the design search space was developed using integrated 
graph theoretical concepts and Ant Colony optimization.  Because a complex engineering 
problem can have a set of hundreds of design variables, typical design space exploration 
methodologies are used to “search” the design space in order to determine potential designs that 
could be overlooked in a traditional design process. 
 
2.3.4 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization Summary 
 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization is a design approach that simultaneously evaluates 
variables in many disciplines in order to develop a system level design.  Many engineering 
problems are complex and multidisciplinary in nature.  An MDO approach couples the discipline 
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specific models for development of optimized designs. A challenge in MDO methods is how to 
balance the use of coupled high-fidelity models with the amount of computational time required.  
Because many discipline specific codes are high fidelity and complex, many researchers utilize 
metamodels as surrogate models in place of the higher fidelity models.  Especially in the early 
conceptual design stage, the use of metamodels allows designers to study a larger number of 
configurations, but at the cost of reduced accuracy.  Researchers have studied the uncertainty in 
many metamodeling approaches and proposed methods that provide greater accuracy. 
 A multiobjective optimization problem is a specific form of MDO because of the many 
and often competing objectives that must be balanced.  In many cases, the output of a MOO 
problem is given as a set of objectives that form a Pareto frontier of non-dominated solutions.  
The choice as to which solution is the preferred solution is left to decision makers who evaluate 
the various solutions through various methods such as tradespace exploration or design space 
exploration. 
 Tradespace exploration is a method used to explore the relationship between objectives 
and design space variables.  According to Ross (2006), broad exploration of the tradespace is 
often overlooked or done on an ad hoc basis.  A methodology for tradespace exploration called 
MATE was developed by MIT to evaluate tradespaces based on customer supplied value 
attributes.  Design space exploration is similar in many respects to tradespace exploration but the 
emphasis is on the study of design space regions and search strategies to develop and optimize 
design space variables.  Several PhD dissertations have been conducted on the topic of design 
space exploration and the need for fully exploring both the objective and design tradespace of a 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization problem during conceptual design. 
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2.4 RISK BASED DESIGN 
 According to Tumer et al. (2005), “Risk Based Design (RBD) can be defined as a design 
process that formally identifies the risk elements during the mission design phase and 
continuously optimizes investments and decisions to mitigate those risks.”  The work by Tumer 
et al. (2005) provided the groundwork for addressing risk in NASA programs and highlighted a 
few promising research directions for RBD based on their review of risk practices in NASA. 
 Risk Based Design methods at NASA are based on reliability analyses applied to design 
problems.  This approach is difficult in the early design stages because information is 
vague and probabilities are difficult to assign. 
 There is a need for more advanced risk informed methods.  Newer methods should treat 
risk as a tradable resource to characterize, balance, and minimize risk in the uncertain 
stage of conceptual design. 
 Designers must understand the design process, risk analysis practices, and the risk 
management efforts at NASA.  Risks and failure modes should be identified related to 
design decisions.  Decisions should also be based on the risk and failure information. 
 
 The findings by Tumer et al. (2005) describe the issues with the current NASA 
approaches for incorporating risk based design decisions early in the conceptual design process.  
The goal of their work was to lay the foundation for more collaboration between NASA 
researchers and the academic research community.  An earlier NASA report by Knight and Stone 
(2002) also highlighted many of the needs for risk based design.  Knight and Stone (2002) 
suggested that risk based design methods make the design process more robust given that a 
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systems level understanding is incorporated and detailed knowledge about the subsystems is 
utilized.  They also point out that just the use of rapid modeling and analysis tools will not 
always result in successful designs (Knight and Stone, 2002). 
 The use of risk based design methods was described in NASA’s Design, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft 
Systems (2008).  One of the guiding principles for developing a human rated spacecraft system 
was to use risk based design loops in the conceptual design phase to iterate the operations 
concept, the design and the requirements for meeting minimum objectives at minimum 
complexity (Miller et al., 2008).   
 The typical approach used by NASA for understanding risk in the early stage of 
conceptual design is through failure and risk analysis methods using traditional reliability tools.  
Tumer et al. (2005) identified the most common methods used for reliability analysis including: 
 Failure Modes Effect Analysis (FMEA), 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA), 
 Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), 
 Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD), 
 Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD), and 
 Master Logic Diagram (MLD). 
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 In addition to the reliability methods listed, a method used within NASA to assess risk is 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis.  The use of PRA identifies what can go wrong, how frequently it 
will happen, and the likely consequences (Tumer et al., 2005).  The issue with PRA is that it 
requires a significant amount of information before a detailed analysis can be completed.  In the 
early stages of conceptual design, many factors such as the particular type of technologies in 
subsystems, the probability of failure of components, and the exact layout and integration of the 
subsystem components many not be fully defined.  If PRA could be used in the early stage of 
conceptual design, it would be a powerful decision tool; but the lack of information and the large 
amount of uncertainty in the design details prevents its use in the early conceptual design phase. 
 Because of the many different methods available to analyze reliability and risk, designers 
are unsure about how to integrate the methods into their current design processes (Tumer et al., 
2005).  Many designers do not have full confidence in early PRA results because of the large 
amount of assumptions used to generate the results.  In addition, the PRA results are difficult to 
understand and designers do not always have the resources for complicated risk analyses (Tumer 
et al., 2005).  To overcome these issues, it has been suggested that risk analysts work closely 
with design engineers to assist with design level decisions in order to effectively steer the design 
in the early stages.  
 The work by Tumer et al. (2005) was intended to build collaboration with the academic 
community to develop additional methods that would assist design engineers in the early stages 
of the design.  A central need identified by Tumer et al. (2005) is “a comprehensive risk-
informed design tool that can be practically used in all phases of conceptual design for low 
volume high cost space missions.”  In addition, Tumer et al. (2005) emphasize the use of 
multiobjective optimization problems for generating Pareto frontiers in aerospace systems.  In 
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their words, “NASA therefore, still lacks a formalized and universal design tool that can 
quantitatively formulate an aerospace system design problem as a multiobjective optimization 
process, and tradeoff risk in a multiobjective sense” (Tumer et al., 2005). 
 A recent work by Mehr and Tumer (2006) developed a new risk based design decision 
making method referred to as Risk and Uncertainty Based Concurrent Integrated Design 
Methodology (RUBIC).  This method utilized concepts from portfolio optimization theory and 
continuous resource management to provide a mathematical rigor for risk based decision 
making.  In their approach, they assumed that risk of an element is not independent of other 
elements in the system and that risk can be traded between elements and subsystems based on 
weighting the criticality of different elements and subsystems (Mehr and Tumer, 2006).   
  
2.4.1 Reliability Analysis 
 NASA defines Reliability as: “the probability that an item will perform its intended 
function for a specified interval under stated conditions.  The function of an item may be 
composed of a combination of individual sub-functions to which the top level reliability value 
can be apportioned” (NASA, 1998).  Reliability analyses are the tools and activities that are 
used to calculate the reliability in a system.   
 A common tool for understanding potential areas of failure is FMEA; which has been 
extensively used for systems safety and for the reliability analysis in many industries (Sharma et 
al., 2007).  FMEA is a top down approach that focuses on the loss of functionality in a given 
design.  In FMEA, the failure modes of the system are identified that could affect the system and 
its performance.  Failure modes are typically scored according to criticality, likelihood of 
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detection, and severity of the failure.  The three scores are multiplied to obtain a Risk Priority 
Number (RPN).  For each high RPN, risk management techniques are used to mitigate the 
identified risk as the design is matured.   
 The difficulty with FMEA approaches is that for complex systems, a large amount of data 
is required and the data that is available is subject to uncertainty (Sharma et al., 2007).  To 
overcome the issue with uncertainty, Sharma et al. (2007) developed a knowledge based 
approximate reasoning methodology that can be coupled with traditional FMEA. 
 Another failure mode approach that focuses on specific components in functions is 
known as a FMECA.  A FMECA is a bottom up reliability analysis that evaluates all of the 
major components in order to identify single point failures and hazards overlooked in other 
system analysis techniques (FAA, 2005).  The disadvantage of FMECA is that it does not 
account for multiple and coupled faults and failures; thus it could give an optimistic estimate of 
system reliability if a quantitative approach is used.  The FMECA should be used with other 
analyses such as FTA to develop reliability estimates (FAA, 2005). 
 A Fault Tree Analysis is a top down approach that illustrates the sequence of events that 
lead to an unfavorable event and provides a quantitative estimate of system reliability (FAA, 
2005).  FTA uses logical symbols to graphically show the progression of a failure on other 
components in the system.  There may be different outcomes to a single event depending upon 
how the failures are controlled or mitigated through fault tolerance. A FTA is conducted when a 
design concept is mature such that failure rates and probability information is available.  A 
detailed explanation of NASA’s approach for FTA can be found in the Fault Tree Handbook 
with Aerospace Applications (NASA, 2002).   
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 Much like the FTA, an ETA is a bottom up approach that graphically explores system 
responses to an initiating event and assesses the probability of the outcome (FAA, 2005).  The 
use of ETA allows designers to assess multiple coexisting faults and failures and identifies 
vulnerabilities.  These vulnerabilities might contain failure propagation throughout the system.  
An ETA is specific to a single initiating event, so multiple analyses could be required for a 
system.  As with FTA, an ETA requires a large amount of data associated with the design and 
interfaces.  An ETA is likely to be conducted when the design is mature beyond the conceptual 
design phase. 
 Another common technique that is used in tradeoffs related to system safety is the use of 
Reliability Block Diagrams.  A RBD illustrates the logical connection between subsystem 
components and can be used to mathematically model the system probability; thus it is useful for 
evaluating various potential configurations (FAA, 2005).  In the example of early conceptual 
design, designers would assign reliability targets for specific components in the subsystems if 
data was not available.  The disadvantage to this approach is that a considerable amount of 
modeling needs to be developed in order to understand reliability sensitivities in the system.  Not 
all systems can be easily modeled using RBD; including non-hardware failure mitigation 
measures (FAA, 2005). 
 The various reliability analysis methods approach the quantification of system reliability 
in a different manner.  Most of the methods require complementary analysis such as FMECA 
should be used with FTA and ETA.  RBD should also be used with ETA to uncover all of the 
potential failures and hazards that could be overlooked with a single approach. 
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2.4.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
 Probabilistic Risk Assessment was identified as a need in 1996 in order to support 
decisions for Space Shuttle upgrades (Stamatelatos et al., 2002).  The reason for adopting PRA 
was to quantify the amount of safety improvement based on the proposed upgrades.  According 
to NASA NPR 8705.5, PRA is defined as: 
“A comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis methodology aimed at identifying and 
assessing risks in complex technological systems.  PRA is generally used for low probability, 
high consequence events for which limited statistical data exist.  – Its application is targeted 
at risk environments common within NASA that may involve the compromise of safety, 
inclusive of the potential loss of life, personal injury, and loss or degradation of high value 
property” (NASA, 2004). 
 
 The emphasis on safety, performance, and mission success is the primary focus of PRA.  
Although it is not a risk management tool, it provides information to decision makers about 
potential issues in the design that could compromise safety.  Risks must either be mitigated 
through continuous design or testing; or the risk is accepted as part of the overall risk strategy.  
PRA informs the decision makers of the sources of risk in order to provide information that will 
determine costs associated with reducing uncertainty (NASA, 2004). 
 The PRA process is different from traditional reliability analysis because it is focused on 
answering three basic questions. (1) What can go wrong? (2) How likely is it? (3) What are the 
consequences?  (NASA, 2004)  NASA uses three different levels of PRA depending upon the 
scope and maturity of the design.  These levels are listed as the following: 
 Full Scope PRA contains all major PRA components and addresses all applicable end 
states that lead to loss of crew, accidental exposure, potential illness or death of public or 
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ground based personnel, loss of ground facilities, loss of space based facilities, mission 
abort, loss of mission, and mission reconfiguration. 
 Limited Scope PRA defined on a case by case basis so that the results can provide 
specific answers to identified mission critical questions and safety concerns rather than an 
assessment of all risks. 
 Simplified PRA identifies and quantifies major risk contributors and applies to systems of 
less available data.  Contains a reduced set of scenarios or simplified scenarios designed 
to capture only essential top level mission risk contributors (NASA, 2004). 
 
 The various levels of a PRA analysis cover a wide range of risk assessments.  In the 
conceptual design phase where data is limited and sometimes unknown, the Simplified PRA is 
the most logical choice for identifying risks that are related to top level mission objectives.  As 
mentioned earlier, a PRA does not mitigate risk but serves to identify where the issues are 
located in the design.  Whether it is lack of information or incorrect design assumptions, the PRA 
is used to uncover design faults such that resources can be allocated as the design matures.  A 
comprehensive guide to the use of PRA can be found in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners by Stamatelatos et al. (2002). 
 According to Tumer et al. (2005) one of the main drawbacks to the use of PRA for early 
conceptual design is the limited amount of data.  The use of knowledge bases of quantitative data 
to derive probabilities has been suggested as a possible solution for reducing uncertainty in PRA.  
This approach seems rather logical, but lessons learned on historical development programs may 
be unable to predict the future behavior of the equipment (Sharma et al., 2007).  The use of PRA 
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approaches are better suited for mature designs and the use of PRA in the conceptual design 
phase could be very uncertain and cumbersome given the final design configuration is in a state 
of flux.   
 
2.4.3 Risk Based Design Summary 
 Risk based design is a process for identifying and mitigating risks in the early design 
phase.  A key issue identified by Tumer et al. (2005) is the need for newer approaches that 
couple traditional reliability analyses with a more risk informed approach in the conceptual 
design phase.  Many of the typical reliability analysis and risk assessment tools used by NASA 
are applicable to designs that have reached a level of maturity such that probabilities of failure in 
components, subsystem configurations, and operation concepts are fully defined.  The reason 
why traditional approaches do not work well for the conceptual design phase is due to the large 
amount of uncertainty and design flexibility.  The detailed nature of PRA does not lend itself to 
very simple assessments of risk and often designers do not accept the results based on the 
assumptions used to generate the analysis.  Other reliability methods also suffer from the same 
problem as PRA in conceptual design.  The lack of information and design definition in the early 
stages prevents an accurate assessment of the overall risk posture of a spacecraft design. 
 The work presented in this research is intended to provide a method to allow designers to 
quantify and trade the amount of risk through a “Safety Index” that will  allow comparison of 
various spacecraft configurations in the early stages of conceptual design.  The use of this index 
is not intended to replace PRA methods, but provide designers with an easy to understand and 
implement process that provides a “measure of goodness” related to future PRA analysis of 
matured spacecraft designs. 
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2.5 MINIMUM FUNCTIONALITY DESIGN 
 Minimum functionality design is a design approach where a baseline configuration is 
defined before trading other factors in human spacecraft designs.  Minimum functionality 
recently gained attention in the Altair Lunar Lander project.  According to the NASA Broad 
Agency Announcement for the Constellation Lunar Lander Development Study in 2008: 
“This design is intended to provide as close to a minimum configuration reasonable to 
evaluate in order to conclusively buy down risk through a deliberate “add-back” process - 
Minimum functionality means that the LDAC-1 Lander design does not incorporate any 
additional capabilities beyond those required to perform the reference mission” (NASA, 
2008). 
 
 The design approach for minimum functionality in the development of the Altair Lunar 
Lander started with a single point baseline design point of departure for cost and risk trades in 
order to justify mass “add-backs” to the subsystems in the form of additional redundancy and 
safety (Cohen, 2009).  The phrase “minimum functionality” as a combination of the words 
“minimum” and “functionality” carries various meanings among different organizations.  For 
example, NASA defines minimum functionality as a minimum configuration spacecraft that will 
perform a successful baseline mission without considering failures or contingencies (NASA, 
2008).   This methodology was first introduced in the Lunar Development Analysis Cycle One 
(LDAC-1) for the Altair Lunar Lander (Cohen, 2009).  In addition, the Orion Crew Exploration 
Vehicle used a similar approach of creating a baseline design with a set of “minimum functions” 
called the “Zero Based Vehicle” (Hu et al., 2008).  According to NASA’s Design, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems, a 
minimum functional design is the simplest, most robust, and highest performance design option 
as the starting point for assessing fault tolerance (Miller et al., 2008).  In each of these 
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approaches, the common theme is that a “minimum” spacecraft configuration is defined to meet 
the desired requirements for a baseline “minimum” mission.  The minimum functional and 
minimum mass configuration serves as a starting point boundary configuration for adding mass 
to reduce risk through increasing fault tolerance, safety, and mission specific operability. 
 Much of the confusion between different minimum functionality approaches is how the 
minimum or starting point configuration is defined before trading other aspects of safety, 
reliability, performance, and cost.  In NASA’s design methodology, a minimum baseline vehicle 
included minimum acceptable Factors of Safety (FoS).  In the Orion ZBV, the intent was to 
reduce the mass of an existing spacecraft design to a minimum mission configuration (Hu et al., 
2008).  Both of these approaches prescribe minimum functionality according to “minimum 
mission requirements” which included aspects of mission operability.  The research presented 
here builds upon the previous concepts of minimum functionality design to define a standardized 
approach that can be used across various conceptual spacecraft design activities.    
 
2.5.1 NASA’s Minimum Functionality Design Approach 
 Because the Lunar Ascent Module contributed the most to the overall mass of the lunar 
mission architecture, a reduction in mass of this spacecraft reduces the required Earth launch 
mass significantly.  Using the Apollo Lunar Excursion Module as an example, a 1 lb. increase in 
the Lunar Ascent Module mass increased the Saturn V gross launch vehicle mass by 883 lb. 
(Thompson et al., 2010).  Thus, a need to design the Lunar Ascent Module to its minimum 
optimized mass is one of the reasons NASA used a “non-traditional” spacecraft design 
philosophy.  This design approach first defined a minimum functionality baseline spacecraft that 
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was assumed to be “non-flyable” because of single strings in the minimum number of 
subsystems required to complete a minimum implementation mission (Dorris, 2008). 
 NASA utilized a set of development cycles to design the Altair Lunar Lander in a true 
risk informed approach. In the LDAC-1 cycle, a “minimum functional” vehicle was developed 
to meet a minimum set of baseline mission requirements.  According to Cohen (2009), the 
designers and systems engineers determined what would be the minimum configuration based on 
single-string redundancy for the subsystems without accounting for failures through fault 
tolerance or other contingencies (Cohen, 2009).  One of the issues identified during this early 
analysis cycle was a lack of expertise in spacecraft developers.  The lack of recent human 
spaceflight projects did not provide the required experience base for understanding all of the 
critical issues in spacecraft development (Dorris, 2008).   
 In the LDAC-2 design cycle, the previous baseline configuration was matured in order to 
reduce risk through cost/risk trades to determine the most significant contributors to LOC.  In the 
LDAC-3 design cycle, the largest contributors to LOM were identified and cost/risk trades were 
performed to optimize the design (Dorris, 2008).  Mass additions through increased subsystem 
redundancy and fault tolerance were justified by stakeholders in the various subsystems (Cohen, 
2009) 
 The non-traditional approach used by NASA was a different methodology than the 
typical government oversight programs of industry charged design and development process.  
The minimum functionality approach was also based on a belief that a traditional Systems 
Engineering approach was too costly (Cohen, 2009).   The intent of the initial government study 
was to mature the design to a point in the lifecycle such as Systems Requirements Review or 
System Definition Review before handing the design over to industry for further development. 
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 According to Cohen (2009), the minimum functional approach created concerns that the 
minimum functionality design was too small and would affect crew productivity.  The focus on 
minimizing everything in the spacecraft included minimizing habitable volume as well.  Other 
concerns such as an EVA porch and line of sight for landing were noted as challenges that would 
need to be addressed (Cohen, 2009).  The issues raised by Cohen (2009) were known by NASA 
and based on the recommendations given by Northrop Grumman on the design of the Altair 
Lunar Lander; one can easily understand that a redesign effort is likely after the design is handed 
over to industry.  Thus, the initial work conducted by NASA served two purposes, first, it trained 
a workforce at NASA in spacecraft development and second, it presented a preferred design 
configuration by NASA to reduce unnecessary trade studying in later phases of development.   
 NASA asked industry to provide feedback to the LDAC-1 minimum functional 
configuration.  The work by Cohen (2009) presented several findings for design issues related to 
crew productivity, pilot view angle, separate habitat and airlock, required habitable volume, 
required airlock volume, pressurized payload implications for lunar surface science, and 
symmetry about the thrust axis.  Although NASA proposed a minimum functional design for the 
LDAC cycles, there were issues raised about human factors being an important part of the top 
level objectives (Cohen, 2009).  A full understanding of the role of human factors and the 
required habitable volume needed for sustaining humans for a long period of time such as an 
extended lunar sortie is one of the issues that should be addressed in any minimum functional 
design approach. 
 The work performed by NASA in the development of the Altair Lunar Lander was 
utilized a risk based design approach and designed the vehicle using a bottom-up philosophy in 
order to understand the impacts of subsystem redundancy on performance, safety, risk, and 
72 
 
mission operability.  Although NASA succeeded in developing a baseline design concept, issues 
with design maturity seem to be evident as expressed by Cohen (2009).  One may imagine that a 
future Altair Lunar Lander might be different from the initial concepts developed by NASA.  
One of the lessons learned from the activities performed by NASA is that the minimum 
functionality process needs to be flexible enough such that design issues can be investigated 
earlier.  The minimum functionality design methodology presented in this research builds upon 
the previous lessons to demonstrate how human factors can be incorporated in the early stage of 
the conceptual design process. 
  
2.5.2 Orion Zero Based Minimum Functionality Approach  
 Because of mass concerns with the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle at the end of the first 
Design Analysis Cycle (DAC-1), a minimum functionality approach was utilized to “scrub” the 
mass of the entire spacecraft before System Definition Review (Hu et al., 2008; Jordan, 2009).  
The Orion approach was in many respects similar to NASA’s minimum functionality design, but 
the definition of the minimum configuration spacecraft was slightly different than an all single 
string subsystems as defined by the LDAC-1 design cycle.  In the minimum functionality Orion 
configuration, components were removed from the existing spacecraft design to reach a 
configuration without “non-essential” components.  Similar to the NASA approach, the 
minimum configuration was not a “flyable” configuration, but served as a point of departure for 
adding back subsystem components.  In the Orion ZBV, not all the subsystems were single 
string, the redundancy was reduced to one fault tolerance for safety critical subsystems and zero 
fault tolerance for mission success (Jordan, 2009).   
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 The weight reduction effort utilized the Orion Vehicle Engineering and Integration 
Working Group to lead the process for adding subsystem components back to the spacecraft (Hu 
et al., 2008; Jordan, 2009).  Components and functions to be added to the ZBV were prioritized 
according to safety, robustness, and mission objectives (Jordan, 2009).  All safety critical items 
were considered mandatory add backs.  A series of operational assessments was conducted and 
subsystem components were ranked according to impact on operations. 
 Although the ZBV activity was similar to NASA’s minimum functionality design, the 
two approaches shared the common methodology of justifying add backs to the configuration 
through safety, performance, risk, and mission objectives.  The minimum functional 
configuration was different between the two approaches, but the concept of establishing a 
baseline for subsequent trading of design attributes was the common theme.  A total of 2500 kg 
was removed from the Orion spacecraft as a result of the ZBV activity and maintained needed 
functionality for lunar sortie missions (Hu et al., 2008).  
 
2.5.3 NASA Processes for Developing Safe and Reliable Human Spacecraft  
 The focus of minimum functionality design is to first establish a baseline configuration 
before the trading of performance, safety, risk, and mission objectives.  A minimum functional 
spacecraft configuration would never be considered as a realistic flyable spacecraft design until 
the risk and reliability is within acceptable levels for human rated requirements.  During the 
Altair LDAC-2 and 3 cycles, the addition of subsystem components increased safety and reduced 
risk in order to meet reliability thresholds. 
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 A recent technical report by NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center, entitled the Design, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated 
Spacecraft Systems, Miller et al. (2008) described a methodology for developing safe and 
reliable human rated systems.  In their approach, the safety and reliability requirements are 
specified through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding failure probability, and adhering to proven 
practices and standards (Miller et al., 2008).  Spacecraft systems should be designed with fault 
tolerance supported by probabilistic safety, reliability, and risk analysis backed up with data and 
analysis.  In a minimum functionality design approach, the determination of fault tolerance and 
reliability is one of the key activities in order to justify the mass additions. 
 The NASA guidelines outlined a conceptual design minimum functionality process for 
spacecraft development in Section 2.3, Conceiving the Right System, Critical Activities Early in 
the Life Cycle (Miller et al., 2008).  Similar to the Altair design activity, the NASA guidelines 
specify a risk based design approach to iterate the operations concept, design, and requirements 
“until the system meets mission objectives at minimum complexity and is achievable within 
constraints” (Miller et al., 2008).  The minimum functional approach first begins with a set of 
top level mission objectives that determine the high level requirements.  Second, a minimum set 
of functions are defined to accomplish the mission objectives; this could be considered the 
“minimum functionality” needed for the mission.  But what the guidelines do not clarify is how 
to develop a minimum set of functions other than what is needed to accomplish the mission 
objectives.  Third, the simplest conceptual design of the proposed system is developed.  In this 
step, the description of the simplest system is the most robust and highest performance.  It is 
unknown if subsystem redundancy is intended to be a part of this minimum configuration.  The 
description of “most robust” could be interpreted as single highly reliable components or 
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redundant subsystems that provide a high level of reliability.  Clarification of “most robust” is 
needed to assist designers in this critical step of development.  The fourth step in the design 
process adds independent elements in order to increase safety.  A decrease in performance is 
accepted as long as reliability is increased to meet safety.  Risk and reliability analyses are 
conducted to determine potential failure modes and evaluate design options.  Next, components 
are added for mission success and evaluated for safety and risk.  Finally, the cost and schedule 
are identified to mature the conceptual design.  
 The NASA guidelines for creating a safe and reliable system are very similar to the 
design and development of the Altair Lunar Lander.  Although the approach is not titled 
“minimum functionality”, it is a process that shares many of the key aspects.  The only 
disadvantage to this approach is that it is subject to different levels of interpretation as to what is 
the “most simple” or “most robust” system.  In the example of comparing two different 
configurations of spacecraft to perform the same mission, the only design attributes that could be 
realistically compared are mass, risk, reliability, and cost.  Judging a spacecraft on these 
parameters alone will often overlook other necessary “illities” such as complexity, 
maintainability, and utility. 
 
2.5.4 NASA Human Rated Spacecraft Requirements 
 Because a minimum functional design would never be considered a flyable design, the 
addition of redundancy and safety in the design is necessary to achieve levels that satisfy human 
rating requirements.  Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems are defined in the NASA 
procedural requirements document NPR 8705.2B.  Because of the recent Commercial Crew 
Development activity, NASA needed to specify the requirements for human rating crewed 
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systems.  The technical requirements in Section 3 specify safety requirements through fault 
tolerance or redundancy, control requirements, and abort requirements.  Mentioned in paragraph 
3.1.2, the requirements are not intended to be “all inclusive or an absolute prescription for 
human rating” (NASA, 2009).  The designers of a spacecraft system should evaluate the 
technical requirements to develop the safest practical system that will meet the mission 
objectives.  The set of human rating requirements is likely the minimum set of requirements that 
must be satisfied in order to achieve human rating certification.  However, many more 
requirements may be levied on a design depending upon risks in the design or incorporation of 
newer unproven technologies.  Each spacecraft design will likely follow its own process for 
human rating and achieving NASA certification in regards to safety and reliability. 
 
2.5.5 Minimum Functionality Design Summary 
 Minimum functionality design is a non-traditional design approach in the conceptual 
design of human spacecraft.  Its purpose is to establish a baseline configuration such that 
additional mass additions can be justified based on performance, safety, reliability, and mission 
objectives.  The minimum functional configuration would never be considered as a flyable 
design and serves only as a lower boundary condition for trading additional design parameters.  
The approach was derived from a risk based approach to justify the needs and requirements for a 
baseline mission.  A similar approach to minimum functionality was used in the Orion program 
where a design configuration called the Zero Based Vehicle was defined as a lower boundary for 
subsequent trading of subsystem redundancy and fault tolerance to meet the mission objectives 
of a lunar mission.  Although the differences in the Orion approach compared to the Altair 
approach were slightly different in implementation, the common theme among the two design 
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activities was the development of a lower baseline configuration in order to justify additional 
subsystem redundancy and fault tolerance to meet safety and mission requirements.  
 Deciding the amount of “safety” in a spacecraft is a difficult task and open to different 
interpretations because the exact safety requirements will depend upon the particular spacecraft 
design.  In response, NASA developed a set of Human Rating Requirements for Spacecraft 
Systems to define requirements that must be achieved in order to be utilized by NASA.  The 
NASA procedural requirements document NPR 8705.2B serves the purpose of defining the 
critical safety requirements for obtaining human rated certification.  Depending upon the 
spacecraft design, additional safety requirements may be levied on the design and the 
requirement specified are not all inclusive.  The goal of a minimum functional design process is 
to first establish a credible design baseline that will be used to evaluate risk reduction and safety 
improvements.  The process of adding components that increase safety and mission objectives 
should be based on a risk based design approach where the reliability in the overall systems is 
evaluated in an iterative fashion.   
 
2.6 LUNAR SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT 
 A human lunar spacecraft, commonly known as a Lunar Lander or Lunar Habitat is very 
much different from other spacecraft designs such as capsules and lifting bodies.  Although there 
are many similarities to conventional LEO spacecraft, a lunar spacecraft must operate in a 
different set of environments on the surface of the moon including: thermal cycling, radiation, 
dust, lighting, and micrometeoroids (Cohen, 2009).  Significant lessons were learned during the 
Apollo missions that will assist designers in the development of future lunar spacecraft.  
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However, there is much to be learned before establishing a human presence on the moon and the 
goals of the Constellation program were intended to fulfill this purpose.   
 Development human lunar spacecraft presents many challenges.  The design team must 
consider the number of crew members, where the crew will land, and how long the mission will 
last.  The coordination of systems, people, and resources needed for a mission requires the 
collaborative efforts of many organizations including government, industry, and academia.  The 
success of the Apollo program was due to the cooperative work of 20,000 companies and 
400,000 people across the country (Fries, 1992; Kelly 2001).  Because of the large number of 
people and systems involved in the lunar architecture design, a Systems Engineering approach is 
necessary to develop and manage the spacecraft architecture from concept to end of life. 
 The focus of this section provides information about the design and development of the 
Apollo and Constellation programs.  This information will be helpful in understanding the Lunar 
Ascent Module design concepts presented as part of the research in this dissertation.  Although 
the literature contains vast information about the Apollo Lunar Excursion Module (LEM), a 
summary of the significant development challenges will be presented.  For the Constellation 
program’s Altair Lunar Lander, a summary of the design concept will be presented beginning 
with the Exploration System Architecture Study.  The intent of this section is not intended to 
provide a comprehensive review of the Lunar Lander literature, but provide information about 
the difficulties and challenges associated with the development of human lunar spacecraft. 
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2.6.1 Apollo Lunar Module Program 
 The goal of the Apollo program was to put a man on the moon and return him safely to 
Earth.  The goals given by President Kennedy in his May 25, 1961 speech before Congress 
became a reality with the successful mission of Apollo 11 on July 20, 1969.  The success of the 
moon landing was in a large part due to the development of the Apollo Lunar Module.  The 
Apollo Lunar Module was conceived, designed, and manufactured by the Grumman Corporation 
(Kelly, 2001).  The most remarkable aspect of this achievement is that the LEM evolved from a 
conceptual idea to operational hardware on the lunar surface in a period of less than 9 years.  The 
successful cooperation between NASA and contractor development teams was likely the main 
reason for the rapid development. 
 Shown in Figure 3 is an illustration of the LEM.  The two parts of the LEM consisted of 
an Ascent and Descent Stage.  The spacecraft was approximately 23 feet tall and 31 feet wide 
across the extended landing gear.  The final vehicle mass was 36,100 lbs at Earth launch with 
approximately 10,000 lbs of wet Ascent mass upon liftoff from the moon (NASA, 1972).  The 
Ascent Stage served a dual purpose of providing a habitable volume and transportation from the 
lunar surface to Low Lunar Orbit.  The LEM was designed for a crew of 2 and duration of 
approximately 3 days on the lunar surface.  The Descent Stage served the purpose of landing the 
spacecraft and providing consumables while on the lunar surface. 
80 
 
 
Figure 3:  Apollo Lunar Module (NASA, 1972). 
 
 The development of the LEM proved to be a challenge for the Grumman Corporation.  
From the beginning of the LEM program, there were schedule delays, hardware failures, 
requirements creep, and mass increase after the conceptual design phase.  The conceptual design 
launch weight of the LEM was initially proposed at 22,000 lbs and grew to 33,000 lbs by the 
time of Apollo 11 (Kelly, 2001).  It is interesting to note that the five most important 
considerations given by Grumman in the conceptual design proposal of the LEM were:  
 Propulsion design and development,  
 Flight control system design and development, 
 Reliability, 
 Weight control, and 
 LEM configuration. 
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 All of the initial considerations experienced later design challenges that led to an increase 
in mass of the LEM and were not immediately obvious during the conceptual design phase.  
Mass became the main driver in the design of the LEM as subsystems were being developed.  
The mass growth from the conceptual design was largely due to overcoming technical challenges 
in the development of subsystems and integration.  A large amount of mass increase was 
discovered through the use of mockup prototypes during preliminary design.   The major factors 
that drove LEM mass during the preliminary design phase were reliability requirements, mission 
operational requirements, and configuration definition.  As the design team studied the design 
reference missions specified by NASA, the understanding of mission operations requirements 
improved and the mass increased (Kelly, 2001).  The final flight design of the LEM launched by 
the Saturn V fully utilized the allocated payload weight of approximately 36,100 lbs.  A 
comprehensive story of the LEM development from the early concepts to the first lunar landing 
can be found in Moon Lander: How we developed the Apollo Lunar Module (Kelly, 2001). 
 
2.6.2    Constellation Lunar Lander Program 
 When President Bush outlined the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) in February 2004, 
the new exploration spacecraft that would achieve this goal were concepts based on previous 
studies.  The development of the new Constellation program spacecraft would follow a “building 
block” approach as NASA planned to finish the International Space Station (ISS) and retire the 
Space Shuttle by 2010.  The initial exploration study of the VSE was documented in the NASA 
ESAS report.  In this report, various launch configurations and lunar missions were studied and 
an approach to the exploration architecture is shown in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4:  ESAS lunar mission architecture (NASA, 2005). 
 
 Unlike Apollo, the Constellation lunar mission architecture utilized two launch systems.  
The first launch vehicle, (later named Ares I), would consist of a single Space Shuttle derived 5-
stack solid rocket booster first stage and a modified J-2X engine for the second stage.  This 
launch vehicle would ferry a crew of 4 in the Orion CEV to LEO.  The second launch vehicle, 
(later named Ares V) would be the next heavy-lift launch vehicle for the United States and would 
carry the Lunar Lander and Earth Departure Stage to LEO for docking with the Orion CEV.  The 
Ares V concept utilized two 5-stack solid rocket boosters for the first stage and 5 RS-68 liquid 
engines for continuous burn throughout the first and second stages.  The third stage of the Ares V 
utilized the J-2X engine of the Earth Departure Stage to reach a parking orbit in LEO.  The Orion 
CEV and Ares I were the only systems to reach a PDR level of design maturity; while the Lunar 
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Lander, Earth Departure Stage, and the Ares V were not fully matured to PDR levels by the time 
the Constellation program was cancelled.   
 As outlined in the ESAS report, the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) undocks 
from the CEV, performs an orbital plane change, and lands on the lunar surface with a crew of 
four.  The Orion CEV would remain unattended in a yet to be determined lunar orbit.  After a 7 
day sortie, the ascent stage of the LSAM launches the crew into Low Lunar Orbit (LLO) to dock 
with the CEV.  The ascent stage of the LSAM is discarded in LLO and the crew returns to Earth 
in the CEV.  This lunar mission architecture utilized a method known as Earth Orbit Rendezvous 
– Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (EOR-LOR) and was found by the ESAS study team to provide 
superior performance and the highest reliability of mission success (NASA, 2005).  Shown in 
Figure 5 is the proposed LSAM Lander concept detailed in the ESAS report. 
 
Figure 5: LSAM concept (NASA, 2005). 
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 The proposed design objectives of the Altair Lunar Lander (formerly known as LSAM) 
were very much different from the Apollo LEM.   The Altair Lunar Lander was designed to carry 
a crew of four, be able to land at any location on the moon, and remain on the surface for up to 2 
weeks.  The small size and weight of the Apollo LEM was largely driven by the shroud diameter 
and payload launch capacity of the Saturn V launch vehicle.  The Apollo LEM was designed for 
landings close the Moon’s equator and short sortie missions lasting no longer than 3 days.  
Unlike Apollo, the focus of lunar exploration in the Constellation program was to develop a 
permanent human presence on the moon.  Shown in Figure 6 was the latest configuration of the 
Altair Lunar Lander concept at the end of the Constellation program. 
 
 
Figure 6: Altair Lunar Lander concept. 
      
 In addition to issues related to configuration and design, the cost of developing the Lunar 
Lander was a limiting factor.  According to information presented by the NASA Lunar Lander 
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Project Office at the 3rd annual Space Exploration Conference, the cost of developing the Lunar 
Lander will exceed funding capability through Phase B. (Dorris, 2008).  The two options that 
NASA faced were either postponing significant Lunar Lander work or pursuing a different 
approach.  Because of the forecasted budget shortfalls, the Lunar Lander Project Office 
“streamlined” the systems engineering development process by “studying the design” and 
validating a “good set of requirements” before SRR. 
 The technological differences between the Apollo and Constellation programs were 
significant in regards to the amount of operational capability that was to be included in the Altair 
design.  In Apollo, the objective was to land a man on the moon for short term sortie missions 
lasting no longer than 3 days.  The focus of the Constellation program was to start with sortie 
missions lasting up to 7 days to develop infrastructure on the lunar surface for a future lunar 
outpost.  The ESAS report concluded that the proposed architecture would have the following 
advantages when compared to the Apollo program; 
 Double the number of crew to the lunar surface; 
 Four times the number of lunar surface crew hours for sortie missions; 
 Global lunar surface access with anytime return to Earth; 
 Enabling a permanent human presence at a lunar outpost; 
 Demonstrating systems and technologies for human Mars missions; 
 Making use of in-situ lunar resources; and  
 Providing significantly higher human safety and mission reliability. 
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 Because the objectives of the Constellation program were more challenging than Apollo, 
a significant amount of technology development was required.  As listed in the ESAS report, the 
following developmental projects were needed in the following areas: Structures and Materials, 
Protection, Propulsion, Power, Thermal Controls, Avionics and Software, Environmental Control 
and Life Support System (ECLSS), Crew Accommodations, Mechanisms, Analysis, Integrations, 
and Operations. 
 The large number of development projects was one of the biggest hurdles in the 
Constellation program (Chaplain, 2009).  Because of funding issues and technical challenges, the 
Constellation program suffered many challenges and was officially cancelled in June 2011.  It is 
unknown if future administrations will change the direction of human exploration back to the 
moon, but the current development of the Orion Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) as an 
exploration vehicle is a step in the right direction toward extending human spaceflight beyond 
LEO.   
 
2.6.3 Lunar Spacecraft Development Summary 
 Perhaps the greatest issue facing both the Apollo and Constellation programs was the 
mass and development of the Lunar Lander.  The challenges of minimizing the mass of the 
Lunar Lander were well known at the time of the ESAS report and led to the use of a non-
traditional design approach known as minimum functionality design for the Altair Lunar Lander.  
The Apollo LEM experienced a 50% growth from the initial conceptual design phase due to 
several issues related to requirements creep, integration, and reliability.  The Altair Lunar Lander 
project recognized the same issues as Apollo and attempted to design the spacecraft within 
NASA in order to better understand the challenges.  However, the technological hurdles and 
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development issues with a limited amount of funding proved to be too much for the 
Constellation program.  Many lessons were learned during the development of the Altair Lunar 
Lander and it is hoped that this knowledge can be applied to future Lunar Lander designs.  Until 
there is motivation to go back to the moon, the current exploration plan is to use the Orion 
MPCV for exploration beyond LEO.  However, in order to establish a presence on the moon, 
resources will have to be directed toward the development of a Lander and surface systems. 
 
2.7 LITERATURE REVIEW SYNOPSIS 
 In the design of a human spacecraft, many different aspects of the design must be 
considered.  The conceptual design phase is driven by human creativity in the exploration of 
various spacecraft configurations.  The task is challenging and many organizations have 
struggled to bring designs to operation, but the prevalent theme in a large majority of the 
literature is the need to explore and quantify the uncertainties associated with a conceptual 
design such that additional flexibility and margin for growth can be accommodated as the design 
matures.  The information presented in this Literature Review explored many of the topics 
related to conceptual design and human spacecraft. 
 
2.7.1    General Summary of the Literature 
 Much has been learned over the past 50 years in human spaceflight, but the risks and 
uncertainties of exploring new environments presents challenges to spacecraft designers.  Since 
the 1960’s, NASA has utilized a process known as Systems Engineering for the design, 
development, and operation of human spacecraft.  Systems Engineering emerged from the 
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management of technological projects during World War II (Emes et. al., 2005).   Because SE is 
interpreted differently among various organizations, there is not a universal definition (Emes et 
al., 2005).  Systems Engineering is more than a traditional management approach, it serves as a 
leadership role to guide the traditional engineering disciplines (NASA, 2007a). 
 The conceptual design phase is one of the most important phases for determining the 
overall cost of a program (NASA 1995; Adelstein et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2008).  According to 
NASA, conceptual designs are offered to demonstrated feasibility and support programmatic 
estimates (NASA, 1995).  However, the processes used in conceptual design are often 
unstructured and not well understood (Jilla and Miller, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2003).  Traditional 
methods rely on methods that settle on a preferred design early in the process without 
considering other many potential designs (McManus et al., 2004).   In addition, the conceptual 
design phase is difficult to translate into a methodology that is useful to both experienced and 
inexperienced designers (Bryant, et al., 2005).  Because of the lack of standardized process and 
difficulty communicating ideas, the conceptual design phase contains many uncertainties 
(Hastings and McManus, 2004; Chudoba and Huang, 2006; German and Daskilewicz, 2009).  In 
order to understand the issues in conceptual design, models that express the relationships 
between the design parameters and fundamental requirements should be utilized (Scheidl and 
Winkler, 2010).   
 Before the start of conceptual design activity, the top level mission objectives or 
customer needs must be clearly defined.  This is the foundation for what is expected in the 
overall design in terms of performance, risk, schedule, and cost (NASA, 1995).  In the example 
of Constellation, NASA chose to redefine top level objectives based on inadequate levels of 
funding and technical challenges (Chaplain, 2009).   
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 Given a set of clearly defined top level mission objectives, the next logical step in a 
spacecraft conceptual design process is to determine the activities that need to take place for the 
mission to be successful. A functional decomposition process identifies and states the 
“functions” or the activities that need to take place in the overall system architecture during a 
given mission.  The development of functional models is one of the first steps in systematic 
methods for product development (Cowan et al., 2006; Pahl and Beitz, 1996; Ulrich and 
Eppinger, 2000, Roy et al., 2008; Kitamura and Mizoguchi, 2003).  A drawbacks associated with 
functional decomposition is that the knowledge about functionality is usually scattered among 
designers in the conceptual design phase (Kitamura and Mizoguchi, 2003; Ingham et al., 2006).  
The large number of relationships among discipline specific functions cannot always be fully 
explored (Camelo and Mulet, 2010).  Regardless of the challenges, functional decomposition 
remains a key process in conceptual design to understand the fundamental needs of the 
spacecraft in order to properly trade potential solutions. 
 Obtaining knowledge in the conceptual design phase is a key activity in the investigation 
of solutions that match to a functional decomposition.  To describe how knowledge can flow 
across boundaries, Star (1989) coined the term “Boundary Objects”.  Boundary Objects are 
representations of knowledge used to improve communication and understanding between 
different groups (Star 1989; Carlile 2002; Carlile 2004; Dare et al., 2004).  In a study conducted 
by Brereton and McGarry (2000) on engineering design thinking and communication, they 
concluded that design thinking is heavily dependent upon experiences with physical objects and 
materials and emphasize the need for hardware as a tool for visualizing abstract concepts and 
exploring the design space.  The use of prototypes in the context of Boundary Objects facilitates 
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communication between multidisciplinary groups and helps to resolve discrepancies before a 
design configuration is selected. 
 Physical prototyping has been successfully used to develop and understand design 
integration.  During the development of the Apollo Lunar Module, many uncertainties were 
discovered in preliminary design with the use of mockups (Kelly, 2001).  A mockup of proposed 
lunar habitats was constructed by NASA Johnson Space Center to demonstrate integration of 
several subsystems for near-term exploration habitats (Kennedy, 2006).  Research conducted by 
Mulenburg and Gundo (2004) described a method titled “Design-by-Prototype” to simplify the 
conceptual design process.  Although prototyping is not a new concept, its use in different 
contexts is prevalent in the literature.  The main reason for using mockups, hardware, or 
prototypes is that uncertainties in the conceptual design can be investigated in a method that 
increases communication between multidisciplinary groups. 
 Computer Aided Design is a well established engineering tool used in the design of 
structures and assemblies.  Computer Aided Design model information can be utilized by high 
fidelity analysis programs such as Finite Element Analysis and Computational Fluid Dynamics.  
Wang and Shan (2007) reported that it takes Ford Motor Company about 36 to 160 hours to run 
one crash simulation with their FEA models.  The huge computational expense has led many 
researchers to investigate the use of approximation models as an alternative to high fidelity and 
time intensive computational codes.  As computing power increases and technology becomes 
available, the future of Computer Aided Design is likely to utilize Virtual Prototyping to a 
greater extent.  According to Choi and Chan (2004), for process simulation, virtual reality can be 
used to determine bottlenecks in manufacturing or production.  The overall goal of virtual 
prototyping is to simulate the many physical aspects of a design in a digital world. 
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 Predicting mass during the conceptual design phase has been a common problem for 
aerospace systems.  Programs such as X-30 and X-33 were not as successful due to mass growth, 
technical difficulties, and incorrect assumptions during the conceptual design phase (Thompson 
et al., 2010).  As observed with the recent cancellation of the Constellation program, mass 
growth in Orion and Ares I was attributed with overcoming technical challenges that had not 
been anticipated in conceptual design (Chaplain, 2008). During the Apollo program, the Lunar 
Module experienced a 50% growth in mass from the initial conceptual design while the Apollo 
Command and Service Module experienced a 42% increase in mass during its development 
(Kelly, 2001; Thompson et al,, 2010).  The increase in payload mass proved to be difficult for 
the Saturn V as its first stage dry mass increased approximately 33% (Thompson et al,, 2010).  A 
study conducted by Thunnissen (2004) concluded that margins for spacecraft mass growth 
should be approximately 50% from the conceptual design phase.   
 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization is an area of research that develops systematic 
approaches for the design of complex systems governed by interacting physical phenomena 
(Alexandrov, 2005).  When first introduced in the 1990’s, the use of MDO methods for complex 
engineering problems had great promise for solving and optimizing problems.  However, the true 
use of MDO has been limited to mostly researchers and has not been widely used in realistic 
engineering problems (Alexandrov, 2005).  The central challenge in MDO is balancing the use of 
coupled high-fidelity models with the amount of computational time required to generate an 
optimized solution (Messac and Mullur, 2008). 
 Many researchers have recognized the difficulty of coupling many different types of 
high-fidelity discipline specific codes and have created approximation techniques intended to 
reduce the computational time.  Metamodeling is the process of creating a model that is an 
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approximation of a complex analysis code model (or a model of a model) (Jin, et al., 2001); 
Simpson et al., 2001; Simpson et al., 2004; Martin and Simpson, 2003; Clarke et al., 2005); 
Yang et al., 2005; Wang and Shan, 2007).  Because the surrogate or approximation models are 
based on an objective function created from a finite set of data points, there is an amount of 
uncertainty in the design solutions (Martin and Simpson, 2006).   
 Tradespace exploration is a method used to explore the various objectives in order to 
understand the relationship to the design space variables.  According to Ross (2006), tradespace 
exploration in the conceptual design phase may empower designers to overcome challenges 
associated with tendencies to reduce the design space and overlook potential design space 
solutions.  Ross (2006) conducted interviews with industry and learned that broad tradespace 
exploration is rare and often done in an ad hoc manner.  In the work by Shaw (1998), an 
approach named GINA was proposed to explore a large set of space system design options in 
terms of generic metrics for comparison among different concepts.  The PhD dissertation by Jilla 
(2002) utilized the GINA process and added MOO techniques to fully explore the design and 
objective tradespace for distributed satellite systems.  According to Hastings (2004), a Multi 
Attribute Tradespace Exploration tool was developed at MIT to analyze system architectures 
with the goal of maximizing system attributes.  Ross (2003) further developed the MATE 
process into MATE-CON; which was an extension into Concurrent Design.   
 Design space exploration is similar in many respects to tradespace exploration where the 
input design variables are evaluated to determine relationships among various objectives.  
According to Acar (2010), metamodels are widely used in design space exploration and there is a 
need for developing techniques that increase the accuracy of the metamodel predictions.  Nixon 
(2006) developed a systematic design space exploration process to keep the design effort 
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manageable in the conceptual design phase.  In the PhD dissertation by Villeneuve (2007), a 
concept and technology selection methodology for complex architectures was developed to 
quantify and explore the design space simultaneously. 
 The findings by Tumer et al. (2005) describe issues with NASA approaches for 
incorporating risk based design decisions early in the conceptual design process.  The goal of 
their work was to lay the foundation for more collaboration between NASA researchers and the 
academic research community.  An earlier NASA report by Knight and Stone (2002) suggested 
that risk based design methods make the design process more robust given that a systems-level 
understanding is incorporated and detailed knowledge about the subsystems is utilized.   
 The typical approach used by NASA for understanding risk in the early stage of 
conceptual design is through the used of failure and risk analysis methods using traditional 
reliability tools.  In addition to the reliability methods listed, a method used by NASA to assess 
risk is PRA.  Probabilistic Risk Assessment was identified as a need in 1996 in order to support 
decisions for Space Shuttle upgrades (Stamatelatos et al., 2002).  The use of PRA identifies what 
can go wrong, how frequently it will happen, and what are the consequences (Tumer et al., 
2005).  The issue with PRA is that it requires a significant amount of information before a 
detailed analysis of the risk can be completed.  In the early stages of conceptual design, many 
factors such as the particular type of technology used in subsystems, the probability of failure of 
components, and the exact layout and integration of the subsystem components many not be 
fully defined. 
 A common tool for understanding potential areas of failure is FMEA; which has been 
extensively used for systems safety and for the reliability analysis in many industries (Sharma, 
2007).  FMEA is a top down approach that focuses on the loss of functionality in a given design.  
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Another failure mode approach that focuses on specific components in functions is known as a 
FMECA.  A FMECA is a bottom up reliability analysis that evaluates all of the major 
components in order to identify single point failures and may identify hazards overlooked in 
other system analysis techniques (FAA, 2005).  The disadvantage for FMECA is that it does not 
account for multiple and coupled faults and failures; thus it could give an optimistic estimate of 
system reliability if a quantitative approach is used.  A Fault Tree Analysis is a top-down 
approach that illustrates the sequence of events that lead to an unfavorable event and provides a 
quantitative estimate of system reliability (FAA, 2005).  FTA uses logical symbols to graphically 
show the progression of a failure on other components in the system.  Much like the FTA, an 
ETA is a bottom up approach that graphically explores system responses to an initiating event 
and assesses the probability of the outcome (FAA, 2005).  The use of ETA allows designers to 
assess multiple coexisting faults and failures and identifies vulnerabilities.   
 Another common technique that is used in tradeoffs related to system safety is the use of 
Reliability Block Diagrams.  A Reliability Block Diagram illustrates the logical connection 
between subsystem components and can be used to mathematically model the system 
probability, thus it is useful for evaluating various potential configurations (FAA, 2005).  In the 
example of early conceptual design, designers would assign reliability targets for specific 
components in the subsystems if data was not available.  A key issue identified by Tumer et al. 
(2005) is the need for newer approaches that couple traditional reliability analyses with a more 
risk informed approach in the conceptual design phase. 
 Minimum functionality design is an approach where a baseline configuration is defined 
before trading other factors in human spacecraft designs.  Minimum functionality recently gained 
attention due to its use by the Altair Lunar Lander Project.  The design approach for minimum 
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functionality in the development of the Altair Lunar Lander started with a single point baseline 
design point of departure for cost and risk trades in order to justify mass “add-backs” to the 
subsystems in the form of additional redundancy and safety (Cohen, 2009).  In addition, the 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle used a similar approach of creating a baseline design with a set 
of “minimum functions” called the “Zero Baseline Vehicle” (Hu et al., 2008).  According to 
NASA’s Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation Considerations for Safe and Reliable 
Human Rated Spacecraft Systems, a minimum functional design is the simplest, most robust, and 
highest performance design option as the starting point for assessing fault tolerance (Miller et al., 
2008).  The NASA guidelines outline a conceptual design minimum functionality process for 
spacecraft development; outlined in section 2.3, Conceiving the Right System, Critical Activities 
Early in the Life Cycle (Miller et al., 2008).  Much of the confusion between different minimum 
functionality approaches is how the minimum (or starting point) configuration is defined before 
trading other aspects of safety, reliability, performance, and cost. 
 Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems are defined in NASA NPR 8705.2B.  In 
this document, the human rating certification process, certification requirements, and technical 
requirements for human rating are specified.  The set of human rating requirements is likely the 
minimum set of requirements that must be satisfied in order to achieve human rating 
certification. 
 A human lunar spacecraft, commonly known as a Lunar Lander or Lunar Habitat is very 
much different from other spacecraft designs such as capsules and lifting bodies.  Although there 
are many similarities to conventional Low Earth Orbit operational spacecraft, a lunar spacecraft 
must operate in a different set of environments on the surface of the moon including thermal 
cycling, radiation, dust, lighting, and micrometeoroids (Cohen, 2009).  Significant lessons were 
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learned during the Apollo missions that will assist designers in the development of future lunar 
spacecraft.   
 The goal of the Apollo program was to put a man on the moon and return him safely to 
Earth.  The Apollo Lunar Module was conceived, designed, and manufactured by the Grumman 
Corporation (Kelly, 2001).  The most remarkable aspect of this achievement is that the LEM 
evolved from a conceptual idea to operational hardware on the lunar surface in a period of less 
than 9 years.  The conceptual design launch weight of the LEM was initially proposed at 22,000 
lbs and grew to 33,000 lbs by the time of Apollo 11 (Kelly, 2001).  The major factors that drove 
LEM mass during the preliminary design phase were reliability requirements, mission 
operational requirements, and configuration definition.  The proposed design objectives of the 
Constellation Altair Lunar Lander (formerly known as LSAM) were very different from the 
Apollo LEM.   The Altair Lunar Lander was designed to carry a crew of four, be able to land at 
any location on the moon, and remain on the surface for up to 2 weeks. 
 Perhaps the greatest issue facing both the Apollo and Constellation lunar architectures 
was the development of the Lunar Lander.  The issues with minimizing the mass of the Lunar 
Lander were well known at the time of the ESAS report and led to the use of the non-traditional 
minimum functionality design approach.  The technological differences between the Apollo and 
Constellation programs were significant in regards to the amount of operational capability that 
was to be included in the Altair design.  Because the objectives of the Constellation program 
were more challenging than Apollo, a significant amount of technology development was needed 
for the new spacecraft architecture.  The large number of development projects was one of the 
biggest hurdles in the Constellation program (Chaplain, 2009).   
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 The Constellation program suffered many challenges and was officially cancelled in June 
2011.  It is unknown if future administrations will change the direction of human exploration, but 
the current development of the Orion MPCV as an exploration vehicle is a step in the right 
direction for spaceflight beyond LEO.  After the cancellation of Constellation, no further plans 
for Lunar Lander development have been proposed by NASA.  
 
2.7.2 Relationship to Studies in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 
 The design methodology described in Chapter 3 build upon the previous approaches of 
minimum functionality and conceptual human spacecraft design.  A new minimum functionality 
design methodology focused on the development of conceptual human spacecraft is developed 
and verified against the Apollo LEM design.  The information gathered from the Altair Lunar 
Lander LDAC cycles, the Orion ZBV approach, and the NASA DDT&E guidelines for 
conceptual human spacecraft design using a risk based approach were examined in the 
development of a systematic minimum functionality approach for conceptual design.  Systems 
Engineering will continue to be utilized within the aerospace industry for development of human 
spacecraft, but within the context of SE, additional tools and procedures are needed to fully 
explore the design space and objective tradespace in an efficient manner. 
 A Conceptual Lunar Ascent Module Program (CLAMP) was developed as a result of the 
research described in this chapter.  The code was verified using Apollo 15 historical data in order 
to establish the mathematical methods used to quantify Safety and Operability as a function of 
overall spacecraft mass.  Many sources of Apollo literature were used in the verification of the 
program.  The information gathered from the development of the Apollo Lunar Module and the 
Constellation Altair Lunar Lander was essential in the development of the program.   
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 The research conducted in Chapter 4 was based on a combination of minimum 
functionality and conceptual design physical prototyping in the context of building full scale 
physical prototypes to evaluate human factors as an early step in the conceptual design of human 
spacecraft.  The use of physical prototypes as Boundary Objects described by Star (1989) 
demonstrated the need for physically evaluating hardware configurations in the context of human 
factors engineering.  The findings by Brereton and McGarry (2000) were demonstrated in this 
exercise as potential issues with subsystem layout, human factors, and design thinking and 
communication were discovered.  Prototypes of the ESAS baseline Lunar Lander Ascent and 
Habitation Module were constructed and studied for interface definition, risk identification, and 
uncertainties.  This activity served as pre-validation of a preferred spacecraft geometry and 
configuration before detailed CAD modeling and design.  Throughout the study, the layout and 
geometry of the conceptual design was reconfigured at least 9 times and used simple 
reconfigurable materials instead of traditional expensive wood prototypes.  The combination of 
Systems Engineering, minimum functionality, conceptual design, and human factors in this 
activity led to a new project based design curriculum. 
 The research conducted in Chapter 5 expanded upon the minimum functionality design 
methodology presented in Chapter 3 to fully explore the multidisciplinary tradespace.  In typical 
human spacecraft designs, decision makers are required to evaluate and balance many competing 
objectives.  A vast amount of literature has been published on methods designed to make the 
conceptual design process more efficient in terms of developing Pareto frontiers and exploring 
the objective tradespace.  Building upon the previous methods presented in the literature for 
minimum functionality, multidisciplinary design optimization, reliability analysis, and risk based 
design, a mass addition process was developed to explore the design space and objective 
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tradespace of three Lunar Ascent Module spacecraft configurations.  The tradespace of Safety, 
Operability and Total Spacecraft mass is proposed as an efficient method for evaluating the 
impacts of mass addition of safety components, redundancy, and operational characteristics.  
 The methods presented in Chapter 6 defined two figures of merit, the “Safety Index” and 
the “Operability Index.”  Using the guidance expressed by Tumer et al. (2005), for risk based 
approaches in conceptual design; this research explored the benefits of the utility parameters as 
an early indication of reliability without the need for detailed information about the probabilities 
of failure in the subsystem components.  Building upon established reliability and risk 
approaches as described by Miller et al. (2008), the Safety Index and Operability Index provide 
designers with an easy to utilize figure of merit that indicates potential issues in design 
configurations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
A MINIMUM FUNCTIONALITY DESIGN METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING 
SAFETY AND OPERABILITY MASS IN HUMAN SPACECRAFT 
 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
 A systematic methodology is presented for defining a minimum functionality baseline 
configuration of a human spacecraft.  In order to estimate a lower bound for the spacecraft mass, 
a set of essential functions is coupled to single string subsystems with zero fault tolerance.  This 
minimum functionality baseline is defined to meet the physical requirements needed to transport 
the crew to the target destination and ensure their physiological needs are met; but without 
margin, dispersions, redundancy or factor of safety.  This constitutes a set of ‘non-negotiable’ 
requirements based on fundamental parameters derived from Physics and Physiology.  By 
definition, this represents a technically feasible solution, but results in the ‘highest risk’ design.  
Mass additions beyond the minimum functional configuration are allocated to increase Safety 
through redundancy, fault tolerance or factor of safety, or to increase Operability through 
additional mission functionality or improved human-system interfaces, and are determined by 
risk analyses and design trade studies.  This proposed methodology was used to analyze a range 
of lunar ascent stage spacecraft configurations and a process was developed to allow systematic 
estimation of mass for the specified spacecraft subsystems.  The modeled results are verified by 
comparison to actual subsystem mass of the Apollo Lunar Module ascent stage. 
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3.2 INTRODUCTION 
 A “minimum functionality” design process defines a baseline configuration of a 
spacecraft that can meet the stated mission objectives as a first step before trading parameters 
such as performance, enhanced objectives, safety, and cost.  NASA described a minimum 
functionality configuration in the Broad Agency Announcement NNJ08ZBT001 for the 
Constellation Lunar Lander development study.  In this context, a spacecraft configuration is 
defined by the various subsystems and components that make up the overall design.  A minimum 
functional configuration would not be considered a realistically flyable spacecraft by NASA 
because of the inherent high risk and reduced safety due to the lack of margin, factor of safety 
and subsystem redundancy.  However, it does serve as a conceptual lower boundary for further 
iteration of the design in order to assess the impact of subsystem mass additions needed to 
provide fault tolerance and increase safety (Cohen, 2009).  According to NASA’s Design, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated 
Spacecraft Systems, a minimum functional design is the simplest, most robust, and highest 
performance design option as the starting point for trading safety and reliability (Miller et al., 
2008).  This definition takes into account expected fault tolerance requirements and represents a 
more realistic vehicle but not a true minimum functionality design.  Likewise, the Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle used a similar approach of establishing a baseline design with a set of 
“minimum functions” called the Zero Based Vehicle (Hu et al., 2008).  In each of these 
approaches, the common theme is that a baseline spacecraft configuration is first defined to meet 
the desired requirements for a “minimum” mission.  However, by this definition, certain risk 
mitigation and operational ground rules are assumed in the baseline configuration that may not 
be absolutely essential for mission success. 
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 Instead of describing minimum functionality according to a set of predetermined mission 
and safety requirements, the minimum functional design methodology presented in this work 
defines a minimum functionality configuration as one that is just capable of meeting the physical 
requirements needed to transport the crew to the target destination (e.g., rocket propulsion, 
structural provisions, minimum habitable volume, no redundancy or factor of safety, etc.) while 
ensuring that the essential physiological requirements of the crew are also met (e.g., metabolic 
consumable provisions, waste collection, atmosphere regulation, etc.).  These requirements 
constitute a set of ‘non-negotiable’ parameters based on the Physics and Physiology needs of a 
given mission.  Subsequent mass additions and spacecraft growth such as margins and abort 
capabilities above the ‘non negotiable’ parameters are allocated to either an increase in Safety 
(reducing risk, increased reliability through redundancy, fault tolerance, robustness, mitigating 
contingencies, adding margin, increasing factor of safety, etc.) or Operability (enhanced mission 
objectives, increased mission specific capabilities, automation, improved user interface, etc.).  
The combination of these four fundamental mass parameters forms the foundation of this 
methodology and can be expressed as: 
∑ Spacecraft Mass = f (Physics) + f (Physiology) + f (Safety) + f (Operability)                (2) 
                         ‘non-negotiable’                       ‘tradespace’   
 
3.2.1 Objectives of Design Methodology 
 This methodology provides a structured approach for developing and evaluating 
conceptual spacecraft configurations using a minimum functionality baseline that is not biased 
toward safety or mission objectives.  It also provides designers with a process for quantifying the 
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amount of mass dedicated to Safety and Operability.  Increases in mass due to Factor of Safety 
for structural and pressure storage components are captured in the Safety mass and increases in 
the mission objectives or automation are captured in the Operability mass.  The methodology can 
be adopted for a variety of conceptual designs and provides a means for relative comparison 
between spacecraft configurations.  Many different and often competing spacecraft concepts 
must be explored in a timely manner during the conceptual design phase to determine feasible 
solutions.  One of the dangers of focusing on a single conceptual design too quickly is that other, 
more flexible design configurations could be overlooked; leading to designs that are mass 
constrained in further development.  Mass growth after conceptual design is a common issue and 
incorrect assumptions about the technology, integration, and configuration of the spacecraft can 
contribute to unforeseen mass growth and reduced performance as a consequence (Thompson et 
al., 2010).   
 It is clear that human spacecraft must be safe and reliable, but this should be achieved 
without the added penalty of over-designing the vehicle with unnecessary additional mass and 
complexity.  Because human spacecraft are typically volume-constrained, highly complex 
systems designed for specific mission objectives, a large amount of uncertainty tends to exist in 
the early stages of development.  Examples of this uncertainty include initial estimates for 
subsystem mass budgets, spacecraft geometry, and reliability in components.  Conceptual 
designs must be flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate unforeseen problems as the 
design is matured, because decisions made in this early phase are critical to the cost and success 
of the spacecraft program (McManus et al., 2004).  In addition, the conceptual design phase is 
often described as being unstructured with designers pursuing single designs instead of 
considering a range of concepts due the vast scope of the overall design challenge and perceived 
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time and effort needed to conduct credible analyses on multiple options (McManus et al., 2004; 
Jilla and Miller, 2004).   
 The goal of this work is to demonstrate the application of a proposed systematic 
methodology for the conceptual design of human spacecraft.  The lunar ascent module is a 
unique type of human spacecraft because it has a large impact on the mass of other systems such 
as launch vehicles and propulsive units; but is relatively straightforward to define in terms of 
required functionality within a limited tradespace.  The Apollo Lunar Ascent Module was used 
to verify the design methodology and a modeling approach was developed to define and 
calculate the mass contributions based on Physics, Physiology, Safety, and Operability for a 
conceptual minimum functionality lunar ascent spacecraft.  A series of parametric analyses was 
then conducted using varying levels of Safety and Operability and the results were combined into 
a tradespace of spacecraft configurations to provide designers with information about how 
specific mass impacts are related to the overall spacecraft design. 
 
3.3 BACKGROUND 
 The design approach used by NASA for the Altair Lunar Lander started with a baseline 
design point of departure for cost and risk trades in order to justify mass “add-backs” to the 
subsystems in the form of additional redundancy and safety (Cohen, 2009).  Because the Lunar 
Ascent Module contributed disproportionately to the overall mass of the lunar mission 
architecture, a reduction in mass of the lunar ascent module would reduce the required Earth 
launch mass significantly.  For an Apollo or Constellation type lunar architecture mission, the 
lunar ascent module mass is “propelled” five times through the various mission phases of Earth 
launch, Earth departure, lunar orbit insertion, lunar landing, and lunar ascent.  Using the Apollo 
106 
 
Lunar Excursion Module as an example, a 1 lb. increase in the Lunar Ascent Module mass 
increased the Saturn V gross launch vehicle mass by 883 lb. (Thompson et al., 2010).  Thus, a 
need to design the Altair Lunar Ascent Module to its minimum optimized mass was one of the 
reasons NASA chose a “non-traditional” spacecraft design philosophy.  According to the NASA 
Broad Agency Announcement for the Constellation Lunar Lander Development Study in 2008, 
the minimum functionality approach was used to buy down risk through an “add-back” process.  
The non-traditional design approach used by NASA was slightly different from a typical 
government oversight program of industry charged design and development.  The minimum 
functionality approach was also based on a belief that a traditional Systems Engineering (SE) 
approach was too costly (Cohen, 2009).  The intent of the initial government study was to mature 
the conceptual design to a point in the lifecycle such as Systems Requirements Review or 
System Definition Review before handing the design over to industry for further development.  
The initial work conducted by NASA trained a workforce in spacecraft development and 
developed a preferred design configuration intended to reduce unnecessary trade studies in later 
phases of the development cycle.   
 To avoid later design issues, NASA asked industry to provide feedback to the LDAC-1 
minimum functional configuration.  The work by Cohen (2009) presented several findings for 
design issues related to crew productivity, pilot view angle, separate habitat and airlock, required 
habitable volume, required airlock volume, pressurized payload implications for lunar surface 
science, and symmetry about the thrust axis.  Although NASA proposed the minimum functional 
design for the LDAC cycles, there were issues raised about human factors being an important 
part of the top level objectives (Cohen, 2009).  A full understanding of the role of human factors 
and the required habitable volume needed for sustaining humans for a long period of time such 
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as an extended lunar sortie is one of the issues that should be addressed in any minimum 
functional design approach for human spacecraft. 
 A minimum functionality design approach was utilized in the Orion Crew Exploration 
Vehicle at the end of the first Design Analysis Cycle.  This approach was utilized to “scrub” the 
mass of the entire spacecraft before System Definition Review (Hu et al., 2008).  The minimum 
functionality configuration was named the Zero Based Vehicle and the process used for defining 
the ZBV was very similar to NASA’s minimum functionality design approach, but differed in 
how the minimum baseline configuration was defined.  The baseline Orion ZBV included a few 
redundant subsystems based on the ground rules of one fault tolerance for safety and zero fault 
tolerance for mission success (Jordan, 2009).  A risk balancing approach was used to identify 
vulnerabilities in subsystems and determine mitigation strategies.  Using a two round approach 
for justification of subsystem technologies and desired functionality, a total of 2500 kg was 
removed from the original DAC-1 configuration (Hu et al., 2008). 
 Quantifying safety in a human spacecraft is not an easy task because of the large number 
of associated hazards and uncertainties that must be characterized.  The NASA Procedural 
Requirements document NPR 8705.2B defines critical safety requirements for obtaining human 
rated certification.  The technical requirements defined in Section 3 of this document specify 
safety measures taken through fault tolerance, redundancy, control and abort modes.  As 
mentioned in paragraph 3.1.2, the requirements are not intended to be “all inclusive or an 
absolute prescription for human rating” and risks in the spacecraft design must be identified and 
understood.  The approach used by NASA for understanding risk in the early stage of conceptual 
design is through the use of failure analysis, risk analysis, traditional reliability methods, and 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment.  A PRA identifies what can go wrong, how frequently it will 
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happen, and the likely consequences (Stamatelatos, 2002).  The issue with PRA is that it requires 
a significant amount of detailed information before an analysis of the risk can be completed.  In 
the early stages of conceptual design, many factors such as the particular type of technology used 
in subsystems, the probability of failure of components, and the exact layout and integration of 
the subsystem components many not be fully defined. 
 
3.3.1 Goals of Minimum Functionality Design 
 The goal of a minimum functionality design approach is to design a spacecraft that is 
sufficiently safe and reliable, while balancing the mass requirements related to optimizing 
performance, safety, risk, and cost.  In previous minimum functionality design approaches, the 
baseline configuration varied according to assumptions made for the “minimum” boundary.  
However, the design methodology presented in this research takes this idea one step further by 
defining groupings of mass based on the four fundamental parameters of Physics, Physiology, 
Safety, and Operability.  The advantage of this methodology compared to previous methods is 
that it can be readily modified for different mission applications and allows the relative impact of 
mass addition to be systematically quantified in the context of total spacecraft mass.   
 
3.4 DEFINING A MINIMUM BASELINE FOR ASSESSING SAFETY AND  
 OPERABILITY 
 The development of this methodology began in the fall of 2006 when a group of graduate 
students from the University of Colorado, inspired by a prior class design project analyzing 
NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration, began construction of a full-scale Lunar Lander 
habitation mockup with goals of better understanding the volumetric constraints of the proposed 
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lunar vehicle architecture and supplying feedback to the stakeholders.  Beginning in 2007, the 
project evolved into a focused Systems Engineering approach in which top level requirements 
were evaluated early in the program through the use of full-scale, low cost, rapid prototyping 
techniques.  The research conducted between 2007 and 2009 focused on prototyping in the 
context of multidisciplinary design optimization (Higdon and Klaus, 2008; Klaus and Higdon, 
2009).  A “rapidly reconfigurable” minimum functionality prototype of the ESAS minimum 
functionality lunar ascent module was constructed and outfitted with single string subsystems for 
studying human factors, subsystem integration, layout, and technology choices.  The lessons 
learned in the prototyping activity of the minimum functionality lunar ascent module formed the 
foundation of this methodology. 
 The proposed design methodology outlines an approach for quantifying the Minimum 
Functionality, Safety, and Operability mass in human spacecraft designs in order to evaluate and 
trade various spacecraft configurations based on key mass drivers.  This approach quantifies 
Safety and Operability through an “add back” process that allows designers to understand how 
increases in redundancy, safety components, or additional mission functionality are related to the 
overall spacecraft mass.  The italicized terms, Physics, Physiology, Operability, and Safety are 
used throughout to refer to the mass associated with each of the parameters.  This process is best 
used in the early stages of conceptual design when the fundamental parameters of spacecraft 
geometry, number of crew, structural materials, and trajectories are being studied to determine 
the most feasible design solutions.  Shown in Figure 7 is a flow chart of the minimum functional 
design methodology starting with a set of top level mission objectives. 
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Figure 7:   Flowchart of the Minimum Functionality design methodology. 
 
3.4.1    Top Level Mission Objectives 
 The significant drivers of a human spacecraft design are the top level mission objectives.  
It can be very confusing to the design teams if the top level mission objectives change in the 
middle of design activity.  In the example of Orion, the top level mission objectives changed 
from Lunar to ISS, then to an ISS Rescue Vehicle, and now Beyond Earth Orbit.  Thus, a need 
for a solid foundation of the operational environment is a necessary requirement for developing 
an efficient design.  The top level questions that form the basis of any human spacecraft are: 
What is the destination; Moon, Mars, or Asteroid?  How many crewmembers will participate; 2, 
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3, 4, or more?  How much time will crewmembers spend at the destination; 1 day or 6 months?  
What type of spacecraft will transport the crew during different phases of the mission; Module, 
Capsule?  The answers to these questions determine the type and size of a spacecraft and launch 
vehicles within the mission architecture.  The combination of all the systems in the mission 
architecture is a very complex problem and becomes a large integration problem as observed 
with the Apollo Lunar Ascent Module.   
 
3.4.2 Functional Decomposition 
 The functional decomposition presented in this design methodology is focused on the 
design of a single individual spacecraft within an overall mission architecture.  In the example of 
a Lunar Ascent Module, its specific functionality is only a small part of the total mission 
architecture.  However, the Lunar Ascent Module is a critical part of the lunar mission and its 
required functions are necessary for the lunar ascent phase.  A functional decomposition matrix 
was developed to capture all of the necessary activities that need to occur in a spacecraft at the 
lowest subsystem and Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) component levels.  Within the global set of 
functions for the spacecraft, a subset was identified to define a minimum functionality baseline 
configuration needed to transport the crew to the desired destination and keep them alive for 
minimum mission duration.  The intent of the functional decomposition activity is to list as many 
of the required functions as possible given the current knowledge of the mission objectives, 
while allowing the flexibility to add new functions as the design matures.  
 Assuming the top level mission objectives are clear, the first step is to create a functional 
decomposition matrix of the necessary spacecraft subsystems to answer the question “What 
activities need to occur to make the mission successful?”  Using this fundamental question as a 
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guideline leads the designer to the lowest level minimum functionality required in the spacecraft.  
Examples of low level functions could include: “Remove Carbon Dioxide from Cabin 
Atmosphere” or “Store Main Engine Fuel”.  The use of a verb-noun descriptor to identify the 
lowest level functions in the spacecraft makes the intent of the function easy to understand and 
group to a particular subsystem.  A list of subsystems and high level functions decomposed into 
lower level functions is listed in Figure 8.   
 
Figure 8:   Human spacecraft subsystems and high level functions. 
 
 The functional decomposition matrix defines all of the necessary activities that need to 
occur in a spacecraft.  Although there are a number of functions that would not be included in a 
minimum functional design, the intent of the functional decomposition activity is to list as many 
of the activities as possible given the current knowledge of the mission and allow flexibility to 
add more functions later as the design matures.   
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3.4.3    Candidate Technology Selections 
 After the functional decomposition matrix has been developed and peer-reviewed by the 
stakeholders, the next step is to identify candidate hardware or technologies to perform the 
intended functionality.  Using the low level function “Remove Carbon Dioxide” as an example, 
there are several different methods of removing Carbon Dioxide such as Lithium Hydroxide 
Canisters, Molecular Sieve Beds, and Catalyst Beds.  Thus, a few different technologies exist 
that would not require a development of new technology to meet this function.  The tradeoff is 
deciding the appropriate technology for the spacecraft.  Each technology choice has a specific 
mass, volume, and perhaps power requirement (which leads to additional required mass).  
Additional questions for selecting a technology include the following: 
 How will this technology choice integrate into the current knowledge of the spacecraft 
design?   
 How much maintenance will be required?   
 Is the technology scalable or does it require a redesign for this particular application?   
 Is this technology proven or will it require significant development activity? 
 What are the unknowns associated with this technology?   
 
 Many decisions are made concerning the technology choices that contribute to the 
uncertainty in the overall design.  Simply assuming that a particular technology choice has flight 
history does not always work for the current design.  In addition to the mass and volume 
characteristics, a probability of failure in the technology is considered in the overall subsystem 
reliability analysis or PRA.  The PRA is usually completed at a later time in the design when 
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reliability information about the subsystems is available.  In the early stages of conceptual 
design, assumptions can be used for expected probabilities, but this also adds uncertainty and the 
PRA must be refined at a later time.  The choice of technologies is of prime importance when 
developing conceptual designs because the decisions made during this process ultimately affect 
the success or failure of the conceptual design moving forward.  
 If the total number of combinations of technologies, redundant number of hardware 
component paths, and spacecraft minimum functions are multiplied to determine the number of 
spacecraft configurations, the number quickly becomes so great that the total possible number of 
subsystem hardware and redundant combinations cannot be fully explored in a timely manner.  
This “curse of dimensionality” is one of the reasons for developing reduced order models or 
commonly known as a model of a model or “metamodels” in the early stage of conceptual design 
to examine a reduced order design tradespace.  
 
3.4.4    Minimum Functionality Baseline 
 The minimum functionality mass is the sum of the ‘non-negotiable’ mass parameters, 
Physics and Physiology; 
 Minimum Baseline = f(Physics) + f(Physiology).                                                                    (3) 
 
 The first non-negotiable mass parameter, Physics, is a function of the following variables 
and subsystems: 
 Physics = f(Avionics, Power, Thermal, Structures, Propulsion, Duration)                            (4)  
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 The Physics mass parameter is defined by incorporating single string subsystems in the 
Avionics, Power, Thermal, and Propulsion subsystems and the mission duration.  The structural 
mass components are designed at a Factor of Safety of 1.0 for given nominal loads without 
dispersions.  The second parameter, Physiology, is expressed as: 
 Physiology = f(Pressure Vessel, Life Support, Crew Accommodations, Duration)              (5)                        
 
 The Physiology mass parameter is defined as a function of the pressure vessel, single 
string subsystems in the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS), minimum 
crew accommodations, and mission duration.  Because the internal atmospheric composition, 
pressure, and temperature are the driving factor for the crew’s physiology, the pressure vessel 
skin structure, and passive thermal protection is considered to be part of the Physiology mass.  
The pressurized volume is determined by combining the minimum habitable volume and the 
internal subsystem component volume.  The Physics parameter can be thought of as the mass to 
keep the entire spacecraft alive and the Physiology parameter is the mass needed to keep the 
crew alive.   
 A minimum functional design may not be a minimal optimized mass design.  The 
minimum functionality is dependent upon a few fundamental parameters in any conceptual 
design.  Changes in any one of these fundamental parameters will change the minimum 
functional design point.  Thus, spacecraft designers must realize that choices made for subsystem 
technologies and materials can change the starting boundary condition of a minimum 
functionality design analysis.  The fundamental parameters that are assumed constant in a 
minimum functional design are the number of crew, habitable volume, subsystem technology 
choices, baseline mission time, and spacecraft geometry and structural materials.   
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3.4.5   Safety Mass in Spacecraft Configurations 
 The mass associated with Safety is described as additions necessary to mitigate potential 
contingencies, reduction of failure modes through subsystem redundancy, and mass dedicated to 
singular components for increasing safety.  Increases in FoS greater than 1.0 for structural 
components are allocated to an increase in Safety.  The increase in structural mass also drives 
other subsystem mass such as increased Propulsion.  The Safety mass of a spacecraft is 
calculated as a function of the following variables, components, and subsystems: 
Safety = f(Factor of Safety, Fault Tolerance, Safety Components, Additional Propulsion,   
Abort Avionics, Additional Instrumentation, Additional Duration, Spacecraft Growth) (6) 
 
Safety mass is defined as: 
 Factor of Safety – Factor of Safety mass addition for structural components, tanks, lines, 
pressurant valves, etc... (Fractional mass of components above FoS = 1.0). 
 Fault Tolerance – Additional subsystem redundant components or pathways to mitigate 
potential component failure modes to prevent loss of spacecraft functionality. 
 Safety Components – Fire extinguishers, alarms, medical kit, special tools, guards and 
mass that has a singular purpose for providing safety and not contributing to the 
minimum functionality mission. 
 Additional Propulsion – The amount of mass increase in the propulsion system due to the 
increase in safety mass; this includes additional propellant, larger engines, larger tanks, 
and plumbing.  Included is the amount of additional propellant needed to correct an off-
nominal event or “Anytime Return” scenario. 
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 Abort Avionics – Guidance, navigation, and control components that are designed to 
return the spacecraft to a safe flight configuration in the event of an off-nominal event. 
 Instrumentation and Data Storage – Any data collected and stored that is not necessary 
for conducting the minimum functional mission including sensors, wiring, and gages. 
 Additional Duration – Spacecraft operating time needed to correct an off-nominal event 
or condition such as an abort scenario for rescue. 
 Subsystem Growth due to Safety – Spacecraft growth of other subsystems such as 
Thermal, Power, Primary Structure; due to an increase in the number of safety 
components and redundancy. 
 
 When assigning a function to one of the two non-negotiable mass parameters (Physics or 
Physiology), one can ask: “Is this component or subsystem string necessary to meet the mission 
objective if everything on the vehicle worked perfectly?”  If the answer is no, then it either 
contributes to Safety or Operability.  In the case of the primary or secondary structural 
components at a higher FoS than 1.0; the amount of mass that is allocated to Safety is the mass 
needed beyond a FoS = 1.0 design to meet the given nominal loading requirements.  An increase 
in fault tolerance in the form of additional subsystem redundancy, addition of dissimilar 
redundancy or other mitigation strategies such as the addition of safety components is another 
contribution to the Safety mass of the spacecraft.  The addition of abort capabilities is considered 
a Safety mass in the form of additional avionics, instrumentation, increased mission duration, and 
increases in spacecraft growth due the need for additional mass and volume.  Dispersions from 
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nominal values are a form of uncertainty and similar to the factor of safety are included with 
Safety mass. 
 Given a particular type of spacecraft geometry, an increase in Safety mass is not a linear 
increase in total spacecraft mass due to additional dependent burdens placed on subsystems such 
as Avionics, Power, Thermal, Structural, and Propulsion.  The Propulsion subsystem must 
ultimately grow larger to accommodate additional mass in the form of larger engines, tanks, 
additional propellant, or a change in orbital trajectory to meet an “Anytime / Anywhere Return” 
scenario.  Depending upon the capabilities of the Propulsion subsystem and the loading on the 
structures, a small increase in mass can increase the total spacecraft mass significantly. 
 
3.4.6    Operability Mass in Spacecraft Configurations 
 The term Operability is defined in this methodology as the mass contribution of 
additional functions beyond the minimum functionality baseline that does not include Safety.  
Operability mass is expressed as: 
 Operability = f(Additional Functions for Mission Objectives, Enhanced User Interfaces)  (7) 
 
 Operability is the measure of the tasks that are planned to be completed in the mission.  It 
includes mission specific tasks such as sample return, photography, observation, and EVA.  
Operability also includes enhanced user interface functions that make tasks more efficient or 
easier such as automation.  Operability is mass for the spacecraft or mission to do tasks beyond 
the minimum functionality of transporting crew.  It can be defined as mass that expands the 
minimum functionality mission to: 
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 Do mission specific tasks - (samples, science return, photography, observation, EVA); 
 Make a task efficient; 
 Make a task easier – (automation for crew tasks, spacecraft control); and 
 Stay for a longer time. 
 
 One could characterize Operability as Mission Operations, but it does not encompass all 
of the mass that is typically associated with Mission Operations such as contingency operations.  
Much like the mass increase in Safety, an increase in Operability beyond a baseline minimum 
functional spacecraft configuration is not an equal increase in the total spacecraft mass due to the 
burden on other subsystems.  Essentially the Operability mass is intended to capture those 
additions that make the spacecraft more capable rather than simply inherently safer. 
 
3.4.7    Conceptual Design Tradespace 
 One of the reasons for quantifying the amount of mass due to Safety and Operability is to 
visualize the relationship between these parameters and the total spacecraft mass.  Combining the 
three parameters into a three dimensional (3-D) tradespace of candidate spacecraft configurations 
allows the designer to understand how changes in subsystem redundancy through additional 
Safety or the addition of additional mission capability through Operability change the overall 
mass of the total spacecraft.  
 In order to generate a domain of spacecraft points, various spacecraft configurations of 
subsystem redundancy, FoS, safety components, and additional functions are calculated in a 
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multidisciplinary Monte Carlo analysis.  The collection of spacecraft configuration data points 
form a Pareto frontier that can be used for determining the most optimal contributions of Safety 
mass and Operability mass on the total spacecraft mass.  Shown in Figure 9 is an illustration of 
the conceptual design tradespace.  The three axes of the conceptual design tradespace are the 
Total Spacecraft mass (x), Safety mass (y), and Operability mass (z).  The tradespace was created 
using spacecraft configurations of various levels of subsystem redundancy, number of Safety 
components, number of Operability components, and FoS.  The outer boundary of the data 
points in the tradespace forms a Pareto frontier that can be used as input for the development of 
reduced order models for characterizing the relative relationship between Safety, Operability, 
and Total Spacecraft mass. 
 
Figure 9:  Conceptual design tradespace for spacecraft configurations. 
 
 Developing Pareto frontiers in this tradespace provides designers with the flexibility to 
conduct other trades.  For example, if a metamodel of the Pareto frontier was created, designers 
could evaluate the impact upon total spacecraft mass rather quickly given an increase in Safety or 
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Operability mass of a specific configuration.  Depending on the shape of the Pareto surface, 
there are many approaches for metamodeling that have different accuracies and methods for 
optimization (Jin et al., 2003; Wang and Shan, 2007; Simpson et al., 2004; Wilson et al., 2001).  
It is possible to compare Pareto frontiers from different analysis runs in a sensitivity analysis to 
determine relationships between the fundamental parameters and the overall spacecraft design.  
A metamodeling approach coupled with this design methodology is suggested as a tool for 
reducing the computational expense of examining a large number of spacecraft configurations.  
 The conceptual design tradespace presented here is intended to capture the mass 
relationships as a means of comparing between competing spacecraft configurations.  It is 
recognized that other metrics such as performance, cost, and risk are important parameters of a 
spacecraft design, but in the context of this work, these metrics are left to the later stages of 
design as the configuration matures.  The information developed in this conceptual design 
tradespace captures mass impacts of risk to be utilized as a starting point in future detailed design 
iterations. 
 
3.4.8    Minimum Functionality Design Methodology Summary 
 The design methodology presented in this work builds upon previous approaches for 
minimum functionality design.  The difference in this methodology compared to previous 
methods is that the Minimum Functionality design point is defined based on Physics and 
Physiology and does not include mass for FoS, contingencies, or minimum mission objectives.  
Using the values of Safety and Operability as mass add backs, various spacecraft configurations 
can be explored in a 3-D tradespace and developed into a reduced order model to understand the 
impacts of mass additions in Safety and Operability in relationship to the total spacecraft mass. 
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3.5  CONCEPTUAL LUNAR ASCENT MODULE PROGRAM 
 A mass and trajectory analysis code named the Conceptual Lunar Ascent Module 
Program was developed in MATLAB to calculate the minimum functionality baseline and to 
assess relative increases in Safety and Operability mass for various Lunar Ascent Module 
spacecraft configurations.  This program is focused on the lunar ascent phase of the overall lunar 
architecture mission.  The information developed in this analysis could be utilized by designers 
of other elements of the overall lunar architecture.  The intent of the program was to determine 
how changes in subsystem mass affect the overall spacecraft mass required to return from the 
lunar surface.  The program played a key role in developing this proposed methodology in order 
to understand how closely coupled the Safety and Operability mass is to the total spacecraft 
baseline mass.  The CLAMP code approaches the development of a conceptual spacecraft design 
with a bottom-up design philosophy using individual components and heuristics matched to 
spacecraft functions.  This approach can be challenging when little information is known about 
the exact mass and volume sizing of the technology components.  But the advantage of this 
design methodology is that it forces designers to consider sensitivities in the lower levels at an 
early stage in order to understand the driving risks and uncertainties as the design is matured.  
Sensitivities of the low level components are captured in uncertainty bands and combined in a 
Monte Carlo analysis to determine the effect on the subsystem and total spacecraft mass.   
 The program relies on design teams to establish a minimum set of functions needed to 
transport the crew and keep them alive.  It also serves as a tool for designers to evaluate changes 
in the design space variables beyond a minimum functionality baseline configuration and the 
relationships between Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass.  The design teams 
ultimately drive the design process and the information generated with this program assists 
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designers and teams with decision making.  Other factors such as reliability and cost will always 
have an effect on design decisions; but the main reason for investigating this tradespace is to give 
subsystem designers visibility into the overall spacecraft design mass at an early stage of 
development.  Shown in Figure 10 is a flowchart of the processes and subsystem modules of 
CLAMP.  
 
 
Figure 10:  Flowchart of CLAMP subroutines. 
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3.5.1 CLAMP Inputs   
 The four boxes at the top of Figure 10 represent the necessary inputs for the analysis.  
The top level goals of the mission are captured in the number of crew, mission time, habitable 
volume, and trajectory and orbits.  These four parameters are the key independent parameters of 
any spacecraft design.  The functional decomposition matrix defines the low level spacecraft 
functions.  The subsystem technologies are the components matched to the low level functions in 
the functional decomposition matrix and represent a LRU when possible in a bottom-up design 
philosophy.  The choice of spacecraft geometry such as a horizontal cylinder, vertical cylinder, 
conic, or lifting body is another key input for determining the structural layout of the spacecraft.  
In this initial version of the code, the spacecraft configuration is assumed to be a horizontal 
cylinder module for the study of typical Lunar Ascent Module designs.  The CLAMP code is 
flexible for adding other spacecraft geometries and could be updated in later versions. 
 
3.5.2    Spacecraft Subsystem Sizing 
 The subsystem modules shown in Figure 10 calculate the mass of the individual interior 
subsystems based upon the input parameters and required functions.  The choice of technologies 
matched to the low level functions is a key driver for mass and safety of the subsystems.  
Beginning with the Avionics subsystem, each individual subsystem mass is calculated using the 
technology choices and component redundancy.  Because the Avionics subsystem is a large 
power and thermal demanding subsystem, it is the first module to be calculated followed by 
EVA, Crew Accommodations, Payloads, ECLSS, Power, Thermal, and Secondary Structures 
subsystems.  This hierarchy of flow from one subsystem to another allows mass, power, and 
volume information from previous subsystem module to be passed to subsequent subsystem 
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modules for input.  The relationship between the Power and Thermal subsystem is iterated once 
the spacecraft thermal requirements have been calculated.  The first step of the conceptual design 
process is to determine the interior subsystems component mass and volume in order to 
determine pressurized volume.   
 The flow process from one subsystem to another captures dependencies and sensitivities 
among the individual subsystems.  In the example of the Avionics system, a small increase in 
mass has downstream effects on Power, Thermal, Pressurized Volume, Secondary Structure, 
Primary Structure, and Propulsion.  Changes in one subsystem ultimately affect the sizing of 
other subsystems and the intent of the flow down approach is to capture the dependencies in 
order to provide designers with critical information about sizing of the individual subsystems.  
The process described here allows designers to evaluate subsystem trades to determine the 
sensitivities of the technology choices on the overall mass and safety of the spacecraft.  For a 
single run, a common set of technologies are assumed for each of the subsystems throughout the 
analysis. 
 Once the interior spacecraft subsystems and components are defined, the pressurized 
volume module is used to calculate the required pressurized volume given a specified minimum 
habitable volume, the total interior subsystem volume, and a “packaging efficiency”.  The use of 
a packaging efficiency takes into account the difficulty of neatly packaging all of the subsystem 
components and serves as a margin above the total interior subsystem volume.  A simplified 
diagram of how total pressurized volume is derived is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 Using the calculated total pressurized volume, the outer diameter of the spacecraft is 
recalculated.  In this example, the assumption is that in a cylindrical configuration as shown in 
Figure 11, the majority of the components are mounted to the cylindrical section and the interior 
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diameter of the cylinder must grow larger to accommodate the change in volume.  The amount of 
gaseous oxygen and leakage makeup gas for the ECLSS subsystem are determined from this 
pressurized volume.  The CLAMP code calculates the storage tank size for the high pressure gas, 
lines, valves, and insulation.  The mounting locations for the ECLSS gas storage are assumed to 
be external to the crew cabin. 
 
Figure 11:  Derivation of total pressurized volume. 
 
 Using the calculated total pressurized volume, the outer diameter of the spacecraft is 
recalculated.  In this example, the assumption is that in a cylindrical configuration as shown in 
Figure 11, the majority of the components are mounted to the cylindrical section and the interior 
diameter of the cylinder must grow larger to accommodate the change in volume.  The amount of 
gaseous oxygen and leakage makeup gas for the ECLSS subsystem are determined from this 
pressurized volume.  The CLAMP code calculates the storage tank size for the high pressure gas, 
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lines, valves, and insulation.  The mounting locations for the ECLSS gas storage are assumed to 
be external to the crew cabin. 
 The primary structure is the backbone of the spacecraft design and the choice of materials 
and configuration is a large driver in the uncertainty of the spacecraft mass.  Because the primary 
structure greatly influences the overall spacecraft conceptual design, the mass estimating code 
develops a primary structure using the dimensions for total pressurized volume, subsystem 
loading, number of crew, docking dimensions, and structural materials.  Shown in Figure 12 is a 
CAD representation of a horizontal cylinder primary structure for a proposed Lunar Ascent 
Module developed with the CLAMP code.  Structural analysis in CLAMP begins with a 
preferred geometry such as a horizontal cylinder as shown in Figure 12.  The pressure vessel skin 
is calculated based on the operating pressure of the cabin atmosphere and is supported by a series 
of outer hoops and stringers.  The size of the hoops is a key driver in the mass of the primary 
structure and is calculated based on the subsystem loading on the walls of the structure.   
 
Figure 12:  CAD model of the horizontal cylinder Lunar Ascent Module structure. 
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 The propulsion subsystem consists of the main engine, Reaction Control System (RCS), 
tanks, lines, valves, and pressurant systems.  The CLAMP code uses the mass of the entire 
spacecraft not including propulsion components as a “payload” for the iteration of the propulsion 
sizing.  The main engine is sized according to a vacuum thrust to weight (T/W) ratio for the 
engine and the mass of the main engine is calculated using a linear equation of kg/kN of thrust 
based on heuristics.  RCS thrusters are sized according to a given vacuum thrust in the same 
method used for the main engine.  Engine parameters such as Specific Impulse (Isp) and 
Oxidizer to Fuel ratios (O/F) determine the amount of propellant mass required to fly a given 
trajectory. 
 The propulsion module performs a 3-DOF analysis of the spacecraft launch trajectory to 
verify the correct orbital insertion parameters.  A loop for calculating propellant mass, sizing 
tanks and engines, and flying the spacecraft trajectory is iterated until the propellant mass 
converges.  Shown in Figure 13 is an example of the 3-DOF trajectory for a Lunar Ascent 
Module based on an Apollo 15 type ascent.  The orbital parameters for this analysis run form an 
elliptical orbit of approximately 20 km x 100 km.   
 
Figure 13:  Lunar ascent trajectory analysis. 
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3.5.3 Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability Mass  
 The process for calculating the mass due to Safety and Operability begins with a 
minimum functional configuration.  To determine the amount of Safety and Operability mass, 
three analysis runs are needed to determine the mass due to “add-backs” for a given 
configuration beyond the minimum functional baseline configuration.  Shown in Figure 14 is a 
flow chart of the processes and the expressions for quantifying the minimum functionality 
baseline, Safety, and Operability mass of spacecraft configurations. 
  
 
Figure 14:  Flowchart for calculating Minimum Functional, Safety, and Operability mass. 
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 The reason for three analysis runs is to determine the mass of the spacecraft configuration 
at various configurations of Safety and Operability.  The first run is a spacecraft configuration 
that does not include any additional Safety or Operability components beyond the minimum 
“best” mission design timeline.  The second run adds mass associated with improving safety 
such as FoS, safety components, contingency propellant, etc.., for any item in the spacecraft that 
is necessary for Safety.  The third run determines the amount of Operability mass in the 
spacecraft where mass is added for components that are related to increasing Operability factors 
of the mission.  In addition, the mission time is increased to the maximum expected length.  To 
calculate the amount of mass that contributes to an increase in the Safety, the first run is 
subtracted from the second run.  The same method is used to determine the amount of 
Operability mass where the second run is subtracted from the third run.  This method provides 
insight into how much the total spacecraft mass increases with additions of mass due to Safety or 
Operability. 
 
3.6 CONCEPTUAL SPACECRAFT ANALYSIS STUDIES 
 The following analysis studies demonstrate the use of the methodology in the design of a 
conceptual human spacecraft.  The focus of these analyses is to study conceptual Lunar Ascent 
Module configurations to understand the relationship between mass add-backs due to Safety and 
Operability and the total spacecraft mass.  Although the Lunar Ascent Module represents only 
one part of the overall lunar mission architecture, the results of these analyses would be included 
in the trade studies for the total lunar mission architecture.  The top level goals for the Lunar 
Ascent Module conceptual design consist of the following: 
 Return a crew of two from the lunar surface in a pressurized cabin,  
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 Launch from a location approximately at the lunar equator into an elliptical orbit, and 
 Rendezvous with transport spacecraft.  
 
 The top level goals for the test studies are the same as Apollo and the design activity will 
use the Apollo Lunar Ascent Module as a comparison for verification of the CLAMP code 
results.  The studies demonstrate the methods used to calculate Safety and Operability mass for 
various spacecraft configurations by predicting upper and lower bounds that the Apollo Lunar 
Ascent Module mass should fall within, ranging from the minimum functionality baseline to 
increasingly safer, more capable iterations. 
 
3.6.1   Apollo Lunar Ascent Module Design Comparison  
 The CLAMP code used an input list of 235 variables in the development of various 
conceptual designs.  The input list consisted of variables for habitable volume, spacecraft 
diameter, technology choices for components, metabolic rates, cabin atmosphere, FoS, structural 
materials, and launch parameters.  The subsystems and components of the historical Apollo LEM 
were matched to a list of the lowest level functions of the spacecraft.  Upon review of several 
sources including the: Apollo Experience Reports (Dietz et al., 1972; Shelton, 1975; Vernon, 
1975; O’Brian and Woodfill, 1972; Kurten, 1975; Gillen et al., 1972; Campos, 1972; White, 
1975; Weiss, 1973; Humphries and Taylor, 1973; Vaughan et al., 1972; Bennett, 1972; Ecord, 
1972), Apollo Operations Handbook Lunar Module LM 10 and Subsequent Volume 1 
Subsystems Data, LEM Design Criteria and Environments (Shreeves et al., 1963), Lunar Module 
Structures Handout LM-5, LEM mass property reports (Aeder et al., 1966a; Aeder et al., 1966b; 
132 
 
Aeder et al., 1966c), NASA Design Mass Properties II (Heineman, 1994), Apollo 15 Mission 
Report  (NASA, 1971a), Apollo Stowage List Mission J-1 CM 112/LM-10 Apollo 15, and 
Apollo News Reference (NASA, 1972), the mass, volume, and power of the subsystems and 
components in the Lunar Ascent Module for lunar ascent were compiled as input variables.  
Where possible, input data based on heuristic textbook equations was used to demonstrate how 
the methodology could be useful for future conceptual designs with limited information about 
the components in the subsystems.  Although the entire input list is too large to be shown here, a 
summary list of the sources for the input information is shown in Table 3.  The Apollo Lunar 
Ascent Module serves as a very good example for validation of the methodology because of its 
design history in optimizing against stringent weight margins. 
Table 3  Summary of Input Sources for Apollo LEM Comparison 
Subsystem Components Source of Mass, Volume, and Power Information 
Avionics Communication Apollo Experience Reports (Dietz et al., 1972); Design Mass Properties II (Heineman, 1994) 
  GN&C Apollo Experience Reports (Shelton, 1975; Vernon, 1975; Design Mass Properties II (Heineman, 
1994) 
  Instrumentation Apollo Experience Reports (O’Brien and Woodfill, 1972); Design Mass Properties II  
(Heineman, 1994) 
  Abort Avionics Apollo Experience Reports (Kurten, 1975); Design Mass Properties II  (Heineman, 1994) 
   
EVA Spacesuits HSMAD (Larson et al., 1999); Apollo Stowage List Mission J-1 CM 112/LM-10 
   
Crew 
Accommodations 
Lighting HSMAD (Larson et al., 1999); Apollo Stowage List Mission J-1 CM 112/LM-10 
  Crew Restraints & 
Personal Storage 
HSMAD (Larson et al., 1999); Apollo Stowage List Mission J-1 CM 112/LM-10 
   
Payloads Lunar Samples Apollo 15 Mission Report [33]; Apollo Stowage List Mission J-1 CM 112/LM-10 
  Tools, Equipment, 
and Photography 
HSMAD (Larson et al., 1999); Apollo Stowage List Mission J-1 CM 112/LM-10 
   
ECLSS Carbon Dioxide 
Removal 
BVAD (Hanford, 2004); Apollo Experience Reports (Gillen et al., 1972), Apollo News 
Reference (NASA, 1972) 
  Metabolic Oxygen 
Storage 
Apollo Experience Reports (Gillen et al., 1972); Apollo News Reference (NASA, 1972) 
  Cabin Leak Rate, 
Humidity, 
Temperature 
Apollo Operations Handbook Lunar Module LM 10 and Subsequent -Volume 1 Subsystems 
Data; BVAD (Hanford, 2004) 
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Table 3  Summary of Input Sources for Apollo LEM Comparison 
Subsystem Components Source of Mass, Volume, and Power Information 
Power Batteries HSMAD (Larson et al., 1999); Apollo Experience Reports (Campos, 1972) 
  Distribution & 
Wiring 
Apollo Experience Reports (Campos, 1972; White, 1975); Design Mass Properties II (Heineman, 
1994) 
  Controllers & 
Inverters 
Apollo Experience Reports (Campos, 1972); Design Mass Properties II (Heineman, 1994) 
   
Thermal Coldplates, Coolant, 
Pumps & Valves 
Apollo Experience Reports (Gillen et al., 1972); BVAD (Hanford, 2004) 
  Sublimators Apollo Experience Reports (Gillen et al., 1972); Tongue (1999) 
   
Secondary 
Structures 
Ratio BVAD (Hanford, 2004); Design Mass Properties II  (Heineman, 1994) 
   
Primary 
Structure 
Material, 
Pressurized 
Volume, Cabin 
Diameter, FoS 
Apollo Experience Reports (Weiss, 1973); Apollo Operations Handbook Lunar Module LM 10 
and Subsequent -Volume 1 Subsystems Data ;LEM Design Criteria  (Ecord, 1972) 
   
TPS / MMOD Materials, 
Probabilities 
Lunar Module Structures Handout LM-5; Apollo Operations Handbook Lunar Module LM 10 
and Subsequent -Volume 1 Subsystems Data ; LEM Design Criteria  (Shreeves et al., 1963); 
Structural Damage Prediction (Elfer, 1996) 
   
Propulsion Main Engine and 
RCS systems 
Apollo Experience Reports (Humphries and Taylor, 1973; Vaughan et al., 1972; Bennett, 1972); 
Apollo Operations Handbook Lunar Module LM 10 and Subsequent -Volume 1 Subsystems Data 
  Propellant and 
Pressurization 
Storage Tanks 
Apollo Experience Reports (Humphries and Taylor, 1973; Vaughan et al., 1972; Bennett, 1972); 
Apollo Operations Handbook Lunar Module LM 10 and Subsequent -Volume 1 Subsystems Data 
 
 A Monte Carlo analysis of 5000 runs was conducted with input variables set at +/- 5% 
uncertainty in mass and volume.  The range of uncertainty was chosen initially to determine how 
much the total spacecraft mass would vary based on a level of input uncertainty associated with 
the subsystem technology choices.  In conceptual design, the variability of mass in technologies 
is often accounted through growth margins and the use of uncertainty in the input technologies 
and variables is intended to allow the user flexibility to generate concepts based on likely growth 
margins.  Although +/- 5% is a very narrow range for conceptual design uncertainty, the intent of 
this comparison analysis is to determine the distribution in total spacecraft mass for a variety of 
spacecraft configurations.  
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3.6.2   Test Study Matrix 
 A matrix of analysis runs was developed to investigate the amount of subsystem and total 
spacecraft mass growth due to changes in FoS, Safety, and Operability at different levels of 
subsystem redundancy.  Shown in Table 4 is a matrix of 11 analysis runs at different levels of 
FoS, subsystem redundancy, Safety components, and Operability components.   
 
Table 4:  Matrix of analysis studies. 
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Code 
Verification Apollo Baseline Configuration X X X X X X X  
Run 1 Minimum Functional Design Point X        
Run 2 Minimum Functional Design at Maximum Mission Time X X       
Run 3 Minimum Functional Design with Time, Factor of Safety and Single String Subsystems X X X   X   
Run 4 Minimum Functional Design with Time, Factor of Safety, Addn'l Safety Components, and Single String Subsystems X X X X  X   
Run 5 Single String Subsystems with Time, Safety, Operability, and Factor of Safety X X X X X X   
Run 6 Minimum Functional Design with Time, Factor of Safety, and Redundant Subsystems X X X    X  
Run 7 Minimum Functional Design with Time, Factor of Safety, Addn'l Safety Components, and Redundant Subsystems X X X X   X  
Run 8 Redundant Subsystems with Time, Safety, Operability, and Factor of Safety X X X X X  X  
Run 9 Dual Redundant Subsystems with Time, Safety, Operability, and Factor of Safety X X X X X   X 
Run 10 Tradespace Development of Conceptual Design Configurations X X X X X X X X 
 
 
 To verify the accuracy of the CLAMP code when compared to heuristic data, the nominal 
“as flown” configuration of the Apollo 15 Lunar Ascent Module is compared with the results of 
135 
 
CLAMP.  For each analysis run, a Monte Carlos set of 5000 runs was completed with an input 
uniform random uncertainty of +/- 5%.  The range of spacecraft configurations in this analysis 
matrix are varied starting from a minimum functional design (lowest mass) to a dual redundant 
subsystem configuration (highest mass).  These boundary conditions represent the minimum and 
maximum anticipated mass of a spacecraft based on habitable volume, number of crew, 
geometry, structural materials, trajectory, and orbital parameters. 
 
3.6.3    Safety and Operability Mass Fractions 
 In each of the analysis runs, the amount of Safety and Operability mass is determined.  
Calculating the Safety and Operability mass as a percentage of the total spacecraft mass provides 
another metric for understanding the mass fractions dedicated to the four fundamental values.  
Although Safety and Operability are defined in the context of mass in this analysis, it is 
important to understand how an increase in reliability through mass addition such as increased 
subsystem redundancy relates to the total spacecraft mass.  
 
3.6.4    Tradespace of Conceptual Design Configurations 
 The relationship between Safety, Operability, and total spacecraft mass can be visualized 
in a 3-D tradespace of various spacecraft subsystem component configurations.  The three axes 
of the conceptual design tradespace are the Total Spacecraft mass (x), Safety mass (y), and 
Operability mass (z).  The tradespace is developed by varying the level of subsystem 
redundancy, number of Safety components, number of Operability components, and Factor of 
Safety for a given spacecraft configuration of habitable volume, number of crew, mission time, 
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spacecraft geometry, structural materials, and orbital parameters.  A Monte Carlo analysis of 
5000 runs was used to generate the tradespace points.   
 
3.7     CONCEPTUAL SPACECRAFT ANALYSIS STUDY RESULTS 
3.7.1   Apollo Lunar Ascent Module Verification 
 Using the input information given in Table 4; the CLAMP code developed a conceptual 
Lunar Ascent Module design based on the Apollo 15 Lunar Ascent Module configuration.  The 
total gross weight of the Apollo 15 Lunar Ascent Module at lunar liftoff was calculated to be 
10,927 lbs. based on information gathered from the literature sources and including crew.  
Uncertainty limits of +/- 5% were applied in the analysis to determine the distribution range of 
the total spacecraft mass and the accuracy of the code when compared to heuristic data.  Shown 
in Figure 15 is a comparison of the upper and lower limit 95% confidence bands of the 
subsystems compared to the mass of the Lunar Ascent Module of Apollo 15.  
 In each subsystem, the nominal mass values of an Apollo 15 configuration were within 
upper and lower limits for 95% confidence.  This analysis demonstrated that the CLAMP code 
could recreate a human spacecraft design for a mission that matched known heuristics within 
95% confidence, therefore providing a calibration case for the following parametric analysis runs 
across various levels of subsystem redundancy and spacecraft configurations. 
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Figure 15:  Comparison of subsystem confidence limits to Apollo 15 subsystem mass. 
 
3.7.2 Subsystem Mass in Various Spacecraft Configurations 
 Shown in Figure 16 are the subsystem mass values for the various spacecraft 
configuration runs in the analysis study matrix.  Beginning with the minimum functional baseline 
configuration at a total mass of 5210 lbs, the mass of this design point is approximately half of 
the nominal as flown Apollo 15 Lunar Ascent Module mass.  It is recognized that while this is 
theoretically a technically feasible design option, it not likely to be considered programmatically 
acceptable due to the high risk it entails.  In this run, the minimum mission time was assumed to 
be 1.37 hours till rendezvous.  This establishes a lower bound for the spacecraft mass needed to 
complete the mission assuming no hardware failures or operational contingencies.  The next run 
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evaluated the minimum functional design at the maximum design time of 12.45 hours.  The 
increase in mission time of approximately 11 hours for the short mission increased the total 
spacecraft mass by 461 lbs.  The additional mass was due to the additional tank mass, power, and 
structure needed for a longer time interval before docking.  The mission duration time was held 
constant at 12.45 hours for the remainder of the analysis runs.  The third configuration run added 
in FoS to the minimum functional design at maximum design time.  The increase of 334 lbs 
above the previous run was due to the addition of FoS of 1.4 in the structure and 1.5 in high 
pressure tanks, and propulsion storage tanks.  The third configuration run loosely corresponds to 
a minimum functional design point according to a ZBV approach not including additional 
mission objective mass.  The mass difference between the lowest minimum functional design 
and a comparable ZBV configuration is 795 lbs for an Apollo Lunar Ascent Module 
configuration.   
 The remainder of the configuration runs added FoS, Safety components, and Operability 
components for either single string, redundant, or dual redundant subsystem components.  The 
maximum mass of approximately 25,000 lbs. represents the upper boundary condition of dual 
redundancy in the subsystem components.  Compared to the minimum functional, high-risk 
baseline configuration, the all dual redundant spacecraft mass is approximately 5 times larger.  
One also should note that this configuration would not be a programmatically acceptable 
spacecraft configuration due to excess mass, rather it defines the maximum boundary condition. 
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Figure 16:  Subsystem mass for various configurations of an Apollo Lunar Ascent Module. 
 
 An interesting finding common to all of the analysis runs is the fraction of propulsion 
mass needed for the spacecraft to reach the orbital insertion parameters.  In all cases, the sum of 
propulsion, main engine propellant, and RCS propellant mass fraction of the total spacecraft 
mass was calculated to be approximately 58%.  As the mass of the spacecraft grew larger, the 
propulsion mass could be easily predicted with this percentage.  However, one should also note 
that the propulsion system was sized for a particular launch trajectory and orbital parameters.  A 
change in the launch trajectory and orbital parameters will change the propulsion mass fraction.  
The mass fraction of the propulsion system is a function of the technology selections and, in this 
example, the hypergolic propulsion system utilized by Apollo was a significant mass of the 
Lunar Ascent Module.  Other types of propulsion systems such as liquid oxygen and methane 
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will produce a different propulsion mass fraction.  Trades between technology choices are left to 
the design teams. 
 As expected, the increase from all single string subsystems to all redundant subsystems 
increased the total spacecraft mass by 7154 lbs.  This is a 75% increase from the single string 
subsystem configuration that included FoS, Safety, and Operability due to added subsystem 
component redundancy.  The previous results should not come as a surprise to most spacecraft 
designers; but the takeaway lesson is that a 1 lb increase due to a Safety addition increased the 
overall spacecraft mass 3.85 lbs.  Because of the multidisciplinary nature of a spacecraft, a 
designer needs to understand the impacts of a small increase in mass in one subsystem and the 
relationship to the whole spacecraft during the early conceptual design phase when so many 
subsystem designs are in flux. 
 
 
3.7.3    Physics, Physiology, Safety, and Operability Mass Fractions  
 Increasing subsystem redundancy and adding components to mitigate failure modes and 
contingencies is intended to improve reliability through increased fault tolerance.  The amount of 
Safety mass in the vehicle can become the significant driver in the spacecraft if unneeded 
complexity is built into the design.  Shown in Figure 17 is a chart of mass fractions of the total 
spacecraft mass grouped into the values of Minimum Functionality, Safety, and Operability.  A 
significant finding of this analysis is that approximately 28% of the total spacecraft mass of an 
Apollo Lunar Ascent Module was dedicated solely to Safety.  The amount of Operability in 
additional time, payload, and mission objectives is approximately 24% of the total spacecraft 
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mass.  The amount of spacecraft mass necessary for Physics and Physiology was 48% of the total 
spacecraft mass.  The most surprising result of this analysis is that the addition of Safety 
components, FoS, and Operability accounted for approximately half of the mass of the total 
spacecraft to meet reliability and mission objectives.  
 In a minimum functional design configuration, the entire mass of the vehicle is dedicated 
100% to Physics and Physiology.  As Safety and Operability components are added to increase 
reliability, the mass fraction of Physics and Physiology decrease while the Safety and Operability 
mass fractions increase or decrease.  For example, when the Operability mass is added to a single 
string subsystem configuration, the mass fraction for the Safety decreased.  In the redundant 
subsystem designs, the amount of Safety is the significant mass driver with a range of 40-50% of 
total spacecraft mass depending upon the addition of Safety or Operability components. 
 
Figure 17:  Mass fractions of Physics & Physiology, Safety, and Operability. 
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3.7.4    Tradespace of Conceptual Spacecraft Design Configurations 
 Because spacecraft designers may not have adequate time or resources to study many 
different configurations of proposed conceptual spacecraft in depth, the methodology presented 
in this work could be used in the development of metamodels based on the objective tradespace.  
Shown in Figure 18 are the results of a Monte Carlo analysis for a run of 5000 spacecraft 
configurations.  Because the Propulsion system sizing was optimized for specified orbital 
parameters, the relationship between Safety, Operability, and total spacecraft mass form a 3-D 
surface that is approximately planer.  The use of a plane as a metamodel could be easily 
developed by designers for calculating total spacecraft mass based on given Safety and 
Operability mass.  The number of points required to generate the plane could be significantly 
reduced from the number shown in the example.  The important lesson of this exercise is to 
demonstrate the utility of this simplified methodology in early conceptual design. 
 
 
Figure 18:  Tradespace of Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass. 
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 For a set of 5000 data points, the equation of the plane of spacecraft configuration 
representing an Apollo type Lunar Ascent Module with an Apollo 15 ascent trajectory was 
calculated as: 
 0.5774 (x) – 0.5771(y) – 0.5775(z) = 3029.9                                                                          (8) 
 
Where, x = Total Spacecraft mass (lbm), y = Safety mass (lbm), and z = Operability mass (lbm). 
As mentioned previously, if one of the fundamental input parameters of crew size, spacecraft 
geometry, materials, orbital parameters, or technology selection is changed, a new tradespace 
must be developed.  Further work will explore the sensitivities of changes in these parameters on 
the spacecraft design.  The projection of the points on the Total Spacecraft and Safety mass plane 
is shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Total Spacecraft mass vs. Safety mass. 
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 Observed in Figure 19, the data in the tradespace also offer many more opportunities for 
investigating the overall mass based on small changes in Safety or Operability.  Judging whether 
a spacecraft meets detailed safety requirements is the next step in the design process, and 
obtaining a thorough understanding of how hardware additions relate to the overall spacecraft 
mass can assist with key trade decisions.  The methodology presented here is intended to help 
designers and program decision makers understand the associated mass impact of making a 
spacecraft safer or better beyond what is needed to meet the mission objectives.  The 
development of this conceptual level tradespace lends itself well for the use of figures of merit as 
a metric for quantifying relative increases in Safety or Operability in the early stages of design.  
Future work is aimed at extending this design methodology by defining quantifiable figures of 
merit for Safety and Operability. 
 
3.8    CONCLUSIONS 
 A minimum functional spacecraft design approach is a method that establishes a clear 
“minimum” baseline configuration before the addition of mass to improve safety, performance, 
or meet other mission objectives.  In previous minimum functionality design approaches, the 
baseline configuration varied according to how the starting “minimum” configuration was 
defined.  In approaches such as NASA’s Altair Minimum Functionality Design and Orion’s Zero 
Based Design, the minimum functionality vehicle configuration was already assumed to include 
factors of safety in the structure and redundant subsystems beyond what was absolutely 
necessary to fly a baseline mission and perform a set of minimum mission objectives.   
 The difference between the previous approaches and the methodology outlined here is 
that a lower boundary spacecraft configuration is more clearly defined, as it is based on the 
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minimum Physics and Physiology parameters required for a given reference mission.  Because 
the Physics and Physiology values are “non-negotiable” requirements, a challenging aspect of 
spacecraft design is deciding on what constitutes sufficient safety and reliability, and then trading 
this goal against increased subsystem redundancy or additional FoS needed to achieve it.  
Adding mission capabilities beyond Physics, Physiology, and Safety is defined in terms of 
Operability.  The degree of Operability required in a spacecraft is highly dependent upon the 
mission objectives, but designers must be aware that making small changes to achieve additional 
functionality can greatly affect the total mass of the spacecraft because of the burden placed on 
other subsystems to accommodate the upgrade.  In the conceptual design phase of human 
spacecraft development, the central goal is to determine feasible design solutions that 
accommodate flexibility while simultaneously reducing uncertainties due to integration 
challenges and various risks that must be mitigated as the design concept matures.  In order to 
make well informed decisions at this stage that will affect the success of the final design, the 
relationships between the various multidisciplinary aspects must be well understood. 
 The development of the CLAMP mass analysis code was shown to be a useful tool that 
demonstrates the design methodology and enables the comparison of different spacecraft 
configurations with various levels of Safety and Operability mass.  One interesting finding from 
this design analysis was that the mass fraction of the Apollo Lunar Ascent Module that was 
dedicated to Safety was approximately 28% of the total spacecraft, and this was considered to be 
a relatively high-risk design.  The results of the Monte Carlo analysis of spacecraft subsystem 
configurations were combined in a tradespace to visualize the relationship between Safety, 
Operability, and total mass for optional spacecraft configurations.  Because the Propulsion 
subsystem was optimized for the given trajectory and orbital parameters, a plane of spacecraft 
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configurations was formed that would enable a user to create a simple expression to define the 
relationship between total spacecraft mass, Safety mass, and Operability mass, across a large 
number of design options. 
 The minimum functional design methodology presented in this research is intended to 
provide human spacecraft designers with a systematic outline for determining a baseline mass 
and then quantifying Safety and Operability driven mass additions by trade study.  The result of 
the methodology establishes a tradespace of configurations that visually represent the 
relationship between total spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass fractions.  It is hoped that this 
minimum functional baseline design methodology will generate interest among the spacecraft 
design community and serve as a useful guideline in the development of future human 
spacecraft. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION OF RAPIDLY RECONFIGURABLE PROTOTYPING 
INTO MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL DESIGN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CONCEPTUAL HUMAN SPACECRAFT 
 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
 A full-scale mockup of a Lunar Lander habitat was constructed based on the dimensions 
defined in NASA’s 2005 Exploration Systems Architecture Study.  An initial goal of the project 
was to establish methods and procedures for constructing a rapidly reconfigurable engineering 
prototype while concurrently using the analogue as a means of developing systems-level 
requirements based on anticipated operational concepts.  The use of cost effective materials in 
the mockup provided a simplified approach for construction of system concepts and readily 
allowed subsequent configuration changes.  The application of rapid prototyping provides a 
means of incorporating a hands-on ‘human in the loop’ component to spacecraft system design.  
This effort was originally intended to be used to help evaluate vehicle configuration options, 
determine subsystem mass and volume budgets, reduce risk factors and derive requirements 
before the Lunar Lander preliminary design review.  The lessons learned in the initial 
prototyping activities were developed into a conceptual design process based on a minimum 
functionality design methodology.  This process allows designers to fully investigate the design 
configuration before the development of CAD models and higher fidelity models such as CFD 
and FEA. 
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4.2  INTRODUCTION 
 The term “rapidly reconfigurable” prototyping used in this context refers to the flexibility 
and adaptability of quickly changing the geometry of a proposed spacecraft design in real time to 
investigate concepts and issues.  Unlike other physical prototypes that are constructed using 
plywood or foam-core, the materials used in this activity were sufficiently sturdy and adaptable 
to changing subsystem hardware layouts in a cost effective manner.  In the course of this work, 
the overall spacecraft configuration was changed many times.  Each change to the overall design 
was on the order of a few minutes to a couple of hours to rebuild and reconfigure the prototype.  
This rapidly reconfigurable prototyping activity was focused on reducing risk, investigating 
human factors, and determining subsystem integration and layout before the use of CAD design 
and high fidelity analyses.   
 This chapter describes the prototyping research activities at the University of Colorado 
from the fall of 2006 until the spring of 2009.  Many lessons were learned as a result of this 
prototyping activity and one of the significant aspects of rapidly reconfigurable prototyping is 
that it integrates well into a minimum functionality design methodology.  The early research 
efforts beginning in 2006 have led to a project based design curriculum for human spacecraft 
conceptual design at the University of Colorado.  Two conference papers resulted from this work 
(Higdon and Klaus, 2008; Klaus and Higdon, 2009).   
 The many lessons learned from the prototyping work shaped the development of a 
conceptual design process based on minimum functionality design and risk based design.  This 
process was developed after the prototyping efforts and serves as an easy to use roadmap for 
future spacecraft conceptual design exploration. 
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4.2.1 Rationale for Rapidly Reconfigurable Engineering Prototypes 
 A central theme in the use of rapidly reconfigurable prototypes during the conceptual 
development phase is to reduce the overall vehicle costs through the investigation of many 
factors in the spacecraft design.  The impact of early program decisions on the overall 
development cost of a spacecraft is well documented (Huang, 2005; Hammond, 1999; Bell et al., 
1995).  As the vehicle matures from concept to preliminary design, unexpected requirement 
drivers increasingly add to overall program costs (NASA, 1995).  The use of prototypes has been 
suggested as a starting point in the development of small, high-risk projects by Mulenburg and 
Gundo (2004), who stated that “despite creating beautiful three dimensional models, and 
detailed computer drawings that can consume hundreds of engineering hours, the resulting 
designs can be extremely difficult to make, requiring many changes that add to the cost and 
schedule”.  In light of the desire to keep program costs down, as well as to produce a safe, 
reliable human-rated spacecraft, incorporating rapidly reconfigurable physical prototyping 
throughout the design flow can be used to identify and analyze key system drivers, vehicle 
interfaces and technology updates early in the program, when their modifications result in cost 
savings, rather than later, when changes tend to create cost overruns.  
 Another advantage of physical prototyping is use of a design aid termed a “Boundary 
Object”, which is intended to facilitate communication across different disciplines involved in 
the design process.  In a research study of adaptive design using system representations, Dare et 
al. (2004) defined Boundary Objects as “representations of knowledge that can improve 
communication and understanding between groups or organizations with different lexicons and 
cognitive foundations”.  The use of a rapidly reconfigurable physical (full-scale) prototype 
facilitates communication between multidisciplinary groups and helps to resolve discrepancies 
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before a design configuration is chosen.  Other studies into how prototypes support engineering 
design decisions have been conducted by Brereton and McGarry  (2000), who concluded that 
physical objects help to influence design thinking by helping relate previous knowledge and 
experiences to the current needs.  The advantage of this approach is that having a physical (full-
scale) system that everyone can see and touch reduces the possibility of misinterpretation where 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) drawings or other computer representations may be viewed 
incompletely or in diverse ways by different members of the design team. 
 The use of rapidly reconfigurable prototyping assists in conducting multiple, low cost 
trade studies in a short time frame and helps to identify and optimize key variables during the 
conceptual design phase.  Research conducted by Thomke et al. (1998) on the modes of 
experimentation highlighted the use of a “serial experimentation process” in which rapid learning 
occurs between successive iterations.  This type of experimentation process produces results at 
the lowest cost, but at a “medium” speed compared to parallel experimentation.  The downstream 
cost savings, however, become particularly important in the design of human spacecraft due to 
the unique one-off nature of the business, where a little more time and effort up front pays off 
substantially in the long run. 
 
4.2.2 Objectives of Rapidly Reconfigurable Prototyping 
 Incorporating standard principles of systems engineering with the use of a full-scale, 
rapid prototype mockup and analytical processes has demonstrated a dynamic design approach 
that builds the spacecraft around the mission objectives and operational needs of the crew.  
However, as the research progressed, it became obvious that a minimum functionality design 
process was needed to account for incremental mass changes in the subsystems.  Due to complex 
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integration factors, small changes in one subsystem can become amplified through multiple other 
subsystems; thus disproportionately impacting the overall vehicle mass.  In order to understand 
integrated mass and reliability drivers in the complete vehicle, a minimum functionality design 
methodology is proposed as a starting point before prototyping to study the relationships 
between system and subsystem designs and the resulting changes to the overall vehicle design. 
 In order to simultaneously minimize overall development time and cost, as well as 
operational risk and cost, a minimum functionality design methodology coupled with the use of 
physical prototyping and computer modeling can be employed to establish a Multidisciplinary 
Design Optimization scheme tailored for human spacecraft conceptual design.  During the 
conceptual design of the Apollo Lunar Module, the major factors that drove the LM mass during 
the design phase involved meeting reliability and mission operational requirements, and 
configuration definition (Kelly, 1999).  The design process presented in this work could be used 
to develop and iterate requirements down to the subsystem level during the conceptual design 
phase.  In turn, the early prototypes offer a means of CAD model validation via a sanity check 
using the physical mockup.  While it may be well recognized that prototypes enable a direct 
‘human in the loop’ component to a design, the focus of this research is on the development of 
an integrated, end-to-end process that utilizes physical prototypes in conjunction with a 
minimum functionality design methodology for cost effective and time efficient development of 
human spacecraft.  This low cost and readily reconfigurable approach provides a competitive 
advantage for government and industry seeking to develop and validate interfaces for new 
systems and technologies for human spacecraft, as well as a unique educational tool for 
academic purposes. 
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4.2.3 Background of Rapidly Reconfigurable Prototyping  
 The first ideas for constructing a prototype of the Lunar Habitat Module were 
investigated in the ASEN 5158 Space Habitat Design class in the fall of 2006.  A group of 
students first conceived ideas for the Lunar Module Habitat based on the recently published 
NASA ESAS report.  Several small scale models and CAD models were generated in this class 
to investigate the notion of building a full scale prototype for further investigation.  Shown in 
Figure 20 is a CAD model developed for the ASEN 5158 class for studying the Lander Habitat 
design. 
 
 
Figure 20:  ASEN 5158 Space Habitat Design, fall 2006 design concept. 
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 The initial development of concepts in the fall of 2006 led to the investigation of where to 
build a full scale mockup and how to build the mockup.  The initial design effort was led by Dan 
Baca, who gathered team members for beginning the fabrication as a voluntary activity.  In a 
stroke of luck, a large room located in the Discovery Learning Center near the Engineering 
Center was unoccupied and was the perfect location for showcasing the activity in this early 
design stage and generating interest among the engineering students.  Shown in Figure 21 is a 
form factor skeleton with Dan Baca (on left) and myself.  The room was a perfect fit for our 
needs and one can see that the top of the form factor (approximately 10 feet in diameter) was 
almost touching the hanging lights; which were eventually moved upwards to allow clearance. 
 
 
Figure 21:  An early form factor Lunar Habitat skeleton. 
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4.2.4 Goals of Rapidly Reconfigurable Prototyping  
 A rapidly reconfigurable prototyping process is intended to follow a minimum 
functionality design methodology where a baseline minimum functional vehicle configuration is 
chosen for additional study of human factors and integration of proposed technology choices.  
The efforts of the prototyping activity can be conducted in parallel with other analysis efforts 
such as CAD, but the risk with developing CAD models too early is that based on the lessons 
learned from rapid prototyping and the study of human factors, the model will change.  Using 
information gathered from the prototyping activity and a human factors standpoint, the minimum 
functionality baseline could be iterated to further define the spacecraft configuration based on 
crew needs and subsystem integration challenges. 
 Because the prototypes were easy to reconfigure, it readily accommodated incremental 
design changes throughout the research efforts.  Using test subjects in simulated spacesuits, 
various tasks such as egress through hatches were studied to assess operational feasibility related 
to human-vehicle interfaces.  This application demonstrated a means of incorporating a hands-on 
‘human in the loop’ component to spacecraft system design and the information was used to 
validate previous mass and volume budgets to determine which critical drivers should be further 
optimized.  The advantage of using a full-scale prototype in the system-level design process is 
that it provides information from a firsthand perspective that can be difficult to achieve using 
CAD models alone.  As a result of the human spacecraft prototyping activity, several other 
projects were developed.  The activity that was once voluntary has been fully developed into a 
project based design curriculum.  Although this was not a primary objective in the initial phases, 
its usefulness for teaching students the fundamentals of spacecraft development has proved to be 
very beneficial from an academic standpoint. 
155 
 
4.3 LUNAR MODULE PROTOTYPING RESEARCH  
 The initial prototyping activity focused on the construction of an ESAS design 
configuration for the LSAM habitation and ascent module.  As NASA was in the early stages of 
development for the Lunar Lander, personnel at the Johnson Space Center suggested that a key 
need within NASA was determining the minimum mass ascent stage for lunar ascent.  The 
prototyping activity conducted in the Discovery Learning Center was based on an ESAS 
Minimum Ascent Module and Habitation Module configuration. 
 The follow on prototyping activity was conducted approximately a year after the start of 
the initial activity and focused on the ESAS Minimum Ascent Module configuration.  Because of 
funding constraints the prototype project was relocated to a much smaller lab in the Engineering 
Center in the Aerospace Engineering Sciences wing.  Because of limited room to construct the 
entire prototype, the decision was made to strictly focus on the Ascent Module only.  In 
hindsight, the “downsizing” of the prototyping activity to a much smaller and focused scale 
allowed more information to be gathered about the spacecraft configuration, where a true 
minimum functionality approach was investigated. 
 
4.3.1 ESAS LSAM Configuration 
 Using the ESAS guidelines specified in paragraph 4.2.5.1.3, LSAM Configuration 
Trades, the LSAM Configuration Concept 1 design was used as a point of departure for the 
initial prototyping activity.  The emphasis of this configuration was to minimize the overall size 
for the Ascent Module (NASA, 2005).  Shown in Figure 22 is the layout for the LSAM 
configuration for the Ascent Module, the Surface Living Module and the Airlock. 
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Figure 22:  ESAS LSAM Configuration Concept 1 with Ascent Module (NASA, 2005). 
 
 The challenge with this configuration was determining the minimum size of the Ascent 
Module in relationship to the Habitation Module.  In addition, a hatch and release mechanism 
would need to be designed to allow the lateral release of the Ascent Module from the Surface 
Living Module.  A docking adaptor would be placed on the top of the Ascent Module for 
docking with the CEV.  Other issues with this design configuration such as an off thrust axis 
docking location with CEV would drive additional mass in the structure to overcome torque 
loads during EDS propulsion.  Even with the many issues surrounding the layout of the modules, 
the recommendations from JSC helped to guide the focus of the prototyping activity toward 
minimizing the Ascent Module and evaluating the design from a human factors and operational 
standpoint.  Other ESAS concepts utilized a combined Living Module and Ascent stage with a 
separable airlock that would be left on the surface.  These concepts were not investigated 
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because of the focus to minimize the Ascent Module configuration.  Shown in Figure 23 is an 
illustration of the early LSAM concept with a combined Ascent Module, Living Module, and 
Airlock. 
 
 
Figure 23: LSAM Lander and Ascent Module (NASA, 2005). 
 
 
4.3.2 ESAS Minimum Ascent Module Configuration 
 The prototyping activities for the ESAS Minimum Ascent Module configuration followed 
the initial prototyping of the outer skeleton prototyping of the ESAS Ascent Module and 
Habitation Module configuration.  This effort was focused primarily on the interior subsystem 
components and layouts for a minimum functionality Ascent Module.  Single string subsystems 
and minimum crew accommodations formed the baseline for the minimum functionality 
prototype.  Components such as propulsion, tanks, and exterior systems were not included in the 
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prototyping effort due to lack of available space for building the full scale prototype.  Shown in 
Figure 24 is a concept developed in the ASEN 5158 Space Habitat Design Project, fall 2007. 
 
 
Figure 24: Minimum Functionality Ascent Module concept from  
ASEN 5158 Space Habitat Design Project, fall 2007. 
 
4.3.3 Prototyping the Minimum Ascent and Habitation Module 
  A physical full scale mockup of the LSAM Lunar Lander’s Ascent Module, Habitation 
Module, and Airlock was kicked off with the construction of a form-factor outer structure based 
on NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study baseline configuration (NASA, 2005).  The 
use of various construction methods and materials was iteratively attempted over the course of 
the first months to determine fabrication techniques that would allow the mockup to be easily 
reconfigured for future design modifications.  
 
159 
 
 The effort began with defining mission objectives and identifying anticipated crew 
operations in order to derive initial volumetric and mass requirements for the Lunar Lander 
based on a functional decomposition.  Next, the initial prototype was constructed using these top 
level requirements to define an external form factor of the proposed vehicle. A design goal 
throughout the activity was defining requirements for a minimal Ascent Module mass.  At the 
same time, the potential for extensibility of the Habitat Module hardware remaining on the moon 
for use as part of the Lunar Outpost was considered through the design of universal hatches and 
reusable docking mechanisms.  A major driver of the Lunar Lander mockup construction was the 
division of two separate modules in order to study trade factors for minimizing the Ascent 
Module (flight deck) mass and optimizing surface access airlock operations.  The overarching 
goal was to maximize habitable volume and mass remaining on the moon for future use, while 
minimizing the Ascent Module mass needed to launch and rendezvous with the crew module.  
 Beginning in the fall of 2006, the outer shape of the LSAM Modules was being 
constructed to determine construction materials and methods.  The first attempts at constructing a 
10 foot diameter cylindrical shape with PVC were not very successful.  Shown earlier in Figure 
21 was the first skeleton constructed with PVC.  The difficulty with PVC is that it cannot hold 
lateral loads in the skeletal members.  An alternative to PVC was needed, but the use of plywood 
would be heavy and very difficult to reconfigure.  After multiple visits to hardware stores in the 
area, a non-traditional solution was proposed.  The use of ½ inch aluminum electrical conduit 
was a cheap and lightweight alternative to the use of PVC.  Shown in Figure 25 is the upper 
section of the LSAM prototype that utilized aluminum electrical conduit for the structural 
members. 
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Figure 25:  Upper section of LSAM Prototype with electrical conduit as structure. 
 
 The conduit was easily formed by hand and was sturdy enough to hold the weight of the 
structure.  In typical applications of conduit, the sections are joined at an electrical box.  
However for this application, something that would resemble more of a “tinker toy” than a hard 
connection to an electrical box was required.  Joints between structural members had to be strong 
enough to carry the weight and easily reconfigurable.  Thus, a non-traditional method was 
adopted.  Shown in Figure 26 are the joints used in the prototyping. 
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Figure 26:  Typical joints used for prototyping. 
  
 As observed in Figure 26, the ends of the electrical conduit are fastened to fittings that 
would normally thread into an electrical box.  In this application, the threads of the electrical 
conduit fittings were cross threaded into PVC threaded adapters for a ½ inch pipe to a ¾ inch 
PVC.  Because of the difference between pipe threads and the electrical fitting threads, the 
threads were cross threaded; but the interference made the joint strong enough to carry the loads.  
Also shown in the figure are PVC “T” joints and cross joints that could be attached to ¾ inch 
PVC pipe.  A wire mesh was used to simulate the OML panels where a layer of aluminized 
Mylar was taped to the ends of the panel to prevent cuts from sharp edged wires.  The panels 
were zip tied to the electrical conduit structural members and were easily removable by cutting 
the ties and replacing.  The wire mesh was affectionately called “chicken wire” but this author 
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disagrees with this term and prefers the term “wire mesh fabric.”  Overall, the materials used in 
this prototype were very cost effective, simple, and easily reconfigurable. 
 In January 2007, a full skeleton of the LSAM configuration was constructed as shown in 
Figure 27.  This form factor skeleton was the correct shape of the ESAS LSAM baseline and 
formed the basis for the project level class, ASEN 5519 Lunar Module Design, in spring 2007 to 
fully construct the LSAM module prototype and further develop the facility.  
 
 
Figure 27:  LSAM skeleton in January 2007 with simulated spacesuits. 
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 Participants in the project level class were: Dr. David Klaus, Dan Baca, Bruce Davis, 
Kevin Eberhart, Lisa Geschwill, Kevin Higdon, Laurren Kanner, Ryan Kobrick, Danielle 
Massey, Sean O’Dell, and Courtney Wright.  The goals of this class were to:  
 Construct a full-scale prototype of Lunar Lander modules;  
 Study human to vehicle interfaces, and incorporate latest changes to design concepts 
(volumetric, mass, geometry, etc.); 
 Use results from mockup activity to derive requirements for subsystem development; 
 Develop mass analysis computational models;  
 Identify Con-Ops requirements;  
 Conduct outreach activities; and 
 Develop funding sources for future research topics. 
 
 Over the course of the semester, the prototype was reconfigured multiple times and 
developed into a fully enclosed structure.  The specific accomplishments of the ASEN 5519 
Lunar Module Design class included: 
 Constructed a full-scale (reconfigurable) mockup of the exterior form factor of the Lunar 
Lander;  
 Reconfigured and rebuilt the Ascent and Habitation modules multiple times; 
 Developed a first draft of mass analysis computational models;  
 Identified top level Con-Ops requirements using NASA’s 181 things to do on the Moon; 
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 Conducted six K-12 outreach activities; and 
 Secured continued funding through William F. Marlar Memorial Trust.  
 
 In addition to the accomplishments of constructing the prototype and identifying top level 
Con-Ops requirements, the class received the following recognition: 
 3rd Place in AIAA Region V Student Paper Conference in April 2007; 
 Competed in a national design competition for development of a Lunar Outpost analogue 
to be built in Hawaii with the Pacific International Space Center for Exploration Systems 
(PISCES) where Dr. Klaus, Jonathan Metts, and Bruce Davis represented CU in the final 
competition and awarded 2nd place in the competition; and 
 Channel 4 CBS Television Interview. 
 
 
Figure 28: Channel 4 CBS Denver television interview. 
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 At the end of the spring 2007 semester, the initial construction phase of the exterior shell 
was completed and detailed studies were focused on hatch design and dust mitigation strategies. 
The overall configuration of the mockup was a 10-foot diameter shell with a re-configurable 
floor and an exterior covering of Mylar attached to modular, wire mesh backing panels as shown 
in Figs. 29 and 30.  The entire effort to construct the form factor skeleton was the collaboration 
of many students who volunteered additional time to assist with the construction of the 
prototype.  
 
   
 
Figure 29:  ESAS Split Ascent and Habitation Module configuration front view. 
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Figure 30:  ESAS Split Ascent and Habitation Module configuration interior view. 
 
4.3.4 Prototyping the Minimum Ascent Module  
 During the summer of 2007, the prototyping activity for the Lunar Module moved from 
the Discovery Learning Center to a much smaller lab in the Engineering Center.  This focus of 
the new lab was to house the prototype for a minimum functionality Lunar Ascent Module.  
During the fall 2007 Space Habitat Design class, the semester project topics were tailored toward 
the minimum functionality Lunar Ascent Module spacecraft configurations.  The prototype of 
the Lunar Ascent Module in August 2007 is shown in Figs. 31 and 32.  The top and lower 
portions of the cylinder were removed because of height limitations. 
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Figure 31:  Lunar Ascent Module prototype in August 2007 front view. 
 
 Shown in Figure 32 is a form factor prototype for a hatch design.  The size of the hatch 
could be reconfigured and test subjects (students) in simulated spacesuits were used to determine 
the minimum size.  In addition to investigating human factors and hatch configurations, the 
specific accomplishments during this semester included: 
 Determined the minimum mass required for lunar ascent based on physics; 
 Developed a “top-down” heuristic mass breakdown of subsystems; 
 Created a “bottom-up” mass based on available subsystem technologies; 
 Identified key drivers for future study; and 
 Developed propulsion and trajectory simulations for future studies. 
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Figure 32:  Lunar Ascent Module prototype in August 2007 hatch view. 
  
 Shown in Figure 33 are examples of the propulsion and trajectory simulation tools 
developed in MATLAB to analyze propulsion requirements for an equatorial orbit and a series of 
plane changes from a polar landing site to an equatorial orbit. 
 
Figure 33:  Propulsion and trajectory simulations of lunar ascent and plane change. 
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 The research conducted in the fall of 2007 led to a more focused approach for 
determining how to couple the prototyping activities with a minimum functional design 
approach.  The last part of the prototyping effort was the most significant because many lessons 
were learned about the minimum functionality design approach and how to determine subsystem 
mass and volume through a bottom-up philosophy.  Starting with the top level goals of a 
minimum functionality mission, all of the subsystem functions were revisited in order to develop 
the baseline minimum functional Lunar Ascent Module configuration.  Shown in Figure 34 is a 
diagram of the top level functional decomposition of the Lunar Ascent Module. 
 
Figure 34: Top level functional decomposition of Lunar Ascent Module. 
 
 Shown in Figures. 35 – 40 are the functional decomposition diagrams for Avionics, 
Structures and Mechanisms, ECLSS, Thermal, Crew Accommodations, and Payload subsystems.  
Although the entire decomposition matrix is too long to be listed here, a detailed decomposition 
matrix is listed in Appendix C.  The following diagrams show how the various subsystems were 
decomposed into lower level functions. 
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Figure 35:  Avionics subsystem functional diagram. 
 
Figure 36:  Structures and Mechanisms subsystem functional diagram. 
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Figure 37:  ECLSS subsystem functional diagram. 
 
Figure 38:  Thermal subsystem functional diagram. 
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Figure 39:  Crew Accommodations subsystem functional diagram. 
 
 
Figure 40:  Payload Accommodations subsystem functional diagram. 
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 Based on the minimum number of functions, subsystems were sized according to 
heuristics using mass and volume information given in Human Spacecraft Mission Analysis and 
Design (Larson et al., 1999) and Advanced Life Support Baseline Values and Assumptions 
Document (Hanford, 2004).  Potential technologies were identified to perform the low level 
functions.  For each of the individual components, a series of specification sheets were 
developed to assist in the sizing of the component prototypes.  The specification sheet contained 
as much information as available in the open literature and heuristic volumetric equations were 
used.  If sufficient information about mass and volume was not available, a cubic volume was 
used as a placeholder.  Shown in Figure 41 is a list of the information captured in the 
specification sheets. 
 
 Figure 41:  Information documented in specification sheets. 
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  Shown in Figure 42 is an example of one function linked to a specification sheet.  In 
this example, a Lithium Ion battery is chosen as a technology candidate for conducting the 
function “Provide Power.”  The specification sheet captured as much information as possible to 
provide a reasonable estimate for a prototype battery. 
 
Figure 42:  Example of specification sheet linked to a function. 
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 Central to the sizing of the subsystem components were the physiological needs of the 
crew during the lunar ascent.  Shown in Figure 43 are the physiological requirements for a crew 
of 4 for the Lunar Ascent Module. 
 
 
Figure 43:  Physiological requirements for a crew of four. 
 
 Prototypes for the following interior subsystem components were constructed and 
installed in the minimum functionality Lunar Ascent Module baseline configuration: 
 Avionics – guidance and control computers, transponder, docking radar, 
communications, data storage, flight deck, heads up display, and flight controls: 
N2
Atmosphere 
Subsystem
Water Subsystem
Waste Subsystem
Food Subsystem
Various Subsystems
Potable H2O (15.636 kg/day)
Food (2.468 kg/day)
O2(3.340 kg/day)
Heat (47.28 MJ/day)
Respired/Perspired 
H2O (8.908 kg/day)
Sweat Solids (0.720 kg/day)
Urine H2O (7.554 kg/day)
Fecal Solids (0.128 kg/day)
Urine Solids (0.236 kg/day)
CO2(3.992 kg/day)
Fecal Water (0.364 kg/day)
Trace Contaminants
ECLSS Input/Output Daily Needs for a Crew of 4
Crew Mass: 280kg (total)
Temperature: 21°C
Shirt Sleeve Environment at 8.3 PSI 30% O2 70%N2
Human (4)
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 ECLSS – carbon dioxide removal, air ducts, oxygen and makeup gas supply, humidity 
removal, particulate removal, and umbilical interfaces; 
 Crew Accommodations – food, water, personal hygiene, tools and equipment, lighting, 
waste management, and stowage; 
 Thermal – cold plates, pumps, and coolant loops; 
 Power – batteries, inverters, power controllers; 
 Secondary Structures; 
 Hatches and docking tunnel geometry; and 
 Payloads – sample return containers. 
 
 Shown in Figure 44 is the final configuration of the minimum functionality Lunar Ascent 
Module.  The cardboard boxes represent subsystem volumes for the various components.  Also 
prototyped were the cabin air ducts as well as a flight control display that allowed re-
configurability.  The rear bulkhead of the prototype was removable (not shown in Figure 44) to 
allow easy access to the interior for installing large components.  A “hoop” on the ceiling 
represented the area of a docking tunnel.  Each component was labeled according to its particular 
subsystem and function according to the functional decomposition matrix.  At the conclusion of 
this prototyping effort, it was obvious that an ESAS sized minimum functionality Lunar Ascent 
Module could be further optimized for habitable volume.  Although four crewmembers could 
comfortably stand in the “square cube” of the habitable volume, much volume was not being 
utilized in the additional spaces.  The next step in the prototyping activity would have likely been 
a reduction in the habitable volume and repackaging of subsystem components.  Because the 
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focus of this prototyping activity was to determine the usefulness of rapidly reconfigurable 
prototype in a minimum functional design, it succeeded in establishing the usefulness of physical 
prototyping as a first step in the conceptual design process.  The role of human factors is a very 
important part in analyzing various subsystem integration and layout configurations. 
 
 
Figure 44:  Minimum functionality Lunar Ascent Module with interior components. 
 
4.3.5 Summary of Lunar Module Prototyping Research 
 Because the focus of the prototyping activity was not to design the entire Lunar Ascent 
Module, this research served a purpose in demonstrating the usefulness of physical prototyping 
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as a first step of defining human factors early in conceptual design.  The significant aspects of 
the prototyping activities included the following: 
 Establishing a “Boundary Object” to increase communication between designers with 
various backgrounds; 
 Determining subsystem components using a bottom up philosophy; 
 Understanding the limitations of subsystem integration and layout; 
 Exploring human factors such as reach, access, egress, and proper configuration of 
subsystems; 
 Providing a “test-bed” for simulated suit activities; 
 Understanding human and vehicle interactions as a precursor to analysis and trade 
studies; 
 Assisting with the design of Secondary Structures;  
 Pre-validating CAD design activities;  
 Developing design requirements; and 
 Reducing design and configuration uncertainty. 
 
 The amount of time to construct a full scale mockup was very small compared to the 
same amount of time required to develop detailed CAD models.  In this authors experience with 
many thousand hours of CAD modeling, the CAD model can only provide the designer with 
limited parametric information such as mass, interference, and rudimentary layout.  The issue 
with relying completely on CAD is that it does not provide sufficient information about other 
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aspects of the design such as human factors, manufacturing, and integration.  The assembly 
might seem to be straight forward in the CAD, but the part may be either difficult to manufacture 
or install on the vehicle due to tight clearances, tolerance stack up, or other physical factors.  The 
use of rapidly reconfigurable physical prototyping coupled with a minimum functionality design 
methodology and risk based design approach is an efficient method for quantifying uncertainty 
and uncovering many issues in the early stages of conceptual design. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 The use of prototypes in conceptual design is not a new approach.  However its use has 
been limited in aerospace applications since CAD was introduced as an engineering tool.  
Although CAD is less expensive than building prototypes, there is much information in a CAD 
model that is not easily recognized when attempting to assemble and manufacture components 
for subsystems.  One limitation of CAD is the study of human factors in the early stages.  
Volumetric studies of human interaction provide some indication of how humans will interact 
with hardware but this does not always uncover many of the unknowns in human factors until 
hardware is built and tested. 
 The purpose of studying rapidly reconfigurable prototypes was to learn what can be 
gained and the limitations.  The design configurations chosen were based on ESAS Lunar 
Module concepts and provided a start in understanding how the many complex subsystems 
should interact.  Because of the initial prototyping activity, the development of the minimum 
functional design methodology became much easier.  It was through hands on experience with 
building prototype hardware using a bottom up philosophy that many of the key design issues in 
a minimum functional design were discovered.  One of the limitations to prototyping is that it is 
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focused on a single spacecraft configuration and the study of many different configurations can 
take time.  However, when the prototyping activity utilizes results from the Minimum Functional 
design methodology, the investigation of many more configurations is possible and the rapidly 
reconfigurable prototype serves as a validation of the analysis assumptions. 
 The lessons learned in the prototyping activity of the Lunar Module were key in 
developing the human spacecraft conceptual design process that couples minimum functionality 
and prototyping in a risk based design approach.  Although the prototyping activity described 
here did not fully explore the entire conceptual design process, it demonstrated how minimum 
functionality can be coupled to a physical prototype as a precursor to detailed analyses, 
requirements development, and risk reduction. 
 After the conclusion of the Lunar Ascent Module prototyping activity in the spring of 
2009, the next phase of spacecraft prototyping began developing subsystem layouts and 
configurations for the Commercial Crew Development program.  Although this author was not 
involved in the prototyping activities beyond 2009, the processes, techniques, and materials were 
recycled for other spacecraft applications.  The collaborative work of many participants has 
grown from a seemingly small spacecraft design activity into a curriculum for training future 
aerospace explorers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A SYSTEMATIC PROCESS FOR EVALUATING SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL 
FUNCTIONALITY IN CONCEPTUAL HUMAN SPACECRAFT  
 
5.1 ABSTRACT 
 A systematic process has been developed for evaluating safety and operational capability 
in conceptual human spacecraft designs.  The process begins with a Minimum Functionality 
baseline configuration and focuses on mitigating hazards through the addition of similar or 
dissimilar redundancy and is defined in this context as Safety.  Likewise, operational capability, 
is added in the form of additional mission time and components for performing mission 
objectives, and is defined in this context as Operability.  A matrix of spacecraft configurations is 
defined with varying levels of Safety and Operability in order to designate locations of design 
configurations in the objective tradespace.  The grid of spacecraft configurations maps the 
objective tradespace to the input design space and provides designers with a complete view of 
potential spacecraft configurations within the tradespace.  A series of zones are designated within 
the tradespace domain to narrow the focus of design concepts to regions of interest for further 
investigation.  The process can be utilized throughout the conceptual design to continually assess 
the impacts of design changes on the overall spacecraft.  Three design configurations of Lunar 
Ascent Modules were used as case studies to demonstrate and validate the mass addition and 
tradespace exploration methodology. 
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5.2     INTRODUCTION 
 The goal of a conceptual design process is to investigate and develop feasible solutions to 
a given problem.  The conceptual design phase is characterized by a large amount of uncertainty 
due to many unknown factors.  Conceptual designs are developed using the creative skills of 
designers and design teams and the conceptual design phase can last from months to years; 
depending upon the type of problem under investigation.  In the example of government 
contracts, conceptual design trade studies are conducted within months to propose candidate 
solutions to contract proposals. 
 The conceptual design phase is critical for determining the success or failure of a 
proposed design.  There are many challenges associated with developing a human spacecraft to 
perform the operational aspects of a mission and bring the crew home safe.  A central problem in 
the early stages of development is due to uncertainty and designs are initially based on heuristic 
data or designer experience until further analysis or testing is available.  In today’s economic 
environment, additional testing or analysis may not be feasible in the early stages of 
development.  Although this approach is typical in human spacecraft development, it also 
introduces potential uncertainty and issues in the conceptual design that might not be discovered 
until later in development.  However, the risks associated with any conceptual design will always 
be present until hardware is built and flown.  
 Given that the conceptual design is dependent upon the creativity and experience of the 
designers and design teams, the processes used to develop the initial designs are often 
unstructured and focused on solving one particular issue at a time.  This approach works to solve 
issues in a sequential fashion, but also creates the possibility of overlooking larger problems at a 
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systems level.  Because the subsystems in a human spacecraft are highly coupled, the overall 
relationships between the subsystems must be evaluated during each step of the design process. 
 The difficulty faced by designers is that the relationships between the discipline specific 
areas and the effects upon the safety posture of the spacecraft may not be fully defined or 
understood by all members of the design team.  The assumptions made during the conceptual 
design phase are often carried over into preliminary design where designers struggle to mature 
the designs with limited information.  The overall systems level relationships between the 
subsystems should be known prior to preliminary design such that changes in the design will not 
significantly affect other subsystems in the form of redesign.  After the conceptual design 
reaches a level of maturity, the preliminary design begins and system level requirements are 
matured based on the knowledge gained during conceptual design. 
 
5.2.1 Process for Tradespace Development and Exploration 
 The process described in this work develops a conceptual design tradespace for 
evaluating concepts based on the levels of Safety and Operability in a spacecraft configuration.  
In this context, Safety is defined as the addition of mass and functionality beyond a “Minimum 
Functional” baseline configuration that provides hazard mitigation through similar or dissimilar 
redundancy or safety dedicated components.  Operability is added functionality dedicated to 
perform mission specific activities beyond transporting the crew and keeping them alive for a 
given minimum mission time.  The relationship between Safety, Operability, and total spacecraft 
mass can be visualized in a tradespace such that design changes made at the subsystem level can 
be evaluated at the systems level.  The tradespace provides the design team with an overall 
picture of the conceptual spacecraft design such that designers can identify areas for increasing 
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safety and reducing risk while maintaining requirements for mass.  Although this approach is 
focused on early conceptual development, the process can be utilized as the design matures into 
preliminary design.  
 Building upon the Minimum Functionality design methodology presented in Chapter 3, 
this chapter fully explores the conceptual design tradespace in order to explain how Safety and 
Operability configurations in the design space can be mapped to the objective tradespace.  The 
minimum functionality design approach has been successfully utilized by the Altair Lunar 
Lander in the LDAC cycles and the Orion program before System Design Review.  However, the 
previous approaches took many months of investigation and focused primarily on optimizing 
single design configurations.  
  The novelty of this process is the methods used to characterize spacecraft conceptual 
design configurations in terms of Safety and Operability.  The advantage of this approach is that 
a tradespace of potential design configurations can be developed quickly such that design teams 
can focus on the most critical elements of the spacecraft.  This process also structures the design 
process in a way that requires designers to focus on the lowest levels of the spacecraft in order to 
reduce and quantify uncertainty associated with component mass.  The philosophy of this 
approach is different from traditional single design optimization methods because it trades the 
impacts of Safety and Operability at an earlier stage in the conceptual design phase. 
 
5.3 BACKGROUND 
 According to NASA NPR 8705.2B, Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems, a 
human rated system is described as one that: 
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“Accommodates human needs, effectively utilizes human capabilities, controls hazards with 
sufficient certainty to be considered safe for human operations, and provides to the maximum 
possible extent practical, the capability to safety recover the crew from hazardous 
situations” (NASA, 2009). 
 
 In summary, human rating a spacecraft is the process of developing and maintaining a 
spacecraft with a focus on the safety of the crew and mission success.  The NASA procedural 
requirements in NPR 8705.2B are applicable to all stages of the spacecraft life cycle process.  
The reduction of risk and uncertainty is key driver for increasing safety and mission success and 
continues throughout flight operations.  The technical requirements for human rating are 
specified in Chapter 3 of NASA NPR 8705.2B.  In paragraph 3.2.2, failure tolerance in systems 
is described as: 
“The space system shall provide failure tolerance to catastrophic events (minimum of one 
fault tolerant), with the specific level of failure tolerance (one, two, or more) and 
implementation (similar or dissimilar redundancy) derived from an integrated design and 
safety analysis.  Failure of primary structure, structural failure of pressure vessel walls, and 
failure of pressurized lines are excepted from the failure tolerance requirement provided the 
potentially catastrophic failures are controlled through a defined process in which approved 
standards and margins are implemented that account for the absence of failure tolerance” 
(NASA, 2009). 
 
 The need to design failure tolerance into the system is a defining requirement for human 
spacecraft in order to mitigate potential hazards and contingencies.  However, the rationale for 
this requirement also points to the need to choose how and where failure tolerance should be 
applied.  Failure tolerance is a frequently used term to identify minimum acceptable redundancy, 
but it may also be used to describe the number of similar or dissimilar systems, cross strapping or 
functional interrelationships that maintain minimum acceptable performance despite failures or 
additional features that mitigate the failure (NASA, 2009).   In addition, reliability is the key 
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driver in the determination of safety and redundancy; without sufficient reliability the spacecraft 
does not meet the intent of the requirement.  Failure tolerance in the spacecraft is intended as a 
first line of defense against potential hazards.  Safety equipment such as fire extinguishers, 
launch and entry pressure suits, and launch abort systems are not considered part of the failure 
tolerance requirement (NASA, 2009).  The NASA human rating technical requirements provide 
the overall guidelines for defining what is considered failure tolerance in a human spacecraft, but 
the decision of applying failure tolerance in the system is dependent upon the designers and 
decision makers.  
 
5.3.1 NASA Best Practices Guidelines 
 In the NASA document, Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) 
Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems a set of guidelines for 
how to approach the development of a system using a risk based design philosophy are 
presented.  In these guidelines, a “three pronged” approach for assessing safety and reliability is 
used to “specify safety and reliability requirements through a triad of fault tolerance, bounding 
failure probability and adhering to proven practices and standards” (Miller et al., 2008).  The 
authors also caution that levying a two fault tolerant requirement at lower levels may introduce 
system complexities that may be inappropriate since migration can occur at higher levels where 
the systems interact.  These guidelines also specify steps for conceiving the right system by 
“thoroughly exploring risks from the top down and using a risk based design loop to iterate the 
operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets minimum mission objectives 
at minimum complexity and is achievable within constraints” (Miller et al., 2008). 
  
189 
 
 The steps for conceiving a system begin with a minimum set of functions necessary to 
achieve the mission objectives and a simple conceptual design is developed.  Elements are added 
to the simple system that may reduce performance but increase reliability to meet safety needs.  
The additional “legs” add to system fault tolerance.  Utilizing this information, Functional 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis along with an integrating technique 
such as Event Sequence diagrams are used to identify risk drivers (Miller et al., 2008).  The 
approach described by Miller et al. (2008) utilizes a single point design and adds functionality in 
a sequential fashion by evaluating the risk and safety impacts to the design.  Cost impacts are 
included in the design decisions because the early activities can commit over 50% of the total 
project costs (Miller et al., 2008).  Miller et al. (2008) also point out that while safety is the 
primary goal; the designers should “make the design work first, make it safe and reliable, and 
then assure it is affordable.”   
 
5.3.2 Altair and Orion Risk Approaches 
 The Altair Lunar Lander program office was the first to utilize a minimum functionality 
approach for conceptual design.  After the minimum functional conceptual design had been 
developed in the first Lunar Design and Analysis Cycle LDAC-1, the following design cycle 
LDAC-2 added mass to the configuration in order to reduce LOC risk.  The third design cycle 
LDAC-3 utilized the previous design configuration to reduce LOM risk and address global 
access capability (Dorris, 2008).  The building block approach of Altair occurred over several 
months and two design cycles (Dorris, 2008). 
 In addition to the methods utilized by Altair for buying down risk through mass 
additions, the Orion program utilized a method called “Risk Balancing” in order to provide an 
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assessment of the safety and reliability of the minimum functional vehicle (Hu et al., 2008).  The 
Orion spacecraft was revised due to mass concerns before System Design Review. 
 
5.3.3 Apollo Reliability Analysis 
 The Apollo program utilized Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to determine possible 
modes of failure and the effects of failures on mission objectives and crew safety.  The areas of 
potential risk such as single point failures were studied and solutions identified.  Where fault 
tolerance or backups to functions was not practical, extensive test programs were conducted for 
qualification and flight certification together with rigorous configuration control and quality 
assurance to minimize the risk (Sperber, 1973).  All single point failures were not completely 
eliminated.  An example of a single point risk was the Lunar Ascent Module main engine.  If this 
engine failed to operate, the astronauts would be stranded on the surface of the moon.  The focus 
of the Apollo reliability process was to drive down risk as much as possible. 
 
5.3.4 Previous Risk Approaches and Operability 
 Throughout the development of human spacecraft, the process for driving down risk and 
increasing safety in the vehicle is one that is iterated between design teams and reliability 
experts.  The methods used for “buying down” risk such as observed with the Altair Lunar 
Lander are one approach for balancing the safety requirements of the spacecraft against the mass 
requirements.  In all of the approaches, the level of Operability in the spacecraft is dependent 
upon first achieving the safety and mass objectives.  The NASA DDT&E guidelines, (Miller et 
al., 2008) point to accepting reduced performance in order to meet the safety requirements.  The 
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balancing of all the competing objectives in a spacecraft design is one that is challenging for 
designers and decision makers.  A comprehensive view of all competing objectives is necessary 
to make informed decisions. 
 
5.3.5 Conceptual Design Variables 
 There are many competing variables and parameters in the design of a human spacecraft.  
The challenge that designers face are how to best balance all of the competing objectives.  In 
many cases, time does not permit a detailed examination of all possible solutions.  During the 
conceptual design of human spacecraft, many variables must be balanced simultaneously and 
this is part of the challenge of driving out uncertainty when so many variables are coupled.  
Shown in Figure 45 is an illustration of the many variables and parameters that must be balanced 
in the conceptual design process. 
 
Figure 45: Conceptual design variables and parameters. 
Conceptual Design
Geometry
Materials
Fault Tolerance
Risk
Schedule
Cost
Integration
Fabrication
Assembly
Design Environments
Functional Decomposition
Mission Objectives
Technology
Mission Time
Complexity
Human Factors
Technology Maturity
Testing
Mission Items
Growth Margins
Analysis
Evaluation
Phase
Formulation
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192 
 
 As shown in Figure 45, the conceptual design process consists of two parts, the 
formulation phase and the evaluation phase.  In the formulation phase of developing concepts, 
ideas are generated for investigation in the evaluation phase.  The formulation of a conceptual 
design begins with the design environments and progresses through the other variables that will 
define the configuration of the proposed solution.  The evaluation phase is where candidate 
solutions are quantified and judged for potential issues.  For example, a proposed concept will be 
evaluated to determine levels of risk, potential growth margins, and analyses to be performed, 
how the assembly fits together as a whole, the amount of testing required, issues with fabrication 
and potential schedule and cost.  The figure does not contain every possible area that is evaluated 
in conceptual design; but serves to illustrate the highly coupled nature of the design process.  As 
concepts are developed, the conceptual design process is iterated to determine the most feasible 
solutions.  In the early stages, many variables are unknown or must be derived from examination, 
iteration, or heuristics.  The challenge in conceptual design is to start with all of the unknowns 
and develop the concept into a feasible solution for further investigation in preliminary design. 
 
5.4 MASS ADDITION PROCESS FOR EVALUATING SAFETY AND 
  OPERABILITY 
 
 The mass addition process described in this work was developed to assist designers and 
decision makers with making informed decisions about conceptual spacecraft design 
configurations.  Building upon the fundamental approach of adding mass beyond a minimum 
functional baseline as proposed by Altair and Orion, this process expands upon the previous 
approaches to develop a systematic method for investigating mass additions in order to provide 
an overall view of the spacecraft objective tradespace.  The mass addition process is based upon 
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a Minimum Functionality design methodology and is focused on providing additional Safety and 
Operability in the spacecraft functions.  The most challenging part of spacecraft design is 
balancing all of the competing mass additions and considering alternatives or trades that will 
enable the spacecraft to meet the requirements for mass, safety, and performance.  The advantage 
of using this process as an early design tool is that more knowledge is gained by evaluating the 
potential spacecraft configurations earlier in the conceptual design process.  
 
5.4.1 Mass Addition Process 
 The mass addition process starts with the list of functions of a minimum functionality 
baseline configuration, the functions are mapped to candidate technology choices and criticalities 
are assigned to the functions.  The criticalities form the basis for evaluating the mass additions 
and should be carefully peer reviewed by the design teams and the risk analysis experts.  Shown 
in Figure 46 is a flow diagram of the mass addition process used for tradespace exploration. 
 
Figure 46: Minimum Functionality mass addition process overview. 
Add Factor of Safety Margins for Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) items
Add Fault Tolerance for Consequence 5 – LOC risk
Technology Selections Mapped to Functions
Functional Decomposition
Top Level Mission Objectives
Assign Consequences to Functions
Add Fault Tolerance for Consequence 4 – LOM risk
Add Safety Dedicated Components and Functionality
Add Fault Tolerance for Consequence 3 and Below
Add Operability Components and Functionality
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5.4.2 Functional Decomposition 
 Using the methods presented in Chapter 3 for decomposing top level mission objectives 
of the spacecraft into lower level functions, the mass addition process starts with a list of 
functions for a minimum functionality baseline configuration.  These functions are typically 
associated with a particular subsystem.  Shown in Figure 47 is a decomposition of subsystems 
and associated high level functions.  
 
Figure 47: Human spacecraft subsystems and high level functions. 
 
 The higher level functions shown in Figure 46 are further decomposed into lower level 
functions and mapped to potential technologies.  Shown in Table 5 are the functions of the 
Avionics subsystem mapped to candidate technologies. 
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Allow External 
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Support 
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Provide 
External 
Interfaces
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Provide Direct 
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Observation
Provide 
Communications
Provide 
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Table 5: Avionics subsystem functions mapped to technology choices. 
 
  
 Listed in Table 5, the Avionics low level functions are derived from the high level 
functions in Figure 47.  Within the low level functions, one or more technologies may be used to 
High Level Function Low Level Function Technologies
Provide Command and Data Handling Sense Subsystem Commands Data bus network boxes
Provide Command and Data Handling Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands Master event controllers
Provide Command and Data Handling Send Commands to Subsystems Sensor communication wiring
Provide Navigation Sense Spacecraft Position IMU
Provide Navigation Sense Spacecraft Position Navigation base
Provide Navigation Sense Spacecraft Position Navigation power
Provide Navigation Sense Spacecraft Position Star tracker
Provide Navigation Convert Analog to Digital Navigation Inputs Navigation analog to digital converter
Provide Navigation Output Navigation to Guidance Multiplexer demultiplexers
Provide Navigation Calculate Spacecraft Guidance Flight control computer
Provide Navigation Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation wiring
Provide Navigation Display Spacecraft Navigation Crew displays navigation
Provide Guidance and Control Input Human Flight Controls Flight joystick
Provide Guidance and Control Input Human Flight Controls Flight translation joystick
Provide Guidance and Control Input Human Navigation to Computer Computer keyboard
Provide Guidance and Control Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion Control propulsion
Provide Guidance and Control Display Spacecraft Control Crew displays control
Provide Guidance and Control Sense Spacecraft Abort Position Abort navigation
Provide Guidance and Control Sense Spacecraft Abort Velocity Inputs Abort control
Provide Guidance and Control Calculate Spacecraft Abort Trajectory Abort guidance
Provide Guidance and Control Input Abort Commands Abort input
Provide Guidance and Control Provide Rendezvous Guidance Rendezvous radar
Store Spacecraft Data Store Spacecraft Data Data storage
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Subsystem Data Health monitoring computer
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor ECS Subsystems Instrumentation sensors ECLSS
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation sensors Propulsion
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation sensors RCS
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Crew Accommodations Instrumentation sensors CA
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Payload Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Payload
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Power Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Power
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Communication Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Communication
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Command and Data Handling (C&DH) Instrumentation sensors CDH
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Health Monitoring Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Health
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Flight Control Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Flight
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Thermal Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Thermal
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Monitor Structures Subsystem Instrumentation sensors Structural
Monitor Vehicle Subsystems Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems Crew displays subsystems
Provide Communications Communicate with Earth ground station Long range transceiver
Provide Communications Communicate with Earth ground station Long range amplifier
Provide Communications Communicate with Earth ground station Long range antenna
Provide Communications Communicate with Earth ground station Long range steerable antenna
Provide Communications Communicate with Earth ground station Long range data processor
Provide Communications Communicate with relay satellites Short range transceiver
Provide Communications Communicate with relay satellites Short range antenna
Provide Communications Communicate with relay satellites Short range data processor
Provide Communications Communicate between suited crewmembers Interior voice communication
Avionics
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perform the function.  A detailed listing of all the high level functions mapped to low level 
functions for the other subsystems is listed in Appendix C.   
 
5.4.3 Assigning Consequences to Functions 
 If a reliability approach is not used to quantify risk and safety, a qualitative method is 
used to judge the levels of risk.  A typical qualitative risk approach matrix is the combination of 
consequence of an event (or failure) occurring and the likelihood of the event.  Based on the 
levels of consequence and likelihood, a risk score is assigned (NASA, 2007a).  For the process 
described in this work, the low level functions are assigned a consequence number based on the 
severity of the loss of the function.  In the conceptual design phase when the exact configuration 
and integration has yet to be determined, a functional approach is one method used to identify 
components that contain the highest risk.  The definition of consequence is sometimes defined 
differently by many organizations and the definitions should be clearly defined (NASA, 2007a).  
The typical scale for consequence is from 1 to 5 with 5 being the highest in severity of the event 
such as Loss of Crew.  Similarly for likelihood, the typical scales are from 1 to 5 with 5 being the 
most likely that an event will occur.  The scale of consequences used in this process was derived 
from the NASA Constellation program risk guidelines. 
 Consequence 5 – Loss of life or permanently disabling injury and top level requirements 
not achievable with existing engineering capabilities; Loss of Crew. 
 Consequence 4 – Severe injury or illness requiring extended medical treatment or major 
impact to requirements, design margins or loss of mission objectives; Loss of Mission. 
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 Consequence 3 – Injury, illness, or incapacitation requiring emergency treatment or 
moderate impact to requirements, design margins or mission objectives. 
 Consequence 2 – Injury requiring first aid treatment, moderate crew discomfort or minor 
impact to requirements, design margins or mission objectives. 
 Consequence 1 – Minor injury not requiring first aid treatment, minor crew discomfort or 
negligible impact to requirements, design margins or mission objectives. 
 
 Using the consequences scale, all of the low level functions in the spacecraft are mapped 
to a consequence based on the severity of the loss of the function.  In the example of a lunar 
ascent module, the loss of the main engine is considered a consequence 5 because it is a single 
point failure for transporting the crew to Low Lunar Orbit.   
 
5.4.4 Adding Failure Tolerance and Factor of Safety Margins 
 The addition of failure tolerance to mitigate the likelihood of a failure is required by 
NASA for a human rated spacecraft.  The specific methods used to add failure tolerance include 
similar or dissimilar redundancy, cross strapping or functional interrelationships.  In the early 
conceptual design phase, the operational aspects of mitigating failures is not always known or 
fully defined and the design teams are challenged with designing failure tolerance into the 
system.  The easiest approach is to consider failure (or fault) tolerance across all the components 
in the system.  However, this is not usually the correct method of adding failure tolerance and 
can lead to an over designed system.  In order to understand where failure tolerance should be 
added, the functions are evaluated according to their consequence rating in order to reduce the 
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likelihood of a failure.  In the mass addition process described in this work, the low level 
functions associated with consequence 5 and 4 are investigated for increasing failure tolerance 
from a minimum functional baseline of 0 Failure Tolerance (FT) to 1 FT.  The components in 
each function are evaluated based on the likelihood of failure and assigned similar or dissimilar 
redundancy.  Cross strapping and functional interrelationships are not considered in this mass 
addition process because of the immaturity in the design operations concepts.  The functions are 
assumed to be independent and common cause failure effects are not considered.  The effects of 
common cause failure are best left to Probabilistic Reliability Assessments after the design has 
reached a level of maturity. 
 In some components of the spacecraft, a failure tolerance strategy for mitigating failures 
is not feasible because of mass and volume constraints.  NASA defines structures and pressure 
vessels in this category where the components are design according to accepted standards and 
margins.  The typical method used by designers in the early stages of design is to assign factors 
of safety for the loading on the structure or pressure vessels.  A common acronym used to 
describe the failure tolerance strategy of these components is Design for Minimum Risk 
(DFMR). 
 
5.4.5 Adding Safety and Operability Functions 
 The functions associated with Safety and Operability are considered bonus functions 
beyond the minimum functionality baseline configuration.  As mentioned earlier, NASA does 
not consider additional safety functionality to contribute to failure tolerance unless the additional 
safety mitigates the potential hazard as a first line of defense.  In this context, Safety functions 
are used to mitigate the effects of a hazard and safely protect the crew.  The most common used 
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example of Safety is a launch abort system.  The launch abort system is not considered in the 
failure tolerance strategy unless it prevents the occurrence of the failure (NASA, 2009). 
 The functions associated with Operability are functions that allow the crew to perform 
specific aspects of the mission or to make the duties more efficient.  A loss of Operability in this 
process is not associated with Loss of Mission because the minimum functionality design 
approach assumes that the primary objective of the mission is transporting crew safely.  
However, depending upon the top level objectives, it can be argued that a loss of Operability will 
affect Loss of Mission because of the loss of mission objectives.  This debate is best left to the 
design teams to decide the importance of Operability in the context of the mission objectives.  
The success or failure of mission objectives will be covered in later reliability assessments and 
will be addressed as the design matures. 
 
5.4.6 Tradespace of Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability Mass 
 The tradespace of Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass was introduced in 
Chapter 3.  The mass addition process described in this chapter explores the tradespace in greater 
detail to provide an overall view of possible spacecraft configurations based on varying levels of 
failure tolerance, Safety functions, and Operability functions.  It was shown earlier that the 
relationship between Safety, Operability, and Total Spacecraft mass form a 3-D surface that is 
approximately planer.  The use of a plane as a metamodel could be easily developed by designers 
for calculating total spacecraft mass based on given levels of Safety and Operability mass. 
Shown in Figure 48 is the tradespace of Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass.   
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Figure 48:  Tradespace of Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass. 
 
5.4.7 Developing Nodes in the Tradespace Domain 
 In order to understand how the design space input variables map to the objective 
tradespace, a series of “nodes” within the tradespace are used to provide information about the 
level of Safety and Operability in the spacecraft designs.  Each point in Figure 48 represents a 
specific spacecraft configuration and in the earlier analysis, the configurations were varied 
according to levels of fault tolerance, Safety components and Operability components in order to 
derive an overall view of the tradespace.  Although the earlier analysis in Chapter 3 
demonstrated the possibilities of the tradespace, the methods used to generate the points in the 
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tradespace needed to be refined in order to determine regions that mapped to the design input 
variables. 
 A set of 40 nodes at various spacecraft configurations of Safety and Operability is used to 
create a grid in the tradespace domain.  Each node is a different spacecraft configuration with a 
different level of fault tolerance, Safety, and Operability.  A set of 10 Safety levels and 4 
Operability levels are used in the 10 × 4 matrix of nodes.  Listed in Table 6 are the Safety levels 
and listed in Table 7 are the Operability levels. 
Table 6: Safety levels in mass addition process. 
 
 
Table 7: Operability levels in mass addition process. 
 
 
Level Mass Addition
1 Minimum Functionality
2 Factor of Safety Addition
3 Consequence 5 Failure Tolerance (1FT) Addition
4 Consequence 4 Failure Tolerance (1FT) Addition
5 Safety Functionality Addition
6 Consequence 3 and Below (1FT) Addition
7 Consequence 5 Failure Tolerance (2FT) Addition
8 Consequence 4 Failure Tolerance (2FT) Addition
9 Safety Functionality Addition
10 Consequence 3 and Below (2FT) Addition
Safety Level
Level Mass Addition
1 Minimum Functionality
2 Mission Time Addition
3 Operability Components and Functions Addition
4 Double Operability and Mission Time Addition
Operability Level
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 As shown in Table 6, the Safety levels are varying according to the mass addition of 
components to the Minimum Functional baseline configuration.  An important note to clarify in 
this process is that each level builds upon the previous one.  A Safety level of 3 contains the 
Minimum Functionality baseline with Factors of Safety and functions designated as consequence 
5 with one additional component for failure tolerance.  As the levels increase, the Safety mass 
increases.  The same approach is used in Table 7 where Operability levels increase with 
additional Operability mass.  The divisions between the levels were chosen to provide the design 
team visibility as to how the addition of failure tolerance and Operability corresponded to total 
spacecraft mass.  The levels shown here are for demonstration of the process and to provide an 
example of how the tradespace can be mapped for greater understanding of spacecraft 
configurations.  The 10 levels of Safety and the 4 levels of Operability are combined in a 10 × 4 
matrix for the individual nodes in the tradespace.  Shown in Table 8 is a map of the nodes used 
to define the grid in the tradespace. 
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Table 8: Node map for tradespace. 
 
  
 A spacecraft configuration is calculated for each of the individual nodes and plotted in 
the tradespace of Total Spacecraft, Safety, and Operability mass.  Shown in Figure 49 is the 
tradespace domain with the node configurations.  
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Figure 49: Node locations in the tradespace domain. 
 
 The node locations in the tradespace domain identify zones for various Safety and 
Operability levels; where, x = Total Spacecraft mass (lbm), y = Safety mass (lbm), and z = 
Operability mass (lbm).  The nodes lie on a plane within the domain and provide a means for 
developing a grid that maps the input design configurations to the tradespace domain.  The 
differences between the nodes allow the user to distinguish between various levels.  Projecting 
the nodes on the Safety vs. Operability mass plane and creating Iso lines of total spacecraft mass 
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presents a simple method of viewing the entire tradespace and understanding the various impacts 
of mass additions.  Shown in Figure 50 is the Safety and Operability mass addition chart. 
 
 
Figure 50: Safety and Operability mass addition chart. 
 
 The Safety and Operability mass addition chart provides a grid of the tradespace domain 
such that a user can determine the levels of Safety and Operability in relation to the total 
spacecraft mass.  The origin is the Minimum Functionality baseline configuration and Safety and 
Operability mass is added to determine total spacecraft mass.  Within the nodes, a grid has been 
developed to identify zones of Safety and Operability.  The lines of Operability levels are best fit 
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linear regression lines between the points.  The chart provides a complete view of all the 
potential spacecraft configurations from a Minimum Functional baseline to a fully two failure 
tolerant spacecraft configuration with the maximum expected level of Operability. 
 
5.4.8 Conceptual Lunar Ascent Module Program  
 The previous examples of the mass addition process were derived using the Conceptual 
Lunar Ascent Module Program.  This program was developed in MATLAB to calculate the 
minimum functionality baseline and to assess relative increases in Safety and Operability mass 
for various Lunar Ascent Module spacecraft configurations.  The program played a key role in 
the development of the mass addition process.  Shown in Figure 51 is a flowchart of the CLAMP 
subroutines.  A detailed summary of the CLAMP program logic is provided in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 51: Flowchart of CLAMP subroutines. 
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5.4.9 Mass Addition Process Summary 
 The process used for adding Safety and Operability mass beyond a Minimum Functional 
baseline configuration is based on varying the levels of failure tolerance and Safety and 
Operability components.  The process is structured such that functions are decomposed into 
lower levels where technologies are assigned to conduct the function.  The functions are assigned 
Consequence values based on the severity of the loss of the function.  The Consequence levels 
are based on industry and government approaches for qualitatively evaluating risk.  The mass 
addition process identifies the highest priority Consequence functions for increasing fault 
tolerance through similar or dissimilar redundancy and steps through the spacecraft functions to 
create spacecraft configurations at various levels. 
 Increased functionality due to the addition of Safety or Operability components does not 
contribute to the failure tolerance levels.  The mass addition process steps through the potential 
mass additions in Safety or Operability to develop a complete view of the tradespace domain of 
likely spacecraft configurations using a set of predetermined nodes.  The nodes are derived from 
a combination of Safety and Operability levels and combined into a matrix for spacecraft 
configuration analysis.  The final result of the process is a Safety and Operability mass addition 
chart that provides designers with a complete view of the tradespace.  The chart is intended to 
assist designers and decision makers with information such that decisions can be made for 
revising functions and the conceptual design.  The process is not intended to be a single pass 
recipe for quantifying fault tolerance.  It is meant as an early design tool that can provide 
guidance about the conceptual design as concepts are investigated and matured. 
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5.5  ANALYSIS STUDIES 
 A series of analysis studies was conducted to verify the mass addition process and 
explore the tradespace domain.  Three configurations of Lunar Ascent module designs were used 
in the studies: 
 Apollo 15 Lunar Ascent Module configuration: 
o Baseline mass of 10,927 lbm at lunar ascent, 
o Pressurized volume of 235 ft3, 
o 2 Crewmembers, 
o Sample return mass of 255 lbm, and 
o Mission time of 12.36 hours. 
 Apollo One Man Lunar Ascent Module configuration: 
o Baseline mass of 8,068 lbm at lunar ascent, 
o Pressurized volume of 117 ft3, 
o 1 Crewmember, 
o ½ sample return mass of 127.5 lbm, and 
o Mission time of 12.36 hours, 
 ESAS Lunar Ascent Module configuration 
o Baseline mass of 22,534 lbm at lunar ascent, 
o Pressurized volume of 1136 ft3, 
o 4 Crewmembers, 
o No sample return, and 
o Mission time of 3 hours. 
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 The analysis studies were focused on investigating the mass addition process and the 
resulting tradespace of the three Lunar Ascent Modules.  Graphs of the mass addition process 
and tradespaces were developed to demonstrate the process.  The intent was to provide designers 
with information that could be utilized for decision making. 
 
5.5.1 Lunar Module Configurations 
 The Apollo Lunar Ascent Module main propulsion system utilized nitrogen tetraoxide 
(oxidizer) and an equal mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (fuel) at an 
oxidizer to fuel ratio of 1.6 to 1 (Humphries and Taylor, 1973).   The Apollo One Man 
configuration utilized many of the same components as the Apollo baseline configuration with 
the exception of one crewmember, half the pressurized volume, and half the sample return 
capability.  Other redundant components necessary for two crewmembers such as flight controls 
and displays were removed from the Apollo One Man configuration. 
 The ESAS Lunar Ascent Module configuration was derived from information listed in 
the ESAS report on page 166 for the reference point of departure design.  The ESAS derived 
configuration utilized liquid oxygen (oxidizer) and methane (fuel) at an oxidizer to fuel ratio of 
3.4 to 1 for the main propulsion system. 
 The main difference between the Apollo and ESAS configurations other than number of 
crewmembers, propulsion system, and pressurized volume is that Apollo utilized a cabin 
atmosphere of 100% Oxygen at 5 psia.  The ESAS configuration used a two gas cabin 
atmosphere of 30% Oxygen at 9.5 psia.  The makeup gas for the ESAS configurations was 
assumed to be Nitrogen. 
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 Because of the limited amount of information related to subsystem components for the 
ESAS configuration, the Apollo component values were used to derive assumptions for the likely 
mass of the ESAS components.  A listing of the ESAS components used in this analysis is 
provided in Appendix G. 
 The Apollo baseline configuration used in the studies was compared to the flight mass 
values for Apollo 15.  The derived ESAS configuration was compared to the published 
subsystem estimated values in the ESAS report (NASA, 2005).  Both configurations were 
verified within 95% confidence of the published mass values. 
 
5.5.2 Mass Addition Process 
 The mass addition process was utilized for the three Lunar Ascent Modules to generate a 
domain of nodes that quantified Safety and Operability levels in the design.  The use of three 
different configurations provided insight as to the mass increases due to the number of 
crewmembers, pressurized volume, and propulsion system.  The mass addition process utilized 
in this analysis study assumed that all components dedicated to the functions increased with 
redundancy.  Dissimilar redundancy was not considered in the analysis.  A one failure tolerant 
system contained two similar components or strings to perform the function.  Safety dedicated 
components not included in the minimum functional baseline were added during the mass 
addition process.  These components were added after the Consequence 4 addition for both the 
one failure tolerant and two failure tolerance steps.  A set of 40 nodes was used to map the Safety 
and Operability levels in the tradespace domain as described in Table 8.  Shown in Figure 52 is 
the process used for mass additions in the analysis study 
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Figure 52: Mass addition process used in analysis studies. 
 
 The mass addition process starts with a Minimum Functional baseline configuration 
based upon the functional decomposition and technology selections.  The first step in the process 
is to add Factors of Safety for DFMR items.  The Factors of Safety are carried throughout the 
remaining steps of the process.  The first grouping of mass additions is focused on adding mass 
in order to develop a one failure tolerant spacecraft configuration.  The second grouping of mass 
additions is focused on the addition of components to develop a two failure tolerant spacecraft 
configuration.  The process is repeated with the addition of Operability components.  The most 
important functions in the configuration are assigned Consequence 5, LOC and 4, LOM and are 
listed in Table 9 - 13. 
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Table 9: Avionics subsystem functions with assigned consequences. 
 
 
Table 10: Power and Thermal subsystem functions with assigned consequences. 
 
 
 
Function Consequence
Avionics
 Sense Subsystem Commands 5
 Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands 5
 Send Commands to Subsystems 5
 Monitor Prop Subsystems 5
 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs 5
 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs 5
 Output Navigation to Guidance 5
 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance 5
 Communicate with Instrumentation 5
 Input Human Flight Controls 5
 Input Human Navigation to Computer 5
 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion 5
 Display Spacecraft Control 5
 Display Spacecraft Navigation 5
 Communicate with Earth ground station 4
 Communicate with relay satellites 4
 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs 4
 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems 4
 Provide Rendezvous Guidance 4
Function Consequence
Power
 Provide Power 5
 Distribute Power 5
 Regulate Power 5
Thermal
 Collect Heat 4
 Transport Heat 4
 Remove Heat 4
213 
 
Table 11: ECLSS subsystem functions with assigned consequences. 
 
 
Table 12: Structures subsystem functions with assigned consequences. 
 
 
 
 
Function Consequence
ECLSS
 Remove Carbon Dioxide 5
 Provide Metabolic Oxygen 5
 Store High Pressure Oxygen 5
 Transport Oxygen 5
 Control Oxygen Flow 5
 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic 5
 Store High Pressure Oxygen 4
 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas 4
 Transport Makeup Gas 4
 Control Makeup Gas Flow 4
 Circulate Air 4
 Provide Air Pressure Sensor 4
 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic 4
 Provide Potable Water 4
Function Consequence
Structures
 Provide protection from vacuum 5
 Provide MMOD/TPS protection 5
 Provide Load Bearing Capability 5
 Provide Forward Windows 5
 Support Docking Mechanism for Lunar Ascent Module to CEV 4
 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent Module to CEV 4
 Provide Docking Mechanism for Lunar Habitat to Lunar Ascent Modu 4
 Provide Docking Viewing Ports 4
Secondary Structures
 Support Internal Subsystems and Components 4
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Table 13: Propulsion subsystem functions with assigned consequences. 
 
 
 A majority of the functions in the spacecraft were assigned either Consequence 4 or 5.  
This approach is likely a very conservative estimate and can be refined in later iterations.  The 
purpose of assigning so many of the functions at a high level was to investigate the mass impacts 
of increasing redundancy.  Shown in the results, the addition of redundancy is a significant driver 
of total spacecraft mass. 
 
 
Function Consequence
Propulsion
 Control Main Engine Fuel 5
 Control Main Engine Oxidizer 5
 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel 5
 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer 5
 Control RCS Fuel 5
 Control RCS Oxidizer 5
 Control RCS Propellant 5
 Provide Main Engine 5
 Provide Main Engine Fuel 5
 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer 5
 Provide Main Engine Pressurant 5
 Provide RCS Pressurant 5
 Provide RCS Propellant 5
 Provide RCS thrusters 5
 Store Main Engine Propellant 5
 Store RCS Propellant 5
 Support Main Engine Components 5
 Transport Main Engine Propellant 5
 Transport RCS Pressurant 5
 Transport RCS Propellant 5
 Insulate Main Engine Propellant 4
 Insulate RCS Propellant 4
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5.5.3 Tradespace Monte Carlo Analysis 
 Using the information generated in the mass addition process, seven tradespace zones 
were investigated.  The zones represent various levels of Safety and Operability spacecraft 
configurations.  For each zone, a Monte Carlo analysis of 2000 runs was completed.  The points 
within the zones were used to develop a distribution of spacecraft configurations based on the 
levels of Safety or Operability.  In each zone, a starting and ending configuration was used to 
vary the redundancy and addition of components.  The seven tradespace zones are listed in Table 
14.  Shown in Figure 53 is a visual representation of the tradespace zones. 
Table 14: Starting and ending configurations for tradespace zones. 
 
Zone Starting Configuration Ending Configuration
1 Minimum Functionality at minimum mission time (Node 1)
Factor of Safety Addition at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 12)
2 Factor of Safety addition at Nominal Mission Time (Node 12)
Consequence 5 (LOC) - 1 FT addition at Nominal 
Mission Time (Node 13)
3 Consequence 5 (LOC) - 1 FT addition at Nominal Mission Time (Node 13)
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 1 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 24)
4
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 1 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 24)
All components -1FT addition with Operability 
components at Nominal Mission Time (Node 26)
5 All components -1FT addition with Operability components at Nominal Mission Time (Node 26)
Consequence 5 (LOC) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 27)
6
Consequence 5 (LOC) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 27)
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 28)
7
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 28)
All components -2FT addition with double 
Operability components at double Nominal Mission 
Time (Node 26)
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Figure 53: Tradespace zones in relationship to mass addition nodes. 
 
 The purpose of focusing on specific areas within the trad space is intended to simulate the 
steps for how mass would be added to the minimum functionality design.  The most likely areas 
of a future spacecraft design are zones 4, 5, and 6.  Focusing on these zones bounds the region of 
interest in the tradespace domain.  The Total Spacecraft, Safety and Operability mass average 
and standard deviation were calculated from the distribution of points in each zone. 
 
5.5.4 Safety vs. Operability Mass Addition Charts 
 Using the information generated in the mass addition process, a set of charts for the three 
Lunar Ascent Module configurations was developed.  These charts represent the overall results 
of the analysis and provide a point of departure for future studies. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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5.6 RESULTS 
5.6.1 Apollo and ESAS Baseline Comparisons 
 The Apollo and ESAS baseline configurations used in the analysis were verified against 
published mass values.  Using an uncertainty of +/- 5% with the component input values, a 
Monte Carlo analysis of 2000 runs was completed to generate a distribution of subsystem mass.  
The standard deviation of the subsystem mass was used to calculate confidence levels of 95%.  
Shown in Figure 54 are the 95% confidence levels compared to the Apollo nominal values.  For 
all subsystems, the upper and lower limits bounded the nominal Apollo subsystem values.  This 
verification provided confidence that the input values used in the analysis were matching the 
Apollo heritage values. 
 
Figure 54: Comparison of 95% confidence limits to Apollo 15 subsystems. 
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 The same approach was used to verify the ESAS input configuration.  The values for the 
ESAS Lunar Ascent Module were derived from the point of departure reference design as listed 
in the ESAS report on page 166 (NASA, 2005).  Shown in Figure 55 are the 95% confidence 
levels compared to the published ESAS values. 
 
Figure 55: Comparison of 95% confidence limits to ESAS subsystems. 
 
 Using estimated values for subsystem component mass, the ESAS input values compared 
very well to the published values.  This step in the analysis process is very important to establish 
the correct configurations of the subsystems in order to investigate the mass additions due to 
Safety and Operability.  
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5.6.2 Mass Addition Process Results 
 The mass addition process was conducted for all three Lunar Ascent Module 
configurations.  The results of this analysis are shown as points in the Total Spacecraft, Safety, 
and Operability tradespace.  Shown in Figure 56 are the results of the Apollo mass addition 
process. 
 
 
Figure 56: Mass addition process results for Apollo configuration. 
  
 Shown in Figure 56 are the 40 node points along with grid lines to visualize the levels of 
Safety and Operability in the tradespace.  The vertical grid lines represent levels of Safety and 
have been labeled for the reader.  As the Safety levels increases (example: nodes 1-10), the mass 
increases greatly.  For a two failure tolerant spacecraft, the Safety mass is approximately 13,000 
lbm.  As mentioned earlier, this analysis assumed that all components in the spacecraft were 
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increased in redundancy.  This analysis was a first attempt at demonstrating the process and 
provides the designers and teams the ability to quantify the impacts of additional redundancy on 
the spacecraft.  Shown in Fig 57 is the mass addition process for the Apollo One Man 
configuration. 
 
 
Figure 57: Mass addition process results for Apollo One Man configuration. 
 
 Comparing the Apollo One Man configuration to the Apollo configuration reveals a few 
significant differences.  The most notable difference is that the Operability mass is 
approximately half of the Apollo configuration.  The addition of components with a 
Consequence less than 4 (between nodes 5 and 6) did not have a significant impact on the 
spacecraft Safety mass.  The total two failure tolerant spacecraft Safety mass is similar to the 
221 
 
Apollo nominal configuration with a mass of approximately 11,000 lbs.  Comparing the 
differences between the two graphs allows designers to determine very quickly where mass 
drivers are located.  As this example illustrated, the mass addition process is intended to provide 
information that can be generated very quickly in order to assist with design decisions.  Shown in 
Figure 58 are the results for the ESAS configuration. 
 
 
Figure 58: Mass addition process results for the ESAS configuration. 
 
 As expected, the ESAS results for Safety are approximately twice the Apollo values.  A  
two failure tolerance spacecraft will have approximately 23,000 lbm of Safety mass.  The 
Operability levels are comparable to the Apollo configuration.  However, the Safety mass is the 
key driver in this configuration.  Tables of the subsystem mass for the node locations of the three 
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Lunar Ascent Module configurations are listed in Appendix H.  The mass addition process 
analysis results for the Lunar Ascent Modules revealed similarities and differences among the 
designs.  The most notable difference between the Apollo and ESAS configuration is the 
doubling of the Safety mass.  The Operability levels were comparable and this is likely due to the 
difference in mission time between the Apollo and ESAS configurations.  The advantage of this 
process is that it provides a quick view of the potential mass additions related to Safety and 
Operability. 
 
5.6.3 Tradespace Monte Carlo Results 
 Shown in Figs. 59 – 61 are the results of the tradespace Monte Carlo analysis for the 
three Lunar Ascent Module configurations. 
 
Figure 59: Tradespace Monte Carlo results for Apollo One Man configuration. 
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Figure 60: Tradespace Monte Carlo results for Apollo configuration. 
 
Figure 61: Tradespace Monte Carlo results for ESAS configuration. 
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 Listed in Table 15 are the results of the tradespace Monte Carlo analysis for each of the 
three Lunar Ascent Module configurations. 
Table 15:  Tradespace Monte Carlo analysis results. 
 
 
 Investigating the differences among the three configurations reveals a few unexpected 
differences.  The first notable difference is between the Apollo and Apollo One Man 
Zone
Average Total 
Spacecraft 
mass (lbm)
Tot S/C 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Safety  mass 
(lbm)
Safety 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Operability 
mass (lbm)
Operability 
Standard 
Deviation
1 5647.5 175.8 261.2 91.1 259.3 152.3
2 7061.1 368.3 1604.4 295.8 329.7 195.9
3 9732.2 411.9 3243.2 184.1 1362.0 352.3
4 11665.8 397.9 5130.7 283.9 1408.1 246.9
5 14583.4 508.5 7751.6 424.7 1704.8 252.0
6 16914.5 385.8 9873.2 267.2 1914.3 255.4
7 20839.3 751.8 11614.3 298.6 4098.0 668.0
Zone
Average Total 
Spacecraft 
mass (lbm)
Tot S/C 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Safety  mass 
(lbm)
Safety 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Operability 
mass (lbm)
Operability 
Standard 
Deviation
1 4250.5 80.9 170.3 57.2 93.1 59.6
2 5439.7 286.7 1326.7 270.7 125.9 76.1
3 7498.1 272.4 2864.1 180.0 646.9 195.3
4 9062.7 269.8 4423.5 217.8 652.1 146.5
5 11362.1 436.2 6614.9 395.1 760.1 148.0
6 13374.4 289.6 8538.3 241.7 849.0 147.6
7 16786.2 431.3 10709.5 248.6 2089.6 330.1
Zone
Average Total 
Spacecraft 
mass (lbm)
Tot S/C 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Safety  mass 
(lbm)
Safety 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Operability 
mass (lbm)
Operability 
Standard 
Deviation
1 10772.8 270.6 725.5 260.5 129.2 87.4
2 12928.5 470.2 2849.6 453.8 160.8 106.9
3 16915.6 674.7 5533.6 409.0 1463.9 524.6
4 20775.1 685.7 9401.4 460.4 1455.7 491.5
5 25924.0 988.2 14349.1 844.0 1656.8 504.7
6 29940.0 876.1 18302.0 704.4 1719.9 504.7
7 36265.1 959.1 21666.2 490.4 4680.8 736.6
Apollo Configuration
Apollo One Man Configuration
ESAS Configuration
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configurations where the average total spacecraft mass difference in zone 1 is approximately 
1400 lbs.  The reduction in pressurized volume and one crewmember did not have as significant 
impact as expected where the difference in the Apollo configuration and the ESAS configuration 
was approximately doubled for the addition of two crewmembers.  In addition to the total 
spacecraft mass differences, the increase in Safety mass was the leading driver in total spacecraft 
mass.  Shown in Figure 62 are the Safety mass fractions for the three Lunar Ascent Module 
configurations according to the tradespace zone. 
 
Figure 62: Safety mass fractions in tradespace zones. 
 
 The results in Figure 62 show a linear increase in Safety mass fraction as the spacecraft 
configuration adds Safety through redundancy or additional components.  Tradespace zone 5 is 
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where the spacecraft configuration exceeds a Safety mass fraction of 50%.  According to this 
analysis, a fully one failure tolerance spacecraft with two failure tolerance for Consequence 5, 
LOC would approach 50% of the spacecraft mass.  This is the most significant outcome of the 
analysis and one that designers should keep in mind when developing concepts. 
 
5.6.4 Safety vs. Operability Mass Addition Charts 
 The following Safety and Operability charts summarize the mass addition process and the 
tradespace Monte Carlo analysis.  The Minimum Functionality design methodology is the 
foundation of this approach and provides a method for designers to investigate potential 
spacecraft configurations based on the levels of Safety and Operability.  Shown in Figs. 63 - 65 
is the resulting Safety vs. Operability charts for the three Lunar Ascent Module configurations. 
 
Figure 63: Safety vs. Operability mass addition chart for Apollo configuration. 
227 
 
 
Figure 64: Safety vs. Operability mass addition chart for Apollo One Man configuration. 
 
Figure 65: Safety vs. Operability mass addition chart for ESAS configuration. 
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 The charts in Figs. 63 – 65 provide a complete view of the conceptual design tradespace 
from a minimum functional configuration beginning at the origin.  The dashed lines represent 
levels of Safety and Operability.  The major levels for Safety have been identified according to 
Consequence and failure tolerance.  The major levels for Operability have been identified 
according to the addition of Operability to the spacecraft configuration.  One will notice the red 
dashed lines that represent the total spacecraft mass and where the lines intersect with the various 
Safety and Operability levels.  If a target goal of total spacecraft mass is an upper limiting 
boundary, the user can easily identify the maximum level of Safety and Operability possible for 
the designated spacecraft mass.  Developing the chart does not require a large amount of time 
because a minimum number of node configurations could be determined and the results plotted 
in the format.  As the spacecraft configuration matures, the mass addition process utilized with 
the Safety and Operability charts is an efficient method for understanding the entire spacecraft 
configuration tradespace. 
 The baseline values for the Apollo, Apollo One Man, and ESAS configurations are 
plotted as blue squares in the charts.  The Apollo and Apollo One Man baseline values are very 
close to the LOM 1FT Safety level and this is because many of the components in the spacecraft 
configuration were only redundant for critical functions.  The Apollo configurations were not a 
full one failure tolerant system in all the subsystems and the addition of contingency propellant 
for Safety is a significant contributor to the level.  The ESAS baseline is closer to a one failure 
tolerant configuration and many of the components in the baseline configuration were assumed 
to be redundant.  The Operability level of the ESAS baseline is below the full operational level 
because not all operability functions were included in the baseline. 
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 This chapter focused on a systematic process for evaluating safety and operational 
capability in conceptual human spacecraft designs.  The mass addition process is based upon a 
Minimum Functionality design methodology such that mass additions to the minimum 
functionality configuration are in the form of increasing Safety through additional redundancy or 
Operability components.  The specifics of how mass is added to the minimum functionality 
configuration is largely dependent upon the design teams.  However, the design teams must be 
aware that small changes in redundancy can have larger consequences on the spacecraft as a 
whole and the mass addition process described here provides an overall view of the likely 
spacecraft configurations. 
 The mass addition process begins with a minimum functional baseline configuration and 
a matrix of spacecraft configurations is defined with varying levels of Safety and Operability in 
order to designate node locations in the objective tradespace.  The grid of spacecraft 
configurations maps the objective tradespace to the input design space and provides designers 
with a complete view of potential spacecraft configurations.  A series of zones are designated 
within the tradespace domain to narrow the focus of design concepts to regions of interest for 
further investigation.  The process can be utilized throughout the conceptual design to 
continually assess the impacts of design changes on the spacecraft.   
 Three design configurations of Lunar Ascent Modules were used as case studies to 
demonstrate and validate the methodology.  These configurations included the nominal Apollo 
Lunar Ascent Module, a reduced Apollo one-man configuration and an ESAS derived 
configuration.  The purpose of using three concepts was to demonstrate the mass addition 
process for different types of spacecraft designs. 
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 Because so many unknowns exist in the early conceptual design phase due to factors such 
as unknown integration, complexity, and uncertainty in requirements, it can be a challenging 
time for correctly estimating the mass of a spacecraft.  However, a bottom up philosophy as 
described in this work forces designers to consider the low level functions in the configuration 
where candidate technologies are chosen and evaluated.  As part of the evaluation process, the 
overall vehicle configuration must be considered in addition to subsystem discipline specific 
trade studies so that designers can understand the impact of decisions on the spacecraft 
configuration.  Incorrect assumptions in the conceptual design phase can lead to redesign or 
reduced performance. 
 Although mass is a key driver in any spacecraft design, the spacecraft must be safe and 
perform the intended mission.  The mass addition and tradespace exploration process described 
is one method that could be coupled with reliability analysis or other figures of merit for 
deciding how to improve the spacecraft configuration.  A difficulty in the early conceptual 
design phase is the limited amount of reliability data.  Common needs for designers are methods 
that assess the other characteristics of Safety in the spacecraft to provide an indication of 
increased reliability.  This work is the focus of the next chapter and will use the information 
developed here as a case study to demonstrate the methodology. 
 
5.7.1 Acknowledgements 
 This work would not have been possible without the educational support from Lockheed 
Martin Corporation and Sierra Nevada Corporation.  The experience of maturing conceptual 
designs and designing flight hardware for the Orion program played a key role in the 
development of this methodology. 
231 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
FIGURES OF MERIT FOR TRADING CONCEPTUAL HUMAN SPACECRAFT 
CONFIGURATIONS 
 
6.1 ABSTRACT  
 Two figures of merit, the Safety Index and Operability Index were developed to provide 
designers with a scoring system that evaluates the overall spacecraft configuration.  The figures 
of merit are not intended to replace reliability based analysis methods, but a method to provide 
designers with a complementary approach for evaluating the safety and operational aspects of a 
spacecraft configuration with limited knowledge of the reliability of the components.  Based 
upon previous methods for functional analysis of early spacecraft conceptual designs, the Safety 
Index scores the entire spacecraft based upon consequence of loss of function, complexity of 
subsystem components, similar and dissimilar redundancy, and potential hazards.  Items such as 
Design for Minimum Risk are included to provide an overall spacecraft safety score.  The 
Operability Index scores are based upon the mission time, crew size, payloads, and operational 
functionality and provide a measure of the spacecraft configuration against top level objectives.  
The Safety Index and Operability Index can be combined into a Total Spacecraft score such that 
comparisons can be made against competing spacecraft types.  Three case studies of human 
spacecraft Lunar Ascent Module designs were used to demonstrate and validate the scoring 
methodologies. 
 
232 
 
6.2 INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this chapter is to introduce two figures of merit for evaluating Safety and 
Operability in conceptual human spacecraft configurations.  Although mass is an important part 
of a spacecraft design, other factors such as complexity, failure modes, similar and dissimilar 
redundancy, and operational capabilities are just a few of the characteristics that need to be 
considered when evaluating a spacecraft design.  In many cases, the focus of design is to reduce 
mass and using this approach alone can introduce additional complexity or result in optimizing 
the spacecraft too early before other issues are discovered.  The figures of merit developed in this 
chapter will provide designers with another method for evaluating parameters that are not always 
easily quantifiable, but must be considered as the spacecraft design matures. 
 The figures of merit described in this work are not intended to replace reliability 
analyses.  An attempt was made to determine a scoring method that correlated with reliability.  
The exact correlation between the figure of merit scores and reliability is very difficult to 
determine without reliability values for the components.  However, increases in component 
redundancy in the figure of merit scores point to an increase in reliability if certain assumptions 
are made for the reliabilities of the functions and spacecraft components.  Because of the large 
number of assumptions needed to compare reliability to the figure of merit scores, it was decided 
that additional work is needed to fully understand how to structure the figure of merit scores with 
predicted reliability in the spacecraft components.  The figures of merit described in this work 
provide a foundation for later research, but do not include reliability.   
 The two figures of merit described in this work are named the Safety Index and 
Operability Index and are intended to be utilized by spacecraft designers in the early stages of 
conceptual design for investigating spacecraft configurations.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, many 
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variables and parameters must be traded when developing conceptual designs and the 
combination of the many parts is the challenge.  Other than mass, an additional scoring method is 
needed to provide a means of comparison between concepts.  The methods presented here are a 
preliminary look into the early developmental stages of a project when many of the variables are 
uncertain and ideas are being formulated.  The figures of merit are intended to “point” the 
designers in the correct direction for iterating and maturing a spacecraft design. 
 
6.3 BACKGROUND 
 The main purpose of using a figure of merit is to quantify aspects of a design for decision 
making.  A figure of merit can be used to compare risks (Miller et al., 2008), represent launch 
vehicle reliability (Hassan and Crossley, 2002), and score spacecraft components (Thunnissen, 
2004).  As mentioned by Miller et al. (2008), a figure of merit is suggested as a technique for 
comparing risk but requires people and judgment to balance the risks.  A figure of merit should 
consider not only local effects, but the system as a whole. 
 NASA’s Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA, 1995) provides guidelines on figures 
of merit used as a multi-objective selection rule.  The alternatives of a system are scored in 
quantifiable terms of how well it achieves each objective.  Combining the multi-objective scores 
yields an overall figure merit for the alternative (NASA, 1995).  The method suggested by the 
NASA guidelines (NASA, 1995) is to linearly combine scores for each of the objectives into a 
weighted sum of the scores.  The choice of weighting factors can be assigned a prior or 
determined using Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) or other techniques such as Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (NASA, 1995).  One should also be aware that weight choices can 
influence the figure of merit score and overlook potential best alternatives (NASA, 1995). 
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 Safety is typically scored using risk and reliability analyses.  The most common 
approaches in early design development and Phase-A spacecraft activities are Functional Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FFMEA) and preliminary hazard analysis (Miller et al, 2008).  
Physics based models are combined with the FFMEA and hazards to understand critical failure 
modes (Miller et al., 2008).  This approach is useful for identifying hardware issues and directing 
the design as it matures.  In this early stage, accurate reliability values for all of the spacecraft 
hardware may not be available and allocated reliability goals can be used to estimate system 
reliability (FAA, 2005).  Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analyses are recommended by 
the FAA and NASA to understand failures in operational scenarios.  The typical method for 
quantifying safety in the early stage of development is through the use of risk and reliability 
analyses that rely on heuristic or expert data. 
 Operability, used in this context, is the functionality required to perform specific mission 
objectives and is typically associated with high level mission objectives.  NASA defines these 
mission objectives as destination, purpose, stay time, crew size and support requirements (Miller 
et al., 2008).  Although these requirements are high level mission objectives, these parameters 
are often traded in order to meet performance objectives.  As a spacecraft design matures, the 
Operability of the spacecraft is typically associated with performance parameters and is 
dependent upon many other spacecraft parameters.   
 The figures of merit, the Safety Index and Operability Index, are scoring methodologies 
built upon a Minimum Functional design methodology.  Based on typical risk and reliability 
approaches used in the early design phase, the two figures of merit provides designers and 
decision makers with a scoring method that evaluates the whole spacecraft configuration and 
quantifies the relative differences between competing design concepts. 
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6.4 DERIVATION OF FIGURES OF MERIT 
 Any figure of merit used for relative comparison of design concepts should include as 
many quantifiable parameters as possible in order to develop a composite “score”.  Although 
mass and safety are key aspects to the design, the operational aspects of a mission should be 
considered at the same time because the three parameters are coupled in the spacecraft 
configuration.  A decrease in Operability mass is an increase in Safety mass for a given total 
spacecraft mass. 
 A challenge in the early stage of development is determining the parameters that 
contribute the most to the overall design.  Using a minimum functionality design methodology 
where low level functions are coupled to potential technology solutions, a designer can trade and 
evaluate potential configurations based on the known information.  This information includes: 
 Consequence of loss of function, 
 Number of components required to perform the functions, 
 Potential failure causes and hazards associated with technology selections, 
 TRL of technology selections, 
 Similar and dissimilar redundancy in low level functions, 
 Design for Minimum Risk components, 
 Factors of Safety margins, 
 Mission time, 
 Number of crew, 
 Payloads and operational equipment,  
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 Basic understanding of spacecraft integration, and 
 Mass estimate of the functions and spacecraft configuration. 
  
 The previous information is a list of the main quantifiable parameters in a spacecraft 
configuration and used in the derivation of the figures of merit for Safety and Operability.  
Although the above list is focused on the components of the spacecraft, the intent is to utilize 
known quantitative information about the configuration in order to score the overall design.  The 
figures of merit provide a complete score of all the components and functions in the spacecraft. 
 
6.4.1 Safety Index Derivation 
 The Safety Index figure of merit is a score of the complexity, margins, failure tolerance, 
safety components, and hazards in the spacecraft.  Although the Safety Index is not directly 
correlated to reliability, the key assumption is that increasing redundancy through similar or 
dissimilar redundancy will increase the failure tolerance of the spacecraft in order to mitigate 
potential hazards.  Another key assumption is that future reliability and safety analyses will be 
completed when the number of components and redundancy are clearly defined for a selected 
spacecraft design.  An advantage of the Safety Index is that it provides an early indication of 
potential issues that will be examined in later detailed analyses.  The Safety Index evaluates the 
typical areas in risk based approaches and is calculated based on the following parameters: 
 Consequence of loss of the function 
 Number of components needed to perform the function 
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 Average redundancy of components in the function 
 Failure causes or hazards associated with components in the function 
 Use of dissimilar redundancy or safety components in the function 
 
 The consequence of loss of function is a key parameter in understanding which functions 
are the highest contributors to safety of the spacecraft.  The number of components needed to 
perform a function is an indicator of the complexity within the function.  A high number of 
components in a function increase the likelihood of potential failure of the function.  The 
redundancy of components in a function reduces the likelihood of failure of the function, but also 
must be traded against the number of components required to perform the function.  The 
potential hazards associated with a function are the key events that could cause failure of the 
function.  Dissimilar redundancy or additional safety components increase the chances of 
mitigating a failure through additional means.  In typical reliability methods, the addition of 
safety components does not add to the reliability of the spacecraft only if the use prevents the 
hazard from occurring.  Based on these key parameters and the information available to 
designers in the early stage of development, the Safety Index is a scoring method that is a 
precursor to detailed risk and reliability methods.  Shown in Figure 66 is the process for 
calculating the Safety Index. 
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Figure 66: Process for calculating the Safety Index. 
 
 The Safety Index is based upon the string of components that perform a function.  Shown 
in Figure 67 is an illustration of how the functions are related to the components in a string. 
 
Figure 67: Component string dedicated to a function. 
 
6.4.1.1 Assigning Consequences  
 A typical qualitative risk approach combines the consequence of an event (or failure) and 
the likelihood of the event.  Based on the levels of consequence and likelihood, a risk score is 
assigned (NASA, 2007a).  For the Safety Index, the low level functions are assigned a 
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consequence value based on the severity of the loss of the function.  The scale of consequences 
used in this process was derived from the NASA Constellation program risk guidelines and are 
listed as follows: 
 Consequence 5 – Loss of life or permanently disabling injury and top level requirements 
not achievable with existing engineering capabilities; Loss of Crew. 
 Consequence 4 – Severe injury or illness requiring extended medical treatment or major 
impact to requirements, design margins or loss of mission objectives; Loss of Mission. 
 Consequence 3 – Injury, illness, or incapacitation requiring emergency treatment or 
moderate impact to requirements, design margins or mission objectives. 
 Consequence 2 – Injury requiring first aid treatment, moderate crew discomfort or minor 
impact to requirements, design margins or mission objectives. 
 Consequence 1 – Minor injury not requiring first aid treatment, minor crew discomfort or 
negligible impact to requirements, design margins or mission objectives.  
 
6.4.1.2 Safety Index Equations 
 Given a set of functions and parameters that characterize the configuration of the 
spacecraft, the individual function parameters of number of components, average redundancy, 
failure causes (hazards), and safety components are normalized into scores for the individual 
functions.  The number of components is scored from 1-10 based on the number of components 
in the function.  Because the distribution of functions can vary depending upon how the low 
level functions are defined, the normalized component score is based upon the maximum number 
of components in an individual function.  The maximum number of components in a single 
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function is determined by identifying the function with the largest number of components.  The 
normalized score for the number of components in a single function is calculated using the 
following expression: 
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 Where Cfunction is the number of individual components in a function and Cmaximum is the 
largest number of components in any of the functions.  The scoring for redundancy is determined 
using the average redundancy in the function.  Because not all components have the same 
amount of redundant components in a function string, the use of average redundancy is an 
indicator of the redundancy level of the components that perform the function.  The average 
redundancy is calculated by dividing the number of single type components by the total number 
of components in the function.  The average redundancy in the function is scored from 1-10 
based on a range of redundancy from 1-3.  Single redundancy in a function is a score of 3.35 
while dual redundancy is a score of 10.  The normalized redundancy score is calculated as:  
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 For components that do not have redundant aspects such as primary structure and 
pressure vessels, the factor of safety is used in place of average redundancy.  In this approach, a 
factor of safety of 3 is considered to be the highest factor of safety for DFMR components.  
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Although it is possible to assign a larger factor of safety, the largest expected factor of safety 
would be used to adjust the scoring. 
 The scoring for failure causes in a function is based upon the number of identified 
hazards or failure causes.  For example, an external mounted electronic box component would be 
subjected to loading, extreme temperature, Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD), and 
contamination that could cause a failure.  Other causes such as manufacturing flaws, design 
flaws, electrical failure, and software could contribute to a failure in the component.  To 
determine how well a function relates to the total number of potential hazards, a listing of all the 
hazards to the spacecraft is compiled.  A list of potential hazards could include electrical failure, 
mechanical failure (wear), stress and structural loading, contamination, temperature, 
manufacturing flaws, design flaws, duty cycle, MMOD, and software.  The total number of 
potential hazards to the spacecraft is determined and used in the normalized scoring of hazards.  
The normalized hazard score is calculated as: 
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 Where HFunction is the number of hazards that are related to the individual function and 
HMaximum is the number of all the potential hazards to the spacecraft.  The number of hazards is 
divided by the average redundancy to account for redundant aspects in components that could 
mitigate a potential failure.  The scoring for additional safety components is a “bonus” score for 
the individual function and is 0 or 10 based upon the addition of safety components.   
 ScoreSafety Components = 0 or 10                                     (12) 
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6.4.1.3 Safety Index Weight Factors 
 The weight factors are an important part of the scoring method.  For the examples used in 
this work, the following weight factors were chosen based on importance and the sensitivity of 
the weighting factors will be demonstrated in the analysis. 
 Weight FactorRedundancy = 3.475 
 Weight FactorComponents = 2.475 
 Weight FactorSafety Components = 2.5 
 Weight FactorHazards = 1.55  
 
The expressions used to weight the parameter scores are: 
 Weighted Components = ScoreComponents x Weight FactorComponents                                        (13) 
 Weighted Redundancy = ScoreRedundancy x Weight FactorRedundancy                                        (14) 
 Weighted Hazards = ScoreHazards  x Weight FactorHazards                                                      (15) 
 Weighted Safety Components = ScoreSafety Components x Weight FactorSafety Components                     (16) 
 
 After the parameter scores have been weighted, the function score is the sum of the 
weighted scores.  This score represents the sum and weighting of the parameter scores and does 
not include weighting for consequence of loss of function. 
 Function Score = Sum of Weighted Parameter Scores              (17) 
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 The function scores are weighted according to the consequence value of the function to 
develop a total weighted function score. 
 Total Weighted Function Score = Function Score x Consequence           (18) 
 
6.4.1.4 Safety Index 
 The Safety Index of the spacecraft is determined by dividing the sum of the total 
weighted function scores by the sum of the consequence values.  The Safety Index has a scale 
from 8-100 and is calculated as follows: 
 Safety Index = Sum of Total Weighted Function Scores / Sum of Consequences       (19) 
 
 The Safety Index is a comprehensive scoring of all the functions in the spacecraft.  The 
figure of merit provides designers with a method for evaluating not only redundant components 
but also DFMR items and safety additional components.  Utilizing the Safety Index not only 
allows comparison between spacecraft of similar type, but also spacecraft of different types of 
configurations.  The examples that follow will demonstrate the application of the Safety Index 
for simple and complex functionality. 
 
6.4.2  Operability Index Derivation 
 The Operability Index is a score of the operational aspects of the spacecraft configuration 
and is based upon the preferences of the decision makers more than the design team.  The 
Operability Index is a much simpler scoring method because it uses parameters that are easier to 
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quantify and interpret.  For the purposes of this derivation, four fundamental parameters have 
been chosen for the Operability Index.  In future studies, the Operability Index could be 
expanded to include other parameters beyond what is described here.  The four fundamental 
parameters chosen for evaluation are: 
 Mission time 
 Number of Operability functions,  
 Number of Crew, and 
 Payload mass. 
 
 The four parameters were chosen based on typical top level objectives for a human 
spacecraft.  The mission time is a key driving aspect of the design and is often related to total 
spacecraft mass.  The number of Operability functions is a measure of the additional 
functionality of the spacecraft beyond a minimum functional design.  The number of crew is also 
a top level objective that is often traded for mass savings, but the ability of the spacecraft to carry 
additional crew is an increase in operational capability.  The payload mass is a key parameter 
based upon the operational aspects of a mission.  An increase in payload mass is associated with 
an increase in operational functionality and the capability of the spacecraft. 
 
6.4.2.1 Operability Index Equations 
 The equations for the Operability Index are normalized according to target goals.  In the 
first parameter, mission time, the mission time is normalized according to maximum mission 
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duration.  The maximum mission time represents a goal of the maximum possible time, but for 
the purposes described here it is an upper boundary condition.  The normalized time is scaled 
from 0 – 10 and is calculated with the following expression: 
 
10min 



Maximum
alNo
Time Time
Time
Score                                                           (20) 
 
 The number of crew is normalized to a maximum number of crew and is calculated with 
the following expression: 
 
10



Maximum
Number
Crew Crew
Crew
Score                                                                (21) 
 
 The amount of payload mass is normalized to a maximum desired payload and is 
calculated with the following expression: 
 
10



Maximum
Mass
Payload Payload
Payload
Score                                                              (22) 
 
 The number of Operability functions in the spacecraft is normalized to the total number 
of function in the spacecraft and is calculated with the following expression: 
 
10_ 



Total
yOperabilit
FunctionsyOperabilit Functions
Functions
Score                                                (23) 
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6.4.2.2 Operability Index Weight Factors 
 For the examples used in this work, the following weight factors were chosen based on 
importance and the sensitivity of the weighting factors is shown in the analysis. 
 Weight FactorTime = 4 
 Weight FactorCrew = 3 
 Weight FactorPayload = 2 
 Weight FactorOperability Functions = 1  
 
The expressions used to weight the parameter scores are: 
 Weighted Time = ScoreTime x Weight FactorTime                                                                   (24) 
 Weighted Crew = ScoreCrew x Weight FactorCrew                                                                 (25) 
 Weighted Payload = ScorePayload  x Weight FactorPayload                                                       (26) 
 Weighted Operability Functions = ScoreOperability Functions x Weight FactorOperability Functions     (27) 
 
6.4.2.3 Operability Index 
 The Operability Index score is a measure of the operational aspects of the spacecraft.  
The score is dependent upon the target goals for each parameter and the weighting factors.  The 
Operability Index has a scale from 0-100 and is calculated as follows: 
 Operability Index = Sum of Weighted scores                     (28) 
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6.4.3 Total Spacecraft Scoring 
 The Safety Index and Operability Index scores can be combined into a Total Spacecraft 
score to be visualized in a tradespace.  The weighting of the scores is dependent upon the user 
preferences and for this example, the Safety Index score is weighted twice the Operability Index 
score.  The Total Spacecraft score is scaled from 0 – 100 and is calculated with the following 
expression: 
 
 



 
3
2 __
_
IndexyOperabilitIndexSafety
SpacecraftTotal
ScoreScore
Score                              (29) 
 
6.5   ANALYSIS STUDIES 
 The following analysis studies demonstrate the Safety Index, Operability Index, and 
Total Spacecraft score using simple examples and case studies.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, a 
figure of merit scoring is necessary to evaluate spacecraft parameters other than mass.  The 
Lunar Ascent Module case studies are used to demonstrate the scoring methodology for a human 
spacecraft configuration. 
 
6.5.1 Weight Factors 
 The weight factors for the Safety Index and the Operability Index were examined to 
determine the sensitivity of each weight factor on the overall scores.  A simple list of 10 
functions was used to demonstrate the scoring methods and the sensitivities of the weight factors.  
The number of components, redundancy, hazards, and safety components in each function were 
generated randomly to simulate a likely spacecraft configuration with a limited number of 
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functions.  A Monte Carlo analysis of 10,000 runs was completed to evaluate the distribution of 
the scores.  The Safety Index weight factors were determined through iteration such that the 
score was not sensitive to a single parameter.  The Operability Index weight factors were 
established based on ranking of the parameters.  Distribution ranges and average score values for 
the Safety Index and Operability Index were determined. 
 
6.5.2 Safety Index Comparisons 
 A baseline example of the Safety Index using a set of 10 functions was created to 
investigate the relative changes in the scores due to increases in overall failure tolerance and 
number of components.  The baseline example simulated a typical spacecraft configuration with 
a smaller set of functions.  The values for consequence, components, total number of 
components, hazards, and safety components were randomly generated for the set of functions.  
A minimum functional, one failure tolerant, and two failure tolerant configurations were used to 
quantify the relative differences in scores due to increased failure tolerance.  A simple 
comparison of changes in Safety Index due to component level changes was conducted to 
investigate the resolution of the Safety Index scale.  The simple examples demonstrated the 
sensitivity of the Safety Index to increases in failure tolerance and number of components. 
 
6.5.3 Operability Index Comparisons 
 A set of four comparisons were conducted to investigate the relative difference in 
Operability Index score for small increments in each of the key parameters.  A baseline 
configuration was established for comparison with incremental increases in time, crewmembers, 
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payload, and Operability functions.  The comparisons demonstrated the sensitivity of the 
Operability Index to each of the parameters. 
 
6.5.4 Lunar Ascent Module Scoring  
      The three Lunar Ascent Module case studies discussed in Chapter 5 were used to 
investigate and demonstrate the scoring methodology.  The three spacecraft types of, Apollo 
nominal, Apollo One Man, and ESAS point of departure were scored and compared.  The first 
part of this analysis focused on the scoring of the node configurations for each of the three 
spacecraft types. Shown in Table 16 is the spacecraft configuration nodes used in the scoring 
process.  
Table 16: Spacecraft configuration nodes for Safety Index and Operability Index scoring. 
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Factor of Safety Addition 2 12 22 32
Consequence 5 Failure Tolerance (1FT) Addition 3 13 23 33
Consequence 4 Failure Tolerance (1FT) Addition 4 14 24 34
Safety Functionality Addition 5 15 25 35
Consequence 3 and Lower (1FT) Addition 6 16 26 36
Consequence 5 Failure Tolerance (2FT) Addition 7 17 27 37
Consequence 4 Failure Tolerance (2FT) Addition 8 18 28 38
Safety Functionality Addition 9 19 29 39
Consequence 3 and Lower (2FT) Addition 10 20 30 40
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  In addition to the node configuration scoring, the tradespace results described in Chapter 
5 were scored using the Safety Index and Operability Index.  The scores were combined into a 
Total Spacecraft score and plotted in a three dimensional tradespace.  The average and standard 
deviation of the scores in each tradespace zone were calculated and compared.  The scoring of 
the Monte Carlo analysis results provided information about relative differences in the 
tradespace.  The seven tradespace zones are listed in Table 17.  Shown in Figure 68 is a visual 
representation of the tradespace zones. 
Table 17: Starting and ending configurations for tradespace zones. 
 
Zone Starting Configuration Ending Configuration
1 Minimum Functionality at minimum mission time (Node 1)
Factor of Safety Addition at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 12)
2 Factor of Safety addition at Nominal Mission Time (Node 12)
Consequence 5 (LOC) - 1 FT addition at Nominal 
Mission Time (Node 13)
3 Consequence 5 (LOC) - 1 FT addition at Nominal Mission Time (Node 13)
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 1 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 24)
4
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 1 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 24)
All components -1FT addition with Operability 
components at Nominal Mission Time (Node 26)
5 All components -1FT addition with Operability components at Nominal Mission Time (Node 26)
Consequence 5 (LOC) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 27)
6
Consequence 5 (LOC) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 27)
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 28)
7
Consequence 4 (LOM) - 2 FT addition with 
Operability components at Nominal Mission Time 
(Node 28)
All components -2FT addition with double 
Operability components at double Nominal Mission 
Time (Node 26)
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Figure 68: Zones for Safety Index, Operability Index, and Total Spacecraft Score. 
 
6.6 RESULTS 
6.6.1 Weight Factors 
 A simple example of the Safety Index scoring system was created to demonstrate the 
methods and investigate sensitivities.  Shown in Table 18 is an example of the Safety Index 
scoring process where the values for consequence, components, total number of components, 
hazards, and safety components were randomly generated.  
 
 
7
6 5
4 3
2
1
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Table 18: Baseline example of Safety Index scoring. 
 
 
 The weight factors for the Safety Index and Operability Index were evaluated to 
determine the sensitivity of the weight factors on the overall score.  Through a process of 
iteration with the Monte Carlo analysis, the weight factors were adjusted such that one parameter 
was not a significant contributor to the overall score.  Shown in Figure 69 is a distribution of 
Safety Index scores generated with a Monte Carlo analysis run of 10,000 points.  For each 
individual score, a set of 10 functions contained random generated values for consequence, 
components, total number of components, hazards, and safety components; this approach was the 
same as described in Table 18.  The range of the scoring was between 29.3 and 76.9 with an 
average of 52.7. 
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1 3 8 20 2.50 1 0 3.00 6.06 10.56 0.00 7.43 21.07 16.37 0.00 44.86 134.58
2 3 3 5 1.67 2 0 8.00 2.00 9.56 0.00 19.80 6.95 14.82 0.00 41.57 124.70
3 2 4 10 2.50 7 1 7.00 6.06 8.32 10.00 17.33 21.07 12.90 25.00 76.29 152.58
4 3 5 7 1.40 10 0 6.00 1.36 3.93 0.00 14.85 4.73 6.09 0.00 25.67 77.00
5 4 6 16 2.67 7 1 5.00 7.25 8.41 10.00 12.38 25.19 13.04 25.00 75.61 302.43
6 4 6 7 1.17 3 1 5.00 1.06 8.34 10.00 12.38 3.69 12.93 25.00 54.00 215.99
7 5 2 6 3.00 5 0 9.00 10.00 9.43 0.00 22.28 34.75 14.62 0.00 71.65 358.23
8 4 6 12 2.00 1 0 5.00 3.25 10.30 0.00 12.38 11.29 15.97 0.00 39.63 158.54
9 4 6 11 1.83 4 1 5.00 2.56 9.04 10.00 12.38 8.90 14.01 25.00 60.29 241.14
10 4 2 3 1.50 4 0 9.00 1.56 8.20 0.00 22.28 5.43 12.71 0.00 40.41 161.66
2.475 3.475 1.550 2.500
Sum of Total Weighted Function Scores 1926.86
Sum of Consequences 36.00
Safety Index Score 53.52
Weight Factors
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Figure 69: Distribution of Safety Index scores. 
 
 To determine the sensitivity of the weight factors, the Monte Carlo analysis was iterated 
to determine the weight factors.  Shown in Table 19 are the results of the Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
Table 19: Sensitivity of Safety Index weight factors. 
 
 
3.475 0 3.475 3.475 3.475
2.475 2.475 0 2.475 2.475
1.55 1.55 1.55 0 1.55
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 0
52.74 38.70 38.93 40.40 40.20
-14.04 -13.81 -12.34 -12.54Difference
Weight Factor Redundancy
Weight Factor Hazards
Weight Factor Safety Components
Safety Index Average Score
Weight Factor Components
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 After a trial and error process, the final weight factors were decided based on the relative 
sensitivity and importance of the parameter.  As the weight factors were set to zero, the Safety 
Index average scores decreased as expected.  The difference relative to the original Safety Index 
score was the deciding variable in the determination of the weight factors.  The differences 
among the analyses were judged to be adequate because the result demonstrated that all 
differences were very close to being equal. 
 The sensitivity of the weight factors for the Operability Index was examined in the same 
manner as the Safety Index.  Because the Operability Index evaluates key operational parameters 
of the spacecraft configuration, the following parameters were randomly varied in a Monte Carlo 
analysis of 10,000 runs: 
 Time – 0 to 36 hrs 
 Crew – 1 to 4 crewmembers 
 Payload – 0 to 1000 lbs 
 Operability Functions – 0 to 20% of total spacecraft functions 
 
 Shown in Figure 70 is the distribution of Operability Index scores based on the previous 
parameters.  The weight factors used in this analysis were: 
 Time weight factor = 4, 
 Crew weight factor = 3, 
 Payloads weight factor = 2, and 
 Operability Functions = 1. 
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 The distribution of Operability Scores resulted in an average score of 49.53 with a 
maximum score of 90.9 and a minimum score of 9.57.  The sensitivity of the weight factors is 
listed in Table 20.   
 
 Figure 70: Distribution of Operability Index scores. 
 
Table 20: Sensitivity of Operability Index weight factors. 
 
 
4 0 4 4 4
3 3 0 3 3
2 2 2 0 2
1 1 1 1 0
49.53 29.67 30.85 39.59 48.47
-19.86 -18.68 -9.94 -1.06
Operability Index Average Score
Difference
Weight Factor Time
Weight Factor Crew
Weight Factor Payloads
Weight Factor Operability Functions
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 For the Operability Index, the weight factors were not adjusted from their importance 
ranking.  The results of the sensitivity analysis show a similar sensitivity for Time and Crew.  
This result was judged to be adequate because increasing Time and Crew is a large operational 
feature of a spacecraft.  The sensitivity to payload is approximately half of the previous two 
parameters and was judged to be appropriately ranked.  The addition of operability functions was 
not a significant driver in the overall score and is due to the low weight factor.    
 
6.6.2 Safety Index Comparisons 
 The resolution of the Safety Index to small changes in the spacecraft configuration is an 
important characteristic of the figure of merit.  Using the baseline example in Table 18, a set of 
comparisons were investigated to determine the sensitivity of the Safety Index to changes in 
overall redundancy and total number of components.  Shown in Table 21, the yellow columns 
represent the changes to the baseline example of Table 18.  For a minimum functionality 
configuration, the functions are single string without redundancy and safety components.  The 
Safety Index score for the minimum functional configuration is 29.44 compared to the baseline 
score of 53.52. The low score of the minimum functional configuration represents a lower 
boundary for the Safety Index and correlates well with the Monte Carlo analysis lower boundary 
of 29.3.   
   
 
 
 
257 
 
Table 21: Baseline example revised to a Minimum Functionality configuration. 
 
 
  
 The same approach was used to calculate the Safety Index for a one failure tolerant 
configuration and a two failure tolerant configuration.  The one failure tolerant configuration 
resulted in a score of 50.29 and the two failure tolerant configuration resulted in a score of 74.85.  
The difference between the minimum functionality configuration and a one failure tolerant 
configuration was 20.85 and the difference between a one failure tolerant configuration and a 
two failure tolerant configuration was 24.56.  This exercise demonstrated the ability of the Safety 
Index to distinguish between failure tolerances, but the remaining comparison will investigate if 
the Safety Index can distinguish between smaller changes in the number of components. 
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3 2 4 4 1.00 7 0 7.00 1.00 4.30 0.00 17.33 3.48 6.67 0.00 27.47 54.93
4 3 5 5 1.00 10 0 6.00 1.00 1.10 0.00 14.85 3.48 1.71 0.00 20.03 60.09
5 4 6 6 1.00 7 0 5.00 1.00 4.10 0.00 12.38 3.48 6.36 0.00 22.21 88.82
6 4 6 6 1.00 3 0 5.00 1.00 7.90 0.00 12.38 3.48 12.25 0.00 28.10 112.38
7 5 2 2 1.00 5 0 9.00 1.00 6.30 0.00 22.28 3.48 9.77 0.00 35.52 177.58
8 4 6 6 1.00 1 0 5.00 1.00 9.60 0.00 12.38 3.48 14.88 0.00 30.73 122.92
9 4 6 6 1.00 4 0 5.00 1.00 7.40 0.00 12.38 3.48 11.47 0.00 27.32 109.28
10 4 2 2 1.00 4 0 9.00 1.00 6.80 0.00 22.28 3.48 10.54 0.00 36.29 145.16
2.475 3.475 1.550 2.500
Sum of Total Weighted Function Scores 1059.71
Sum of Consequences 36.00
Safety Index Score 29.44
Weight Factors
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 Using the baseline example as shown in Table 18, the fourth function with a consequence 
of 3 and an average redundancy of 1.4 was used to evaluate the resolution of the Safety Index to 
smaller changes.  A reduction in the number of components from 7 to 5 resulted in a decrease of 
0.48.  Shown in Table 22 is the revised baseline example. 
 
Table 22: Baseline example with revised number of components in function 4. 
 
  
 The previous analysis demonstrated that small changes in components may not have a 
large impact on the overall Safety Index score.  However, if the example is continued and the 
consequence value is changed from 3 to 4, the Safety Index decreases to 52.14, which is a 
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2 3 3 5 1.67 2 0 8.00 2.00 9.56 0.00 19.80 6.95 14.82 0.00 41.57 124.70
3 2 4 10 2.50 7 1 7.00 6.06 8.32 10.00 17.33 21.07 12.90 25.00 76.29 152.58
4 3 5 5 1.00 10 0 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 14.85 3.48 1.55 0.00 19.88 59.63
5 4 6 16 2.67 7 1 5.00 7.25 8.41 10.00 12.38 25.19 13.04 25.00 75.61 302.43
6 4 6 7 1.17 3 1 5.00 1.06 8.34 10.00 12.38 3.69 12.93 25.00 54.00 215.99
7 5 2 6 3.00 5 0 9.00 10.00 9.43 0.00 22.28 34.75 14.62 0.00 71.65 358.23
8 4 6 12 2.00 1 0 5.00 3.25 10.30 0.00 12.38 11.29 15.97 0.00 39.63 158.54
9 4 6 11 1.83 4 1 5.00 2.56 9.04 10.00 12.38 8.90 14.01 25.00 60.29 241.14
10 4 2 3 1.50 4 0 9.00 1.56 8.20 0.00 22.28 5.43 12.71 0.00 40.41 161.66
2.475 3.475 1.550 2.500
Sum of Total Weighted Function Scores 1909.48
Sum of Consequences 36.00
Safety Index Score 53.04
Weight Factors
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change of 1.38.  Designers should be aware that small changes in the Safety Index could indicate 
significant changes in the spacecraft configuration. 
 
6.6.3 Operability Index Comparisons 
 Four comparisons were conducted to determine the sensitivity of the Operability Index to 
small changes in time, crew, payload, and Operability functions.  A baseline score was 
established using the following values: 
 Time = 18 hours, 
 Crew = 2 crewmembers, 
 Payload = 500 lbs, and 
 Operability functions = 10% of total spacecraft functions. 
  
 Shown in Table 23 are the results of the Operability Index comparisons.  The first 
comparison increased the time from 18 hours to 20 hours.  This change increased the score 2.22 
from the baseline score of 46.00.  For the second comparison, the increase in one crewmember is 
a significant increase of 7.50.  The third comparison increased the payload mass by 100 lbs and 
resulted in a score increase of 2.00.  The final comparison increased the percentage of 
Operability functions and did not increase the score significantly.  The sensitivities demonstrated 
that small changes in time, crew, and payload were easily observed in the Operability Index 
score.  The increase in Operability functions is not as significant.  The primary reason for the 
small increase is due to the weight factor for Operability functions.  In future analyses, an 
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increase in the weighting of the Operability functions is needed.  The overall results of the 
comparisons demonstrate the ability of the Operability Index to capture incremental changes in 
spacecraft Operability. 
 
Table 23: Operability Index comparisons. 
 
 
6.6.4 Lunar Ascent Module Scoring  
 The three Lunar Ascent Module case studies as presented in Chapter 5 were used to 
investigate the scoring methodology.  The three configurations, Apollo nominal, Apollo One 
Man, and ESAS point of departure were scored for Safety Index, Operability Index, and Total 
Spacecraft score.  Shown in Figs. 71 -73 are the Safety Index and Operability Index results for 
the Apollo, Apollo One Man, and ESAS configurations.  Listed in Tables 25 -26 are the scores 
for Safety Index, Operability Index, and Total Spacecraft at the node locations. 
 Observing the results between the Apollo, Apollo One Man and ESAS configurations 
shows a range of Safety Index between 33 and 74.  Many of the Safety Index levels are 
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Baseline 18 2 500 10.00% 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 1.00 46.00
Baseline + 2 hours 20 2 500 10.00% 5.56 5.00 5.00 1.00 22.22 15.00 10.00 1.00 48.22 2.22
Baseline + 1 crewmember 18 3 500 10.00% 5.00 7.50 5.00 1.00 20.00 22.50 10.00 1.00 53.50 7.50
Baseline + 100 lbs payload 18 2 600 10.00% 5.00 5.00 6.00 1.00 20.00 15.00 12.00 1.00 48.00 2.00
Baseline + 5% Operability Functions 18 2 500 15.00% 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.50 20.00 15.00 10.00 1.50 46.50 0.50
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comparable among the three configurations.  A one failure tolerance configuration among the 
three types reveals a safety score of approximately 52.  The reason for the continuity is due to the 
number of components and functions among the three.  The component list for the Apollo One 
Man is similar to the Apollo configuration and the ESAS configuration was derived from the 
Apollo configuration.   
 
Figure 71: Safety Index and Operability Index scores for the Apollo configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
262 
 
Table 24: Safety Index and Operability Index scores for the Apollo configuration. 
 
 
Figure 72: Safety Index and Operability Index for the Apollo One Man configuration. 
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Minimum Functionality 33.16 33.16 33.13 33.16 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 27.60 31.69 33.64 40.22
Factor of Safety Addition 34.39 34.39 34.36 34.39 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 28.42 32.50 34.46 41.04
Consequence 5 Failure 
Tolerance (1FT) Addition 44.38 44.38 44.36 44.39 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 35.08 39.16 41.13 47.71
Consequence 4 Failure 
Tolerance (1FT) Addition 47.62 47.62 47.51 47.55 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 37.24 41.32 43.23 49.81
Safety Functionality Addition 51.34 51.34 51.26 51.29 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 39.72 43.80 45.73 52.31
Consequence 3 and Lower 
(1FT) Addition 52.06 52.06 52.01 52.05 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 40.20 44.29 46.23 52.81
Consequence 5 Failure 
Tolerance (2FT) Addition 64.63 64.63 64.58 64.62 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 48.58 52.66 54.61 61.19
Consequence 4 Failure 
Tolerance (2FT) Addition 68.91 68.91 68.84 68.89 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 51.43 55.51 57.45 64.04
Safety Functionality Addition 72.27 72.27 72.21 72.25 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 53.67 57.76 59.70 66.28
Consequence 3 and Lower 
(2FT) Addition 73.59 73.59 73.45 73.51 16.48 28.73 34.67 54.34 54.55 58.64 60.52 67.12
Total Spacecraft ScoreSafety Index Score Operability Index Score
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Table 25: Safety Index and Operability Index for the Apollo One Man configuration. 
 
 
Figure 73: Safety Index and Operability Index scores for the ESAS configuration. 
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Minimum Functionality 32.79 32.79 32.76 32.83 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 24.85 26.65 27.76 31.23
Factor of Safety Addition 34.02 34.02 33.98 34.06 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 25.67 27.47 28.57 32.04
Consequence 5 Failure 
Tolerance (1FT) Addition 44.32 44.32 44.31 44.38 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 32.54 34.34 35.45 38.92
Consequence 4 Failure 
Tolerance (1FT) Addition 47.66 47.66 47.54 47.64 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 34.76 36.56 37.61 41.10
Safety Functionality Addition 51.38 51.38 51.28 51.36 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 37.24 39.04 40.11 43.58
Consequence 3 and Lower 
(1FT) Addition 51.90 51.90 51.81 51.89 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 37.59 39.39 40.45 43.93
Consequence 5 Failure 
Tolerance (2FT) Addition 64.50 64.50 64.41 64.50 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 46.00 47.79 48.86 52.33
Consequence 4 Failure 
Tolerance (2FT) Addition 69.02 69.02 68.75 68.86 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 49.01 50.81 51.75 55.24
Safety Functionality Addition 72.40 72.40 72.13 72.24 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 51.26 53.06 54.00 57.50
Consequence 3 and Lower 
(2FT) Addition 73.47 73.47 73.19 73.31 8.98 14.37 17.75 28.01 51.97 53.77 54.71 58.21
Total Spacecraft ScoreSafety Index Score Operability Index Score
264 
 
Table 26: Safety Index and Operability Index scores for the ESAS configuration. 
 
 
 The differences among the three types of spacecraft are the Operability levels.  Using the 
Apollo configuration as a baseline, the Operability for the ESAS minimum functionality 
configuration is almost twice as high as the Apollo configuration and this is due to the increased 
number of crew.  However, because the ESAS configuration did not carry a payload and the 
mission time was approximately half of the Apollo configuration, the Operability Index score is 
comparable with Apollo scoring 34.67 and ESAS scoring 39.30 for a nominal Operability level.  
The results suggest that an ESAS configuration with two additional crewmembers, no payload, 
and 25% of the time is approximately equivalent to a nominal Apollo configuration for 
Operability.  The Operability Index scores for the Apollo One Man configuration are 
approximately half of the nominal Apollo configuration.  One should also keep in mind the 
Safety Index Scores at 
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Minimum Functionality 34.94 34.94 34.94 34.94 31.53 33.39 39.31 48.61 33.81 34.43 36.40 39.50
Factor of Safety Addition 35.65 35.65 35.65 35.65 31.53 33.39 39.31 48.61 34.27 34.89 36.87 39.97
Consequence 5 Failure 
Tolerance (1FT) Addition 44.41 44.41 44.41 44.41 31.51 33.37 39.30 48.59 40.11 40.73 42.71 45.81
Consequence 4 Failure 
Tolerance (1FT) Addition 47.48 47.48 47.48 47.48 31.50 33.36 39.29 48.60 42.16 42.77 44.75 47.85
Safety Functionality Addition 50.67 50.67 50.67 50.67 31.50 33.36 39.29 48.59 44.28 44.90 46.88 49.98
Consequence 3 and Lower 
(1FT) Addition 52.01 52.01 52.01 52.01 31.52 33.37 39.31 48.61 45.18 45.80 47.78 50.88
Consequence 5 Failure 
Tolerance (2FT) Addition 64.30 64.30 64.30 64.30 31.51 33.37 39.30 48.60 53.37 53.99 55.97 59.07
Consequence 4 Failure 
Tolerance (2FT) Addition 68.89 68.89 68.89 68.89 31.51 33.36 39.30 48.60 56.43 57.05 59.03 62.13
Safety Functionality Addition 71.53 71.53 71.53 71.53 31.50 33.36 39.29 48.60 58.19 58.81 60.78 63.88
Consequence 3 and Lower 
(2FT) Addition 73.71 73.71 73.77 73.77 31.51 33.37 39.30 48.60 59.64 60.26 62.28 65.38
Total Spacecraft ScoreSafety Index Score Operability Index Score
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scoring weights used for time, crew, and payload when evaluating the differences.  Shown in 
Figs. 74 – 76 are the results of the Monte Carlo analysis for the tradespace zones. 
 
Figure 74: Safety and Operability Index tradespace for the Apollo configuration. 
 
Figure 75: Safety and Operability Index tradespace for the Apollo One Man configuration. 
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Figure 76: Safety and Operability Index tradespace for the ESAS configuration. 
 
 Listed in Table 27 are the results of the Monte Carlo tradespace analysis.  The average 
and standard deviation of the Safety Index, Operability Index, and Total Spacecraft scores are 
calculated by zone.  As shown in Table 27, the scores for the Safety Index by zone are 
comparable between the three spacecraft types.  The difference in the Total Spacecraft score is 
due to the differences in Operability Index.  A comparison of the Total Spacecraft scores 
between the three spacecraft types shows that the ESAS configuration scored slightly higher in 
the majority of the zones.  The major driver for the ESAS score was the increased number of 
crewmembers.  If the nominal mission time had been increased for ESAS, then the Operability 
Index would have outranked the Apollo configuration.  The scoring weights for the Operability 
Index are critical for evaluating designs and comparing parameters such as crew, time, and 
payload. 
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Table 27: Safety Index, Operability Index, and Total Spacecraft scores by tradespace zone. 
 
 
6.6.5 Advantages and Limitations 
 The weighting factors of a figure of merit are critical to the outcome of the score and a 
bias toward a single objective can overlook potential solutions.  The comparison of the three 
types of Lunar Ascent Modules revealed similarities and differences among the scores that were 
Zone
Average Total 
Spacecraft 
Score
Tot S/C Score 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Safety 
Index
Safety 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Operability 
Index
Operability 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation
1 30.0 1.2 33.7 0.2 22.6 3.5
2 34.0 1.5 39.7 1.5 22.6 3.6
3 40.9 0.7 46.0 0.5 30.8 1.8
4 43.8 0.6 50.5 0.4 30.4 1.7
5 49.0 1.6 58.3 2.2 30.4 1.7
6 54.6 0.8 66.7 0.8 30.4 1.7
7 62.5 1.4 71.2 0.4 45.0 4.2
Zone
Average Total 
Spacecraft 
Score
Tot S/C Score 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Safety 
Index
Safety 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Operability 
Index
Operability 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation
1 26.1 0.5 33.3 0.2 11.6 1.6
2 30.3 1.1 39.6 1.5 11.7 1.6
3 35.8 0.5 45.9 0.6 15.7 1.0
4 38.7 0.4 50.3 0.4 15.5 0.9
5 43.9 1.5 58.1 2.2 15.4 0.9
6 49.6 0.6 66.7 0.8 15.4 0.9
7 55.2 0.8 71.2 0.4 23.3 2.1
Zone
Average Total 
Spacecraft 
Score
Tot S/C Score 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Safety 
Index
Safety 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation
Average 
Operability 
Index
Operability 
Index 
Standard 
Deviation
1 34.3 0.2 35.3 0.1 32.5 0.5
2 37.5 1.0 40.0 1.4 32.5 0.5
3 42.5 0.7 46.0 0.5 35.6 1.7
4 45.3 0.6 50.3 0.4 35.1 1.7
5 50.4 1.6 58.1 2.2 35.0 1.7
6 56.1 0.8 66.6 0.8 35.1 1.7
7 62.4 0.7 71.3 0.4 44.6 1.8
Apollo Configuration
Apollo One Man Configuration
ESAS Configuration
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driven by weighting factors and functionality.  The advantage of this approach is that it allows 
designers to simultaneously compare Safety and Operability without a bias toward mass.  The 
Safety Index is not focused entirely on high consequence functions and scores the entire 
spacecraft including Design for Minimum Risk components.  The Operability Index provides a 
measure of the spacecraft Operability to top level mission objectives and can be used to compare 
different types of spacecraft configurations.  The two scores can be combined into a Total 
Spacecraft score for relative comparisons. 
 The limitations of the figures of merit are primarily due to the resolution of the Safety 
Index scale.  Small changes at the component level may not be as noticeable as large changes in 
subsystem failure tolerance.  However, this approach is intended to provide designers with a 
quantifiable value such that configuration details can be explored prior to detailed risk and 
reliability analysis of a preferred spacecraft configuration. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 The two figures of merit, the Safety Index and Operability Index are methods that can be 
utilized by designers and decision makers to investigate spacecraft configurations prior to 
detailed risk and reliability analyses.  The Safety Index points to an increase in failure tolerance 
and includes parameters of consequence of loss of function, complexity, similar and dissimilar 
redundancy, hazards, safety equipment, and Design for Minimum Risk items.  The Operability 
Index provides a measure of the level of operational functionality in the spacecraft configuration 
and can be used to judge if a candidate configuration will meet top level requirements.  The 
Safety Index and Operability Index scoring methodologies are based upon quantitative 
information and can be easily reproduced.  The weighting factors for the Safety Index were 
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specified according to sensitivities in the scoring such that one parameter did not influence the 
overall score.  The weight factors for the Operability Index were chosen based upon preferences 
in the design.  The results demonstrated that the weighting factors for the Operability Index were 
the likely drivers for the magnitude of the scores and influence the outcome.  The advantage of 
the approach is that Safety and Operability are scored simultaneously and the two indices can be 
combined into a Total Spacecraft score for relative comparison among competing designs.   
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
 This section provides a summary of the research conducted in this dissertation.  Chapter 2 
reviewed the literature on Systems Engineering, Conceptual Design, Multidisciplinary Design 
Optimization, Risk Based Design, Minimum Functionality Design, and Lunar Spacecraft 
Development.  Chapter 3 presented the Minimum Functionality design methodology for 
determining Safety and Operability mass in human spacecraft.  The three remaining chapters 
explored the Minimum Functionality design methodology in greater detail.  Chapter 4 described 
the research activities and development of rapidly reconfigurable prototypes of conceptual 
human spacecraft.  Chapter 5 explored the Minimum Functionality design methodology 
tradespace and developed a mass addition process focused on the early stages of conceptual 
design.  Finally, Chapter 6 introduced two figures of merit for evaluating spacecraft 
configurations based on the levels of Safety and Operability.  Sections 7.1.1 to 7.1.5 provide a 
detailed summary of Chapters 2 through 6. 
 The methods described in Chapters 3 – 6 are combined in a conceptual design process 
that couples with typical approaches used within NASA and industry.  The minimum 
functionality design methodology serves as a pre-analysis activity to gather information and 
reduce uncertainty before detailed modeling and analysis. 
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7.1.1 Summary of Chapter 2 
 Chapter 2 reviewed literature topics on spacecraft design and development.  Beginning 
with the fundamentals of Systems Engineering, the literature review progressed through the 
many subject areas related to the design, development, and maturation of human spacecraft.  The 
final part of Chapter 2 summarized previous lunar spacecraft programs to provide the reader with 
background information related to the case studies in the following chapters. 
 It is commonly known that the conceptual design phase is one of the most important 
phases for determining the costs of a program and yet the processes used in conceptual design 
are often unstructured.  Systems Engineering is a methodology widely used by many aerospace 
organizations in the design, development, and operation of human spacecraft.  The discipline of 
Systems Engineering emerged from technical projects after World War II and was utilized in the 
Apollo program.  Many organizations view Systems Engineering differently and many 
definitions are not consistent.  However, the practice of Systems Engineering is well established 
in industry and will continue to be utilized in the development of future human spacecraft.  
 The challenge during conceptual design is obtaining knowledge in order to develop 
feasible solutions.  The use of “Boundary Objects” as representations of knowledge is one 
method to communicate and present information.  Physical prototyping is a form of a Boundary 
Object and has been historically used to explore concepts and gain knowledge in the early stages 
of development.  The use of CAD models has largely replaced physical prototyping because 
CAD models can be used to represent geometry and concepts and is easily updated.  However, 
one limitation of CAD is difficulties associated with evaluating human factors of a spacecraft 
design.  Virtual reality is being used to simulate physical aspects of a design in a digital world. 
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 The uncertainty in the conceptual design phase can lead to mass growth in later phases of 
development.  Mass growth during conceptual design is a common problem and has been 
observed on many successful and unsuccessful spacecraft programs.  The typical approach for 
dealing with uncertainty is to use standard mass growth allowance tables to predict mass in the 
later phases of development.  
 Multidisciplinary Design Optimization is an area of research that has largely been 
constrained to the research community.  The introduction of MDO in the early 1990’s showed 
great promise for solving and optimizing complex engineering problems.  However, because of 
the complexities of linking discipline specific codes, the use of MDO has not become 
widespread in the aerospace industry and is due to the computational expense of coupling high 
fidelity models and the time required to generate optimized solutions.  Researchers have 
recognized this limitation and developed surrogate “Metamodels” or models of a model to 
reduce the computational burden.  The development and visualization of metamodels is an active 
area of research in the field of MDO. 
 A recent approach proposed by NASA for the development of human spacecraft is Risk 
Based Design.  In Risk Based Design, the goal is to couple the rapid design activities with risk 
analysis in order to evaluate the safety and guide the design as it matures.  The difficulty with 
this approach as observed by some researchers is the lack of complete reliability knowledge and 
the speed at which the design progresses in the early phases.  Reliability analysis such as 
Probabilistic Reliability Analysis requires detailed configuration and reliability information in 
order to quantify safety in a proposed design.  In the early stages of conceptual design, many 
factors such as the particular type of technology used in subsystems, the probability of failure in 
components, and the exact layout and integration of the subsystem components may not be fully 
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defined.  Other reliability analysis methods such as FMEA, FTA, and ETA are typically used to 
quantify reliability in the early stages of conceptual design. 
 Minimum functionality design is an approach where a baseline configuration is defined 
before trading other factors in a spacecraft design.  Minimum functionality gained attention due 
to its use by the Altair Lunar Lander Project Office.  The design approach for minimum 
functionality in the development of the Altair Lunar Lander started with a single point baseline 
design point of departure for cost and risk trades in later design cycles.  The minimum 
functionality approach was also used in the Orion Zero Baseline Vehicle to reduce mass prior to 
SDR.  According to NASA’s Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation Considerations for 
Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems, a minimum functional design is the 
simplest, most robust, and highest performance design option as the starting point for assessing 
fault tolerance.  The exact definition of minimum functionality is interpreted differently among 
various groups. 
 Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems are defined in NASA NPR 8705.2B.  In 
this document, the human rating certification process, certification requirements, and technical 
requirements for human rating are specified.  The set of human rating requirements is likely the 
minimum set of requirements that must be satisfied in order to achieve human rating 
certification. 
 A human lunar spacecraft, commonly known as a Lunar Lander or Lunar Habitat is very 
different from other spacecraft designs such as capsules and lifting bodies.  Although there are 
many similarities to conventional LEO operational spacecraft, a lunar spacecraft must operate in 
a different set of environments on the surface of the moon with a larger set of requirements. 
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 The goal of the Apollo program was to put a man on the moon and return him safely to 
Earth.  The most remarkable aspect of this achievement is that the LM evolved from a 
conceptual idea to operational hardware on the lunar surface in less than 9 years.  The major 
factors that drove LM mass during the preliminary design phase were reliability requirements, 
mission operational requirements, and configuration definition.  The proposed design objectives 
of the Constellation Altair Lunar Lander (formerly known as LSAM) were more complex than 
the Apollo LM.   The Altair Lunar Lander was designed to carry a crew of four, be able to land 
at any location on the moon, and remain on the surface for up to 2 weeks. 
 The Constellation program suffered many challenges and was officially cancelled in June 
2011.  At the current time, the direction of human exploration is being reexamined and the focus 
of commercial partners to provide services to the International Space Station along with the 
current development of the Orion Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System (SLS) 
as an exploration vehicle is a step in the right direction toward achieving spaceflight beyond 
LEO.  Due to the cancellation of Constellation, no plans for Lunar Lander development are 
currently proposed by NASA; but it is hoped that the development of the Orion and SLS 
programs will eventually spur a new Lunar Lander program to continue the legacy of the 
Constellation Altair program. 
 
7.1.2    Summary of Chapter 3 
 A systematic methodology was presented for defining a minimum functionality baseline 
configuration of a human spacecraft.  In order to estimate a lower bound for the spacecraft mass, 
a set of essential functions are coupled to single string subsystems with zero fault tolerance.  This 
minimum functionality baseline is defined to meet the physical requirements needed to transport 
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the crew to the target destination and ensure their physiological needs are met; but without 
margin, redundancy or factor of safety.  This constitutes a set of ‘non-negotiable’ requirements 
based on fundamental parameters derived from Physics and Physiology.  By definition, this 
represents a technically feasible solution, but results in the ‘highest risk’ design.  Mass additions 
beyond the minimum functional configuration are allocated to increase Safety through 
redundancy, fault tolerance or factor of safety, or to increase Operability through additional 
mission functionality or improved human-system interfaces, and are determined by risk analyses 
and design trade studies.  The methodology was used to analyze a range of lunar ascent stage 
spacecraft configurations and a process was developed to allow systematic estimation of mass 
for the specified spacecraft subsystems.  The modeled results are verified by comparison to 
actual subsystem mass of the Apollo Lunar Module ascent stage. 
 A mass and trajectory analysis code named the Conceptual Lunar Ascent Module 
Program was developed in MATLAB to calculate the minimum functionality baseline and to 
assess relative increases in Safety and Operability mass for various Lunar Ascent Module 
spacecraft configurations.  The program is focused on the lunar ascent phase of the overall lunar 
architecture mission.  The intent of the program was to determine how changes in subsystem 
mass affect the overall spacecraft mass required to return from the lunar surface.  The CLAMP 
code approaches the development of a conceptual spacecraft design in a bottom-up design 
philosophy using individual components and heuristics matched to spacecraft functions.  The 
program played a key role in developing the proposed methodology in order to understand how 
closely coupled the Safety and Operability mass is to the total spacecraft baseline mass.   
 The Minimum Functionality design methodology establishes a tradespace of 
configurations that visually represent the relationship between total spacecraft, Safety, and 
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Operability mass.  It is hoped that this minimum functional baseline design methodology will 
generate interest among the spacecraft design community and serve as a useful guideline in the 
development of future human spacecraft. 
 
7.1.3    Summary of Chapter 4 
 This chapter describes the prototyping research activities at the University of Colorado 
from the fall of 2006 until the spring of 2009.  Many lessons were learned as a result of this 
prototyping activity and one of the significant aspects of rapidly reconfigurable prototyping is 
that it integrates well into a minimum functionality design methodology.  The early research 
efforts beginning in 2006 have led to a project based design curriculum for human spacecraft 
conceptual design at the University of Colorado.   
 A full-scale mockup of a Lunar Lander habitat was constructed based on the dimensions 
defined in NASA’s Exploration Systems Architecture Study.  An initial goal of the project was 
to establish methods and procedures for constructing a rapidly reconfigurable engineering 
prototype while concurrently using the analogue as a means of developing systems-level 
requirements based on anticipated operational concepts.  The use of cost effective materials in 
the mockup provided a simplified approach for construction of system concepts and readily 
allowed subsequent configuration changes.  The application of rapid prototyping provides a 
means of incorporating a hands-on ‘human in the loop’ component to spacecraft system design.  
This effort was originally intended to be used to help evaluate vehicle configuration options, 
determine subsystem mass and volume budgets, reduce risk factors and derive requirements 
before the Lunar Lander preliminary design review.  The lessons learned in the initial 
prototyping activities were developed into a conceptual design process based on a minimum 
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functionality design methodology.  This process allows designers to fully investigate the design 
configuration before the development of CAD models and higher fidelity models such as CFD 
and FEA.   
 One purpose of studying rapidly reconfigurable prototyping was to learn what can be 
gained in the approach and the limitations.  The design configurations constructed were based on 
ESAS Lunar Module concepts and provided a point of departure for understanding how the 
subsystems interact.  The experience of building prototype hardware helped to shape the 
minimum functional design methodology.  One of the limitations to prototyping is that it focuses 
on a single spacecraft configuration and the study of many different configurations takes 
additional time.  However, when the prototyping activity is coupled with the Minimum 
Functional Design Methodology, the investigation of many more configurations is possible and 
the rapidly reconfigurable prototype served as validation of the analysis assumptions. 
 After the conclusion of the Lunar Ascent Module prototyping activity in the spring of 
2009, the next phase of spacecraft prototyping began developing subsystem layouts and 
configurations for the Commercial Crew Development program.  Although this author was not 
involved in the prototyping activities beyond 2009, the processes, techniques, and materials were 
recycled for other spacecraft applications.  The collaborative work of many participants has 
grown from a seemingly small spacecraft design activity into a curriculum for training future 
aerospace explorers. 
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7.1.4    Summary of Chapter 5 
 In the context of human spacecraft, the conceptual design phase is critical for determining 
the success or failure of a proposed design.  There are many challenges associated with 
developing a human spacecraft to perform the operational aspects of a mission and bring the 
crew home safe.  A central problem in the early stages of development is due to uncertainty and 
designs are initially based on heuristic data or designer experience until further analysis or 
testing is available.  In today’s economic environment, additional testing or analysis may not be 
feasible in the early stages of development.  Although this approach is typical in human 
spacecraft development, it also introduces potential uncertainty and issues in the conceptual 
design that might not be discovered until much later in development.  However, the risks 
associated with any conceptual design will always be present until hardware is built and flown.  
The goal of a conceptual design process is to investigate and develop feasible solutions to a 
given problem.  Conceptual designs are developed using the creative skills of designers and 
design teams.   
 The process described in this chapter introduces conceptual design tradespace methods 
for evaluating concepts based on the levels of Safety and Operability in a spacecraft 
configuration.  The tradespace provides the design team with an overall picture of the conceptual 
spacecraft design configurations so that designers can identify areas for increasing safety and 
reducing risk while maintaining requirements for mass.  Although this approach is focused on 
early conceptual development, the process can be used as the design matures into preliminary 
design.  
 Because many unknowns exist due to integration, complexity, and uncertainty in 
requirements, it can be a challenging time for correctly estimating the mass of a spacecraft.  
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However, a bottom up philosophy forces designers to consider the low level functions in the 
design where candidate technologies are chosen and evaluated.  As part of the evaluation 
process, the overall vehicle configuration must be considered in addition to subsystem discipline 
specific trade studies so that designers can understand the impact of decisions on the spacecraft 
configuration.  Incorrect assumptions in the conceptual design phase can lead to redesign or 
reduced performance. 
 Three designs of Lunar Ascent Modules were used as case studies to demonstrate and 
validate the methodology.  These configurations included the nominal Apollo Lunar Ascent 
Module, a reduced Apollo One Man configuration and an ESAS derived configuration.  The 
purpose of using the three concepts was to demonstrate and explore the mass addition process for 
different types of spacecraft designs. 
 Although mass is a key driver in any spacecraft design, the spacecraft must be safe and 
perform the intended mission.  The mass addition and tradespace exploration process described 
in this work is one method that could be coupled with reliability analysis or other figures of merit 
for improving the spacecraft design. 
 
7.1.5    Summary of Chapter 6 
 Two figures of merit, the Safety Index and Operability Index were derived to provide 
designers with a scoring system that evaluates the entire spacecraft configuration.  The figures of 
merit are not intended to replace typical reliability based analysis methods; but provide designers 
with a complementary method for evaluating the safety and operational aspects of a spacecraft 
configuration.  Based upon traditional methods for functional analysis of early spacecraft 
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conceptual designs, the Safety Index scores the entire spacecraft upon consequence of loss of 
function, complexity of subsystem components, similar and dissimilar redundancy, and potential 
hazards.  Components that are categorized as Design for Minimum Risk are included in the 
overall spacecraft Safety Index.  The Operability Index scores are based upon the mission time, 
crew size, payloads, and operational functionality and provide a measure of the spacecraft 
configuration against top level mission objectives.  The Safety Index and Operability Index can 
be combined into a Total Spacecraft score such that comparisons can be made against competing 
spacecraft types.  Three case studies of human spacecraft designs were used to demonstrate and 
validate the scoring methodologies.  
 The Safety Index and Operability Index scoring methodologies are based upon 
quantitative information and can be easily reproduced.  The weighting factors for the Safety 
Index were specified according to sensitivities in the scoring such that one parameter did not 
influence the overall score.  The weight factors for the Operability Index were chosen based 
upon preferences in the design.  The results demonstrated that the weighting factors for the 
Operability Index were the likely drivers for the magnitude of the scores and influenced the 
outcome.  The advantage of the approach is that Safety and Operability are scored 
simultaneously and the two indices can be combined into a Total Spacecraft score for relative 
comparison among competing designs.   
 
7.2 A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PROCESS UTILIZING MINIMUM 
 FUNCTIONALITY AND RAPIDLY RECONFIGURABLE PROTOTYPING 
 
 The design and analysis methods described in Chapters 3 - 6 can be combined into a 
conceptual design process for exploring and maturing candidate designs.  The foundation of the 
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approach is the Minimum Functional design methodology that establishes a baseline 
configuration for trading Safety and Operability.  These methods serve as a pre-analysis step in 
the conceptual design process to identify candidate solutions before significant resources are 
dedicated to high fidelity modeling such as CAD, CFD, and FEA.  Shown in Figure 77 is a 
diagram of the conceptual design process. 
 
  
 
Figure 77: The Minimum Functionality Conceptual Design Process. 
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 The conceptual design process begins with a set of given top level mission objectives.  
These objectives are decomposed into functions for the activities the spacecraft has to perform in 
order to accomplish the mission.  Within the overall set of functions, a set of minimum functions 
can be derived to establish a minimum functional baseline configuration.  The minimum 
functional baseline configuration is established according to the guidelines in Chapter 3.  After 
the spacecraft geometry has been chosen and the minimum functionality baseline established, the 
next step in the process is to trade Safety and Operability using the guidelines described in 
Chapter 5 for mass additions and tradespace exploration.  Based upon the results of the 
tradespace, the next step scores candidate solutions according to the figures of merit described in 
Chapter 6.  This step allows designers to focus on the most preferred spacecraft configuration for 
further examination.   
 Using the information gathered from the Minimum Functionality design analysis, a 
spacecraft configuration is chosen for further investigation using physical prototyping.  The 
particular spacecraft configuration could be a minimum functionality baseline or representative 
of a configuration with added Safety components or Operability components.  A rapidly 
reconfigurable prototype is constructed to further study the conceptual design as it relates to 
system and subsystem interfaces, layout, habitability, and human factors.  Much information can 
be gathered during this activity that will provide valuable information to designers before the 
development of CAD models.  The initial engineering prototypes should be based on the 
specified volumetric layout for subsystems.  This activity forms an experimental basis for 
determining the form and fit of the subsystem interfaces with the overall vehicle as well as the 
crew.  Because the prototype is designed to be easy and inexpensive to reconfigure, numerous 
parameters can be varied quickly to determine optimum layouts for subsystems, interfaces, and 
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human machine interactions.  Manufacturability and maintenance requirements of the system and 
subsystems could be independently investigated.  This prototype now serves as a Boundary 
Object for the spacecraft design configuration and is intended to facilitate communication 
between multi-disciplinary design groups working on the project.  It serves as a means of 
enhancing knowledge transfer regarding subsystem interfaces, vehicle layout, mass and volume 
analyses, and operational needs, including accessibility for performing maintenance tasks, which 
often results in underestimated operational impacts (Russell and Klaus, 2007).   
 In order to define the total vehicle mass required as a function of the full mission 
timeline, consumables and expendables needed by subsystems such as Crew Accommodations, 
Power, Environmental Control and Life Support System and Extravehicular Activity must be re-
evaluated, along with any supporting mass required for enabling the science and exploration 
objectives.  Using the baseline vehicle mass budgets previously analyzed in the minimum 
functionality analysis, these additional mission duration- dependent consumable and expendable 
mass requirements are added to the prototype to simulate mission operations. 
 Using the prototyping activity to study human interaction and subsystem layouts can be 
used to lead or supplement concurrent CAD efforts.  As the prototype develops in fidelity, 
detailed CAD modeling will parallel the construction to develop digital prototypes of the 
spacecraft anchored to the physical Boundary Object. Components that are not easily modeled 
(or necessary) in the physical mockup could be included in the CAD, such as radiation 
protection, passive thermal control and micrometeoroid protection on the outer shell of the 
spacecraft.  Mass and center of gravity calculations of the vehicle structure would include all 
actual materials and components, and be analyzed during the CAD phase.  After completion of a 
3-D CAD model, an FEA model evaluates the spacecraft mass based on material choices and 
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verifies structural integrity of the spacecraft during all operational profiles from pre-flight testing 
to end of mission.  Including standard factors of safety to the structural analysis will identify 
areas within the structure that need iteration to optimize mass while maintaining safety 
requirements of the structure and interfaces.  The FEA analysis also serves as a verification of 
the physical prototyping activity. 
 The final step in the iterative design loop is the development of design requirements for 
the system and subsystems.  Using the previous analyses, critical design drivers can be identified 
for further optimization.  As the fidelity of the design increases, the potential failure modes in the 
spacecraft can be identified and their integrated effects analyzed. From this collective 
information, trade studies into risk reduction versus performance optimization can be conducted 
in a risk based design approach.   
 The first round of the process concludes with the updating of the candidate design 
information into the original minimum functionality baseline configuration.  The entire process 
is repeated such that areas of uncertainty can be further explored.  The second and following 
rounds use the previous information to increase model fidelity and trade additional technology 
choices.   
  
7.2.1 Summary of Conceptual Design Process 
 The conceptual design process identifies and explores issues before significant cost and 
effort is incurred in later stages of the design.  Alternative concepts within the design are readily 
explored using the methods described in Chapters 3 - 6 and requirements are derived based on 
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information gathered through analysis and demonstration in the prototyping activity instead of 
solely relying on expert opinion and heuristics.   
 Given a set of top level objectives, a functional decomposition is developed to identify 
the functions required for the mission.  These top level functions are used to develop and explore 
concept vehicle architectures.  In the example of a Lunar Mission, there are many systems that 
must interact together to make the mission successful (i.e. Launch Vehicles, Spacecraft, Landers, 
etc.).  After the baseline architecture has been chosen, a minimum set of functions are identified 
to establish a Minimum Functionality baseline configuration for trading Safety and Operability 
using the methods described in Chapter 5 and 6.  Because human spacecraft are highly coupled 
systems, small changes in one subsystem can disproportionately affect the mass and performance 
of the entire spacecraft.  This in turn impacts mission operations, risk, reliability, and other 
factors.  The use of a Minimum Functionality design approach coupled with rapidly 
reconfigurable physical prototypes provides a cost effective method for including a ‘human in 
the loop’ at the earliest stages of the conceptual design.  Using data gathered from a physical 
prototype that serves as a Boundary Object, models can concurrently be used to analyze vehicle 
layout and performance characteristics, and allow requirements to be refined as the design 
process incrementally progresses.  As the iteration loops progress, the fidelity of the models will 
increase and the design requirements will become increasingly better defined.  The emphasis on 
physical prototyping in the process design loop provides the opportunity for assessing 
requirements and configuration options and serves as a means of uncovering design issues early 
in the program when alternative solutions are still relatively easy and inexpensive to implement.     
 As diminishing returns from the iterations are reached, the conceptual design process will 
conclude with various detailed, high fidelity analytical models in place and a physical 
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engineering prototype that can serve as a Boundary Object for future work.  The concurrently 
developed mockup provides a physical anchor for the detailed CAD drawings of the spacecraft, 
related structural and thermal analyses, mission operations evaluations, risk and reliability 
indices, and draft requirements.  The amount of information gathered as a result of this 
conceptual development process is aimed at reducing development costs of the spacecraft 
development process as it moves forward into the preliminary design phase. A key premise of 
this concept is to gather as much ‘hands on’ operational and detailed analytical information about 
the spacecraft design as possible, in the most cost effective manner practical, well before the 
actual flight hardware design is locked for testing and qualification. 
 
7.3     FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Based on the results of this dissertation, the most promising areas of future research are 
related to scoring spacecraft design configurations using the Safety Index and Operability Index.  
The two indices are coupled in a spacecraft configuration and should be evaluated 
simultaneously when comparing different concepts.  The research presented in this dissertation 
introduces the figures of merit and how they are used in scoring candidate solutions.  A more 
detailed study of the two figures of merit is recommended for future research. 
 
7.3.1    Safety Index 
 Of the two figures of merit, the Safety Index was the most complicated to develop.  
Because the accepted approach for quantifying safety in the aerospace industry is based upon 
reliability methods, the introduction of another figure of merit is likely to be received with 
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skepticism until proven through detailed analysis.  As the Safety Index was being derived using 
classical reliability based approaches, a comparison between spacecraft reliability and Safety 
Index scores was attempted but was not fully explored because the information required was 
more than the scope of this dissertation.  However, if certain assumptions are made concerning 
the reliability allocation of components within the spacecraft, the Safety Index score can be 
tuned to provide trends in reliability.  Additional research is needed to fully examine how the 
Safety Index can be correlated to reliability.  The Safety Index is not intended to replace 
reliability based analyses, but provide designers and decision makers with a scoring system that 
can be easily adopted in order to predict reliability in a spacecraft. 
 
7.3.2    Operability Index 
 Unlike the Safety Index, the Operability Index is not an easily defined figure of merit.  
The Operability Index is a measure of the spacecraft configuration against top level mission 
objectives that can change due to other factors such as mass, time, and safety.  The weighting 
factors for the Operability Index were the most significant contributors to the overall score and 
more detailed research is necessary to determine user preferences in a spacecraft.  The weighting 
factors used in this dissertation was an example of what decision makers might prefer and the 
scoring results reflected the preferences.  Additional research for the Operability Index would 
focus on developing realistic target goals for the normalization of the parameters and methods 
used to weight the decisions properly.  The use of an Analytic Hierarchy Process is suggested as 
a starting point for maturing the Operability Index.  The Operability of a spacecraft is typically 
quantified last in the spacecraft design, but as observed in the results of this dissertation are an 
important contributor to the overall spacecraft design and should be considered simultaneously 
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with other parameters.  The Operability Index coupled with the Safety Index can provide 
designers with an overall scoring methodology for evaluating and trading early conceptual 
designs. 
 
7.4     CONCLUSIONS 
 The research efforts in this dissertation focused on reducing uncertainty in the conceptual 
design phase through a process of establishing a minimum functionality baseline before trading 
Safety and Operability in a spacecraft configuration.  The challenge in any spacecraft 
development process is how to combine the many parts into a working design that complies with 
many requirements for top level mission objectives, safety, and mission success.  The design 
methodologies presented in this dissertation provides designers and decision makers with a larger 
view of candidate design concepts.  The following lists of items are significant contributions to 
the field of human spacecraft development: 
 Defined the four fundamental parameters in all human spacecraft as Physics, Physiology, 
Safety, and Operability (Chapter 3); 
 Defined the minimum functional baseline configuration based on Physics and Physiology 
(Chapter 3); 
 Used rapidly reconfigurable prototypes for the study of human factors before detailed 
CAD and analysis modeling (Chapter 4); 
 Developed tradespace exploration methods for quantifying levels of Safety and 
Operability (Chapter 5); 
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 Developed a mass addition process to evaluate different types of spacecraft 
configurations instead of solely focusing on single point optimization (Chapter 5); 
 Created two figures of merit, the Safety Index and the Operability Index for trading 
spacecraft configurations (Chapter 6); 
 Developed a conceptual design process based on a minimum functionality and bottom up 
philosophy that couples easily with common approaches in human spacecraft conceptual 
design (Chapter 7); and 
 Created a Conceptual Lunar Ascent Module Program for quantifying Minimum 
Functionality, Safety, and Operability in spacecraft configurations. 
 
 This work established a definition for a minimum functional design baseline and is the 
first to group the fundamental mass parameters of a human spacecraft in the categories of 
Physics, Physiology, Safety, and Operability.  The minimum functional baseline configuration 
defined in this work is different from previous approaches because it eliminates the bias toward a 
minimum set of requirements.  The amount of Safety in the spacecraft is the mass dedicated to 
safety through similar or dissimilar redundancy, safety components, margins, and dispersions.  
The amount of Operability in the spacecraft is the mass used to perform mission objectives and 
make functions easier or efficient.  Because human spacecraft are highly coupled systems, the 
introduction of mass in one subsystem has downstream effects on other subsystems that are not 
easily recognized by designers and the use of rapidly reconfigurable prototypes allows designers 
and multidisciplinary teams to utilize Boundary Objects as a means of communication for 
maturing design concepts.  The mass addition process coupled with the minimum functionality 
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approach creates a tradespace of potential spacecraft configurations and provides designers with 
an overall view of how various levels of Safety or Operability additions will affect the overall 
spacecraft mass.  The information provided in the mass addition tradespace can reveal subsystem 
issues and bound the overall mass of the spacecraft such that future mass growth allowances can 
be allocated.  The figures of merit provide a simplified method for evaluating the spacecraft as a 
whole instead of focusing solely on criticality functions that could overlook subtle dependencies 
in other functions.  The Safety Index is based upon quantifiable information and uses parameters 
that are typically evaluated in early reliability analysis.  The advantage of the Safety Index is that 
it couples the various parameters into a complete score; which is different from typical reliability 
based approaches that focus on limited areas of the spacecraft design.  Although the Safety Index 
is not intended to replace conventional reliability methods, its purpose is to provide the designer 
with another tool such that comparisons of competing design concepts can be evaluated in a 
rapid design process.  The Operability Index is a measure of the design configuration against top 
level mission objectives.  In typical spacecraft development, the performance is often quantified 
as a resulting objective of the spacecraft design.  In this process, the Operability Index is 
evaluated simultaneously with the Safety Index and the total spacecraft to provide a complete 
score of the design for future trading. 
 The previous methods can be combined into an overall conceptual design process that 
couples easily with typical industry approaches to human spacecraft development.  The use of 
minimum functionality as a precursor to more conventional approaches allows the spacecraft 
configuration to take shape before time consuming detailed CAD and higher fidelity analyses. 
 The overall conclusion of this dissertation is that human spacecraft are challenging 
vehicles to design, develop, and operate.  The decisions made in the conceptual design phase are 
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critical to the success of the program and uncertainty can lead to unnecessary redesign in later 
phases.  It is hoped that the information presented in this dissertation will provide designers with 
a different perspective on how to approach the problem of conceptual design in the development 
of future human spacecraft. 
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APPENDIX B 
LUNAR ASCENT MODULE DESIGN GUIDELINES 
 
 The following sections present the top level mission objective, ground rules and 
assumptions, and definitions of a Lunar Ascent Module human spacecraft conceptual design.   
 
B.1 TOP LEVEL MISSION OBJECTIVES 
1. The Lunar Ascent Module shall transport a crew from the lunar surface to an elliptical 
lunar orbit of approximately 20 x 100km. 
 
B.2 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. The Lunar Ascent Module is pressurized and encloses the crew during ascent, 
rendezvous, and docking. 
2. The Lunar Ascent Module minimum functionality baseline is the functionality required to 
meet the physical and physiological requirements of the lunar ascent flight. 
3. The Lunar Ascent Module minimum functional baseline configuration assumes all 
systems perform without failures and does not address emergencies, contingencies, 
failures, safety, or comfort. 
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4. The Lunar Ascent Module baseline should include subsystems and components that are 
of minimal mass and volume. 
5. The Lunar Ascent Module assumed minimum flight operations time is 1.37 hours. 
6. The Lunar Ascent Module baseline subsystem components default location will be 
located outside the habitable volume unless a need is shown to include the subsystem 
components inside the pressurized volume. 
7. The Lunar Ascent Module will be designed with two hatches such that one is used for 
ingress/egress with a transfer orbiting spacecraft and a second for ingress/egress to the 
lunar surface, an airlock, or a habitation module. 
8. The outer mold line of the Lunar Ascent Module is configuration independent. 
9. The Lunar Ascent Module windows are designed for viewing of descent, landing, ascent, 
and rendezvous with orbiting spacecraft. 
10. The Lunar Ascent Module flight control system will include components used for 
descent, landing, and ascent. 
11. The Lunar Ascent Module main engine propulsion system will be designed for single use. 
12. The Lunar Ascent Module will utilize its own Reaction Control System for ascent flight.  
The descent flight RCS is assumed to be a separate system and located on the Descent 
Module. 
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13. The Lunar Ascent Module minimum functional structure design is based on maximum 
acceleration loads during Earth Launch Ascent, Trans Lunar Injection, Lunar Descent, 
Lunar Landing, and Lunar Ascent. 
14. The Lunar Ascent Module internal subsystems shall be capable of operating in a vacuum 
environment. 
 
B.3 DEFINITIONS  
Assumptions - Variables, equations, or procedures used to simplify complex problems and 
uncertainties. 
Configuration – The arrangement of subsystem components within a spacecraft design. 
Contingency – A scenario where off-nominal operations are required, usually due to a failure 
and includes degraded performance, dealt with by operational workaround or redundant systems.   
Factor of Safety – Design factors or margin used to account for uncertainty in structural loading. 
Functional Decomposition – The process of decomposing high level mission objectives into 
lower level functions to meet the Mission Goals. 
Ground Rules – The top level constraints for the proposed research or development program 
used to create boundary conditions and limits for the design architecture. 
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Margin – Design factors used to account for uncertainty in deterministic variables and 
parameters. 
Minimum Functionality – The lowest achievable baseline configuration of a human spacecraft 
based upon the parameters of habitable volume, crew size, material selection, propulsion system, 
and required trajectories using single string subsystems without margins or accounting for 
contingencies. 
Mission Goals – A set of objectives given by stakeholders. 
Operability – The means within a spacecraft to achieve top level mission objectives other than 
transporting crew and mitigating contingencies. 
Redundancy – The use of similar or dissimilar means of achieving a given functional 
requirement. 
Reliability – probability of a given device functioning within expected environmental 
conditions.  
Risk - The combination of consequence and likelihood of component failure, subsystem failure, 
loss of mission, or loss of crew; a quantitative assessment of scenarios that will prevent the 
mission from meeting requirements.   
Safety - The means within a spacecraft design for mitigating and preventing contingencies in 
order to prevent harm to the crew or the mission objectives. 
Solutions – Technology choices used to perform tasks required for low level functions.
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APPENDIX C 
LUNAR ASCENT MODULE FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION TABLES 
 
 The following tables list the derived functions for a Lunar Ascent Module based upon the 
top level mission objectives and ground rules and assumptions.  The functional decomposition 
list was a precursor to the development of the CLAMP code and provided guidance in the 
development of the minimum functionality prototyping efforts.  The tables are grouped by 
subsystem beginning with Primary Structures to provide an overall view of the derived 
functionality of a Lunar Ascent Module. 
 
Table C.1: Primary Structure subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Structures 
1.1 Provide Environmental 
Protection
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum  1.1.1.1 Provide Pressure Vessel
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection
1.2 Provide Load Bearing 
Capability
1.2.1 Provide Structural Support for 
Environmental Loads
1.2.1.1 Provide Structural Support for Internal Pressure 
Loads
1.2.1.2 Provide Structural Support for Launch Loads
1.2.1.3 Provide Structural Support for TLI Loads
1.2.1.4 Provide Structural Support for Landing Loads
1.2.1.5 Provide Structural Support for Docked Loads
1.3 Support External 
Subsystems and Components
1.3.1 Provide Structural Support for External 
ECLSS Components  1.3.1.1 Support High Pressure Oxygen Tanks
1.3.1.2 Support High Pressure External Oxygen Lines
1.3.1.3 Support High Pressure Makeup Gas Tanks
1.3.1.4 Support High Pressure Makeup Gas Exterior Lines 
and Valves
1.3.1.5 Support Interface between External and Internal 
transfer piping
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Table C.1: Primary Structure subsystem functional decomposition (continued). 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Structures 
1.3.2 Provide Structural Support for External Crew 
Accomodations Components  1.3.2.1 Provide Structural Support for External Lighting
1.3.3 Provide Structural Support for Exterior 
Payload Equipment 
1.3.4 Provide Structural Support for Exterior 
Communications Equipment 
1.3.5 Provide Structural Support for Exterior 
Power Equipment
1.3.6 Provide Structural Support for Exterior 
Command and Data Handling Equipment
1.3.7 Provide Structural Support for Exterior 
Health Monitoring Equipment
1.3.8 Provide structural Support for Exterior Flight 
Navigation and Control Equipment
1.3.9 Provide Structural Support for Exterior 
Thermal System Equipment  1.3.9.1 Support Radiator 
1.3.9.2 Support External Piping 
1.3.9.3 Support External Pumps 
1.3.9.4 Support Thermal Fluid Interfaces
1.3.9.5 Support Valves
1.3.9.6 Support Heat Exchanger
1.3.10 Provide Structural Support for Propulsion 
System
1.3.10.1 Support Ascent Engine 
1.3.10.2 Support Oxidizer Tank 
1.3.10.3 Support Fuel Tank 
1.3.10.4 Support Pressurant Tank 
1.3.10.5 Support RCS system
1.3.10.6 Support RCS piping / valves 
1.3.10.7 Support Oxidizer Lines 
1.3.10.8 Support Fuel Lines 
1.3.10.9 Support Pressurant Lines 
1.3.11 Provide EVA Mounts 1.3.11.1 Provide EVA Mounts
1.4 Support Internal 
Subsystems and Components 1.4.1 Provide Structural Support for ECLSS  1.4.1.1 Support Air Return Vent
1.4.1.2 Support Trace Contaminant Removal Components
1.4.1.3 Support Particulate Removal Components
1.4.1.4 Support Cabin Fan
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Table C.1: Primary Structure subsystem functional decomposition (continued). 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Structures 
1.4.1.5 Support Bypass Valve
1.4.1.6 Support Humidity Separator
1.4.1.7 Support Humidity Waste Storage
1.4.1.8 Support Humidity Waste Transport
1.4.1.9 Support CO2 Removal Components
1.4.1.10 Support Air Flow Mix 
1.4.1.11 Support Air Output Vent
1.4.1.12 Support Air Circulation Ductwork
1.4.1.13 Provide Mounting Location for Cabin Air Pressure 
Sensor
1.4.1.14 Provide Mounting Location for Cabin Air 
Temperature Sensor
1.4.1.15 Support Food Storage Container
1.4.1.16 Support Food Preparation Components
1.4.1.17 Support Potable Water Container
1.4.1.18 Support Hygiene Water Container
1.4.1.19 Support Urine Collection Container
1.4.1.20 Support Fecal Solid Collection Container
1.4.1.21 Support Liquid Waste Container
1.4.1.22 Support Solid Waste Container
1.4.1.23 Support Liquid Waste Jettison Transport and 
Control
1.4.1.24 Support Fire Detection Sensor
1.4.1.25 Support Fire Suppression Equipment
1.4.2 Provide Structural Support for Crew 
Accommodations
1.4.2.1 Support Overhead Lighting
1.4.2.2 Support Side Lighting
1.4.2.3 Support Commander Restraints
1.4.2.4 Support Pilot Restraints
1.4.2.5 Support Mission Specialist Restraints
1.4.2.6 Support Handholds
1.4.3 Provide Structural Support for Payloads & 
Storage
1.4.3.1 Support Personal Storage 
1.4.3.2 Support Hygiene Storage 
1.4.3.3 Support Medical Kit Storage 
1.4.3.4 Support Science Payload Storage
1.4.3.5 Support General Payload Storage
1.4.3.6 Support Tools and Equipment Storage
1.4.3.7 Support Space Suit Storage
1.4.3.8 Support Consumable Equipment Storage
1.4.3.9 Support Additional Clothing Storage
1.4.4 Provide Structural Support for 
Communication Systems
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Table C.1: Primary Structure subsystem functional decomposition (continued). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Structures 
1.4.5 Provide Structural Support for Power 
Systems
1.4.5.1 Support Power Source 
1.4.5.2 Support Power Distribution 
1.4.5.3 Support Power Regulation
1.4.5.4 Support Grounding Interfaces
1.4.5.5 Support Overload Protection Cabinet
1.4.6 Provide Structural Support for Command 
and Data Handling Systems
1.4.7 Provide Structural Support for Health 
Monitoring Systems
1.4.8 Provide Structural Support for Flight 
Navigation and Control Systems
1.4.9 Provide Structural Support for Thermal 
Systems Equipment 1.4.9.1 Support Internal Thermal System Coldplates
1.4.9.2 Support Internal Thermal System Fluid Transport
1.4.9.3 Support Internal Thermal System Fluid Control
1.4.9.4 Support Internal Thermal System Fluid Pumps
1.4.10 Provide Structural Support for Propulsion 
Equipment
1.5 Provide External 
Interfaces
1.5.1 Support Docking Mechanism for Lunar 
Ascent Module to CEV 
1.5.1.1 Provide Lunar Ascent Module with Interface to LIDS 
system
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent 
Module to CEV 
1.5.2.1 Provide Ingress / Egress for Microgravity 
Environment with LIDS Interface
1.5.3 Provide Docking Mechanism for Lunar 
Habitat to Lunar Ascent Module 
1.5.3.1 Provide Docking / Undocking Interface between 
Modules
1.5.3.2 Provide Mechanical Decoupling between Modules
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat to 
Lunar Ascent Module 1.5.4.1 Provide Ingress/Egress for 1/6g Environment
1.6 Provide Direct External 
Observation
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows 1.6.1.1 Provide Look Angles for Descent / Ascent Flight 
Control
1.6.1.2 Provide Look Angles for Landing
1.6.2 Provide Docking Viewing Ports 1.6.2.1 Provide Look Angles for Docking
1.6.3 Provide Aft Viewing Ports 1.6.3.1 Provide Look Angles for Aft 
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Table C.2: Crew Accommodations subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
Table C.3: Payloads subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Crew Accommodations
3.1 Support Human Factors 3.1.1 Provide Cabin Lighting 3.1.1.1 Provide Light Overhead
3.1.1.2 Provide Light for Sides of Interior
3.1.2 Provide Panel Lighting 3.1.2.1 Provide Light Subsystem Instrument Panels 
3.1.2.2 Provide Flight Instrument Panel Lighting
3.1.3 Provide Light for Exterior Viewing 3.1.3.1 Provide Light Forward Viewing
3.1.3.2 Provide Light for S/C Docking 
3.1.3.3 Provide Light for Aft Viewport
3.1.4 Provide Restraints 3.1.4.1 Restrain Commander 
3.1.4.2 Restrain Pilot 
3.1.4.3 Restrain Mission Specialist(s)
3.1.5 Provide Handholds 3.1.5.1 Provide Handholds for Hatch
3.1.5.2 Provide Handholds for Interior
3.1.5.3 Provide Handholds for Exterior
3.2 Maintain Happiness 3.2.1 Provide Personal Storage
3.2.2 Provide Additional Clothing Storage
3.2.3 Provide Entertainment
3.3 Maintain Health 3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies
3.3.2 Provide Medical Kit 
3.3.3 Provide Exercise Capability
3.3.4 Provide Sleep Accommodations
3.3.5 Provide Operational Supplies
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Payloads
4.1 Store Payloads 4.1.1 Provide Science Payload Storage 4.1.1.1 Provide Sample Storage (lunar materials)
4.1.2 Provide General Payload Storage
4.2 Store Tools and Equipment 4.2.1 Provide Tools  4.2.1.1 Provide Hand Tools Storage
4.2.2 Provide Consumable Equipment  4.2.1.1 Provide Extra LiOH Canister Storage
4.2.1.2 Provide Extra Trace Contaminant Filter Storage
4.2.1.3 Provide Extra Particulate Filter Storage
4.2.1.4 Provide Additional Equipment Storage
4.2.3 Provide Space Suit Storage 4.2.3.1 Provide Helmet Storage
4.2.3.2 Provide Suit / Gloves Storage
4.2.3.3 Provide Umbilical Storage
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Table C.4: EVA subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
Table C.5: ECLSS subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
EVA
12.1 Environmental Protection 12.1.1 Provide Space Suit
12.2 Allow External Mobility 12.2.1 Provide Mobility Aids
12.2.2 Provide Umbilical
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) (i.e. Tech Choice)
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) 
2.1  Control Atmosphere 2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide
2.1.2 Provide Metabolic Oxygen 2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen
2.1.2.2 Transport Oxygen
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow
2.1.2.4 Measure pp Oxygen Level in Cabin Air
2.1.3 Provide Makeup / Buffer Gas  2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas
2.1.3.2 Transport Makeup Gas
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow
2.1.4 Remove Trace Contaminants 2.1.4.1 Provide Filter
2.1.5 Remove Particulates 2.1.5.1 Provide Filter
2.1.6 Remove Humidity 2.1.6.1 Provide Humidity Separator
2.1.6.2 Condense Cabin Air
2.1.6.3 Transport Humidity to Waste Container
2.1.7 Control Air Temperature 2.1.7.1 Provide Air Circ Bypass
2.1.7.2 Measure Air Temperature
2.1.8 Provide Air Circulation 2.1.8.1 Circulate Air
2.1.8.2 Return Air
2.1.8.3 Output Air
2.1.8.4 Direct Air Flow
2.1.8.5 Mix Air Circ Streams
2.1.9 Control Cabin Air Pressure 2.1.9.1 Provide Air Pressure Sensor
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic
2.1.10 Provide Fire Detection and Suppression
2.2 Provide Food 2.2.1 Store Food 2.2.1.1 Prevent Food Contamination
2.2.1.2 Control Food Storage Temperature
2.2.2 Prepare Food 2.2.2.1 Heat Food
2.2.2.2 Handle Food
2.3 Provide Water 2.3.1 Provide Potable Water 2.3.1.1 Store Potable Water
2.3.1.2 Dispense Potable Water
2.3.2 Provide Hygiene Water 2.3.2.1 Store Hygiene Water
2.3.2.2 Dispense Hygiene Water
2.4 Manage Waste 2.4.1 Collect Urine 2.4.1.1 Provide Urine Bags
2.4.1.2 Collect Urine Waste
2.4.2 Collect Fecal Solids 2.4.2.1 Provide Garments
2.4.2.2 Control Odor
2.4.2.3 WCS supplies
2.4.2.4 Collect Garments
2.4.3 Collect Liquid Waste 2.4.3.1 Collect Humidity Waste
2.4.3.2 Collect Liquid Waste
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste 2.4.4.1 Collect Solid Waste
2.4.5 Jettison Liquid Waste 2.4.5.1 Transport Liquid Waste
2.4.5.2 Control Liquid Waste Flow
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Table C.6: Communications subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
Table C.7: Command and Data Handling subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Communication (Radio Frequencies)
6.1  Provide voice/data 
communication
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station 
(External to Ascent Module) 6.1.1.1 Transmit voice communication
6.1.1.2 Receive voice communication
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites (External 
to Ascent Module) 6.1.2.1 Transmit voice communication
6.1.2.2 Receive voice communication
6.1.3 Communicate between Suited 
Crewmembers
6.1.3.1 Transmit voice communication
6.1.3.2 Receive voice communication
6.2.1.1 Uplink data
6.2.1.2 Downlink data
6.2.2.1 Uplink data
6.2.2.2 Downlink data
6.2.3.1 Uplink data
6.2.3.2 Downlink data
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Command & Data Handling (Computer Control)
7.1  Sense Subsystem 
Commands
7.1.1 Accept ECLSS Commands 7.1.1.1 Output commands from ECLSS
7.1.1.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.2 Accept Crew Accommodations Commands 7.1.2.1 Output commands from Crew Accommodations
7.1.2.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.3 Accept Payload Commands 7.1.3.1 Output commands from Payload
7.1.3.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.4 Accept Power Commands 7.1.4.1 Output commands from Power
7.1.4.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.5 Accept Communication Commands 7.1.5.1 Output commands from Communication
7.1.5.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.6 Accept C&DH Commands 7.1.6.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.1.6.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.7 Accept Health Monitoring Commands 7.1.7.1 Output commands from Health Monitoring
7.1.7.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.8 Accept Flight Control Commands 7.1.8.1 Output commands from Flight Control
7.1.8.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.9 Accept Thermal Commands 7.1.9.1 Output commands from Thermal System
7.1.9.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.10 Accept Propulsion Commands 7.1.10.1 Output commands from Propulsion
7.1.10.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.1.11 Accept Structures Commands 7.1.11.1 Output commands from Structures
7.1.11.2 Input commands to C&DH
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Table C.7: Command and Data Handling subsystem functional decomposition (continued). 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Command & Data Handling (Computer Control)
7.2 Process/Amplify Subsystem 
Commands
7.2.1 Check input commands for errors 7.2.1.1 Check bit count
7.2.1.2 Verify system will not fail with command 
implimented
7.2.2 Prioritize commands 7.2.2.1 Categorize commands
7.2.2.2 Execute commands
7.3 Send Commands to 
Subsystems
7.3.1 Send Commands to ECLSS Subsystem 7.3.1.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.1.2 Input commands to ECLSS
7.3.2 Send Commands to Crew Accommodations 
Subsystem
7.3.2.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.1.2.2 Input commands to Crew Accommodations
7.3.3 Send Commands to Payload Subsystem 7.3.3.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.3.2 Input commands to Payloads
7.3.4 Send Commands to Power Subsystem  7.3.4.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.4.2 Input commands to Power
7.3.5 Send Commands to Communication 
Subsystem  7.3.5.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.5.2 Input commands to Communications
7.3.6 Send Commands to C&DH Subsystem 7.3.6.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.6.2 Input commands to C&DH
7.3.7 Send Commands to Health Monitoring 
Subsystem
7.3.7.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.7.2 Input commands to Health Monitoring
7.3.8 Send Commands to Flight Control Subsystem 7.3.8.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.8.2 Input commands to Flight Control
7.3.9 Send Commands to Thermal Subsystem 7.3.9.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.9.2 Input commands to Thermal
7.3.10 Send Commands to Propulsion Subsystem 7.3.10.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.10.2 Input commands to Propulsion
7.3.11 Send Commands to Structures Subsystem 7.3.11.1 Output commands from C&DH
7.3.11.2 Input commands to Structures
7.4 Store Spacecraft Data 7.4.1 Input Health Monitoring Data 7.4.1.1 Input ECLSS sensor data
7.4.1.2 Input Crew Accommodations sensor data
7.4.1.3 Input Payloads sensor data
7.4.1.4 Input Power sensor data
7.4.1.5 Input Communications sensor data
7.4.1.6 Input C&DH sensor data
7.4.1.7 Input Health Monitoring sensor data
7.4.1.8 Input Flight Control sensor data
7.4.1.9 Input Thermal sensor data
7.4.1.10 Input Propulsion sensor data
7.4.1.11 Input Structures sensor data
7.4.2 Store Health Monitoring Data 7.4.2.1 Store ECLSS sensor data
7.4.2.2 Store Crew Accommodations sensor data
7.4.2.3 Store Payloads sensor data
7.4.2.4 Store Power sensor data
7.4.2.5 Store Communications sensor data
7.4.2.6 Store C&DH sensor data
7.4.2.7 Store Health Monitoring sensor data
7.4.2.8 Store Flight Control sensor data
7.4.2.9 Store Thermal sensor data
7.4.2.10 Store Propulsion sensor data
7.4.2.11 Store Structures sensor data
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Table C.8: Health monitoring subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
Table C.9: Flight Control and Navigation subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Health Monitoring (Sensor System)
8.1 Monitor Vehicle 
Subsystems
8.1.1 Monitor Subsystem Data
8.1.2 Report Status to Ground
8.1.3 Report Status to Crew
8.2 Sense Vehicle Health Status 8.2.1 Monitor ECLSS 
8.2.2 Monitor Crew Accommodations 
8.2.3 Monitor Payload Subsystem 
8.2.4 Monitor Power Subsystem 
8.2.5 Monitor Communication Subsystem 
8.2.6 Monitor Command and Data Handling 
(C&DH) Subsystem 
8.2.7 Monitor Health Monitoring Subsystem 
8.2.8 Monitor Flight Control Subsystem 
8.2.9 Monitor Thermal Subsystem
8.2.10 Monitor Propulsion Subsystem 
8.2.11 Monitor Structures Subsystem 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Flight Control & Nav (Avionics)
9.1 Provide Spacecraft 
Navigation
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs
9.1.2 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs
9.1.3 Output Navigation to Guidance
9.2 Provide Spacecraft 
Guidance (PGNS) 9.2.1 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance
9.2.2 Interface with Instrumentation
9.3 Provide Spacecraft Control 
(CES)
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Control
9.3.2 Input Human Navigation to Computer
9.3.3 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion
9.3.4 Display Spacecraft Control
9.3.5 Display Spacecraft Navigation
9.3.6 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems
9.4 Provide Abort Guidance 
(AGS)
9.4.1 Sense Spacecraft Abort Position
9.4.2 Sense Spacecraft Abort Velocity Inputs
9.4.3 Calculate Spacecraft Abort Trajectory
9.4.4 Input Abort Commands
9.5 Provide Rendezvous 
Guidance
9.6 Provide Inertial Reference
9.7 Provide Additional Avionics
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Table C.10: Power subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Power 
5.1 Provide Power 5.1.1 Provide Power from Internal Source 5.1.1.1 Generate Power
5.1.1.2 Store Power
5.2 Distribute Power 5.2.1 Distribute Power to ECLSS 5.2.1.1 Distribute Power to Cabin Fan
5.2.1.2 Distribute Power to Humidity Separator
5.2.2 Distribute Power to Crew Accommodations
5.2.3 Distribute Power to Payload Subsystem
5.2.4 Distribute Power to Power Subsystem
5.2.5 Distribute Power to Communication 
Subsystem
5.2.6 Distribute Power to Command and Data 
Handling Subsystem
5.2.7 Distribute Power to Health Monitoring 
Subsystem
5.2.8 Distribute Power to Flight Control 
Subsystem
5.2.9 Distribute Power to Thermal Subsystem
5.2.10 Distribute Power to Propulsion Subsystem
5.2.11 Distribute Power to Structures Subsystem
5.3 Regulate Power 5.3.1 Regulate Power to ECLSS
5.3.2 Regulate Power to Crew Accommodations
5.3.3 Regulate Power to Payload Subsystem
5.3.4 Regulate Power to Power Subsystem
5.3.5 Regulate Power to Communication 
Subsystem
5.3.6 Regulate Power to Command and Data 
Handling Subsystem
5.3.7 Regulate Power to Health Monitoring 
Subsystem
5.3.8 Regulate Power to Flight Control Subsystem
5.3.9 Regulate Power to Thermal Subsystem
5.3.10 Regulate Power to Propulsion Subsystem
5.3.11 Regulate Power to Structures Subsystem
5.4 Provide Grounding 5.4.1 Ground ECLSS
5.4.2 Ground Crew Accommodations
5.4.3 Ground Payload Subsystem
5.4.4 Ground Power Subsystem
5.4.5 Ground Communication Subsystem
5.4.6 Ground Command and Data Handling 
Subsystem
5.4.7 Ground Health Monitoring Subsystem
5.4.8 Ground Flight Control Subsystem
5.4.9 Ground Thermal Subsystem
5.4.10 Ground Propulsion Subsystem
5.4.11 Ground Structures Subsystem
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Table C.10: Power subsystem functional decomposition (continued). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Power 
5.5 Provide Shielding 5.5.1 Shield ECLSS wiring
5.5.2 Shield Crew Accommodations wiring
5.5.3 Shield Payload Subsystem wiring
5.5.4 Shield Power Subsystem wiring
5.5.5 Shield Communication Subsystem wiring
5.5.6 Shield Command and Data Handling 
Subsystem wiring
5.5.7 Shield Health Monitoring Subsystem wiring
5.5.8 Shield Flight Control Subsystem wiring
5.5.9 Shield Thermal Subsystem wiring
5.5.10 Shield Propulsion Subsystem wiring
5.5.11 Shield Structures Subsystem wiring
5.6 Provide Overload 
Protection
5.6.1 Overload Protection for ECLSS
5.6.2 Overload Protection for Crew 
Accommodations
5.6.3 Overload Protection for Payload Subsystem
5.6.4 Overload Protection for Power Subsystem
5.6.5 Overload Protection for Communication 
Subsystem
5.6.6 Overload Protection for Command and Data 
Handling Subsystem
5.6.7 Overload Protection for Health Monitoring 
Subsystem
5.6.8 Overload Protection for Flight Control 
Subsystem
5.6.9 Overload Protection for Thermal Subsystem
5.6.10 Overload Protection for Propulsion 
Subsystem
5.6.11 Overload Protection for Structures 
Subsystem
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Table C.11: Thermal subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.#) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Thermal
10.1 Collect Heat 10.1.1 Collect Heat from ECLSS Subsystem
10.1.2 Collect Heat from Crew Accommodations 
Subsystem
10.1.3 Collect Heat from Payload Subsystem 
10.1.4 Collect Heat from Power Subsystem
10.1.5 Collect Heat from Communication 
Subsystem
10.1.6 Collect Heat from Command and Data 
Handling Subsystem 
10.1.7 Collect Heat from Health Monitoring 
Subsystem 
10.1.8 Collect Heat from Flight Control Subsystem 
10.1.9 Collect Heat from Thermal Subsystem 
10.1.10 Collect Heat from Propulsion Subsystem 
10.1.11 Collect Heat from Structures Subsystem 
10.2 Transport Heat  10.2.1 Transport Heat from ECLSS Subsystem
10.2.2 Transport Heat from Crew 
Accommodations Subsystem
10.2.3 Transport Heat from Payload Subsystem 
10.2.4 Transport Heat from Power Subsystem
10.2.5 Transport Heat from Communication 
Subsystem
10.2.6 Transport Heat from Command and Data 
Handling Subsystem 
10.2.7 Transport Heat from Health Monitoring 
Subsystem 
10.2.8 Transport Heat from Flight Control 
Subsystem 
10.2.9 Transport Heat from Thermal Subsystem 
10.2.10 Transport Heat from Propulsion 
Subsystem 
10.2.11 Transport Heat from Structures 
Subsystem 
10.3 Remove Heat 10.3.1 Remove Heat From Spacecraft
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Table C.12: Propulsion subsystem functional decomposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top Level Functional 
Objectives (#.0) Second Level (#.#.#) Third Level (#.#.#.#) 
Propulsion 
11.1 Provide Main Ascent 
Engine Propulsion 11.1.1 Provide Main Engine Fuel
11.1.2 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant
11.1.4 Control Main Engine Pressurant 11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant ‐ Fuel
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant ‐ Oxidizer
11.1.5 Transport Pressurant
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Fuel
11.1.8 Store Main Engine Oxidizer
11.1.9 Transport Main Engine Propellant
11.1.10 Control Main Engine Propellant 11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer
11.1.11 Provide Contingency Propellant
11.1.12 Support Main Engine Components
11.1.13 Insulate Propellant
11.1.14 Control Propellant Bypass
11.2 Provide Flight Control 
(RCS)
11.2.1 Provide RCS Fuel
11.2.2 Provide RCS Oxidizer
11.2.3 Provide RCS Pressurant
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant
11.2.5 Transport RCS Pressurant
11.2.6 Provide RCS Engine
11.2.7 Store RCS Fuel
11.2.8 Store RCS Oxidizer
11.2.9 Transport RCS Propellant 11.2.9.1 Filter RCS propellant
11.2.10 Control RCS Propellant 11.2.10.1 Control RCS Fuel
11.2.10.2 Control RCS Oxidizer
11.2.11 Provide RCS Contingency Propellant
11.2.12 Support RCS Components
11.2.13 Insulate RCS Propellant
11.2.14 Heat RCS lines 11.2.14.1 Heat RCS Fuel Lines
11.2.14.2 Heat RCS Oxidizer Lines
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APPENDIX D 
CONCEPTUAL LUNAR ASCENT MODULE PROGRAM  
 
D.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The Conceptual Lunar Ascent Module Program was developed to analyze and study 
various configurations of a Lunar Ascent Spacecraft.  The code is a combination of heuristics, 
textbook equations, and 3-degree of freedom trajectory analysis.  It is an end-to-end program that 
quantifies total spacecraft mass and subsystem configurations with a set of given input variables 
and parameters.  Shown in Figure D.1 is a flowchart of the CLAMP code. 
 
 
Figure D.1: Flowchart of CLAMP. 
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 The program was written in MATLAB and utilizes a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet as an 
interface for the input variables.  No additional computational programs are required to run the 
program and the typical time for a single run is less than 8 seconds depending upon the 
processing speed of the computer.  The information presented in this appendix describes the 
logic, equations, and assumptions for key subroutines in the program  
 
D.2 INPUT FILE 
 A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet format was used to provide the input variables and 
parameters for a given spacecraft configuration to the MATLAB code. The spreadsheet format 
allows the user to quickly identify specific variables in a large list instead of a text file based 
approach.  Shown in Figure D.2 is an example of the main input file list.   
 
 
Figure D.2: Microsoft Excel input file. 
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 The main sheet within the Microsoft Excel file is named “Variables”.  This spreadsheet 
contains all of the key variables and parameters used in the program.  The sheet is loaded into a 
MATLAB array and referred to in the source code as “input_vars”.  The columns of the input file 
include the function, variable keyword, units, variable value, error, redundancy, and number of 
systems, consequence of the function, a flag for indicating Safety or Operability components, a 
flag for cooling, and the number of hazards associated with the component.  In order for 
MATLAB to recognize a specific variable, the Variable_Keyword identifier is used to identify 
the input information that will be passed to a MATLAB variable.  If the input value is a variable, 
the program will search for information in the variable value and error column.  Otherwise, the 
program will utilize the variable keyword to identify the number of components in the 
redundancy column.  The program will then look up the mass and volume information in the 
specific subsystem database tables.   
 Because the program is based upon a bottom up design philosophy, a list of components 
matched to variable keywords can be found in separate subsystem technology sheets within the 
Microsoft Excel input file.  These sheets are named: Avionics_Tech, Prop_Tech, ECLSS_Tech, 
CA_Tech, Payload_Tech, EVA_Tech, Power_Tech, and Thermal_Tech.  Shown in Figure D.3 is 
an example of a subsystem technology sheet.  The subsystem technology sheet is a database that 
contains component mass, volume, power, and other information utilized in the spacecraft design 
configuration analysis. 
 For each variable keyword row, a set of units is specified.  Some variables keywords call 
out metric units and others call out English units.  The program always converts English units to 
metric during input to the subroutines and the metric system is utilized in all calculations within 
the program.  The output of the program provides both metric and English units. 
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Figure D.3: Example of the subsystem technology sheet for Avionics. 
 
 In the subsystem technology sheet, the equipment name is the same as the variable 
keyword.  For each piece of equipment, the redundancy of each component is specified for none, 
primary, secondary, and backup.  This allows the user to specify different components that could 
be utilized to capture different or dissimilar redundancy.  The code will use these parameters to 
calculate the mass of the individual components.  In some instances, a parameter is used by the 
program to determine component mass such as wiring given in kg/m.  Where volume 
information was available, the X length, Y length, and Z length values were updated.   
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D.3 MAIN PROGRAM FILE 
 A main program file is utilized to control the flow of the subroutines.  The main program 
begins with loading the Microsoft Excel input file information and copying to MATLAB arrays.  
The first subroutine is named “Input_Excel” and the name of the input file is passed as a 
parameter to the subprogram.  After the input file has been loaded into the MATLAB arrays, the 
original input file is saved as a copy and the program creates an input file for a minimum 
functionality baseline configuration.  Once the lower mass boundary has been determined, a 
table of propulsion mass based on increased spacecraft payload mass is developed.  The use of a 
propulsion flyout table increases the speed of the analysis because the code does not have to 
repeatedly perform the 3 degree of freedom trajectory analysis.  After the propulsion flyout table 
has been constructed, the program creates two output files named CG_string_matrix, and 
SC_mass that are updated by the subsystem routines to capture the list of components. 
 The main output file, CG_string_matrix is a MATLAB cell string matrix that records 
information as strings instead of numbers.  The maximum precision of this matrix is 4 decimal 
places.  Throughout the development process, the precision did not pose a problem for 
generating accurate results.  Although the use of a cell string matrix is not typical for a high 
fidelity analysis code, the method worked adequately for storing the information.  At the end of 
the analysis, the CG_string_matrix is saved as a “.mat” file for post processing.  Shown in Figure 
D.4 is an example of the CG_string_matrix. 
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Figure D.4: Example of the CG_string_matrix output file. 
 
D.3 SUBROUTINES 
 The following sections provide a top level overview of how the CLAMP code calculates 
the mass, power, and volume for each of the subsystems.  The intent of this section is to provide 
information about how the subsystem components are determined and integrated in the 
spacecraft.  Key assumptions are made with respect to the sizing of various components in each 
subsystem and are described in the following sections. 
 
D.3.1    AVIONICS SUBSYSTEM 
 The Avionics subroutine records the spacecraft components matched to functions related 
to Communications, Navigation, and Command and Data Handling.  This subroutine uses 
parameters specified in the input file and records the mass, redundancy, volume, and other 
parameters in the CG_string_matrix output file.  Because many of the avionics components are 
considered “black boxes”; the mass, volume, and power of the electronics components are input 
directly to the program.  The wiring components, “Sensor_comm_wiring” and “RF_cabling” 
Function Keyword Redundancy
System_
Num Mass (kg)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Volume 
(m^3) Consequence Cooling
Safety / 
Operability Thermal
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_transceiver 1 1 4.52 0 0 0 18 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_transceiver 2 1 4.5143 0 0 0 18 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_amplifier 1 1 4.2678 0 0 0 36 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_amplifier 2 1 4.2373 0 0 0 36 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_antenna 1 1 0.18103 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_antenna 2 1 0.18227 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_steerable_antenna 1 1 12.4363 0 0 0 60 1 5 2 1 0
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station (External to Ascent Module) Long_range_data_processor 1 1 4.6872 0 0 0 14.1 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites (External to Ascent Module) Short_range_transceiver 1 1 2.9574 0 0 0 50 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites (External to Ascent Module) Short_range_transceiver 2 1 2.9846 0 0 0 50 1 5 2 0 1
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites (External to Ascent Module) Short_range_antenna 1 1 1.0978 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites (External to Ascent Module) Short_range_antenna 2 1 1.0956 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites (External to Ascent Module) Short_range_data_processor 1 1 1.1876 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 1
7.1 Sense Subsystem Commands Data_bus_network_boxes 1 1 16.139 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 1
7.1 Sense Subsystem Commands Data_bus_network_boxes 2 1 15.9286 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 1
7.2 Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands Master_event_controllers 1 1 10.2651 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 1
7.3 Store Spacecraft Data Data_storage 1 1 1.124 9.81E-05 9.82E-05 9.86E-05 25 0.00017 5 1 1 1
8.1.1 Monitor Vehicle Subsystem Data Health_monitoring_computer 1 1 8.3223 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 1 1
8.1.2 Monitor ECS Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS 1 1 2.6962 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
8.1.3 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion 1 1 1.6233 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
8.1.4 Monitor RCS Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_RCS 1 1 2.22 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 0 0
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs IMU 1 1 18.9655 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 1
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_base 1 1 1.8203 0.000164 0.000164 0.000166 0 0.000285 5 1 0 0
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_power 1 1 9.2509 0.000238 0.000238 0.000239 25 0.000413 5 1 0 1
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Star_tracker 1 1 10.5218 0.000342 0.000342 0.000342 0 0.000592 5 1 1 0
9.1.2 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs Nav_analog_digital 1 1 6.6465 0.00011 0.000111 0.00011 25 0.000191 5 1 0 1
9.1.3 Output Navigation to Guidance Multiplexer_demultiplexers 1 1 16.842 9.85E-05 9.73E-05 9.74E-05 25 1 5 2 0 1
9.2.1 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance Flight_control_computer 1 1 29.4103 0.000263 0.000263 0.000263 90 0.000456 5 1 0 1
9.2.2 Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation_comm 1 1 1.7393 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 1
9.2.2 Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation_comm 2 1 1.7416 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 1
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_roll_pitch_yaw 1 1 2.1701 9.82E-05 9.85E-05 9.89E-05 0 0.000171 5 1 0 0
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_roll_pitch_yaw 2 1 2.1567 9.93E-05 9.75E-05 9.79E-05 0 0.00017 5 1 0 0
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_translation 1 1 2.3753 9.83E-05 9.78E-05 9.80E-05 0 0.00017 5 1 0 0
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_translation 2 1 2.368 9.74E-05 9.74E-05 9.89E-05 0 0.00017 5 1 0 0
9.3.2 Input Human Navigation to Computer Computer_keyboard 1 1 7.8537 0.000127 0.000125 0.000126 25 0.000218 5 1 0 0
9.3.3 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion Control_propulsion 1 1 10.7549 0 0 0 25 1 5 2 0 0
9.3.5 Display Spacecraft Control Crew_displays_control 1 1 16.4218 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0
9.3.6 Display Spacecraft Navigation Crew_displays_navigation 1 1 3.3769 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0
9.3.7 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems Crew_displays_subsystems 1 1 1.9943 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0
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wire lengths are estimated based upon the total number of electronic boxes.  A key assumption 
for sizing the communication and sensor wiring is that a single wire length to each box is 
estimated by adding the circumference to the length of the overall spacecraft.  The number of 
cables is determined by counting the number of electronic boxes and multiplying by two for 
input and output wires.  This subroutine does not derive the mass, volume, and power 
requirements for the electronics boxes.  The reason for this assumption is that in many cases, the 
electronic components are procured through various suppliers.  Listed in Table D.1 are the 
functions and variable keywords for the Avionics subsystem. 
 
Table D.1: Avionics functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
Function Variable_Keyword
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_transceiver
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_amplifier
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_antenna
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_steerable_antenna
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_data_processor
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_transceiver
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_antenna
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_data_processor
6.1.3 Communicate between suited crewmembers Interior_voice_comm
7.1 Sense Subsystem Commands Data_bus_network_boxes
7.2 Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands Master_event_controllers
7.3 Send Commands to Subsystems Sensor_comm_wiring
7.4 Store Spacecraft Data Data_storage
8.1.1 Monitor Subsystem Data Health_monitoring_computer
8.2.1 Monitor ECS Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_RCS
8.2.2 Monitor Crew Accommodations Instrumentation_sensors_CA
8.2.3 Monitor Payload Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Payload
8.2.4 Monitor Power Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Power
8.2.5 Monitor Communication Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Comm
8.2.6 Monitor Command and Data Handling (C&DH) Instrumentation_sensors_CDH
8.2.7 Monitor Health Monitoring Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Health
8.2.8 Monitor Flight Control Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Flight
8.2.9 Monitor Thermal Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal
8.2.9 Monitor Structures Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Structural
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs IMU
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_base
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_power
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Star_tracker
9.1.2 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs Nav_analog_digital
9.1.3 Output Navigation to Guidance Multiplexer_demultiplexers
9.2.1 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance Flight_control_computer
9.2.2 Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation_comm
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_roll_pitch_yaw
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_translation
9.3.2 Input Human Navigation to Computer Computer_keyboard
9.3.3 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion Control_propulsion
9.3.4 Display Spacecraft Control Crew_displays_control
9.3.5 Display Spacecraft Navigation Crew_displays_navigation
9.3.6 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems Crew_displays_subsystems
9.4.1 Sense Spacecraft Abort Position Abort_navigation
9.4.2 Sense Spacecraft Abort Velocity Inputs Abort_control
9.4.3 Calculate Spacecraft Abort Trajectory Abort_guidance
9.4.4 Input Abort Commands Abort_input
9.5 Provide Rendezvous Guidance Rendezvous_radar
9.6 Provide Inertial Reference Ordeal
9.7 Provide Additional Avionics Misc_avionics
Avionics
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D.3.2   EXTRA VEHICULAR ACTIVITY SUBSYSTEM 
 The EVA subroutine is dedicated to the functions necessary to conduct EVA.  Spacesuits, 
mobility aids (tools), and umbilical lines are components dedicated to EVA.  Similar to the 
avionics system, the EVA subroutine records the components in the CG_string_matrix output 
file.  The number of spacesuits and umbilical hoses are determined based upon the number of 
crew.  The program has the capability to add redundant EVA components if necessary.  For 
example, if two types of suits such as ascent pressure suits and EVA suits will be carried in the 
spacecraft, the EVA suits could be specified as redundant components and the mass identified as 
a “backup” mass.  Listed in Table D.2 are the functions and variable keywords for the EVA 
subsystem. 
 
Table D.2: EVA functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
 
D.3.3 CREW ACCOMMODATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
 The Crew Accommodations subroutine calculates the components related to the functions 
of Crew Accommodations.  The first step in the Crew Accommodations subroutine is to record 
the mass of the crew.  Individual crew mass is an average mass of all the crew members.   The 
nominal value for crew mass is specified in the input file and the crew members are recorded 
individually in the CG_string_matrix.  Other components that are a function of the number of 
crew such as restraints, handholds, clothing, personal storage, sleep accommodations, and 
hygiene consumables are multiplied by the number of crew and recorded in the 
Function Variable_Keyword
12.1.1 Provide Space Suit Spacesuits
12.2.1 Provide Mobility Aids EVA_mobility
12.2.2 Provide Umbilical Suit_umbilical
EVA 
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CG_string_matrix.  Lighting for the cabin, panel, and exterior is specified in the input file and 
recorded in the CG_string_matrix.  Other crew accommodation components such as 
Entertainment, Exercise, and Medical Kit are recorded as specified by the input file.  Listed in 
Table D.3 are the functions and variable keywords for the Crew Accommodations subsystem. 
 
Table D.3: Crew Accommodations functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
  
D.3.4 PAYLOAD SUBSYSTEM 
 The Payloads subroutine is dedicated to the functions for carrying payloads and 
performing mission operations.  The parameters of payloads are specified in the input file and 
similar to the previous subroutines, the Payload subroutine records the science payload, general 
payload, tools and equipment, and consumable equipment storage mass, volume and power in 
the CG_string_matrix output file. 
 The two main types of payload specified in this subroutine are the Science Return and the 
General Return.  Although both types can be used, the intent of dividing the two functions is to 
designate the amount of sample return from the amount of other mass that is returned from the 
Function Variable_Keyword
3.1.1 Provide Cabin Lighting Cabin_lighting
3.1.2 Provide Panel Lighting Panel_lighting
3.1.3 Provide Light for Exterior Viewing Exterior_lighting
3.1.4 Provide Restraints CA_restraints
3.1.5 Provide Handholds CA_handholds
3.2.1 Provide Personal Storage Personal_storage
3.2.2 Provide Additional Clothing Storage Clothing
3.2.3 Provide Entertainment Entertainment
3.3.2 Provide Medical Kit Storage Medical_kit
3.3.3 Provide Exercise Capability Exercise
3.3.4 Provide Sleep Accommodations Sleep_accommodations
3.3.5 Provide Operational Supplies Operational_supplies
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_consumables
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_kit
Crew Accommodations
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lunar surface.  However, the user has the flexibility to use either one or both; because the 
program carries the information from the input file and records in the CG_string_matrix output 
file.  Listed in Table D.4 are the functions and variable keywords for the Payloads subsystem. 
 
Table D.4: Payloads functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
  
 
D.3.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
 The ECLSS subsystem mass, volume, and power are calculated using two subroutines.  
The first subroutine records the information for all of the interior components.  The second 
subroutine determines the amount of gas storage and is calculated after all of the interior 
volumes of the components are determined.  The second subroutine is named the ECLSS Gas 
Storage System and is called after the primary structure has been sized.  The first subroutine of 
the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) is dedicated to the functions of 
cabin atmosphere management, food management, and waste management.  A key assumption in 
this subroutine is that the Carbon Dioxide removal functions utilize consumable cartridges.  
These cartridges are determined based upon the given mission time and number of crew.  Other 
time and crew dependent components such as food management, potable water, and waste 
management are calculated from heuristic values of (kg/crewmember) × time as specified in the 
Function Variable_Keyword
4.1.1 Provide Science Payload Storage Science_return
4.1.2 Provide General Payload Storage General_return
4.2.1 Provide Tools Storage Tools_equipment
4.2.2 Provide Consumable Equipment Storage Consumable_equipment
4.2.3 Provide Space Suit Storage Spacesuit_storage
4.2.4 Provide Photography Equipment Photography
Payloads
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input file.  Listed in Table D.5 are the functions and variable keywords for the ECLSS 
subsystem. 
 
Table D.5: ECLSS functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
Function Variable_Keyword
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_crew_day_rate
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_rate
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_mass
2.1.10 Provide Fire Detection and Suppression Fire_extinguisher
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_density
2.1.2 Provide Metabolic Oxygen O2_crew_day_rate
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_FoS
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen PaO2
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_radius_length_ratio
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_temperature
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_pressure
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_yield_strength
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_redundancy
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Oxygen_tank_insulation
2.1.2.2 Transport Oxygen Oxygen_gas_transport_lines
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_relief_valve
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve
2.1.2.4 Measure pp Oxygen Level in Cabin Air Oxygen_pp_gauge
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_temperature
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_pressure
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas Nitrogen_tank_insulation
2.1.3.2 Transport Makeup Gas Nitrogen_gas_transport_lines
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve
2.1.4 Remove Trace Contaminants Trace_Contaminants_filter
2.1.5 Remove Particulates Particulates_filter
2.1.6 Remove Humidity Humidity_percent
2.1.6.2 Condense Cabin Air Condense_air_heat_exchanger
2.1.6.1 Provide Humidity Separator Humidity_capture
2.1.7.1 Provide Air Circ Bypass Mix_air_valve
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Cabin_temp
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Temperature_sensor
2.1.8.1 Circulate Air Cabin_fan
2.1.8.2 Return Air Return_air_ducts
2.1.8.3 Output Air Direct_air_ducts
2.1.9.1 Provide Air Pressure Sensor Air_Pressure_gauge
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_leak_percent  
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_atm_pressure
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_air_control
2.2.1 Store Food Food_storage
2.2.1 Store Food Food_rate
2.2.2 Prepare Food Galley_supplies
2.2.2 Prepare Food Heat_food
2.3.1 Provide Potable Water Potable_water
2.3.2 Provide Hygiene Water Hygiene_water
2.4.1 Collect Urine Urine_bags
2.4.2 Collect Fecal Solids Diapers
2.4.2.2 Control Odor Control_odor
2.4.2.3 WCS supplies WCS_supplies
2.4.3 Collect Liquid Waste Vacuum
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Trash_bags
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Housecleaning_supplies
2.4.5 Jettison Liquid Waste Dump_Valve_Piping
ECLSS 
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D.3.6 POWER SUBSYSTEM 
 The Power subroutine calculates the power needs for the spacecraft.  The total power 
required for the previous subsystems is determined and used to size batteries and power 
subsystem components.  This subroutine is the first to utilize the information from the previous 
subsystems in order to determine mass and volume.  The power subsystem is not entirely 
enclosed in the crew cabin and components that are located outside the pressurized volume can 
are specified in the input file.  The power subsystem is a very challenging subsystem to calculate 
because of the dependencies to other subsystems.  For this analysis code, the amount of battery 
mass is determined from the total amount of power required for the mission time.  Redundancy 
in the batteries is determined by dividing the total amount of power needed for the mission by 
the amount of redundancy.  The key assumption is that in the case of a failure in the batteries, a 
redundant set of batteries would be utilized and operational procedures would be set in place to 
mitigate the contingency.  Battery mass is a huge driver in spacecraft mass and redundancy in 
batteries is a safety concern that should be addressed by the operational requirements at a later 
point in the design.  Battery mass is calculated with heuristic values of kg/kW.  Similar to battery 
mass, the wiring mass is estimated using a kg/kW relationship.  As the spacecraft design 
matures, wiring mass can be more efficiently estimated through mockups or CAD.  For the 
purposes of this estimating code, the heuristic approach was appropriate given the configuration 
of the spacecraft was yet to be determined.  Other components such as power controllers, circuit 
breakers, inverters, and relays are recorded in the CG_string_matrix output file.  Listed in Table 
D.6 are the functions and variable keywords for the Power subsystem. 
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Table D.6: Power functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
 
D.3.7  ACTIVE THERMAL SYSTEM 
 The thermal subroutine calculates the functions associated with the thermal subsystem.  
This subroutine begins by summing the total power needs of the spacecraft in watts (W).  The 
program does not include the amount of heat generated by the crew.  The total amount of heat 
that needs to be rejected includes all of the components that utilize power and the batteries.  The 
total heat is adjusted for mission time in heat rejection.  For components that require cooling, a 
key assumption is that cold plates are used for components above a specified wattage.  The 
number of cold plates is determined by summing all of the components that are greater than the 
minimum wattage level as specified in the input file.  Another key assumption is that all batteries 
utilize cold plates.  The cold plates are recorded in the CG_string_matrix according to the 
component that requires cooling in the format of component_coldplate.  The number of coolant 
loops is determined by dividing the total heat by a “loop capacity”.  The key assumption is that a 
single loop will remove a specified number of watts of heat.  As the total heat number increases 
through redundant components, the total number of loops increases.  For each loop, a set of 
valves and pumps is determined based on the input parameters and redundancy specified in the 
input file.   
Function Variable_Keyword
5.1 Provide Power Batteries
5.1 Provide Power Depth_of_Discharge
5.1 Provide Power Duty_cycle_coast
5.2 Distribute Power Power_Distr_Wiring
5.3 Regulate Power Power_Distr_Controller
5.3 Regulate Power Power_inverters
5.3 Regulate Power Power_relays
5.6 Provide Overload Protection Power_Distr_CircBreak
Power
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Radiators or sublimators are used to remove heat from the spacecraft in a vacuum environment.  
A key assumption in the program is that the spacecraft uses sublimators.  The mass of the 
sublimator is determined from a kg/kW heat rejected relationship.  The amount of water needed 
for the sublimator is determined by multiplying the total heat (W) by the mission duration and 
dividing by the latent heat of vaporization at vacuum conditions.   
 The last part of the thermal subroutine calculates the mass of the cooling loops and fluid.  
The cooling fluid density is given in the input file and the mass of coolant line is determined 
from the material density and the outer diameter of the line.  The inner diameter of the coolant 
line is assumed to be 85% of the outer diameter.  This assumption was made loosely on the wall 
thickness of a 1/2" inch outer diameter coolant line with approximately 7/16” inside diameter.  
The mass of the fluid is calculated based upon the volume of the inner diameter.  A key 
assumption for a single coolant line length is the spacecraft circumference plus the length.  Two 
single coolant line lengths are added to determine the overall loop mass (input and output).  
Although it is an over estimate of an actual thermal system, it is a conservative estimate for the 
thermal needs of the spacecraft.  Listed in Table D.7 are the functions and variable keywords for 
the Thermal subsystem. 
 
Table D.7: Thermal functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
Function Variable_Keyword
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplate_min_power
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_capacity
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_diameter
10.1 Collect Heat Thermal_interior_fluid_density
10.1 Collect Heat Coolant_piping
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplates
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_pumps
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_lines_valves
10.3 Remove Heat Interior_exterior_heat_exchanger
10.3 Remove Heat Water_system_sublimators
10.3 Remove Heat Exterior_radiators
Thermal 
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D.3.8 ECLSS GAS STORAGE SYSTEM 
 The ECLSS gas storage subroutine determines the mass of the high pressure gas storage 
system.  In order to determine the amount of oxygen and makeup gas, the total spacecraft 
habitable volume is adjusted by the volume of the interior components.  Because the interior 
components will not always be neatly packaged, a “packaging efficiency” is used to adjust the 
volume of the interior components.  The two volumes are added to determine the total 
pressurized volume.  Shown in Figure D.5 is an illustration of the derivation of total pressurized 
volume. 
 
 
Figure D.5:  Derivation of total pressurized volume. 
 
 The derived pressurized volume used to determine the inner diameter of the pressure 
vessel.  This diameter is used in the primary structures subroutine to calculate the mass of the 
pressure vessel and supporting structure.  The amount of oxygen needed is a function of the 
Minimum Habitable Volume
Total Pressurized Volume
Subsystem 
Volume
Packaging 
Efficiency
Volume
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pressurized volume, crew members, and mission duration.  The amount of makeup gas is a 
function of the atmospheric composition and cabin leak rate.  The total mass of Oxygen needed 
by the crew is determined by: 
 Oxygen Mass = Number Crew × (Oxygen Daily Rate) × (Mission Duration (hrs) / 24)   (D.1) 
 
The total mass of makeup gas needed for the spacecraft is determined by: 
 Oxygen Makeup = [(Cabin Daily Leak Percent × Cabin Oxygen Mass)/24] 
      × Mission Duration (hrs)               (D.2) 
 
 Makeup Gas = [(Cabin Daily Leak Percent × Cabin Makeup Gas Mass)/24] 
      × Mission Duration (hrs)               (D.3) 
 
Where the Oxygen and Makeup Gas in the cabin are calculated using the ideal gas relationship: 
 Cabin Oxygen Mass = (Oxygen Partial Pressure × Cabin volume)  
       ÷ ((Ru / Molecular weight of Oxygen) × Cabin Temperature)    (D.4) 
 
 Cabin Makeup Gas Mass = (Makeup Gas Partial Pressure × Cabin volume)  
       ÷ ((Ru / Molecular weight of Oxygen) × Cabin Temperature)    (D.5) 
 
The total amount of Oxygen and Makeup Gas is summed using the following expressions: 
 Total Oxygen Mass = Crew Oxygen + Oxygen Makeup + Cabin Oxygen Mass               (D.6) 
 Total Makeup Gas Mass = Makeup Gas + Cabin Makeup Gas          (D.7) 
 
 The program has the capability to calculate a one or two gas system.  Given the cabin 
atmospheric pressure and the partial pressure needed for Oxygen, the amount of makeup gas is 
based upon the partial pressure of the makeup gas.  If the partial pressure for Oxygen is equal to 
the cabin atmospheric pressure, then makeup gas will not be included.  The storage of Oxygen 
and Makeup gas is determined using ideal gas equation for the volume at high pressure.  The 
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storage tanks are sized according to the volume of the gas, the material density of the tank, and a 
factor of safety and are assumed to be spherical.  The following expression is used to size the 
high pressure gas tanks: 
 Tank Volume = (Mass × (Ru / Molecular weight of gas)) × Storage Temperature 
           ÷ Storage Pressure                              (D.8) 
 
 Spherical Radius = Tank Volume ÷ ((4/3π) 1/3                 (D.9) 
 
 Tank Wall Thickness = (Storage Pressure × Spherical Radius) 
       ÷ 2 × (Storage Tank Yield Strength / Factor of Safety)       (D.10) 
 
 Once the tank mass and volume has been determined, the amount of insulation is 
calculated based upon the outer surface area of the tank.  After the tanks have been sized, the 
transport lines are calculated.  Using the same material, pressure and factor of safety for the 
storage tanks, the outer diameter of the lines are sized based on the given input diameter and the 
material.  The storage tanks, insulation, and transport lines are recorded in the CG_string_matrix.  
Other components such as relief valves and regulator valves specified in the input file are 
recorded in the CG_string_matrix according to redundancy.  The ECLSS Gas Storage 
components are assumed to be mounted external to the crew cabin.   
 
 
 
B.3.9 SECONDARY STRUCTURES SUBSYSTEM 
 The Secondary Structures subroutine calculates the mass of secondary structural 
components.  Because the exact configuration of the spacecraft has yet to be determined, this 
mass is difficult to determine in the early conceptual design phase.  However, a factor can be 
utilized to estimate the mass of secondary structures for mounted components.   
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 Secondary Structure Mass = (Sum of Component Mass – Crew Mass) × Factor            (D.11) 
 
 The mass of Secondary Structures is on the order of 21% of the total component mass.  
This is a conservative estimate that can be adjusted according to the loading on the spacecraft 
and the configuration of the components.  It is difficult to accurately predict secondary structure 
mass until detailed information about the dynamics of the spacecraft is quantified.  The purpose 
of including Secondary Structures was to include mass that might otherwise be overlooked in the 
estimating process. 
 
B.3.10   PRIMARY STRUCTURES SUBSYSTEM 
 The Primary Structures subroutine is one of the more important parts of the spacecraft 
estimating code.  Because the exact configuration of the structure has yet to be determined, a 
skin-stringer approach was chosen to estimate the loading on the pressure vessel and the 
structure.  The equations used for predicting loading on structural components were textbook 
equations with various conservative assumptions on the loading.  To calculate the Primary 
Structure mass, the overall subroutine was divided into three parts.  The first subroutine, named 
Struct_1, develops a node matrix of mounting locations to the primary structure.  Assuming the 
mounting locations for components is located at the intersection of beams and hoops; the matrix 
for loading on the primary structure at the node locations is developed.  Shown in Figure D.6 is 
an example of the node locations at the intersection of beams and hoops around the primary 
structure. 
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Figure D.6: Node locations at intersection of beams and hoops used for loading matrix. 
 
 In order to size the loading on the beams and hoops of the primary structure, the total 
amount of mass in the spacecraft is summed.  This “payload” mass is used to create a distribution 
profile on the primary structure.  To determine the amount of mass at the individual nodes, an 
assumption that the majority of the heavier components would be mounted toward the bottom of 
the primary structure and a slope of mass vs. angle was developed to simulate the mounting 
conditions of the components on the structure. 
 The next subroutine, Struct_2, calculates components in the primary structure such as the 
pressure vessel wall thickness, docking tunnel, floor beams, floor plate, docking ring flange, 
tunnel supports, docking flange support, hatch flanges, windows, and view ports.  These 
components are updated in the node loading matrix. 
 
Node Locations
At Intersections
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 Given the material yield strength, the cabin atmospheric pressure, factors of safety and 
loading, the pressure vessel cylinder wall thickness is calculated by: 
 Pressure Vessel Wall Thickness = (Cabin Pressure × Inner Diameter) 
                     ÷ 2 × (Material Yield Strength/(FoS × Loading))    (D.12) 
 
 
 Because the ends of the cylinder are dome shaped, the equivalent spherical diameter is 
determined using the protrusion ratio given in the input file.  This protrusion ratio is defined as: 
 Protrusion Distance = Protrusion Ratio × Inner Diameter              (D.13) 
 
And the radius of curvature is determined as: 
 Radius of Curvature = (Inner Diameter/2)2 + (Protrusion2) 
                       ÷ 2 × Protrusion                         (D.14) 
 
The thickness of the spherical section is calculated by: 
 Spherical Wall Thickness = (Cabin Pressure ×Radius of Curvature) 
           ÷ 2 × (Material Yield Strength/(FoS × Loading))           (D.15) 
 
 
 
The volume of the pressure vessel skin including the spherical end caps is calculated and the 
mass of the pressure vessel skin is determined by multiplying the volume by the material density. 
 
 Another important part of the primary structure is the floor beams and decking.  The 
maximum loading on the floor beams is calculated as a concentrated load of the total crew mass 
times the acceleration loading in the center of the beam.  Two floor beams provide support in the 
crew cabin.  One beam is at the mid section of the cylinder and the main beam is in the middle of 
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the floor and runs front to aft.  Shown in Figure D.7 are the floor beams and decking in the 
primary structure. 
 
 
Figure D.7: Cross sectional view showing floor beams and decking. 
 
 
 The maximum moment due to bending in the floor beams was used to size the floor 
beams and was calculated using the following expression: 
 Floor Beam Bending Moment = ((Crew Mass × Loading)/2) × (Length of beam/2)       (D.16) 
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The base of the floor beam was assumed as a ratio of height to base as given in the input file 
 Beam base = Beam height /Height to Base Ratio                          (D.17) 
 
The height of the floor beam is calculated as: 
 Beam height = Height to Base Ratio × Bending Moment × 6 
         ÷ Material Yield Strength / (FoS × Loading)                        (D.18) 
 
Given the height and base dimensions of the floor beam, the mass of all the beams was 
determined by multiplying the volume times the material density. 
 For this example, the simplest method of determining floor plate thickness is to assume 
the loading in the center of the floor plate.  One floor plate is a “quadrant” of the floor beams.  
The floor plates were assumed constrained at the edges and the moments were distributed along 
the edges.  The largest thickness was used in the calculation of the floor plate mass.  The 
following equations were used to size the floor decking. 
Y = Width of Floor / 2 
Z = Length of Floor / 2 
Crew Weight = Crew Mass × 9.81 
 
Thickness = [(3/2) × (Y / Z) × Crew Weight 
   ÷ (Beam Yield Strength / (FoS × Loading) )] ½                                              (D.19) 
 
 
 The docking ring flange was calculated using the maximum expected loading force on 
the ring.  The maximum loading on the ring was assumed to be distributed, and the docking ring 
was sized according to equations of rings on multiple supports.  Shown in Figure D.8 is the 
docking ring and supporting structure. 
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Figure D.8: Docking ring, tunnel and support structure. 
 
The tunnel and docking flange support cross sections were sized according to the base and height 
dimensions of the docking ring.  The docking hatch outer and inner structural rings that hold the 
hatch door was sized according to the same base and height dimensions. 
 The aft bulkhead hatch is sized according to dimensions given in the input file.  The 
flanges of the hatch are calculated using a flange ratio of the major hatch dimension.  Shown in 
Figure D.9 is the aft bulkhead hatch. 
Docking Ring, Tunnel
And Supports
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Figure D.9: Aft bulkhead hatch. 
 
 The primary structure assumes two windows with two window panes.  One pane is for 
thermal management and the other for maintaining pressure.  The overall window assembly 
frame thickness is 5 window pane thicknesses.  Three window frames, outer, mid, and inner hold 
the window pane assembly and mount to the primary structure spherical hoops on the forward 
bulkhead.  The window frame thickness is specified in the input file.  The position of the 
windows on the forward bulkhead is a function of height above the crew floor.  The center of the 
window is positioned at a specified height.  The lateral distance of the window from the 
centerline axis of the vehicle is specified at angles from the mid planes of the cylinder.  Shown in 
Figure D.10 are the forward windows. 
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Figure D.10: Forward windows and front of primary structure. 
 
A docking view port window was included in the design and is assumed to be a circular window 
above the commander’s window.  The total window frame assembly thickness is 5 window pane 
thicknesses, with two window panes.  The mass for the docking frames and the window panes 
are added together for the docking view port assembly mass.  An aft viewing port was included 
in the code and was calculated in the same manner as the docking port.  
 The last part of the Struct_2 subroutine updates the node loading matrix with the newly 
calculated components of the primary structure including pressure vessel skin, floor beams, floor 
plates, docking tunnel, docking ring, docking hatch, front windows, and aft hatch. 
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 The final Primary Structure Subroutine is Struct_3. This subroutine sizes the outer hoops 
and stringers based on the mass information compiled in the node loading matrix.  The 
subroutine first identifies the stringer with the worst loads.  A single stringer is calculated and the 
mass of each stringer is added to the nodes in the node loading matrix.  The Struct_3 subroutine 
also calculates the necessary height of the hoops based upon the loading at each of the nodes.  
Using the height to base ratio, the base of the hoop is calculated based on the hoop height.  The 
mass at the nodes is adjusted for total expected acceleration loading and the moment at the node 
locations is calculated using the following equation: 
 Moment at Nodes = PR (cos θ -1) – HR sin θ                                                                   (D.20) 
 
Where P is the tangential force acting at the node, R is the radius of curvature, and H is the 
normal force acting at the node.  Because the nodes are located circumferentially around the 
cylinder, the angle from the bottom of the cylinder is used as the 0 degree reference.  The 
moments at the nodes are summed at the lower portion of the cylinder and the maximum bending 
stress in the hoop is calculated with the following equation: 
 Maximum Bending Stress = Σ Node Moments / ((base × height2)/6)                               (D.21) 
 
The maximum bending stress is used to size the hoops according to the maximum allowable 
yield strength and the factor of safety.  A data matrix named the Struct_mass matrix is used as a 
placeholder matrix to record the mass of all the primary structure components.  The total Primary 
Structure mass is summed using the values in the Struct_mass matrix.  The Primary Structure 
mass is not yet recorded in the CG_string_matrix because of the need to iterate with the TPS / 
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MMOD subroutine.  Listed in Table D.8 are the functions and variable keywords for the Primary 
Structures subsystem. 
Table D.8: Primary Structures functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
 
 
Function Variable_Keyword
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety_PV_skin
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Interior_diameter_hab_volume
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Cylinder_length_hab_volume
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Packaging_efficiency
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Protrusion_ratio
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_yield_strength
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_density
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Elasticity
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Rigidity
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Max_acceleration_gs
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_hoops
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_stringers
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Height_to_base_ratio
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Fillet_ratio
1.5.3 Provide Docking Mechanism for Lunar Habitat to Lu LIDS_published_weight
1.5.1 Support Docking Mechanism for Lunar Ascent ModuDocking_ring_load_Force
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent Module to LIDS_tunnel_diameter
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent Module to LIDS_tunnel_height
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat to Lunar A Hatch_width
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat to Lunar A Hatch_height
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat to Lunar A Hatch_corner_radius_ratio
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat to Lunar A Hatch_flange_ratio
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_material_density
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_pane_thickness
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_width_horizontal
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_length
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_corner_radius_ratio
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_frame_ratio
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_position_angle
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_center_height
1.6.2 Provide Docking Viewing Ports Docking_window
1.6.3 Provide Aft Viewing Ports Aft_window
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection MMOD_standoff
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_time_days
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection PNP_target
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection TPS_blanket
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_altitude
Primary Structures
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D.3.11 THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 
 The TPS_MMOD_iterate subroutine calculates the required TPS and MMOD thickness 
given a probability of no penetration.  To determine the required shielding, the TPS_MMOD 
subroutine is iterated with Struct_3 to determine the optimum standoff height for a whipple 
shield of MMOD protection.  The MMOD shield is a two layer whipple shield of the same 
material as the primary structure.  The thicknesses of the outer and inner shield walls are 
calculated given the standoff distance of the hoop.  The ballistic limit equations follow the 
instructions for sizing whipple shields as given in NASA TP – 2003 - 210788 Meteroid / Debris 
Shielding.  Once the MMOD protection has been calculated, the surface area of the TPS is 
calculated and using the input surface area parameters specified in the input file for TPS 
blankets, the mass for TPS is calculated.  The TPS protection is assumed to be mounted inside 
the MMOD protection.  The TPS for the Lunar Ascent Module assumed Nextel and Saffil 
blanket insulation. 
 
D.3.12 PROPULSION INERT COMPONENTS 
 The Propulsion inert components subroutine records the inert components of the 
propulsion subsystem.  Propellant storage tanks and related components are calculated after the 
propellant mass has been determined.  Many of the inert components include valves, filters, 
pressure regulators and relief valves.  The two parts of the propulsion system are divided 
between the main engine and the RCS system.  Each component is recorded in the 
CG_string_matrix according to redundancy or safety.  The main engine pressurant, fuel, and 
oxidizer lines are sized according to specified pressure in the lines and the material yield 
strength.  Trapped propellant in the Fuel and Oxidizer lines is also accounted for in the mass 
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estimate.  Components such as trim orifices, filters, isolation valve, pressure regulators, 
explosive valves, bipropellant valves, and solenoid valves are input in the CG_string matrix 
based on the desired redundancy specified in the input file.  The RCS system is sized using the 
same methods as the Main Engine.  For the RCS system, it is assumed that multiple systems of 
thrusters will be mounted on the spacecraft.  The user has the option to choose the number of 
systems and the number of thrusters in each system.  Listed in Table D.9 are the functions and 
variable keywords for the Propulsion subsystem. 
 
Table D.9: Propulsion functions and Variable Keyword identifiers. 
 
 
Function Variable_Keyword
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Specific_impulse
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Vacuum_thrust
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_weight_thrust_ratio
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Gravity_constant
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_gravity_parameter
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_radius
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_apogee_altitude
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_perigee_altitude
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_azimuth
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_latitude
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_longitude
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer_fuel_ratio
11.1.2 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_density
11.1.1 Provide Main Engine Fuel Fuel_density
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press
11.1.11 Provide Contingency Propellant Contingency_propellant
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_pressure
11.2.3 Provide RCS Pressurant Pressurant_pressure_RCS
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_tank_temperature
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_ratio_spec_heats
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_gas_constant
Propulsion
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Table D.9: Propulsion functions and Variable Keyword identifiers (continued). 
 
 
 
Function Variable_Keyword
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_material_density
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_yield_strength
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_factor_of_safety
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_unused_fraction
11.2.7 Store RCS Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press_RCS
11.1.9 Transport Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_line_id
11.1.5 Transport Main Engine Pressurant Main_engine_pressurant_line_id
11.2.9 Transport RCS Propellant Propulsion_line_id_RCS
11.2.5 Transport RCS Pressurant Pressurant_line_id_RCS
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_linear_slope
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_y_intercept
11.1.12 Support Main Engine Components Propulsion_secondary_struct_ratio
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_side_A_B_choice
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Specific_impulse_RCS
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Vacuum_thrust_RCS
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_linear_slope
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_y_intercept
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_RCS_engines_system
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_fire_RCS_thrust_ascent
11.2.11 Provide RCS contingency propellant RCS_additional_propellant_mass
11.1.13 Insulate Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation
11.2.13 Insulate RCS Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation_RCS
11.2.1 Provide RCS Propellant RCS_propellant
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_valve
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_filter
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_trim_orifice
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_filter
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_isolation_valve
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve
Propulsion
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Table D.9: Propulsion functions and Variable Keyword identifiers (continued). 
 
 
D.3.13 PROPULSION FLYOUT TABLE 
 To reduce the computational burden of analyzing many trajectories during a Monte Carlo 
analysis, a propulsion look up table is developed before the analysis begins.  Starting from a 
minimum functional configuration, the amount of main engine propellant and RCS propellant is 
Function Variable_Keyword
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_valve
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_filter
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_check_valve
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_trim_orifice
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_filter
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_isolation_valve
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_bipropellant_valve
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_valve_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_filter_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_orifice_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS
11.2.10.2 Control RCS Oxidizer Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS
11.2.10.1 Control RCS Fuel Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS
11.2.9.1 Filter RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS
11.2.10 Control RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS
11.2.14.2 Heat RCS Oxidizer lines Oxidizer_heater_RCS
11.2.14.1 Heat RCS Fuel lines Fuel_heater_RCS
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter
Propulsion
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derived for varying levels of spacecraft mass.  The program calculates a range of potential 
spacecraft mass from 0.99 of the minimum functional configuration to 6 times the minimum 
functional mass.  This range covers the anticipated spacecraft mass expected during a tradespace 
run.  Using the orbital parameters given in the input file, an ideal delta V is calculated as a 
starting point condition and used to provide an initial value for the main engine propellant and 
RCS propellant mass.  The program steps through an iteration routine where tanks are sized 
according to the predicted propellant mass ant the spacecraft is flown in a 3 degree of freedom 
trajectory from the lunar surface.  Because the purpose of the subroutine is to determine an 
estimate for propellant mass, the trajectories are not optimized.  The lunar ascent trajectory is a 
three part ascent with vertical rise, pitch over, and gravity turn to orbital insertion.  The program 
flies the trajectory, determines the amount of propellant used to reach the orbital insertion and 
iterates again with new tank sizes based on the calculated propellant.  This process repeats until 
the propellant mass converges to within 10 kg and the data is saved to a propellant mass look up 
table.  Once the data has been compiled in the propellant mass look up table, a linear curve fit is 
used to smooth the data to reduce potential uncertainties calculated during the trajectory analysis.  
Shown in Figure D.11 is an illustration of the lunar ascent trajectory calculated using the 
CLAMP routine 
. 
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Figure D.11: Lunar ascent trajectory and orbit. 
 
D.3.14 PROPULSION STORAGE SYSTEM 
 Using the main engine propellant and RCS propellant mass determined from the flyout 
table, the main engine and RCS pressurant, fuel, and oxidizer tanks are sized according to the 
propellant mass and the input parameters.  The volume of the oxidizer and fuel needed for 
storage is calculated and the amount of pressurant needed to drive the propellant is determined 
based on the volume and differences in pressures. The pressurant, fuel, and oxidizer tanks are 
recorded in the CG_string_matrix.  The RCS system uses the same equations as the main engine 
storage system and the tanks are sized according to the required propellant. A key assumption in 
the RCS system is that the thrusters utilize the same fuel and oxidizer propellant type as the main 
engine. 
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D.4 CLAMP ANALYSIS RUNS TO DETERMINE SAFETY AND OPERABILITY 
 The previous sections described the main subroutines in a single CLAMP analysis run.  
To calculate the amount of Safety and Operability in the spacecraft configuration, three runs are 
needed.  Shown in Figure D.12 is a flowchart of the three CLAMP runs. 
 
 
Figure D.12:  Flowchart for calculating Minimum Functional, Safety, and Operability Mass. 
 
  
D.4.1 MINIMUM FUNCTIONALITY CONFIGURATION – RUN 1 
 The program begins the analysis by first evaluating the minimum functionality 
configuration.  Given an input file of a preferred spacecraft configuration, the 
Determine_Min_Functional subprogram strips away unnecessary components and modifies the 
Run (1)
Calculate Total Spacecraft Mass for the Minimum Functional Design Configuration 
FoS = 1.0, Single string subsystems at minimum number of functions
No Safety or Operability components
Minimum “best” mission time
Minimum Functionality Baseline Configuration Mass (Run 1)
Run (2) 
Add back Safety 
Increase FoS to Design FoS (ex: 1.4, 1.51, etc..)
Include Safety Dedicated Components
Subsystem redundancy (single or dual redundant)
Minimum Functionality + Safety Mass (Run 2)
Run (3) 
Add back Operability 
Increase mission time to maximum 
Include Operability dedicated components
Subsystem redundancy (single or dual redundant)
Minimum Functionality + Safety Mass + Operability Mass (Run 3)
Minimum Functional Baseline Configuration (Physics & Physiology) Mass = Total Spacecraft Mass (Run 1)
Spacecraft Safety Mass = (Run 2) – (Run 1)
Spacecraft Operability Mass = (Run 3) – (Run 2)
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original input file to be used by the program.  This subroutine removes all redundant 
components, removes Safety and Operability identified components, specifies all Factors of 
Safety at 1.0, sets the mission time to the minimum mission time, and removes contingency or 
reserve propellants.  In addition, error input information is set to zero for a deterministic analysis.  
After the minimum functionality input matrix has been created by the 
Determine_Min_Functional subprogram, the program runs the Min_Func_Config subprogram as 
a normal analysis with the previously mentioned subprograms.  The information from the 
minimum functionality configuration run is written to output matrices named 
CG_string_matrix_minimum and SC_mass_minimum for later analysis to determine Safety and 
Operability mass. 
 
D.4.2 SAFETY CONFIGURATION – RUN 2 
 Similar to the minimum functionality configuration, the Determine_Safety subprogram 
removes all Operability components from the original input file and creates a new input file to be 
used in the Safety configuration run.  Minimum mission time is a part of this analysis.  Error 
input is not changed in this subprogram to allow for Monte Carlo analysis.  The program runs a 
subroutine called Safety_Config to determine the spacecraft configuration with additional safety.  
The output of the analysis run is stored in the matrices CG_string_matrix_safety and 
SC_mass_safety for later analysis. 
 
D.4.3 OPERABILITY CONFIGURATION – RUN 3 
 The original input file is not modified for the Operability configuration run.  The analysis 
run contains all elements of Safety and Operability for the desired configuration. Error input is 
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not changed in this subprogram to allow for Monte Carlo analysis.  The program runs a 
subroutine called Operability_Config to determine the spacecraft configuration all components 
as specified in the input file.  The output of the analysis run is stored in the matrices 
CG_string_matrix_operability and SC_mass_operability for later analysis. 
 
D.4.4 SAFETY AND OPERABILITY MASS 
 The reason for three analysis runs is to determine the mass of the spacecraft configuration 
at various configurations of Safety and Operability.  The first run is a spacecraft configuration 
that does not include any additional Safety or Operability components beyond the minimum 
“best” mission design timeline.  The second run adds mass associated with improving safety 
such as FoS, safety components, contingency propellant, etc.., for any item in the spacecraft that 
is necessary for Safety.  The third run determines the amount of Operability mass in the 
spacecraft where mass is added for components that are related to increasing Operability factors 
of the mission.  In addition, the mission time is increased to the maximum expected length.  To 
calculate the amount of mass that contributes to an increase in the Safety, the first run is 
subtracted from the second run, the minimum functional baseline configuration.  The same 
method is used to determine the amount of Operability mass where the second run is subtracted 
from the third run.  This method calculates the difference in how much the total spacecraft mass 
increases with additions of mass due to Safety or Operability. 
 
D.4.5 SAFETY AND OPERABILITY INDEX 
 The Safety Index and Operability Index are determined using the input and output files 
from each of the three analysis runs.  The scores for the Safety Index and Operability Index are 
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based upon the equations in Chapter 6.  The scores are combined into a Total Spacecraft score 
and stored in a placeholder matrix named Safety_Oper_scores for later output. 
 
D.4.6 OUTPUT FILE FORMATS 
 The last step in the CLAMP program is to write output files for the previous analysis.  
Three output files are written in MATLAB formats.  The three output files are used in post 
processing program to generate figures and investigate subsystem information.  These files are 
the following: 
 Input file of the Operability configuration 
 Output CG_string_matrix of the Operability configuration 
 SC_mass file that includes all subsystem data, Safety Index, Operability Index, and Total 
Spacecraft scores for all three runs. 
 
D.4.7  CONCLUSIONS 
 The previous sections provided a top level overview of the subroutines in the CLAMP 
program.  Additional subroutines were used in the Monte Carlo sensitivity analyses and were not 
described here; but were utilized in generating data for the tradespaces in Chapter 3, 5, and 6.  
The CLAMP program contains over 10,000 lines of code and was a significant part of this 
dissertation. 
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APPENDIX E 
APOLLO CONFIGURATION INPUT VARIABLE TABLES 
 
 The following tables were copied from the Microsoft Excel input file for the CLAMP 
analysis.  The tables are grouped according to subsystems 
 
Table E.1: Crew, Mission Time, and Avionics input variables list. 
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0.1.1 Number of Crew Crew_members Num of Crew 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.2 Maximum Mission Time Mission_Duration_HRS Mission hours 12.36 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.3 Minimum Mission Time Mission_Duration_HRS_min Absolute Minimum Mission hours 1.33 0 1 0 0 0 0
Avionics
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_transceiver S-Band Transceiver -2  2 1 3 2 0 1 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_amplifier Power_amp & diplex - 1  2 1 3 2 0 1 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_antenna S_Band Inflight Antennas - 2  2 1 3 2 2 0 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_steerable_antenna Steerable Antenna - 1  1 1 3 2 0 0 8
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_data_processor Signal Processor Assy  1 1 4 2 0 1 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_transceiver VHF Xceiver and diplex  2 1 4 2 0 1 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_antenna VHF Antenna  2 1 4 2 0 0 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_data_processor VHF Ranging  1 1 4 2 0 1 7
6.1.3 Communicate between suited crewmembe Interior_voice_comm In VHF Xceiver  0 0 3 0 0 1 6
7.1 Sense Subsystem Commands Data_bus_network_boxes Signal conditioner Assy -2  2 1 5 1 0 1 6
7.2 Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands Master_event_controllers PCMETA -1  1 1 5 1 0 1 6
7.3 Send Commands to Subsystems Sensor_comm_wiring Wire harness A&B  1 1 5 2 0 0 7
7.4 Store Spacecraft Data Data_storage Data Storage  1 1 3 1 1 1 6
8.1.1 Monitor Subsystem Data Health_monitoring_computer Caution and Warning  1 1 4 1 1 1 6
8.2.1 Monitor ECS Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS ECS Sensors - total mass  1 1 3 2 2 0 7
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion Prop Sensors - total mass  1 1 5 2 0 0 8
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_RCS RCS Sensors - total mass  1 1 5 2 0 0 8
8.2.2 Monitor Crew Accommodations Instrumentation_sensors_CA CA Sensors  0 0 1 1 0 0 7
8.2.3 Monitor Payload Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Payload Payload Sensors  0 0 1 2 0 0 7
8.2.4 Monitor Power Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Power Power Sensors  0 0 2 2 0 0 7
8.2.5 Monitor Communication Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Comm Comm Sensors  0 0 1 1 0 0 7
8.2.6 Monitor Command and Data Handling (C& Instrumentation_sensors_CDH CDH Sensors  0 0 1 1 0 0 7
8.2.7 Monitor Health Monitoring Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Health Health Sensors  0 0 1 1 0 0 7
8.2.8 Monitor Flight Control Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Flight Flight Sensors  0 0 5 1 0 0 7
8.2.9 Monitor Thermal Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal Thermal Sensors  0 0 1 1 0 0 7
8.2.9 Monitor Structures Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Structural Structural Sensors  0 0 1 2 0 0 7
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs IMU IMU  1 1 5 1 0 1 8
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_base IMU mounting  1 1 5 1 0 0 4
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_power Power and Servo Assy  1 1 5 1 0 1 6
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Star_tracker AOT Telescope / Computer Con  1 1 4 1 0 0 5
9.1.2 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs Nav_analog_digital Pulse Torque Assembly  1 1 5 1 0 1 6
9.1.3 Output Navigation to Guidance Multiplexer_demultiplexers Coupling Data Unit  1 1 5 1 0 1 7
9.2.1 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance Flight_control_computer LM Guidance Computer  1 1 5 1 0 1 8
9.2.2 Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation_comm Signal Conditioner Assy  2 1 5 1 0 1 7
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_roll_pitch_yaw ACA - Attitude Controller Assem  2 1 5 1 0 0 8
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_translation TTCA - Thrust and translation con 2 1 5 1 0 0 8
9.3.2 Input Human Navigation to Computer Computer_keyboard DSKD  1 1 5 1 0 0 8
9.3.3 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion Control_propulsion ATCA - Attitude and Translation  1 1 5 2 0 0 8
9.3.4 Display Spacecraft Control Crew_displays_control Panel 3 4 5  1 1 5 1 0 0 8
9.3.5 Display Spacecraft Navigation Crew_displays_navigation Panel 1 2  1 1 5 1 0 0 8
9.3.6 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems Crew_displays_subsystems Panel 6 8 11 12 14 16  1 1 4 1 0 0 8
9.4.1 Sense Spacecraft Abort Position Abort_navigation Abort Sensor Assy  1 1 5 1 1 1 8
9.4.2 Sense Spacecraft Abort Velocity Inputs Abort_control Rate Gyro Assy  1 1 5 1 1 1 7
9.4.3 Calculate Spacecraft Abort Trajectory Abort_guidance Abort Electronics Assy  1 1 5 1 1 1 8
9.4.4 Input Abort Commands Abort_input DEDA -Data Entry and Display A 1 1 5 1 1 0 8
9.5 Provide Rendezvous Guidance Rendezvous_radar Rendezvous Radar  1 1 4 2 0 0 10
9.6 Provide Inertial Reference Ordeal Ordeal  1 1 2 1 2 0 6
9.7 Provide Additional Avionics Misc_avionics Misc Avionics  0 0 1 0 2 0 4
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Table E.2: EVA, Crew Accommodations, and Payloads input variables list. 
 
 
Table E.3: ECLSS input variables list. 
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EVAs
12.1.1 Provide Space Suit Spacesuits Pressure Suit, no PLSS 1 1 3 0 1 0 8
12.2.1 Provide Mobility Aids EVA_mobility Mobility devices 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
12.2.2 Provide Umbilical Suit_umbilical Umbilical hoses 0 0 3 0 0 0 7
Crew Accommodations
3.1.1 Provide Cabin Lighting Cabin_lighting Lighting - normalized to one day 1 1 2 1 1 0 5
3.1.2 Provide Panel Lighting Panel_lighting Assumed same as cabin light 1 1 3 1 0 0 6
3.1.3 Provide Light for Exterior Viewing Exterior_lighting Lighting 2 1 3 2 1 0 7
3.1.4 Provide Restraints CA_restraints kg 1 1 2 1 1 0 4
3.1.5 Provide Handholds CA_handholds handholds 1 1 1 1 2 0 4
3.2.1 Provide Personal Storage Personal_storage kg/person/day -normalized from HSMAD 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
3.2.2 Provide Additional Clothing Storage Clothing kg/person/day - normalized from HSMAD 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
3.2.3 Provide Entertainment Entertainment Not included 0 0 1 1 0 0 5
3.3.2 Provide Medical Kit Storage Medical_kit kg/day-normalized from HSMAS 1 1 3 1 1 0 5
3.3.3 Provide Exercise Capability Exercise Not included 0 0 1 1 0 0 6
3.3.4 Provide Sleep Accommodations Sleep_accommodations Not included 0 0 1 1 0 0 4
3.3.5 Provide Operational Supplies Operational_supplies kg/person 1 1 3 1 1 0 6
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_consumables kg/person/day 1 1 1 1 2 0 4
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_kit kg/person 0 0 1 1 2 0 4
Payloads
4.1.1 Provide Science Payload Storage Science_return http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/A 1 1 1 1 2 0 6
4.1.2 Provide General Payload Storage General_return Not included 0 0 1 1 2 0 6
4.2.1 Provide Tools Storage Tools_equipment 1.67 kg estimated 1 1 2 1 1 0 5
4.2.2 Provide Consumable Equipment Storage Consumable_equipment Not included 0 0 2 1 0 0 6
4.2.3 Provide Space Suit Storage Spacesuit_storage Not included 1 1 0 0 2
4.2.4 Provide Photography Equipment Photography 19kg estimated Lunar Mission 1 1 1 1 2 0 9
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ECLSS
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_crew_day_rate kg/person/day 0.998 0 5 0 0 0 6
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_rate CO2 Canister Perf 1 1 5 1 0 0 6
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_mass CO2 Canister Mass 2 1 5 1 0 0 6
2.1.10 Provide Fire Detection and Suppression Fire_extinguisher Not included 0 0 4 1 0 0 6
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_density lbm/in^3 0.296 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2 Provide Metabolic Oxygen O2_crew_day_rate kg/person/day 0.835 0 5 0 0 0 2
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_FoS Storage Tank FOS 1.5 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen PaO2 psi - Apollo all Oxygen 5.2 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_radius_length_ratio ratio 1 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_temperature Celsius 26.67 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_pressure psi 840 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_yield_strength psi 142000 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_redundancy Redundancy in Oxygen 2 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Oxygen_tank_insulation Use same as MMOD 1 1 4 2 0 0 7
2.1.2.2 Transport Oxygen Oxygen_gas_transport_lines Assume 1/2 inch line 1 1 5 2 0 0 7
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_relief_valve Used 1/2 ISS regulator valve 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve Used 1/2 ISS relief valve 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
2.1.2.4 Measure pp Oxygen Level in Cabin Air Oxygen_pp_gauge Not included 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_temperature Celsius 26.67 0 4 0 0 0 7
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_pressure psi 840 0 4 0 0 0 7
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas Nitrogen_tank_insulation Use same as MMOD 0 0 4 2 0 0 7
2.1.3.2 Transport Makeup Gas Nitrogen_gas_transport_lines Assume1/2 inch line 0 0 4 2 0 0 7
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve Used 1/2 ISS relief valve 0 0 4 2 1 0 7
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve Used 1/2 ISS regulator valve 0 0 4 2 0 0 9
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Table E.3: ECLSS input variables list (continued). 
 
 
Table E.4: Power and Thermal input variables list. 
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ECLSS
2.1.5 Remove Particulates Particulates_filter Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Filter 1 1 2 1 1 0 5
2.1.6 Remove Humidity Humidity_percent Percent (40% = 0.4) 0.6 0 3 0 0 0 7
2.1.6.2 Condense Cabin Air Condense_air_heat_exchanger Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Conds Heat Exch 1 1 3 1 0 0 7
2.1.6.1 Provide Humidity Separator Humidity_capture Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Separator 1 1 3 1 0 0 5
2.1.7.1 Provide Air Circ Bypass Mix_air_valve Assumed Spacelab 1/2 TCV 1 1 2 1 2 0 7
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Cabin_temp Celsius 22.05 0 2 0 0 0 6
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Temperature_sensor Assumed Shuttle 1 1 1 1 1 0 6
2.1.8.1 Circulate Air Cabin_fan Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Fan 1 1 4 1 0 1 7
2.1.8.2 Return Air Return_air_ducts Unknown - Assumed 4 in diameterflex line 1 1 1 1 1 0 4
2.1.8.3 Output Air Direct_air_ducts Unknown - Assumed 4 in diameterflex line 1 1 1 1 1 0 4
2.1.9.1 Provide Air Pressure Sensor Air_Pressure_gauge Assumed Shuttle Sensor 1 1 4 1 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_leak_percent  %/day 0.05 0 4 0 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_atm_pressure psi 5.2 0 5 0 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_air_control Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Cabin Temp Control 1 1 3 1 0 0 7
2.2.1 Store Food Food_storage Assumed in Food mass 0 0 3 1 0 0 4
2.2.1 Store Food Food_rate kg/person/day 1 1 3 1 0 0 4
2.2.2 Prepare Food Galley_supplies kg/person/day 0 0 1 1 2 0 4
2.2.2 Prepare Food Heat_food Assumed HSMAD 0 0 1 1 2 0 4
2.3.1 Provide Potable Water Potable_water kg/person/day 1 1 4 2 0 0 5
2.3.2 Provide Hygiene Water Hygiene_water kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 2 0 5
2.4.1 Collect Urine Urine_bags kg/person/day 1 1 1 1 0 0 4
2.4.2 Collect Fecal Solids Diapers kg/person/day 0 0 1 1 0 0 4
2.4.2.2 Control Odor Control_odor kg/person/day 0 0 1 1 2 0 3
2.4.2.3 WCS supplies WCS_supplies kg/person/day 1 1 1 1 2 0 3
2.4.3 Collect Liquid Waste Vacuum Assumed HSMAD 0 0 1 1 2 0 6
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Trash_bags kg/person/day 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Housecleaning_supplies kg/person/day 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
2.4.5 Jettison Liquid Waste Dump_Valve_Piping Assumed ISS Overboard Water 1 1 2 1 2 0 7
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Power
5.1 Provide Power Batteries Adapted from Apollo 2 1 5 2 0 1 7
5.1 Provide Power Depth_of_Discharge 1 0 5 0 0 0 7
5.1 Provide Power Duty_cycle_coast 1 0 5 0 0 0 7
5.2 Distribute Power Power_Distr_Wiring Adapted from Apollo 2 1 5 2 0 0 7
5.3 Regulate Power Power_Distr_Controller Power Controller ECA 2 1 5 2 0 1 8
5.3 Regulate Power Power_inverters Power Inverter 2 1 5 2 0 1 8
5.3 Regulate Power Power_relays Power relay - Electronic 2 1 5 2 0 1 7
5.6 Provide Overload Protection Power_Distr_CircBreak Panels/Circuit Breakers 2 1 4 1 1 0 7
Thermal
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplate_min_power Minimum watts for a coldplate 20 0 4 0 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_capacity Watts of heat removed single loo 500 0 4 0 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_diameter inches 0.518 0 4 0 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Thermal_interior_fluid_density kg/m3 1040 0 4 0 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Coolant_piping kg/m3 1 1 4 1 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplates 5.25 kg/kW derived from Apollo 1 1 4 1 0 0 6
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_pumps Assumed Shuttle Water Pump 1 1 4 1 0 0 7
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_lines_valves Assumed Shuttle Check Valve 1 1 4 1 0 0 8
10.3 Remove Heat Interior_exterior_heat_exchanger 3.2 kg/kW derived from Apollo 2 1 4 1 0 0 7
10.3 Remove Heat Water_system_sublimators Latent Heat of Vaporization 2501.3 0 4 2 0 0 7
10.3 Remove Heat Exterior_radiators Radiator Panels 0 0 4 2 0 0 8
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Table E.5: Secondary Structures and Structures input variables list. 
 
 
Table E.6: Propulsion input variables list. 
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Secondary Structures
1.4 Support Internal Subsystems and ComponenSecondary_struct_ratio ratio 0.21 0 4 0 0 0 6
Structures
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety Structural FoS 1.41 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety_PV_skin Structural FoS 2.00 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Interior_diameter_hab_volume meters 2.159 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Cylinder_length_hab_volume meters 1.455 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Packaging_efficiency ratio 0.35 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Protrusion_ratio (0.001 -0.25) 0.065 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_yield_strength psi 73000 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_density lbm/in^3 0.102 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Elasticity 10^6 psi 10.4 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Rigidity 10^6 psi 3.9 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Max_acceleration_gs gs of acceleration 4.7 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_hoops Odd Number 19 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_stringers Multiple of 4 20 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Height_to_base_ratio ratio 8.2 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Fillet_ratio ratio 0.1 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.5.3 Provide Docking Mechanism for Lunar HabLIDS_published_weight lbs 870 0 4 0 0 0 8
1.5.1 Support Docking Mechanism for Lunar AscDocking_ring_load_Force lbf 23300 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent MLIDS_tunnel_diameter inches 32 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent MLIDS_tunnel_height inches 16 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_width inches 32 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_height inches 32 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_corner_radius_ratio ratio 5.33 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_flange_ratio ratio 20 0 4 0 0 0 6
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_material_density lbm/in^3 0.091402 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_pane_thickness inches 0.2 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_width_horizontal inches 18 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_length inches 17 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_corner_radius_ratio ratio 4 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_frame_ratio ratio 4 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_position_angle degrees 45 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_center_height inches 60 0 5 0 0 0 7
1.6.2 Provide Docking Viewing Ports Docking_window area in^2 60 0 4 0 0 0 7
1.6.3 Provide Aft Viewing Ports Aft_window area in^2 40 0 3 0 0 0 7
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection MMOD_standoff Minimum standoff inches 3 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_time_days days 8.6 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection PNP_target Probability 0.9995 0 5 0 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection TPS_blanket kg/m^2 - 1" Thermal Blanket 6pc 2.15 3 4 0 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_altitude km 350 0 5 0 0 0 6
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Propulsion
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Specific_impulse Isp (seconds) 311.7 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Vacuum_thrust N (newtons) 15746 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_weight_thrust_ratio ratio 3.17 0 5 0 0 0 9
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Gravity_constant m/s2 9.81 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_gravity_parameter km3/sec2 4902.87 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_radius km 1738 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_apogee_altitude km 78.71 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_perigee_altitude km 16.67 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_azimuth degrees North 270 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_latitude degrees 26.1322 0 1 0 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_longitude degrees 3.63386 0 1 0 0 0 0
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Table E.6: Propulsion input variables list (continued). 
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Propulsion
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer_fuel_ratio ratio 1.61 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.1.2 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_density kg/m3 1450 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.1 Provide Main Engine Fuel Fuel_density kg/m3 903 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press psi 179 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.11 Provide Contingency Propellant Contingency_propellant ratio 0.031 0 4 0 1 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_pressure psi 3050 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.2.3 Provide RCS Pressurant Pressurant_pressure_RCS psi 3050 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_tank_temperature degrees K 294.26 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_ratio_spec_heats ratio 1.667 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_gas_constant R J/kg*K 2076.9 0 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_material_density lbm/in^3 0.16 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_yield_strength psi 140000 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_factor_of_safety FoS 1.5 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_unused_fraction ratio 0.01 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.2.7 Store RCS Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press_RCS psi 179 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.9 Transport Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_line_id m 0.0254 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.5 Transport Main Engine Pressurant Main_engine_pressurant_line_id m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.2.9 Transport RCS Propellant Propulsion_line_id_RCS m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.2.5 Transport RCS Pressurant Pressurant_line_id_RCS m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 0 7
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_linear_slope linear_slope kg/kN 0.5786 0 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_y_intercept linear_curve_intercept - kg 65 0 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.12 Support Main Engine Components Propulsion_secondary_struct_ratio ratio 0.2 0 5 0 0 0 6
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_side_A_B_choice Integer, 1,2,3 2 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Specific_impulse_RCS Isp (seconds) 240 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Vacuum_thrust_RCS N (newtons) 444.822 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_linear_slope linear_slope kg/kN 6.48 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_y_intercept linear_curve_intercept - kg 0 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_RCS_engines_system Integer, 4,8,16 8 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_fire_RCS_thrust_ascent Num firing during ascent 0.57 0 5 0 0 0 9
11.2.11 Provide RCS contingency propellant RCS_additional_propellant_mass Rendezvous -kg 96.2 3 4 0 1 0 3
11.1.13 Insulate Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation Use same as TPS 1 1 4 2 0 0 4
11.2.13 Insulate RCS Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation_RCS Placeholder 1 1 4 2 0 0 4
11.2.1 Provide RCS Propellant RCS_propellant Placeholder 1 1 5 0 0 0 3
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_valve kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_filter kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve kg 2 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_trim_orifice kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 5
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_filter kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_isolation_valve kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_valve kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_filter kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_check_valve kg 2 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_trim_orifice kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 5
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_filter kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_isolation_valve kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_bipropellant_valve kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_valve_RCS kg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_filter_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_orifice_RCS kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 5
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_RCkg 2 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 6
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.2.10.2 Control RCS Oxidizer Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.2.10.1 Control RCS Fuel Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.2.9.1 Filter RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.2.10 Control RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS kg 1 1 5 2 0 0 9
11.2.14.2 Heat RCS Oxidizer lines Oxidizer_heater_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 6
11.2.14.1 Heat RCS Fuel lines Fuel_heater_RCS kg 1 1 4 2 1 0 6
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve kg 2 1 4 2 1 0 9
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter kg 2 1 4 2 1 0 7
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve kg 2 1 4 2 1 0 9
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter kg 2 1 4 2 1 0 7
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Table E.7: Avionics technology database. 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass Error 
(+/-,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m) Power (W)
Abort_control 0.91 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 2
Abort_guidance 14.74 5 0.603 0.203 0.133 96
Abort_input 3.40 5 0.140 0.152 0.132 10
Abort_navigation 9.38 5 0.130 0.229 0.292 74
Computer_keyboard 7.71 5 0.203 0.203 0.178 25
Control_propulsion 10.75 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 50
Control_propulsion_thrusters 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_control 7.44 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_navigation 15.79 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_subsystems 5.35 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Data_bus_network_boxes 15.99 5 0.203 0.133 0.607 15
Data_storage 1.13 5 0.052 0.102 0.158 10
Flight_control_computer 31.75 5 0.152 0.318 0.610 70
Flight_roll_pitch_yaw 2.16 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Flight_translation 2.38 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Health_monitoring_computer 8.30 5 0.178 0.171 0.298 13
IMU 19.10 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 100
Instrumentation_comm 1.27 5 0.084 0.224 0.284 25
Instrumentation_sensors_CA 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_CDH 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Comm 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS 2.68 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_Flight 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Health 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Payload 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Power 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion 2.45 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_RCS 2.22 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_voice_comm 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Long_range_amplifier 4.24 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
Long_range_antenna 0.18 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Long_range_data_processor 4.72 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 27
Long_range_steerable_antenna 12.47 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 60
Long_range_transceiver 4.54 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 18
Master_event_controllers 10.25 5 0.171 0.130 0.502 11
Misc_avionics 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Multiplexer_demultiplexers 15.88 5 0.140 0.288 0.508 25
Nav_analog_digital 6.80 5 0.064 0.279 0.330 25
Nav_base 1.36 5 0.287 0.287 0.287 0
Nav_power 9.07 5 0.067 0.225 0.597 100
Ordeal 3.13 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 4
Rendezvous_radar 35.43 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 95
Short_range_antenna 1.09 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Short_range_data_processor 1.18 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 5
Short_range_transceiver 2.97 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
Star_tracker 10.48 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table E.8: EVA technology database. 
 
 
Table E.9: Payloads technology database. 
 
 
Table E.10: Power technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
EVA_mobility 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Spacesuits 33.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Suit_umbilical 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Science_return 115.62 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Consumable_equipment 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
General_return 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Photography 19.00 5 0.437 0.437 0.437 0
Tools_equipment 1.67 5 0.149 0.149 0.149 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Batteries 154.27 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 1000
Power_Distr_CircBreak 17.89 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_Distr_Controller 4.76 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_Distr_Wiring 47.14 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_inverters 6.98 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_relays 4.56 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table E.11: Thermal technology database. 
 
 
Table E.12: Crew Accommodations technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Coldplates 5.50 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exterior_radiators 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_coolant_lines_valves 0.90 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_coolant_pumps 1.88 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Cabin_lighting 1.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 25
CA_handholds 0.60 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
CA_restraints 4.16 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Clothing 1.53 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Entertainment 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exercise 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exterior_lighting 6.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 100
Medical_kit 0.32 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Operational_supplies 6.50 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Panel_lighting 1.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 25
Personal_storage 1.66 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Sleep_accommodations 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
369 
 
 
Table E.13: ECLSS technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Oxygen_tank_relief_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Air_Pressure_gauge 0.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Cabin_air_control 2.22 5 0.006 0.006 0.006 16
Cabin_fan 4.65 5 0.002 0.002 0.002 70
Condense_air_heat_exchanger 8.89 5 0.045 0.045 0.045 0
Control_odor 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Diapers 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Dump_Valve_Piping 1.46 5 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
Fecal_bags 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Fire_extinguisher 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Food_rate 2.30 5 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
Food_storage 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Galley_supplies 0.50 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
Heat_food 5.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Housecleaning_supplies 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Humidity_capture 1.28 5 0.004 0.004 0.004 0
Hygiene_water 4.10 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Mix_air_valve 1.15 5 0.008 0.008 0.008 0
Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_pp_gauge 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Particulates_filter 1.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Potable_water 1.60 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Temperature_sensor 0.08 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Trace_Contaminants_filter 1.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Trash_bags 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Urine_bags 0.23 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Vacuum 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
WCS_supplies 0.05 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
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Table E.14: Propulsion technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_bipropellant_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_filter 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_heater_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_isolation_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS 0.11 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS 0.11 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_check_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_filter 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_trim_orifice 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_filter 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_heater_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_isolation_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_filter 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_trim_orifice 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_filter_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_orifice_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
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APPENDIX F 
APOLLO ONE MAN INPUT VARIABLE TABLES 
 
 The following tables were copied from the Microsoft Excel input file for the CLAMP 
analysis.  The tables are grouped according to subsystems. 
 
Table F.1: Crew, Mission Time, and Avionics input variables list. 
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0.1.1 Number of Crew Crew_members Num of Crew 1 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.2 Maximum Mission Time Mission_Duration_HRS Mission hours 6.18 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.3 Minimum Mission Time Mission_Duration_HRS_min Absolute Minimum Mission ho 1.33 0 1 0 0 0
Avionics
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_transceiver S-Band Transceiver -2 0 0 3 0 1 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_amplifier Power_amp & diplex - 1 0 0 3 0 1 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_antenna S_Band Inflight Antennas - 2 0 0 3 2 0 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_steerable_antenna Steerable Antenna - 1 0 0 3 0 0 8
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_data_processor Signal Processor Assy 1 1 4 0 1 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_transceiver VHF Xceiver and diplex 2 1 4 0 1 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_antenna VHF Antenna 2 1 4 0 0 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_data_processor VHF Ranging 1 1 4 0 1 7
6.1.3 Communicate between suited crewmembe Interior_voice_comm In VHF Xceiver 0 0 3 0 1 6
7.1 Sense Subsystem Commands Data_bus_network_boxes Signal conditioner Assy -2 2 1 5 0 1 6
7.2 Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands Master_event_controllers PCMETA -1 1 1 5 0 1 6
7.3 Send Commands to Subsystems Sensor_comm_wiring Wire harness A&B 1 1 5 0 0 7
7.4 Store Spacecraft Data Data_storage Data Storage 1 1 3 1 1 6
8.1.1 Monitor Subsystem Data Health_monitoring_computer Caution and Warning 1 1 4 1 1 6
8.2.1 Monitor ECS Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS ECS Sensors - total mass 0 0 3 2 0 7
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion Prop Sensors - total mass 1 1 5 0 0 8
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_RCS RCS Sensors - total mass 1 1 5 0 0 8
8.2.2 Monitor Crew Accommodations Instrumentation_sensors_CA CA Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.3 Monitor Payload Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Payload Payload Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.4 Monitor Power Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Power Power Sensors 0 0 2 0 0 7
8.2.5 Monitor Communication Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Comm Comm Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.6 Monitor Command and Data Handling (C& Instrumentation_sensors_CDH CDH Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.7 Monitor Health Monitoring Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Health Health Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.8 Monitor Flight Control Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Flight Flight Sensors 0 0 5 0 0 7
8.2.9 Monitor Thermal Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal Thermal Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.9 Monitor Structures Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Structural Structural Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs IMU IMU 1 1 5 0 1 8
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_base IMU mounting 1 1 5 0 0 4
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_power Power and Servo Assy 1 1 5 0 1 6
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Star_tracker AOT Telescope / Computer Control and Reticle dimme 1 1 4 0 0 5
9.1.2 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs Nav_analog_digital Pulse Torque Assembly 1 1 5 0 1 6
9.1.3 Output Navigation to Guidance Multiplexer_demultiplexers Coupling Data Unit 1 1 5 0 1 7
9.2.1 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance Flight_control_computer LM Guidance Computer 1 1 5 0 1 8
9.2.2 Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation_comm Signal Conditioner Assy 2 1 5 0 1 7
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_roll_pitch_yaw ACA - Attitude Controller Assembly 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_translation TTCA - Thrust and translation controller assembly 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.2 Input Human Navigation to Computer Computer_keyboard DSKD 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.3 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion Control_propulsion ATCA - Attitude and Translation Control Assy 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.4 Display Spacecraft Control Crew_displays_control Panel 3 4 5 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.5 Display Spacecraft Navigation Crew_displays_navigation Panel 1 2 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.6 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems Crew_displays_subsystems Panel 6 8 11 12 14 16 1 1 4 0 0 8
9.4.1 Sense Spacecraft Abort Position Abort_navigation Abort Sensor Assy 1 1 5 1 1 8
9.4.2 Sense Spacecraft Abort Velocity Inputs Abort_control Rate Gyro Assy 1 1 5 1 1 7
9.4.3 Calculate Spacecraft Abort Trajectory Abort_guidance Abort Electronics Assy 1 1 5 1 1 8
9.4.4 Input Abort Commands Abort_input DEDA -Data Entry and Display Assembly 1 1 5 1 0 8
9.5 Provide Rendezvous Guidance Rendezvous_radar Rendezvous Radar 1 1 4 0 0 10
9.6 Provide Inertial Reference Ordeal Ordeal 0 0 2 2 0 6
9.7 Provide Additional Avionics Misc_avionics Misc Avionics 0 0 1 2 0 4
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Table F.2: EVA, Crew Accommodations, and Payloads input variables list. 
 
 
Table F.3: ECLSS input variables list. 
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EVAs
12.1.1 Provide Space Suit Spacesuits Pressure Suit, no PLSS 1 1 3 1 0 8
12.2.1 Provide Mobility Aids EVA_mobility Mobility devices 0 0 1 0 0 6
12.2.2 Provide Umbilical Suit_umbilical Umbilical hoses 0 0 3 0 0 7
Crew Accommodations
3.1.1 Provide Cabin Lighting Cabin_lighting Lighting - normalized to one day 1 1 2 1 0 5
3.1.2 Provide Panel Lighting Panel_lighting Assumed same as cabin light 1 1 3 0 0 6
3.1.3 Provide Light for Exterior Viewing Exterior_lighting Lighting 2 1 3 1 0 7
3.1.4 Provide Restraints CA_restraints kg 1 1 2 1 0 4
3.1.5 Provide Handholds CA_handholds handholds 1 1 1 2 0 4
3.2.1 Provide Personal Storage Personal_storage kg/person/day -normalized from HSMAD 0 0 1 0 0 2
3.2.2 Provide Additional Clothing Storage Clothing kg/person/day - normalized from HSMAD 0 0 1 0 0 3
3.2.3 Provide Entertainment Entertainment Not included 0 0 1 0 0 5
3.3.2 Provide Medical Kit Storage Medical_kit kg/day-normalized from HSMAS 1 1 3 1 0 5
3.3.3 Provide Exercise Capability Exercise Not included 0 0 1 0 0 6
3.3.4 Provide Sleep Accommodations Sleep_accommodations Not included 0 0 1 0 0 4
3.3.5 Provide Operational Supplies Operational_supplies kg/person 1 1 3 1 0 6
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_consumables kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 4
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_kit kg/person 0 0 1 2 0 4
Payloads
4.1.1 Provide Science Payload Storage Science_return http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029 1 1 1 2 0 6
4.1.2 Provide General Payload Storage General_return Not included 0 0 1 2 0 6
4.2.1 Provide Tools Storage Tools_equipment 1.67 kg estimated 1 1 2 1 0 5
4.2.2 Provide Consumable Equipment Storage Consumable_equipment Not included 0 0 2 0 0 6
4.2.3 Provide Space Suit Storage Spacesuit_storage Not included 1 0 0 2
4.2.4 Provide Photography Equipment Photography 19kg estimated Lunar Mission 1 1 1 2 0 9
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ECLSS
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_crew_day_rate kg/person/day 0.998 0 5 0 0 6
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_rate CO2 Canister Perf 1 1 5 0 0 6
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_mass CO2 Canister Mass 2 1 5 0 0 6
2.1.10 Provide Fire Detection and Suppression Fire_extinguisher Not included 0 0 4 0 0 6
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_density lbm/in^3 0.296 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2 Provide Metabolic Oxygen O2_crew_day_rate kg/person/day 0.835 0 5 0 0 2
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_FoS Storage Tank FOS 1.5 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen PaO2 psi - Apollo all Oxygen 5.2 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_radius_length_ratio ratio 1 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_temperature Celsius 26.67 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_pressure psi 840 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_yield_strength psi 142000 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_redundancy Redundancy in Oxygen 2 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Oxygen_tank_insulation Use same as MMOD 1 1 4 0 0 7
2.1.2.2 Transport Oxygen Oxygen_gas_transport_lines Assume 1/2 inch line 1 1 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_relief_valve Used 1/2 ISS regulator valve 1 1 4 1 0 7
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve Used 1/2 ISS relief valve 1 1 5 0 0 9
2.1.2.4 Measure pp Oxygen Level in Cabin Air Oxygen_pp_gauge Not included 0 0 4 0 0 5
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_temperature Celsius 26.67 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_pressure psi 840 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas Nitrogen_tank_insulation Use same as MMOD 0 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.2 Transport Makeup Gas Nitrogen_gas_transport_lines Assume1/2 inch line 0 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve Used 1/2 ISS relief valve 0 0 4 1 0 7
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve Used 1/2 ISS regulator valve 0 0 4 0 0 9
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Table F.3: ECLSS input variables list (continued). 
 
 
Table F.4: Power and Thermal input variables list. 
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ECLSS
2.1.4 Remove Trace Contaminants Trace_Contaminants_filter Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Filter 1 1 2 1 0 5
2.1.5 Remove Particulates Particulates_filter Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Filter 1 1 2 1 0 5
2.1.6 Remove Humidity Humidity_percent Percent (40% = 0.4) 0.6 0 3 0 0 7
2.1.6.2 Condense Cabin Air Condense_air_heat_exchanger Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Conds Heat Exch 1 1 3 0 0 7
2.1.6.1 Provide Humidity Separator Humidity_capture Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Separator 1 1 3 0 0 5
2.1.7.1 Provide Air Circ Bypass Mix_air_valve Assumed Spacelab 1/2 TCV 1 1 2 2 0 7
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Cabin_temp Celsius 22.05 0 2 0 0 6
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Temperature_sensor Assumed Shuttle 1 1 1 1 0 6
2.1.8.1 Circulate Air Cabin_fan Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Fan 1 1 4 0 1 7
2.1.8.2 Return Air Return_air_ducts Unknown - Assumed 4 in diameterflex line 1 1 1 1 0 4
2.1.8.3 Output Air Direct_air_ducts Unknown - Assumed 4 in diameterflex line 1 1 1 1 0 4
2.1.9.1 Provide Air Pressure Sensor Air_Pressure_gauge Assumed Shuttle Sensor 1 1 4 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_leak_percent  %/day 0.05 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_atm_pressure psi 5.2 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_air_control Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Cabin Temp Control 1 1 3 0 0 7
2.2.1 Store Food Food_storage Assumed in Food mass 0 0 3 0 0 4
2.2.1 Store Food Food_rate kg/person/day 1 1 3 0 0 4
2.2.2 Prepare Food Galley_supplies kg/person/day 0 0 1 2 0 4
2.2.2 Prepare Food Heat_food Assumed HSMAD 0 0 1 2 0 4
2.3.1 Provide Potable Water Potable_water kg/person/day 1 1 4 0 0 5
2.3.2 Provide Hygiene Water Hygiene_water kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 5
2.4.1 Collect Urine Urine_bags kg/person/day 1 1 1 0 0 4
2.4.2 Collect Fecal Solids Diapers kg/person/day 0 0 1 0 0 4
2.4.2.2 Control Odor Control_odor kg/person/day 0 0 1 2 0 3
2.4.2.3 WCS supplies WCS_supplies kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 3
2.4.3 Collect Liquid Waste Vacuum Assumed HSMAD 0 0 1 2 0 6
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Trash_bags kg/person/day 0 0 1 0 0 3
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Housecleaning_supplies kg/person/day 0 0 1 0 0 3
2.4.5 Jettison Liquid Waste Dump_Valve_Piping Assumed ISS Overboard Water 1 1 2 2 0 7
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Power
5.1 Provide Power Batteries Adapted from Apollo 2 1 5 0 1 7
5.1 Provide Power Depth_of_Discharge 1 0 5 0 0 7
5.1 Provide Power Duty_cycle_coast 1 0 5 0 0 7
5.2 Distribute Power Power_Distr_Wiring Adapted from Apollo 2 1 5 0 0 7
5.3 Regulate Power Power_Distr_Controller Power Controller ECA 2 1 5 0 1 8
5.3 Regulate Power Power_inverters Power Inverter 2 1 5 0 1 8
5.3 Regulate Power Power_relays Power relay - Electronic 2 1 5 0 1 7
5.6 Provide Overload Protection Power_Distr_CircBreak Panels/Circuit Breakers 2 1 4 1 0 7
Thermal
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplate_min_power Minimum watts for a coldplate 20 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_capacity Watts of heat removed single 500 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_diameter inches 0.518 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Thermal_interior_fluid_density kg/m3 1040 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Coolant_piping kg/m3 1 1 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplates 5.25 kg/kW derived from Apollo 1 1 4 0 0 6
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_pumps Assumed Shuttle Water Pump 1 1 4 0 0 7
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_lines_valves Assumed Shuttle Check Valve 1 1 4 0 0 8
10.3 Remove Heat Interior_exterior_heat_exchanger 3.2 kg/kW derived from Apollo 2 1 4 0 0 7
10.3 Remove Heat Water_system_sublimators Latent Heat of Vaporization 2501.3 0 4 0 0 7
10.3 Remove Heat Exterior_radiators Radiator Panels 0 0 4 0 0 8
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Table F.5: Secondary Structures and Structures input variables list. 
 
 
Table F.6: Propulsion input variables list. 
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Secondary Structures
1.4 Support Internal Subsystems and ComponenSecondary_struct_ratio ratio 0.21 0 4 0 0 6
Structures
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety Structural FoS 1.41 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety_PV_skin Structural FoS 2.00 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Interior_diameter_hab_volume meters 2 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Cylinder_length_hab_volume meters 0.762 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Packaging_efficiency ratio 0.55 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Protrusion_ratio (0.001 -0.25) 0.065 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_yield_strength psi 73000 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_density lbm/in^3 0.102 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Elasticity 10^6 psi 10.4 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Rigidity 10^6 psi 3.9 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Max_acceleration_gs gs of acceleration 4.7 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_hoops Odd Number 15 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_stringers Multiple of 4 20 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Height_to_base_ratio ratio 8.2 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Fillet_ratio ratio 0.1 0 5 0 0 6
1.5.3 Provide Docking Mechanism for Lunar HabLIDS_published_weight lbs 870 0 4 0 0 8
1.5.1 Support Docking Mechanism for Lunar AscDocking_ring_load_Force lbf 23300 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent MLIDS_tunnel_diameter inches 32 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent MLIDS_tunnel_height inches 16 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_width inches 32 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_height inches 32 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_corner_radius_ratio ratio 5.33 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_flange_ratio ratio 20 0 4 0 0 6
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_material_density lbm/in^3 0.091402 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_pane_thickness inches 0.2 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_width_horizontal inches 18 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_length inches 17 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_corner_radius_ratio ratio 4 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_frame_ratio ratio 4 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_position_angle degrees 45 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_center_height inches 60 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.2 Provide Docking Viewing Ports Docking_window area in^2 60 0 4 0 0 7
1.6.3 Provide Aft Viewing Ports Aft_window area in^2 40 0 3 0 0 7
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection MMOD_standoff Minimum standoff inches 3 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_time_days days 8.6 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection PNP_target Probability 0.9995 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection TPS_blanket kg/m^2 - 1" Thermal Blanket 6 2.15 3 4 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_altitude km 350 0 5 0 0 6
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Propulsion
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Specific_impulse Isp (seconds) 311.7 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Vacuum_thrust N (newtons) 15746 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_weight_thrust_ratio ratio 3.17 0 5 0 0 9
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Gravity_constant m/s2 9.81 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_gravity_parameter km3/sec2 4902.87 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_radius km 1738 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_apogee_altitude km 78.71 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_perigee_altitude km 16.67 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_azimuth degrees North 270 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_latitude degrees 26.1322 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_longitude degrees 3.63386 0 1 0 0 0
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Table F.6: Propulsion input variables list (continued). 
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Propulsion
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer_fuel_ratio ratio 1.61 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.2 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_density kg/m3 1450 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.1 Provide Main Engine Fuel Fuel_density kg/m3 903 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press psi 179 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.11 Provide Contingency Propellant Contingency_propellant ratio 0.031 0 4 1 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_pressure psi 3050 0 5 0 0 3
11.2.3 Provide RCS Pressurant Pressurant_pressure_RCS psi 3050 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_tank_temperature degrees K 294.26 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_ratio_spec_heats ratio 1.667 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_gas_constant R J/kg*K 2076.9 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_material_density lbm/in^3 0.16 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_yield_strength psi 140000 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_factor_of_safety FoS 1.5 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_unused_fraction ratio 0.01 0 5 0 0 7
11.2.7 Store RCS Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press_RCS psi 179 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.9 Transport Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_line_id m 0.0254 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.5 Transport Main Engine Pressurant Main_engine_pressurant_line_id m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 7
11.2.9 Transport RCS Propellant Propulsion_line_id_RCS m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 7
11.2.5 Transport RCS Pressurant Pressurant_line_id_RCS m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_linear_slope linear_slope kg/kN 0.5786 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_y_intercept linear_curve_intercept - kg 65 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.12 Support Main Engine Components Propulsion_secondary_struct_ratio ratio 0.2 0 5 0 0 6
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_side_A_B_choice Integer, 1,2,3 2 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Specific_impulse_RCS Isp (seconds) 240 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Vacuum_thrust_RCS N (newtons) 444.822 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_linear_slope linear_slope kg/kN 6.48 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_y_intercept linear_curve_intercept - kg 0 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_RCS_engines_system Integer, 4,8,16 8 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_fire_RCS_thrust_ascent Num firing during ascent 0.57 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.11 Provide RCS contingency propellant RCS_additional_propellant_mass Rendezvous -kg 96.2 3 4 1 0 3
11.1.13 Insulate Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation Use same as TPS 1 1 4 0 0 4
11.2.13 Insulate RCS Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation_RCS Placeholder 1 1 4 0 0 4
11.2.1 Provide RCS Propellant RCS_propellant Placeholder 1 1 5 0 0 3
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_valve kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_filter kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_trim_orifice kg 1 1 5 0 0 5
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_filter kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_isolation_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_valve kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_filter kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_check_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_trim_orifice kg 1 1 5 0 0 5
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_filter kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_isolation_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_bipropellant_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_valve_RCS kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_filter_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_orifice_RCS kg 1 1 5 0 0 5
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_Rkg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 6
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.10.2 Control RCS Oxidizer Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.10.1 Control RCS Fuel Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.9.1 Filter RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.10 Control RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS kg 1 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.14.2 Heat RCS Oxidizer lines Oxidizer_heater_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 6
11.2.14.1 Heat RCS Fuel lines Fuel_heater_RCS kg 1 1 4 1 0 6
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 9
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 9
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
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Table F.7: Avionics technology database. 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass Error 
(+/-,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m) Power (W)
Abort_control 0.91 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 2
Abort_guidance 14.74 5 0.603 0.203 0.133 96
Abort_input 3.40 5 0.140 0.152 0.132 10
Abort_navigation 9.38 5 0.130 0.229 0.292 74
Computer_keyboard 7.71 5 0.203 0.203 0.178 25
Control_propulsion 10.75 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 50
Control_propulsion_thrusters 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_control 7.44 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_navigation 15.79 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_subsystems 5.35 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Data_bus_network_boxes 15.99 5 0.203 0.133 0.607 15
Data_storage 1.13 5 0.052 0.102 0.158 10
Flight_control_computer 31.75 5 0.152 0.318 0.610 70
Flight_roll_pitch_yaw 2.16 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Flight_translation 2.38 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Health_monitoring_computer 8.30 5 0.178 0.171 0.298 13
IMU 19.10 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 100
Instrumentation_comm 1.27 5 0.084 0.224 0.284 25
Instrumentation_sensors_CA 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_CDH 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Comm 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS 2.68 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_Flight 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Health 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Payload 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Power 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion 2.45 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_RCS 2.22 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_voice_comm 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Long_range_amplifier 4.24 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
Long_range_antenna 0.18 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Long_range_data_processor 4.72 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 27
Long_range_steerable_antenna 12.47 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 60
Long_range_transceiver 4.54 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 18
Master_event_controllers 10.25 5 0.171 0.130 0.502 11
Misc_avionics 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Multiplexer_demultiplexers 15.88 5 0.140 0.288 0.508 25
Nav_analog_digital 6.80 5 0.064 0.279 0.330 25
Nav_base 1.36 5 0.287 0.287 0.287 0
Nav_power 9.07 5 0.067 0.225 0.597 100
Ordeal 3.13 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 4
Rendezvous_radar 35.43 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 95
Short_range_antenna 1.09 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Short_range_data_processor 1.18 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 5
Short_range_transceiver 2.97 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
Star_tracker 10.48 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table F.8: EVA technology database. 
 
 
Table F.9: Payloads technology database. 
 
 
Table F.10: Power technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
EVA_mobility 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Spacesuits 33.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Suit_umbilical 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Science_return 115.62 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Consumable_equipment 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
General_return 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Photography 19.00 5 0.437 0.437 0.437 0
Tools_equipment 1.67 5 0.149 0.149 0.149 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Batteries 154.27 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 1000
Power_Distr_CircBreak 17.89 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_Distr_Controller 4.76 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_Distr_Wiring 47.14 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_inverters 6.98 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_relays 4.56 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table F.11: Thermal technology database. 
 
 
Table F.12: Crew Accommodations technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Coldplates 5.50 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exterior_radiators 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_coolant_lines_valves 0.90 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_coolant_pumps 1.88 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Cabin_lighting 1.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 25
CA_handholds 0.60 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
CA_restraints 4.16 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Clothing 1.53 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Entertainment 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exercise 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exterior_lighting 6.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 100
Medical_kit 0.32 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Operational_supplies 6.50 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Panel_lighting 1.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 25
Personal_storage 1.66 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Sleep_accommodations 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table F.13: ECLSS technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Oxygen_tank_relief_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Air_Pressure_gauge 0.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Cabin_air_control 2.22 5 0.006 0.006 0.006 16
Cabin_fan 4.65 5 0.002 0.002 0.002 70
Condense_air_heat_exchanger 8.89 5 0.045 0.045 0.045 0
Control_odor 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Diapers 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Dump_Valve_Piping 1.46 5 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
Fecal_bags 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Fire_extinguisher 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Food_rate 2.30 5 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
Food_storage 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Galley_supplies 0.50 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
Heat_food 5.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Housecleaning_supplies 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Humidity_capture 1.28 5 0.004 0.004 0.004 0
Hygiene_water 4.10 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Mix_air_valve 1.15 5 0.008 0.008 0.008 0
Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_pp_gauge 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Particulates_filter 1.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Potable_water 1.60 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Temperature_sensor 0.08 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Trace_Contaminants_filter 1.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Trash_bags 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Urine_bags 0.23 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Vacuum 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
WCS_supplies 0.05 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
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Table F.14: Propulsion technology database. 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve 0.76 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_bipropellant_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_filter 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_heater_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_isolation_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS 0.11 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS 0.11 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_check_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_filter 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_trim_orifice 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_filter 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_heater_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_isolation_valve 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_filter 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve 0.83 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS 0.60 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_trim_orifice 0.70 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_filter_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_orifice_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_valve_RCS 0.51 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
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APPENDIX G 
ESAS CONFIGURATION INPUT VARIABLE TABLES 
 
 The following tables were copied from the Microsoft Excel input file for the CLAMP 
analysis.  The tables are grouped according to subsystems. 
 
Table G.1: Crew, Mission Time, and Avionics input variables list. 
 
Function Variable_Keyword Units Va
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0.1.1 Number of Crew Crew_members Num of Crew 4 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.2 Maximum Mission Time Mission_Duration_HRS Mission hours 3 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.3 Minimum Mission Time Mission_Duration_HRS_min Absolute Minimum Mission hours 1.33 0 1 0 0 0
Avionics
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_transceiver S-Band Transceiver -2 2 1 3 0 1 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_amplifier Power_amp & diplex - 1 2 1 3 0 1 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_antenna S_Band Inflight Antennas - 2 2 1 3 0 0 7
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_steerable_antenna Steerable Antenna - 1 1 1 3 0 0 8
6.1.1 Communicate with Earth ground station Long_range_data_processor Signal Processor Assy 2 1 4 0 1 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_transceiver VHF Xceiver and diplex 2 1 4 0 1 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_antenna VHF Antenna 2 1 4 0 0 7
6.1.2 Communicate with relay satellites Short_range_data_processor VHF Ranging 2 1 4 0 1 7
6.1.3 Communicate between suited crewmembe Interior_voice_comm In VHF Xceiver 0 0 3 0 1 6
7.1 Sense Subsystem Commands Data_bus_network_boxes Signal conditioner Assy -2 2 1 5 0 1 6
7.2 Process/Amplify Subsystem Commands Master_event_controllers PCMETA -1 2 1 5 0 1 6
7.3 Send Commands to Subsystems Sensor_comm_wiring Wire harness A&B 2 1 5 0 0 7
7.4 Store Spacecraft Data Data_storage Data Storage 1 1 3 2 1 6
8.1.1 Monitor Subsystem Data Health_monitoring_computer Caution and Warning 1 1 4 1 1 6
8.2.1 Monitor ECS Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS ECS Sensors - total mass 1 1 3 2 0 7
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion Prop Sensors - total mass 1 1 5 0 0 8
8.2.10 Monitor Prop Subsystems Instrumentation_sensors_RCS RCS Sensors - total mass 1 1 5 0 0 8
8.2.2 Monitor Crew Accommodations Instrumentation_sensors_CA CA Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.3 Monitor Payload Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Payload Payload Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.4 Monitor Power Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Power Power Sensors 0 0 2 0 0 7
8.2.5 Monitor Communication Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Comm Comm Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.6 Monitor Command and Data Handling (C& Instrumentation_sensors_CDH CDH Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.7 Monitor Health Monitoring Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Health Health Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.8 Monitor Flight Control Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Flight Flight Sensors 0 0 5 0 0 7
8.2.9 Monitor Thermal Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal Thermal Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
8.2.9 Monitor Structures Subsystem Instrumentation_sensors_Structural Structural Sensors 0 0 1 0 0 7
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs IMU IMU 2 1 5 0 1 8
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_base IMU mounting 2 1 5 0 0 4
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Nav_power Power and Servo Assy 2 1 5 0 1 6
9.1.1 Sense Spacecraft Position Nav Inputs Star_tracker AOT Telescope / Computer Control and Reticle dimmer a 1 1 4 0 0 5
9.1.2 Convert Analog to Digital Nav Inputs Nav_analog_digital Pulse Torque Assembly 2 1 5 0 1 6
9.1.3 Output Navigation to Guidance Multiplexer_demultiplexers Coupling Data Unit 2 1 5 0 1 7
9.2.1 Calculate Spacecraft Guidance Flight_control_computer LM Guidance Computer 2 1 5 0 1 8
9.2.2 Communicate with Instrumentation Instrumentation_comm Signal Conditioner Assy 2 1 5 0 1 7
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_roll_pitch_yaw ACA - Attitude Controller Assembly 2 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.1 Input Human Flight Controls Flight_translation TTCA - Thrust and translation controller assembly 2 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.2 Input Human Navigation to Computer Computer_keyboard DSKD 2 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.3 Output Spacecraft Control to Propulsion Control_propulsion ATCA - Attitude and Translation Control Assy 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.4 Display Spacecraft Control Crew_displays_control Panel 3 4 5 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.5 Display Spacecraft Navigation Crew_displays_navigation Panel 1 2 1 1 5 0 0 8
9.3.6 Manual Control Spacecraft Subsystems Crew_displays_subsystems Panel 6 8 11 12 14 16 1 1 4 0 0 8
9.4.1 Sense Spacecraft Abort Position Abort_navigation Abort Sensor Assy 1 1 5 1 1 8
9.4.2 Sense Spacecraft Abort Velocity Inputs Abort_control Rate Gyro Assy 1 1 5 1 1 7
9.4.3 Calculate Spacecraft Abort Trajectory Abort_guidance Abort Electronics Assy 1 1 5 1 1 8
9.4.4 Input Abort Commands Abort_input DEDA -Data Entry and Display Assembly 1 1 5 1 0 8
9.5 Provide Rendezvous Guidance Rendezvous_radar Rendezvous Radar 1 1 4 0 0 10
9.6 Provide Inertial Reference Ordeal Ordeal 1 1 2 2 0 6
9.7 Provide Additional Avionics Misc_avionics Misc Avionics 0 0 1 2 0 4
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Table G.2: EVA, Crew Accommodations, and Payloads input variables list. 
 
 
Table G.3: ECLSS input variables list. 
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EVAs
12.1.1 Provide Space Suit Spacesuits Pressure Suit, no PLSS 1 1 3 2 0 8
12.2.1 Provide Mobility Aids EVA_mobility Mobility devices 0 0 1 0 0 6
12.2.2 Provide Umbilical Suit_umbilical Umbilical hoses 0 0 3 0 0 7
Crew Accommodations
3.1.1 Provide Cabin Lighting Cabin_lighting Lighting - normalized to one day 2 1 2 0 0 5
3.1.2 Provide Panel Lighting Panel_lighting Assumed same as cabin light 2 1 3 0 0 6
3.1.3 Provide Light for Exterior Viewing Exterior_lighting Lighting 2 1 3 0 0 7
3.1.4 Provide Restraints CA_restraints kg 2 1 2 2 0 4
3.1.5 Provide Handholds CA_handholds handholds 2 1 1 2 0 4
3.2.1 Provide Personal Storage Personal_storage kg/person/day -normalized from HSMAD 0 0 1 0 0 2
3.2.2 Provide Additional Clothing Storage Clothing kg/person/day - normalized from HSMAD 0 0 1 0 0 3
3.2.3 Provide Entertainment Entertainment Not included 0 0 1 0 0 5
3.3.2 Provide Medical Kit Storage Medical_kit kg/day-normalized from HSMAS 1 1 3 2 0 5
3.3.3 Provide Exercise Capability Exercise Not included 0 0 1 0 0 6
3.3.4 Provide Sleep Accommodations Sleep_accommodations Not included 0 0 1 0 0 4
3.3.5 Provide Operational Supplies Operational_supplies kg/person 1 1 3 2 0 6
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_consumables kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 4
3.3.1 Provide Hygiene Supplies Hygiene_kit kg/person 0 0 1 2 0 4
Payloads
4.1.1 Provide Science Payload Storage Science_return http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4029/Apollo_15a_Summary.ht 0 0 1 2 0 6
4.1.2 Provide General Payload Storage General_return Not included 0 0 1 2 0 6
4.2.1 Provide Tools Storage Tools_equipment 1.67 kg estimated 0 0 2 2 0 5
4.2.2 Provide Consumable Equipment Storage Consumable_equipment Not included 0 0 2 0 0 6
4.2.3 Provide Space Suit Storage Spacesuit_storage Not included 1 0 0 2
4.2.4 Provide Photography Equipment Photography 19kg estimated Lunar Mission 0 0 1 2 0 9
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ECLSS
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_crew_day_rate kg/person/day 0.998 0 5 0 0 6
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_rate CO2 Canister Perf 1 1 5 0 0 6
2.1.1 Remove Carbon Dioxide CO2_removal_mass CO2 Canister Mass 2 1 5 0 0 6
2.1.10 Provide Fire Detection and Suppression Fire_extinguisher Not included 0 0 4 0 0 6
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_density lbm/in^3 0.296 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2 Provide Metabolic Oxygen O2_crew_day_rate kg/person/day 0.835 0 5 0 0 2
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_FoS Storage Tank FOS 1.5 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen PaO2 psi - Apollo all Oxygen 3 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_radius_length_ratio ratio 1 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_temperature Celsius 26.67 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen O2_storage_pressure psi 840 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_material_yield_strength psi 142000 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Storage_tank_redundancy Redundancy in Oxygen 2 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.1 Store High Pressure Oxygen Oxygen_tank_insulation Use same as MMOD 1 1 4 0 0 7
2.1.2.2 Transport Oxygen Oxygen_gas_transport_lines Assume 1/2 inch line 1 1 5 0 0 7
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_relief_valve Used 1/2 ISS regulator valve 1 1 4 1 0 7
2.1.2.3 Control Oxygen Flow Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve Used 1/2 ISS relief valve 1 1 5 0 0 9
2.1.2.4 Measure pp Oxygen Level in Cabin Air Oxygen_pp_gauge Not included 0 0 4 0 0 5
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_temperature Celsius 26.67 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas N2_storage_pressure psi 840 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.1 Store High Pressure Makeup Gas Nitrogen_tank_insulation Use same as MMOD 1 1 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.2 Transport Makeup Gas Nitrogen_gas_transport_lines Assume1/2 inch line 1 1 4 0 0 7
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve Used 1/2 ISS relief valve 1 1 4 1 0 7
2.1.3.3 Control Makeup Gas Flow Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve Used 1/2 ISS regulator valve 1 1 4 0 0 9
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Table G.3: ECLSS input variables list (continued). 
 
 
Table G.4: Power and Thermal input variables list. 
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ECLSS
2.1.4 Remove Trace Contaminants Trace_Contaminants_filter Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Filter 1 1 2 0 0 5
2.1.5 Remove Particulates Particulates_filter Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Filter 1 1 2 0 0 5
2.1.6 Remove Humidity Humidity_percent Percent (40% = 0.4) 0.6 0 3 0 0 7
2.1.6.2 Condense Cabin Air Condense_air_heat_exchanger Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Conds Heat Exch 1 1 3 0 0 7
2.1.6.1 Provide Humidity Separator Humidity_capture Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Separator 1 1 3 0 0 5
2.1.7.1 Provide Air Circ Bypass Mix_air_valve Assumed Spacelab 1/2 TCV 1 1 2 2 0 7
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Cabin_temp Celsius 22.05 0 2 0 0 6
2.1.7.2 Measure Cabin Air Temp Temperature_sensor Assumed Shuttle 1 1 1 0 0 6
2.1.8.1 Circulate Air Cabin_fan Assumed 1/2 Spacelab Fan 1 1 4 0 1 7
2.1.8.2 Return Air Return_air_ducts Unknown - Assumed 4 in diameterflex line 1 1 1 0 0 4
2.1.8.3 Output Air Direct_air_ducts Unknown - Assumed 4 in diameterflex line 1 1 1 0 0 4
2.1.9.1 Provide Air Pressure Sensor Air_Pressure_gauge Assumed Shuttle Sensor 1 1 4 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_leak_percent  %/day 0.05 0 4 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_atm_pressure psi 9.5 0 5 0 0 7
2.1.9.2 Provide Cabin Air Control Logic Cabin_air_control Assumed 1/2 Shuttle Cabin Temp Control 1 1 3 0 0 7
2.2.1 Store Food Food_storage Assumed in Food mass 1 1 3 0 0 4
2.2.1 Store Food Food_rate kg/person/day 1 1 3 0 0 4
2.2.2 Prepare Food Galley_supplies kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 4
2.2.2 Prepare Food Heat_food Assumed HSMAD 1 1 1 2 0 4
2.3.1 Provide Potable Water Potable_water kg/person/day 1 1 4 0 0 5
2.3.2 Provide Hygiene Water Hygiene_water kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 5
2.4.1 Collect Urine Urine_bags kg/person/day 1 1 1 0 0 4
2.4.2 Collect Fecal Solids Diapers kg/person/day 1 1 1 0 0 4
2.4.2.2 Control Odor Control_odor kg/person/day 0 0 1 2 0 3
2.4.2.3 WCS supplies WCS_supplies kg/person/day 1 1 1 2 0 3
2.4.3 Collect Liquid Waste Vacuum Assumed HSMAD 0 0 1 2 0 6
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Trash_bags kg/person/day 0 0 1 0 0 3
2.4.4 Collect Solid Waste Housecleaning_supplies kg/person/day 0 0 1 0 0 3
2.4.5 Jettison Liquid Waste Dump_Valve_Piping Assumed ISS Overboard Water 1 1 2 2 0 7
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Power
5.1 Provide Power Batteries Adapted from Apollo 2 1 5 0 1 7
5.1 Provide Power Depth_of_Discharge 1 0 5 0 0 7
5.1 Provide Power Duty_cycle_coast 1 0 5 0 0 7
5.2 Distribute Power Power_Distr_Wiring Adapted from Apollo 2 1 5 0 0 7
5.3 Regulate Power Power_Distr_Controller Power Controller ECA 2 1 5 0 1 8
5.3 Regulate Power Power_inverters Power Inverter 2 1 5 0 1 8
5.3 Regulate Power Power_relays Power relay - Electronic 2 1 5 0 1 7
5.6 Provide Overload Protection Power_Distr_CircBreak Panels/Circuit Breakers 2 1 4 1 0 7
Thermal
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplate_min_power Minimum watts for a coldplate 20 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_capacity Watts of heat removed single loo 500 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Loop_diameter inches 0.518 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Thermal_interior_fluid_density kg/m3 1040 0 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Coolant_piping kg/m3 2 1 4 0 0 6
10.1 Collect Heat Coldplates 5.25 kg/kW derived from Apollo 2 1 4 0 0 6
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_pumps Assumed Shuttle Water Pump 2 1 4 0 0 7
10.2 Transport Heat Interior_coolant_lines_valves Assumed Shuttle Check Valve 2 1 4 0 0 8
10.3 Remove Heat Interior_exterior_heat_exchanger 3.2 kg/kW derived from Apollo 2 1 4 0 0 7
10.3 Remove Heat Water_system_sublimators Latent Heat of Vaporization 2501.3 0 4 0 0 7
10.3 Remove Heat Exterior_radiators Radiator Panels 0 0 4 0 0 8
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Table G.5: Secondary Structures and Structures input variables list. 
 
 
Table G.6: Propulsion input variables list. 
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Secondary Structures
1.4 Support Internal Subsystems and ComponenSecondary_struct_ratio ratio 0.2155 0 4 0 0 6
Structures
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety Structural FoS 1.41 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Factor_of_Safety_PV_skin Structural FoS 1.41 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Interior_diameter_hab_volume meters 3 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Cylinder_length_hab_volume meters 4.245 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Packaging_efficiency ratio 0.75 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Protrusion_ratio (0.001 -0.25) 0.08 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_yield_strength psi 73000 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_material_density lbm/in^3 0.102 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Elasticity 10^6 psi 10.4 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.1 Provide protection from vacuum Pressure_vessel_mod_of_Rigidity 10^6 psi 3.9 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Max_acceleration_gs gs of acceleration 3.5 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_hoops Odd Number 25 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Number_stringers Multiple of 4 20 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Height_to_base_ratio ratio 9.99 0 5 0 0 6
1.2 Provide Load Bearing Capability Fillet_ratio ratio 0.1 0 5 0 0 6
1.5.3 Provide Docking Mechanism for Lunar HabLIDS_published_weight lbs 870 0 4 0 0 8
1.5.1 Support Docking Mechanism for Lunar AscDocking_ring_load_Force lbf 23300 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent MLIDS_tunnel_diameter inches 32 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.2 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Ascent MLIDS_tunnel_height inches 16 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_width inches 32 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_height inches 32 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_corner_radius_ratio ratio 5.33 0 4 0 0 6
1.5.4 Provide Ingress/Egress for Lunar Habitat toHatch_flange_ratio ratio 20 0 4 0 0 6
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_material_density lbm/in^3 0.091402 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_pane_thickness inches 0.2 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_width_horizontal inches 18 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_length inches 17 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_corner_radius_ratio ratio 4 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_frame_ratio ratio 4 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_position_angle degrees 45 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.1 Provide Forward Windows Window_center_height inches 60 0 5 0 0 7
1.6.2 Provide Docking Viewing Ports Docking_window area in^2 60 0 4 0 0 7
1.6.3 Provide Aft Viewing Ports Aft_window area in^2 40 0 3 0 0 7
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection MMOD_standoff Minimum standoff inches 3 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_time_days days 8.6 0 5 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection PNP_target Probability 0.9905 7 5 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection TPS_blanket kg/m^2 - 1" Thermal Blanket 6pc 4.37 3 4 0 0 6
1.1.2 Provide MMOD/TPS protection LEO_altitude km 350 0 5 0 0 6
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Propulsion
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Specific_impulse Isp (seconds) 320.7 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Vacuum_thrust N (newtons) 44500 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_weight_thrust_ratio ratio 3.06 0 5 0 0 9
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Gravity_constant m/s2 9.81 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_gravity_parameter km3/sec2 4902.87 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Moon_radius km 1738 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_apogee_altitude km 78.71 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Orbital_perigee_altitude km 16.67 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_azimuth degrees North 270 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_latitude degrees 26.1322 0 1 0 0 0
0.1.4 Launch Trajectory Launch_longitude degrees 3.63386 0 1 0 0 0
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Table G.6: Propulsion input variables list (continued). 
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Propulsion
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer_fuel_ratio ratio 3.4 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.2 Provide Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_density kg/m3 1140 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.1 Provide Main Engine Fuel Fuel_density kg/m3 445 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press psi 179 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.11 Provide Contingency Propellant Contingency_propellant ratio 0.083 0 4 1 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_pressure psi 3050 0 5 0 0 3
11.2.3 Provide RCS Pressurant Pressurant_pressure_RCS psi 3050 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_tank_temperature degrees K 294.26 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_ratio_spec_heats ratio 1.667 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.3 Provide Main Engine Pressurant Pressurant_gas_constant R J/kg*K 2076.9 0 5 0 0 3
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_material_density lbm/in^3 0.16 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_yield_strength psi 140000 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_factor_of_safety FoS 1.5 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.7 Store Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tank_unused_fraction ratio 0.01 0 5 0 0 7
11.2.7 Store RCS Propellant Fuel_ox_tank_press_RCS psi 179 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.9 Transport Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_line_id m 0.0254 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.5 Transport Main Engine Pressurant Main_engine_pressurant_line_id m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 7
11.2.9 Transport RCS Propellant Propulsion_line_id_RCS m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 7
11.2.5 Transport RCS Pressurant Pressurant_line_id_RCS m 0.015875 0 5 0 0 7
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_linear_slope linear_slope kg/kN 2.65 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.6 Provide Main Engine Main_engine_y_intercept linear_curve_intercept - kg 42.953 0 5 0 0 9
11.1.12 Support Main Engine Components Propulsion_secondary_struct_ratio ratio 0.2 0 5 0 0 6
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_side_A_B_choice Integer, 1,2,3 2 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Specific_impulse_RCS Isp (seconds) 240 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Vacuum_thrust_RCS N (newtons) 444.822 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_linear_slope linear_slope kg/kN 6.48 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters RCS_engine_y_intercept linear_curve_intercept - kg 0 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_RCS_engines_system Integer, 4,8,16 8 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.6 Provide RCS thrusters Num_fire_RCS_thrust_ascent Num firing during ascent 0.57 0 5 0 0 9
11.2.11 Provide RCS contingency propellant RCS_additional_propellant_mass Rendezvous -kg 200 3 4 2 0 3
11.1.13 Insulate Main Engine Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation Use same as TPS 1 1 4 0 0 4
11.2.13 Insulate RCS Propellant Propulsion_tanks_insulation_RCS Placeholder 1 1 4 0 0 4
11.2.1 Provide RCS Propellant RCS_propellant Placeholder 1 1 5 0 0 3
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.2 Control ME Pressurant - Oxidizer Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_trim_orifice kg 2 1 5 0 0 5
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_isolation_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.10.2 Control Main Engine Oxidizer Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_check_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.4.1 Control ME Pressurant - Fuel Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_trim_orifice kg 2 1 5 0 0 5
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_isolation_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.1.10.1 Control Main Engine Fuel Fuel_bipropellant_valve kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_valve_RCS kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_filter_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_orifice_RCS kg 2 1 5 0 0 5
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_RCkg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 9
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 6
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.4 Control RCS Pressurant Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.10.2 Control RCS Oxidizer Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.10.1 Control RCS Fuel Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.9.1 Filter RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.2.10 Control RCS Propellant Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS kg 2 1 5 0 0 9
11.2.14.2 Heat RCS Oxidizer lines Oxidizer_heater_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 6
11.2.14.1 Heat RCS Fuel lines Fuel_heater_RCS kg 2 1 4 1 0 6
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 9
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve kg 2 1 4 1 0 9
11.1.14 Control Main Engine Bypass APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter kg 2 1 4 1 0 7
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Table G.7: Avionics technology database. 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Abort_control 0.91 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 4
Abort_guidance 14.74 5 0.603 0.203 0.133 200
Abort_input 3.40 5 0.140 0.152 0.132 20
Abort_navigation 9.38 5 0.130 0.229 0.292 145
Computer_keyboard 7.71 5 0.203 0.203 0.178 25
Control_propulsion 10.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 100
Control_propulsion_thrusters 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_control 7.44 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_navigation 15.79 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Crew_displays_subsystems 5.35 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Data_bus_network_boxes 15.99 5 0.203 0.133 0.607 15
Data_storage 1.13 5 0.052 0.102 0.158 10
Flight_control_computer 4.53 5 0.152 0.318 0.610 250
Flight_roll_pitch_yaw 2.16 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Flight_translation 2.38 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Health_monitoring_computer 8.30 5 0.178 0.171 0.298 100
IMU 9.55 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 150
Instrumentation_comm 1.27 5 0.084 0.224 0.284 50
Instrumentation_sensors_CA 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_CDH 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Comm 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_ECLSS 2.68 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_Flight 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Health 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Payload 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Power 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Instrumentation_sensors_Propulsion 2.45 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_RCS 2.22 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Instrumentation_sensors_Thermal 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_voice_comm 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Long_range_amplifier 4.24 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 36
Long_range_antenna 0.18 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Long_range_data_processor 4.72 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 27
Long_range_steerable_antenna 12.47 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 300
Long_range_transceiver 4.54 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 18
Master_event_controllers 10.25 5 0.171 0.130 0.502 11
Misc_avionics 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Multiplexer_demultiplexers 7.94 5 0.140 0.288 0.508 50
Nav_analog_digital 6.80 5 0.064 0.279 0.330 50
Nav_base 1.36 5 0.287 0.287 0.287 0
Nav_power 9.07 5 0.067 0.225 0.597 100
Ordeal 3.13 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 8
Rendezvous_radar 35.43 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 200
Short_range_antenna 1.09 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Short_range_data_processor 1.18 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 5
Short_range_transceiver 2.97 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 32
Star_tracker 10.48 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table G.8: EVA technology database. 
 
 
Table G.9: Payloads technology database. 
 
 
Table G.10: Power technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
EVA_mobility 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Spacesuits 33.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Suit_umbilical 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Science_return 115.62 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Consumable_equipment 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
General_return 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Photography 19.00 5 0.437 0.437 0.437 0
Tools_equipment 1.67 5 0.149 0.149 0.149 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Batteries 100.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1000
Power_Distr_CircBreak 17.89 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_Distr_Controller 9.52 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_Distr_Wiring 47.14 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_inverters 13.96 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Power_relays 9.12 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table G.11: Thermal technology database. 
 
 
Table G.12: Crew Accommodations technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Coldplates 5.50 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exterior_radiators 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_coolant_lines_valves 0.90 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Interior_coolant_pumps 1.88 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
CA_handholds 5.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
CA_restraints 5.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Cabin_lighting 2.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 100
Clothing 4.60 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Entertainment 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exercise 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Exterior_lighting 10.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 300
Medical_kit 1.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Operational_supplies 5.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Panel_lighting 1.00 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 100
Personal_storage 1.66 5 0.100 0.100 0.100 0
Sleep_accommodations 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
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Table G.13: ECLSS technology database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
Air_Pressure_gauge 0.25 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
Cabin_air_control 2.22 5 0.006 0.006 0.006 16
Cabin_fan 9.30 5 0.002 0.002 0.002 100
Condense_air_heat_exchanger 13.52 5 0.045 0.045 0.045 0
Control_odor 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Diapers 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Dump_Valve_Piping 3.00 5 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
Fecal_bags 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Fire_extinguisher 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Food_rate 2.30 5 0.005 0.005 0.005 0
Food_storage 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Galley_supplies 0.50 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
Heat_food 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Housecleaning_supplies 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Humidity_capture 2.55 5 0.004 0.004 0.004 0
Hygiene_water 4.10 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Mix_air_valve 2.30 5 0.008 0.008 0.008 0
Nitrogen_tank_regulator_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Nitrogen_tank_relief_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_pp_gauge 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_tank_regulator_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Oxygen_tank_relief_valve 0.49 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Particulates_filter 2.50 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Potable_water 2.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Temperature_sensor 0.08 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Trace_Contaminants_filter 2.50 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Trash_bags 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Urine_bags 0.23 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Vacuum 0.00 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
WCS_supplies 0.05 5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
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Table G.14: Propulsion technology database. 
 
 
 
 
Equipment Mass (kg)
Mass 
Error (+/-
,%)
X_length 
(m)
Y_length 
(m)
Z_length 
(m)
Power 
(W)
APS_interconnect_Fuel_filter 2.28 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Fuel_valve 2.28 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_filter 2.28 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
APS_interconnect_Oxidizer_valve 2.28 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_bipropellant_valve 2.10 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_filter 2.10 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_heater_RCS 1.79 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_isolation_valve 2.10 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_Ox_filter_RCS 0.33 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_Ox_isolation_valve_RCS 0.33 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_check_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_check_valve_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_explosive_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_filter 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_pressure_regulator 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_solenoid_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_pressurant_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_shutoff_valve_RCS 1.79 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Fuel_trim_orifice 1.05 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_bipropellant_valve 2.10 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_filter 2.10 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_heater_RCS 1.79 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_isolation_valve 2.10 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_check_valve_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_explosive_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_filter 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_pressure_regulator 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_relief_valve_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_solenoid_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_pressurant_valve 2.49 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_shutoff_valve_RCS 1.79 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
Oxidizer_trim_orifice 1.05 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_filter_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_orifice_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_pressure_regulator_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
System_pressurant_valve_RCS 1.53 5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0
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Table H.1: Apollo subsystem mass at node configurations. 
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1 Min Funct Minimum Time 554 0 330 2 0 138 99 64 180 463 324 356 2372 270 5152 0 0
2 FoS Minimum Time 554 0 330 2 0 138 99 65 180 664 330 410 2584 269 5626 474 0
3 LOC 1FT Minimum Time 944 0 330 2 0 363 162 83 326 788 356 577 3660 307 7899 2747 0
4 LOM 1FT Minimum Time 1086 0 330 2 0 415 301 94 399 834 359 601 4120 307 8848 3696 0
5 Safety Comp Minimum Time 1176 146 330 65 4 529 361 117 504 891 366 742 5350 536 11117 5965 0
6 All Comp 1FT Minimum Time 1226 146 330 68 4 564 411 145 538 916 367 754 5576 536 11582 6430 0
7 LOC 2FT Minimum Time 1643 146 330 68 4 956 481 164 727 1050 385 865 6850 539 14204 9052 0
8 LOM 2FT Minimum Time 1789 146 330 68 4 1032 769 175 836 1107 387 902 7576 539 15660 10508 0
9 Safety Comp Minimum Time 1882 291 330 131 7 1181 855 198 955 1178 403 1001 8398 540 17349 12197 0
10 All Comp 2FT Minimum Time 1933 291 330 133 7 1232 930 226 998 1210 404 1015 8680 540 17930 12778 0
11 Min Funct Nominal Time 554 0 330 2 0 270 146 81 221 480 325 365 2605 270 5648 0 522
12 FoS Nominal Time 554 0 330 2 0 270 146 83 222 683 332 423 2826 269 6140 474 538
13 LOC 1FT Nominal Time 944 0 330 2 0 565 237 101 388 811 357 596 4015 307 8654 2747 780
14 LOM 1FT Nominal Time 1086 0 330 2 0 653 388 117 472 857 360 623 4537 307 9733 3696 910
15 Safety Comp Nominal Time 1176 146 330 65 4 820 466 140 591 941 368 771 5905 536 12260 5965 1168
16 All Comp 1FT Nominal Time 1226 146 330 68 4 879 523 173 634 968 370 785 6176 537 12817 6430 1260
17 LOC 2FT Nominal Time 1643 146 330 68 4 1341 620 192 843 1107 387 902 7574 539 15695 9052 1515
18 LOM 2FT Nominal Time 1789 146 330 68 4 1454 921 207 964 1167 390 943 8368 539 17289 10508 1654
19 Safety Comp Nominal Time 1882 291 330 131 7 1655 1025 231 1096 1241 405 1046 9277 541 19156 12197 1832
20 All Comp 2FT Nominal Time 1933 291 330 133 7 1730 1106 264 1148 1273 407 1062 9604 541 19830 12778 1924
21 Min Funct Operability  569 0 330 13 297 272 146 106 295 524 344 382 3052 271 6600 0 1473
22 FoS Operability  569 0 330 13 297 272 146 108 295 760 351 449 3313 270 7172 474 1571
23 LOC 1FT Operability  962 0 330 13 297 567 237 126 462 875 368 620 4485 308 9651 2747 1777
24 LOM 1FT Operability  1104 0 330 13 297 656 433 142 555 925 371 650 5060 309 10844 3696 2021
25 Safety Comp Operability  1194 146 330 76 300 822 511 165 675 1013 379 800 6467 538 13417 5965 2325
26 All Comp 1FT Operability  1244 146 330 78 300 882 523 198 708 1014 380 810 6657 538 13807 6430 2250
27 LOC 2FT Operability  1662 146 330 78 300 1344 620 216 917 1158 405 928 8071 540 16717 9052 2538
28 LOM 2FT Operability  1808 146 330 78 300 1457 922 232 1038 1220 408 969 8869 541 18317 10508 2683
29 Safety Comp Operability  1901 291 330 142 304 1658 1025 255 1171 1296 416 1071 9772 542 20173 12197 2849
30 All Comp 2FT Operability  1953 291 330 144 304 1733 1106 288 1222 1329 417 1088 10100 542 20849 12778 2943
31 Min Funct 2x Operability 585 0 330 25 594 423 200 170 419 617 362 411 3813 272 8219 0 3092
32 FoS 2x Operability 585 0 330 25 594 423 200 174 420 852 368 489 4089 272 8817 474 3216
33 LOC 1FT 2x Operability 979 0 330 25 594 798 322 192 611 1004 386 670 5423 310 11643 2747 3769
34 LOM 1FT 2x Operability 1121 0 330 25 594 927 532 212 716 1060 389 703 6070 311 12990 3696 4167
35 Safety Comp 2x Operability 1211 146 330 89 597 1152 629 236 852 1130 405 860 7628 540 15805 5965 4713
36 All Comp 1FT 2x Operability 1261 146 330 91 597 1239 649 274 894 1160 406 874 7898 540 16360 6430 4802
37 LOC 2FT 2x Operability 1682 146 330 91 597 1781 777 293 1127 1319 424 999 9454 543 19563 9052 5384
38 LOM 2FT 2x Operability 1828 146 330 91 597 1935 1093 313 1260 1387 427 1044 10333 543 21326 10508 5692
39 Safety Comp 2x Operability 1921 291 330 155 601 2194 1216 336 1410 1472 435 1152 11341 544 23397 12197 6073
40 All Comp 2FT 2x Operability 1972 291 330 157 601 2297 1305 375 1469 1509 437 1171 11722 545 24180 12778 6274
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Table H.2: Apollo subsystem mass fractions at node configurations. 
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1 Min Funct Minimum Time 11% 0% 6% 0% 0% 3% 2% 1% 3% 9% 6% 7% 46% 5% 100% 0% 0%
2 FoS Minimum Time 10% 0% 6% 0% 0% 2% 2% 1% 3% 12% 6% 7% 46% 5% 100% 8% 0%
3 LOC 1FT Minimum Time 12% 0% 4% 0% 0% 5% 2% 1% 4% 10% 5% 7% 46% 4% 100% 35% 0%
4 LOM 1FT Minimum Time 12% 0% 4% 0% 0% 5% 3% 1% 5% 9% 4% 7% 47% 3% 100% 42% 0%
5 Safety Comp Minimum Time 11% 1% 3% 1% 0% 5% 3% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 48% 5% 100% 54% 0%
6 All Comp 1FT Minimum Time 11% 1% 3% 1% 0% 5% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 48% 5% 100% 56% 0%
7 LOC 2FT Minimum Time 12% 1% 2% 0% 0% 7% 3% 1% 5% 7% 3% 6% 48% 4% 100% 64% 0%
8 LOM 2FT Minimum Time 11% 1% 2% 0% 0% 7% 5% 1% 5% 7% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 67% 0%
9 Safety Comp Minimum Time 11% 2% 2% 1% 0% 7% 5% 1% 6% 7% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 70% 0%
10 All Comp 2FT Minimum Time 11% 2% 2% 1% 0% 7% 5% 1% 6% 7% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 71% 0%
11 Min Funct Nominal Time 10% 0% 6% 0% 0% 5% 3% 1% 4% 8% 6% 6% 46% 5% 100% 0% 9%
12 FoS Nominal Time 9% 0% 5% 0% 0% 4% 2% 1% 4% 11% 5% 7% 46% 4% 100% 8% 9%
13 LOC 1FT Nominal Time 11% 0% 4% 0% 0% 7% 3% 1% 4% 9% 4% 7% 46% 4% 100% 32% 9%
14 LOM 1FT Nominal Time 11% 0% 3% 0% 0% 7% 4% 1% 5% 9% 4% 6% 47% 3% 100% 38% 9%
15 Safety Comp Nominal Time 10% 1% 3% 1% 0% 7% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 6% 48% 4% 100% 49% 10%
16 All Comp 1FT Nominal Time 10% 1% 3% 1% 0% 7% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 6% 48% 4% 100% 50% 10%
17 LOC 2FT Nominal Time 10% 1% 2% 0% 0% 9% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 58% 10%
18 LOM 2FT Nominal Time 10% 1% 2% 0% 0% 8% 5% 1% 6% 7% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 61% 10%
19 Safety Comp Nominal Time 10% 2% 2% 1% 0% 9% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 64% 10%
20 All Comp 2FT Nominal Time 10% 1% 2% 1% 0% 9% 6% 1% 6% 6% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 64% 10%
21 Min Funct Operability  9% 0% 5% 0% 4% 4% 2% 2% 4% 8% 5% 6% 46% 4% 100% 0% 22%
22 FoS Operability  8% 0% 5% 0% 4% 4% 2% 2% 4% 11% 5% 6% 46% 4% 100% 7% 22%
23 LOC 1FT Operability  10% 0% 3% 0% 3% 6% 2% 1% 5% 9% 4% 6% 46% 3% 100% 28% 18%
24 LOM 1FT Operability  10% 0% 3% 0% 3% 6% 4% 1% 5% 9% 3% 6% 47% 3% 100% 34% 19%
25 Safety Comp Operability  9% 1% 2% 1% 2% 6% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 6% 48% 4% 100% 44% 17%
26 All Comp 1FT Operability  9% 1% 2% 1% 2% 6% 4% 1% 5% 7% 3% 6% 48% 4% 100% 47% 16%
27 LOC 2FT Operability  10% 1% 2% 0% 2% 8% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 54% 15%
28 LOM 2FT Operability  10% 1% 2% 0% 2% 8% 5% 1% 6% 7% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 57% 15%
29 Safety Comp Operability  9% 1% 2% 1% 2% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 60% 14%
30 All Comp 2FT Operability  9% 1% 2% 1% 1% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 61% 14%
31 Min Funct 2x Operability 7% 0% 4% 0% 7% 5% 2% 2% 5% 8% 4% 5% 46% 3% 100% 0% 38%
32 FoS 2x Operability 7% 0% 4% 0% 7% 5% 2% 2% 5% 10% 4% 6% 46% 3% 100% 5% 36%
33 LOC 1FT 2x Operability 8% 0% 3% 0% 5% 7% 3% 2% 5% 9% 3% 6% 47% 3% 100% 24% 32%
34 LOM 1FT 2x Operability 9% 0% 3% 0% 5% 7% 4% 2% 6% 8% 3% 5% 47% 2% 100% 28% 32%
35 Safety Comp 2x Operability 8% 1% 2% 1% 4% 7% 4% 1% 5% 7% 3% 5% 48% 3% 100% 38% 30%
36 All Comp 1FT 2x Operability 8% 1% 2% 1% 4% 8% 4% 2% 5% 7% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 39% 29%
37 LOC 2FT 2x Operability 9% 1% 2% 0% 3% 9% 4% 1% 6% 7% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 46% 28%
38 LOM 2FT 2x Operability 9% 1% 2% 0% 3% 9% 5% 1% 6% 7% 2% 5% 48% 3% 100% 49% 27%
39 Safety Comp 2x Operability 8% 1% 1% 1% 3% 9% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 5% 48% 2% 100% 52% 26%
40 All Comp 2FT 2x Operability 8% 1% 1% 1% 2% 9% 5% 2% 6% 6% 2% 5% 48% 2% 100% 53% 26%
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Table H.3: Apollo One Man subsystem mass at node configurations. 
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1 Min Funct Minimum Time 472 0 165 2 0 124 89 60 157 326 185 332 1813 263 3989 0 0
2 FoS Minimum Time 472 0 165 2 0 124 89 60 157 463 191 376 1971 263 4334 345 0
3 LOC 1FT Minimum Time 831 0 165 2 0 337 128 78 289 556 205 535 2920 296 6341 2352 0
4 LOM 1FT Minimum Time 966 0 165 2 0 389 275 89 362 606 208 559 3385 296 7303 3314 0
5 Safety Comp Minimum Time 1055 73 165 42 4 503 331 110 445 649 219 692 4442 526 9256 5267 0
6 All Comp 1FT Minimum Time 1055 73 165 44 4 513 333 137 453 650 219 694 4491 526 9356 5367 0
7 LOC 2FT Minimum Time 1435 73 165 44 4 881 438 155 636 772 233 803 5727 529 11895 7906 0
8 LOM 2FT Minimum Time 1573 73 165 44 4 957 702 166 739 816 235 838 6397 530 13238 9249 0
9 Safety Comp Minimum Time 1665 146 165 84 7 1105 782 187 835 871 241 928 7067 531 14613 10624 0
10 All Comp 2FT Minimum Time 1665 146 165 86 7 1119 783 215 844 894 242 932 7146 531 14775 10786 0
11 Min Funct Nominal Time 472 0 165 2 0 174 107 64 172 338 186 336 1905 263 4185 0 198
12 FoS Nominal Time 472 0 165 2 0 174 107 64 172 463 191 380 2053 263 4508 345 176
13 LOC 1FT Nominal Time 831 0 165 2 0 418 159 82 313 572 206 543 3067 296 6653 2352 314
14 LOM 1FT Nominal Time 966 0 165 2 0 486 311 94 391 606 208 568 3543 296 7636 3314 335
15 Safety Comp Nominal Time 1055 73 165 42 4 623 375 115 480 668 220 704 4665 526 9715 5267 461
16 All Comp 1FT Nominal Time 1055 73 165 44 4 635 377 144 490 668 220 706 4720 527 9827 5367 472
17 LOC 2FT Nominal Time 1435 73 165 44 4 1034 495 162 682 794 234 818 6011 529 12478 7906 585
18 LOM 2FT Nominal Time 1573 73 165 44 4 1127 764 174 789 838 236 854 6709 530 13880 9249 644
19 Safety Comp Nominal Time 1665 146 165 84 7 1298 852 195 892 894 242 946 7418 531 15333 10624 722
20 All Comp 2FT Nominal Time 1665 146 165 86 7 1314 854 223 902 918 243 951 7503 531 15508 10786 735
21 Min Funct Operability  487 0 165 8 169 175 108 80 216 357 200 347 2169 264 4744 0 757
22 FoS Operability  487 0 165 8 169 175 108 81 216 503 200 395 2335 264 5106 345 774
23 LOC 1FT Operability  848 0 165 8 169 419 159 98 357 620 220 559 3366 297 7286 2352 947
24 LOM 1FT Operability  983 0 165 8 169 488 312 111 435 657 222 584 3845 298 8275 3314 974
25 Safety Comp Operability  1072 73 165 47 173 625 375 131 524 703 227 719 4963 528 10327 5267 1073
26 All Comp 1FT Operability  1072 73 165 49 173 637 377 160 534 723 228 723 5039 528 10482 5367 1127
27 LOC 2FT Operability  1453 73 165 49 173 1037 495 178 726 833 242 834 6316 531 13106 7906 1213
28 LOM 2FT Operability  1592 73 165 49 173 1129 764 190 834 903 245 871 7042 531 14562 9249 1327
29 Safety Comp Operability  1683 146 165 89 177 1300 852 211 936 962 250 964 7754 532 16022 10624 1411
30 All Comp 2FT Operability  1683 146 165 91 177 1317 854 240 947 962 250 967 7814 532 16146 10786 1372
31 Min Funct 2x Operability 502 0 165 13 339 241 132 106 280 404 209 362 2566 265 5584 0 1597
32 FoS 2x Operability 502 0 165 13 339 241 132 107 280 563 209 417 2749 265 5981 345 1650
33 LOC 1FT 2x Operability 864 0 165 13 339 525 198 125 434 672 228 584 3837 299 8283 2352 1944
34 LOM 1FT 2x Operability 1000 0 165 13 339 614 358 139 517 710 230 611 4353 300 9349 3314 2048
35 Safety Comp 2x Operability 1089 73 165 53 342 780 432 160 615 781 237 751 5574 530 11580 5267 2327
36 All Comp 1FT 2x Operability 1089 73 165 55 342 796 434 190 626 781 237 754 5635 530 11707 5367 2353
37 LOC 2FT 2x Operability 1472 73 165 55 342 1236 568 208 830 922 251 870 7014 532 14538 7906 2645
38 LOM 2FT 2x Operability 1610 73 165 55 342 1349 844 221 944 971 253 908 7755 533 16024 9249 2789
39 Safety Comp 2x Operability 1702 146 165 95 346 1549 942 242 1054 1033 259 1003 8517 534 17587 10624 2976
40 All Comp 2FT 2x Operability 1702 146 165 97 346 1569 944 272 1066 1034 259 1007 8584 534 17725 10786 2952
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Table H.4: Apollo One Man subsystem mass fractions at node configurations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
od
e N
um
be
r
Sa
fe
ty
 Le
ve
l
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y L
ev
el
A
vi
on
ic
s (l
bm
)
EV
A
 (lb
m
)
Cr
ew
 (lb
m
)
Cr
ew
 Ac
co
m
m
od
at
io
ns
 (lb
m
)
Pa
yl
oa
ds
 (lb
m
)
Po
w
er
 (lb
m
)
Th
er
m
al
 (lb
m
)
EC
LS
S (
lb
m
)
Se
co
nd
ar
y S
tr
uc
tu
re
s (l
bm
)
Pr
im
ar
y S
tr
uc
tu
re
s (l
bm
)
TP
S/
M
M
O
D
 (lb
m
)
Pr
op
ul
si
on
 (lb
m
)
M
ai
n E
ng
in
e P
ro
pe
lla
nt
 (lb
m
)
RC
S P
ro
pe
lla
nt
 (lb
m
)
To
ta
l Sp
ac
ec
ra
ft
 M
as
s (l
bm
)
Sa
fe
ty
 M
as
s 
O
pe
ra
bi
lit
y M
as
s
1 Min Funct Minimum Time 12% 0% 4% 0% 0% 3% 2% 2% 4% 8% 5% 8% 45% 7% 100% 0% 0%
2 FoS Minimum Time 11% 0% 4% 0% 0% 3% 2% 1% 4% 11% 4% 9% 45% 6% 100% 8% 0%
3 LOC 1FT Minimum Time 13% 0% 3% 0% 0% 5% 2% 1% 5% 9% 3% 8% 46% 5% 100% 37% 0%
4 LOM 1FT Minimum Time 13% 0% 2% 0% 0% 5% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 46% 4% 100% 45% 0%
5 Safety Comp Minimum Time 11% 1% 2% 0% 0% 5% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 48% 6% 100% 57% 0%
6 All Comp 1FT Minimum Time 11% 1% 2% 0% 0% 5% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 48% 6% 100% 57% 0%
7 LOC 2FT Minimum Time 12% 1% 1% 0% 0% 7% 4% 1% 5% 6% 2% 7% 48% 4% 100% 66% 0%
8 LOM 2FT Minimum Time 12% 1% 1% 0% 0% 7% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 70% 0%
9 Safety Comp Minimum Time 11% 1% 1% 1% 0% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 73% 0%
10 All Comp 2FT Minimum Time 11% 1% 1% 1% 0% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 73% 0%
11 Min Funct Nominal Time 11% 0% 4% 0% 0% 4% 3% 2% 4% 8% 4% 8% 46% 6% 100% 0% 5%
12 FoS Nominal Time 10% 0% 4% 0% 0% 4% 2% 1% 4% 10% 4% 8% 46% 6% 100% 8% 4%
13 LOC 1FT Nominal Time 12% 0% 2% 0% 0% 6% 2% 1% 5% 9% 3% 8% 46% 4% 100% 35% 5%
14 LOM 1FT Nominal Time 13% 0% 2% 0% 0% 6% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 46% 4% 100% 43% 4%
15 Safety Comp Nominal Time 11% 1% 2% 0% 0% 6% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 48% 5% 100% 54% 5%
16 All Comp 1FT Nominal Time 11% 1% 2% 0% 0% 6% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 48% 5% 100% 55% 5%
17 LOC 2FT Nominal Time 11% 1% 1% 0% 0% 8% 4% 1% 5% 6% 2% 7% 48% 4% 100% 63% 5%
18 LOM 2FT Nominal Time 11% 1% 1% 0% 0% 8% 6% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 67% 5%
19 Safety Comp Nominal Time 11% 1% 1% 1% 0% 8% 6% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 69% 5%
20 All Comp 2FT Nominal Time 11% 1% 1% 1% 0% 8% 6% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 70% 5%
21 Min Funct Operability  10% 0% 3% 0% 4% 4% 2% 2% 5% 8% 4% 7% 46% 6% 100% 0% 16%
22 FoS Operability  10% 0% 3% 0% 3% 3% 2% 2% 4% 10% 4% 8% 46% 5% 100% 7% 15%
23 LOC 1FT Operability  12% 0% 2% 0% 2% 6% 2% 1% 5% 9% 3% 8% 46% 4% 100% 32% 13%
24 LOM 1FT Operability  12% 0% 2% 0% 2% 6% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 46% 4% 100% 40% 12%
25 Safety Comp Operability  10% 1% 2% 0% 2% 6% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 48% 5% 100% 51% 10%
26 All Comp 1FT Operability  10% 1% 2% 0% 2% 6% 4% 2% 5% 7% 2% 7% 48% 5% 100% 51% 11%
27 LOC 2FT Operability  11% 1% 1% 0% 1% 8% 4% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 60% 9%
28 LOM 2FT Operability  11% 0% 1% 0% 1% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 64% 9%
29 Safety Comp Operability  11% 1% 1% 1% 1% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 66% 9%
30 All Comp 2FT Operability  10% 1% 1% 1% 1% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 67% 8%
31 Min Funct 2x Operability 9% 0% 3% 0% 6% 4% 2% 2% 5% 7% 4% 6% 46% 5% 100% 0% 29%
32 FoS 2x Operability 8% 0% 3% 0% 6% 4% 2% 2% 5% 9% 3% 7% 46% 4% 100% 6% 28%
33 LOC 1FT 2x Operability 10% 0% 2% 0% 4% 6% 2% 2% 5% 8% 3% 7% 46% 4% 100% 28% 23%
34 LOM 1FT 2x Operability 11% 0% 2% 0% 4% 7% 4% 1% 6% 8% 2% 7% 47% 3% 100% 35% 22%
35 Safety Comp 2x Operability 9% 1% 1% 0% 3% 7% 4% 1% 5% 7% 2% 6% 48% 5% 100% 45% 20%
36 All Comp 1FT 2x Operability 9% 1% 1% 0% 3% 7% 4% 2% 5% 7% 2% 6% 48% 5% 100% 46% 20%
37 LOC 2FT 2x Operability 10% 1% 1% 0% 2% 9% 4% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 4% 100% 54% 18%
38 LOM 2FT 2x Operability 10% 0% 1% 0% 2% 8% 5% 1% 6% 6% 2% 6% 48% 3% 100% 58% 17%
39 Safety Comp 2x Operability 10% 1% 1% 1% 2% 9% 5% 1% 6% 6% 1% 6% 48% 3% 100% 60% 17%
40 All Comp 2FT 2x Operability 10% 1% 1% 1% 2% 9% 5% 2% 6% 6% 1% 6% 48% 3% 100% 61% 17%
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Table H.5: ESAS subsystem mass at node configurations. 
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1 Min Funct Minimum Time 464 0 617 29 0 344 259 184 276 1359 980 654 4505 269 9939 0 0
2 FoS Minimum Time 464 0 617 29 0 344 259 184 276 1923 1003 816 5136 269 11320 1381 0
3 LOC 1FT Minimum Time 776 0 617 29 0 818 389 205 478 2045 1011 1150 6495 307 14320 4381 0
4 LOM 1FT Minimum Time 924 0 617 29 0 905 786 233 620 2127 1015 1241 7490 308 16295 6356 0
5 Safety Comp Minimum Time 1013 0 617 29 0 1055 942 235 706 2215 1020 1726 10251 809 20617 10678 0
6 All Comp 1FT Minimum Time 1068 0 617 57 0 1262 1097 315 819 2259 1022 1793 10998 809 22115 12176 0
7 LOC 2FT Minimum Time 1423 0 617 57 0 2080 1333 336 1127 2450 1032 2114 13245 809 26624 16685 0
8 LOM 2FT Minimum Time 1577 0 617 57 0 2205 2048 363 1347 2547 1036 2266 14960 809 29833 19894 0
9 Safety Comp Minimum Time 1671 0 617 57 0 2404 2274 366 1459 2599 1039 2516 15897 809 31709 21770 0
10 All Comp 2FT Minimum Time 1729 0 617 86 0 2701 2404 446 1587 2651 911 2579 16603 809 33123 23184 0
11 Min Funct Nominal Time 464 0 617 29 0 419 274 190 296 1359 980 661 4610 269 10169 0 251
12 FoS Nominal Time 464 0 617 29 0 419 274 191 297 1923 1003 826 5244 269 11556 1381 257
13 LOC 1FT Nominal Time 776 0 617 29 0 923 412 212 507 2086 1013 1167 6684 307 14733 4381 433
14 LOM 1FT Nominal Time 924 0 617 29 0 1023 812 241 653 2170 1017 1261 7701 308 16754 6356 481
15 Safety Comp Nominal Time 1013 0 617 29 0 1191 973 243 743 2215 1020 1746 10482 809 21080 10678 485
16 All Comp 1FT Nominal Time 1068 0 617 57 0 1429 1133 325 865 2304 1024 1823 11331 809 22783 12176 689
17 LOC 2FT Nominal Time 1423 0 617 57 0 2277 1376 346 1181 2450 1032 2143 13577 809 27288 16685 686
18 LOM 2FT Nominal Time 1577 0 617 57 0 2415 2094 375 1405 2597 1038 2303 15373 809 30661 19894 848
19 Safety Comp Nominal Time 1671 0 617 57 0 2632 2325 377 1522 2650 911 2543 16198 809 32313 21770 624
20 All Comp 2FT Nominal Time 1729 0 617 86 0 2961 2460 459 1658 2703 913 2622 17098 809 34115 23184 1012
21 Min Funct Operability  483 291 617 180 300 422 275 200 464 1463 988 732 5560 269 12245 0 2327
22 FoS Operability  483 291 617 180 300 422 275 201 464 2045 1011 918 6227 269 13704 1381 2405
23 LOC 1FT Operability  799 291 617 180 300 928 412 222 675 2175 1019 1256 7646 307 16828 4381 2528
24 LOM 1FT Operability  946 291 617 180 300 1028 813 252 821 2262 1023 1350 8667 308 18857 6356 2584
25 Safety Comp Operability  1036 291 617 180 300 1196 973 254 911 2309 1026 1849 11628 809 23379 10678 2783
26 All Comp 1FT Operability  1090 291 617 208 300 1434 1133 335 1033 2402 1030 1925 12480 809 25089 12176 2995
27 LOC 2FT Operability  1449 291 617 208 300 2284 1377 356 1350 2553 1038 2246 14739 809 29620 16685 3018
28 LOM 2FT Operability  1603 291 617 208 300 2423 2095 385 1574 2654 912 2389 16345 809 32607 19894 2794
29 Safety Comp Operability  1697 291 617 208 300 2639 2326 388 1691 2708 915 2641 17313 810 34544 21770 2856
30 All Comp 2FT Operability  1754 291 617 237 300 2968 2556 469 1848 2815 918 2737 18402 810 36724 23184 3622
31 Min Funct 2x Operability 502 582 617 331 601 563 303 231 671 1576 996 818 6721 269 14781 0 4863
32 FoS 2x Operability 502 582 617 331 601 563 303 234 671 2174 1019 1030 7426 269 16322 1381 5023
33 LOC 1FT 2x Operability 821 582 617 331 601 1124 454 255 898 2312 1028 1376 8937 308 19643 4381 5343
34 LOM 1FT 2x Operability 968 582 617 331 601 1248 860 287 1051 2404 1031 1472 10001 308 21762 6356 5489
35 Safety Comp 2x Operability 1058 582 617 331 601 1447 1029 289 1150 2454 1034 1995 13263 809 26660 10678 6064
36 All Comp 1FT 2x Operability 1112 582 617 359 601 1743 1198 373 1286 2503 1036 2075 14157 809 28453 12176 6359
37 LOC 2FT 2x Operability 1475 582 617 359 601 2648 1455 394 1619 2711 916 2397 16435 810 33020 16685 6418
38 LOM 2FT 2x Operability 1628 582 617 359 601 2810 2179 426 1850 2818 919 2556 18237 810 36393 19894 6581
39 Safety Comp 2x Operability 1722 582 617 359 601 3058 2418 428 1976 2875 922 2813 19260 810 38443 21770 6754
40 All Comp 2FT 2x Operability 1780 582 617 388 601 3445 2657 513 2148 2931 924 2912 20384 810 40691 23184 7589
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Table H.6: ESAS subsystem mass fractions at node configurations. 
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1 Min Funct Minimum Time 5% 0% 6% 0% 0% 3% 3% 2% 3% 14% 10% 7% 45% 3% 100% 0% 0%
2 FoS Minimum Time 4% 0% 5% 0% 0% 3% 2% 2% 2% 17% 9% 7% 45% 2% 100% 12% 0%
3 LOC 1FT Minimum Time 5% 0% 4% 0% 0% 6% 3% 1% 3% 14% 7% 8% 45% 2% 100% 31% 0%
4 LOM 1FT Minimum Time 6% 0% 4% 0% 0% 6% 5% 1% 4% 13% 6% 8% 46% 2% 100% 39% 0%
5 Safety Comp Minimum Time 5% 0% 3% 0% 0% 5% 5% 1% 3% 11% 5% 8% 50% 4% 100% 52% 0%
6 All Comp 1FT Minimum Time 5% 0% 3% 0% 0% 6% 5% 1% 4% 10% 5% 8% 50% 4% 100% 55% 0%
7 LOC 2FT Minimum Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 5% 1% 4% 9% 4% 8% 50% 3% 100% 63% 0%
8 LOM 2FT Minimum Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 7% 7% 1% 5% 9% 3% 8% 50% 3% 100% 67% 0%
9 Safety Comp Minimum Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 50% 3% 100% 69% 0%
10 All Comp 2FT Minimum Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 50% 2% 100% 70% 0%
11 Min Funct Nominal Time 5% 0% 6% 0% 0% 4% 3% 2% 3% 13% 10% 7% 45% 3% 100% 0% 2%
12 FoS Nominal Time 4% 0% 5% 0% 0% 4% 2% 2% 3% 17% 9% 7% 45% 2% 100% 12% 2%
13 LOC 1FT Nominal Time 5% 0% 4% 0% 0% 6% 3% 1% 3% 14% 7% 8% 45% 2% 100% 30% 3%
14 LOM 1FT Nominal Time 6% 0% 4% 0% 0% 6% 5% 1% 4% 13% 6% 8% 46% 2% 100% 38% 3%
15 Safety Comp Nominal Time 5% 0% 3% 0% 0% 6% 5% 1% 4% 11% 5% 8% 50% 4% 100% 51% 2%
16 All Comp 1FT Nominal Time 5% 0% 3% 0% 0% 6% 5% 1% 4% 10% 4% 8% 50% 4% 100% 53% 3%
17 LOC 2FT Nominal Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 5% 1% 4% 9% 4% 8% 50% 3% 100% 61% 3%
18 LOM 2FT Nominal Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 50% 3% 100% 65% 3%
19 Safety Comp Nominal Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 8% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 50% 3% 100% 67% 2%
20 All Comp 2FT Nominal Time 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 9% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 50% 2% 100% 68% 3%
21 Min Funct Operability  4% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 2% 2% 4% 12% 8% 6% 45% 2% 100% 0% 19%
22 FoS Operability  4% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 2% 1% 3% 15% 7% 7% 45% 2% 100% 10% 18%
23 LOC 1FT Operability  5% 2% 4% 1% 2% 6% 2% 1% 4% 13% 6% 7% 45% 2% 100% 26% 15%
24 LOM 1FT Operability  5% 2% 3% 1% 2% 5% 4% 1% 4% 12% 5% 7% 46% 2% 100% 34% 14%
25 Safety Comp Operability  4% 1% 3% 1% 1% 5% 4% 1% 4% 10% 4% 8% 50% 3% 100% 46% 12%
26 All Comp 1FT Operability  4% 1% 2% 1% 1% 6% 5% 1% 4% 10% 4% 8% 50% 3% 100% 49% 12%
27 LOC 2FT Operability  5% 1% 2% 1% 1% 8% 5% 1% 5% 9% 4% 8% 50% 3% 100% 56% 10%
28 LOM 2FT Operability  5% 1% 2% 1% 1% 7% 6% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 50% 2% 100% 61% 9%
29 Safety Comp Operability  5% 1% 2% 1% 1% 8% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 8% 50% 2% 100% 63% 8%
30 All Comp 2FT Operability  5% 1% 2% 1% 1% 8% 7% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 50% 2% 100% 63% 10%
31 Min Funct 2x Operability 3% 4% 4% 2% 4% 4% 2% 2% 5% 11% 7% 6% 45% 2% 100% 0% 33%
32 FoS 2x Operability 3% 4% 4% 2% 4% 3% 2% 1% 4% 13% 6% 6% 45% 2% 100% 8% 31%
33 LOC 1FT 2x Operability 4% 3% 3% 2% 3% 6% 2% 1% 5% 12% 5% 7% 46% 2% 100% 22% 27%
34 LOM 1FT 2x Operability 4% 3% 3% 2% 3% 6% 4% 1% 5% 11% 5% 7% 46% 1% 100% 29% 25%
35 Safety Comp 2x Operability 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 5% 4% 1% 4% 9% 4% 7% 50% 3% 100% 40% 23%
36 All Comp 1FT 2x Operability 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 6% 4% 1% 5% 9% 4% 7% 50% 3% 100% 43% 22%
37 LOC 2FT 2x Operability 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 8% 4% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 50% 2% 100% 51% 19%
38 LOM 2FT 2x Operability 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 8% 6% 1% 5% 8% 3% 7% 50% 2% 100% 55% 18%
39 Safety Comp 2x Operability 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 8% 6% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 50% 2% 100% 57% 18%
40 All Comp 2FT 2x Operability 4% 1% 2% 1% 1% 8% 7% 1% 5% 7% 2% 7% 50% 2% 100% 57% 19%
